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THE WORLD COMMUNITY

EDITED BY QUINCY WRIGHT

THE WORLD COMMUNITY

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THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS · CHICAGO

THE

NORMAN WAIT HARRIS MEMORIAL FOUNDATION

The Twenty-third Institute

QUINCY WRIGHT • *DIRECTOR*

THE Harris Foundation Lectures at the University of Chicago have been made possible through the generosity of the heirs of Norman Wait Harris and Emma Gale Harris, who donated to the University a fund to be known as "The Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation" on January 27, 1923. The letter of gift contains the following statement:

The purpose of the foundation shall be the promotion of a better understanding on the part of American citizens of the other peoples of the world, thus establishing a basis for improved international relations and a more enlightened world order. The aim shall always be to give accurate information, not to propagate opinion.

Annual Institutes have been held at the University of Chicago since the summer of 1924. The lectures delivered or the papers presented each year have been published in essentially their original form in a series of volumes of which this is the most recent.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO 37
Cambridge University Press, London, N.W. 1, England
W. J. Gage & Co., Limited, Toronto 2B, Canada

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Published 1948. Composed and printed by THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, *Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.*

INTRODUCTION

STUDY of the history, origin, composition, structure, characteristics, and functioning of communities and societies, and of the relations among such entities, is one of the tasks of the social sciences. The social scientists have, however, usually devoted attention to groups smaller than the human race. There has been widespread discussion, especially since World War II, of the desirability of "One World," of a world community, a world society, or a world government. In view of the varieties of opinion expressed concerning the characteristics, the process of development, the possible existence and the conditions of existence of such entities, it appeared that a comparison of the positions of the various social disciplines on these problems would be timely and perhaps useful. The Committee on the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation at the University of Chicago gave a group of social scientists this opportunity at its Twenty-third Institute.

This Institute took place at the Moraine Hotel, Highland Park, Illinois, March 23–25, 1947. Sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, political scientists, economists, historians, geographers, educators, philosophers, theologians, and internationalists attended. The list of participants appears at the end of this volume, and the volume itself includes a record of the proceedings of the Institute.

Differing from previous institutes under the Harris Foundation, there were no public lectures, and the group of participants discussed the problem intensively and critically on the basis of papers prepared by certain participants and distributed in advance. To insure a similar understanding of the scope of the subject, the committee itself had prepared a general statement raising the strategic questions to which it was hoped the participants would address themselves. This was distributed in advance to those who prepared papers as well as to the other participants.

In order to make the references in the discussion clear, it was felt desirable to include the original memorandum as well as the prepared papers. In some cases the introductory remarks of discussion leaders overlap this prepared material, but such duplications have in the main been eliminated.

The discussion indicated that the differences of vocabulary and point of view among the social sciences present a barrier to easy communication. This barrier was never entirely eliminated, and the suggestion was made by some participants that this problem be made the subject of a special research. Nevertheless, a considerable measure of mutual understanding was achieved, and there proved to be considerable areas of agreement on the relations to one another of world community, world society, world government, and world peace and on the roles of education, communication, politics, economics, symbols, and institutions in advancing or hampering their development.

At the time the discussion was proceeding, the negotiations in the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations were reaching a condition of stalemate. The application of the veto in the Security Council was impairing, and threatening to frustrate, the capacity of the United Nations to reach decisions. Negotiations for peace with Germany had bogged down. The opposition between the United States and the Soviet Union, occupying two poles of a divided world, was increasing in gravity. The problem of regulating the world order with its existing structure was taxing the capacity of statesmen, and widespread movements were calling for a unification of that structure through the establishment of world government or world federation or by amendment of the United Nations Charter.

The object of the conference was not to provide guides for statesmen but rather to enlarge understanding of the fundamental problems with which both the statesmen and the people of the world are faced. In the record of the conference the careful reader may learn much concerning the social trends affecting the world order, the characteristics of human nature which influence these trends, the cultural, economic, and political relations which account for the present situation, and the points at which and the methods by which human action might influence the achievement of desired goals or values.

Among the points emphasized was the importance of the "we-they" relationship, which both in folk villages and in nations often means, "If *they* want it, it cannot be to *our* advantage." Prolonged attention was also given to the possibility of expanding a sense of "responsibility" beyond the existing horizons of established groups; to possible techniques for "pretesting" in experimental situations the attitudes and opinions consequent upon anticipated real situations; to a comparison of the various possible relationships of hostility and

discussion; and to the problem of reconciling allegiance to the status quo with the necessary adjustments of opinion and attitude to changing conditions in a dynamic world. The discussion of the relationship of world culture to national cultures raised the issue of uniformity versus mutual accommodation to differences. While opinions differed on the relationship of human nature to culture, there were few if any who thought human nature could be defined in any absolute terms or that any absolute values could be demonstrated from comparative studies of culture. The prevailing opinion seemed to recognize that humanity is committed to diversity and a pluralistic world but that in our shrinking world there must be mutual understanding and appreciation of cultures by one another and general realization that the values of all cultures have authentic roots in a common human nature. It was suggested that people should accustom themselves to "valuing the dynamic integration of the different."

While all the participants recognized the gravity of the world situation, and occasional notes of anxiety, frustration, or pessimism emerged, on the whole, as one of the members remarked in the final session, the keynote was not one of defeatism but of urgency and resourcefulness.

QUINCY WRIGHT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
October 1947

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THE WORLD COMMUNITY: PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

Prepared by the COMMITTEE ON THE HARRIS INSTITUTE*

THE theme of the discussion will be "The World Community." This term, "world community," does not set forth the idea very fully. Public movements for a world government to prevent war among the different states have attracted increased attention recently because of the destruction by World War II and the fear that another world war would be fought with atomic bombs. World government to prevent war might be attained by conquest, but empires over very large areas have, in the past, broken down before many years, and even in federations there have been civil wars.

World-government movements generally favor a union voluntarily obtained. It is argued that such a government might endure as does a community. A world government holding the parts of the world together by force is not so attractive a goal as a world naturally cohering by friendliness, division of labor, mutual interdependence, and common aims and understandings. These are among the characteristics of a community. The idea of world government, therefore, becomes that of a world community.

To discuss this question realistically, we need to examine critically the underlying concepts and trends.

This memorandum is intended to suggest approaches to such an examination by considering (I) "Historic Trends of Communities," (II) "Meaning of the Term 'Community,'" (III) "Measurable Aspects of the World Community," and (IV) "Trends and Possibilities of the World Community Today." An outline of "Topics for Discussion," suggested by this analysis, is presented at the end of the memorandum.

I. HISTORIC TRENDS OF COMMUNITIES

The first groups of men identified with territory had only legs for transportation and oral speech and gestures for communication. The area of their habitation was naturally small. Many of the early hunters were combined into small wandering bands, but the abodes

* The committee consisted of Quincy Wright, *chairman*, Carl F. Huth, *executive secretary*, C. C. Colby, H. F. MacNair, H. J. Morgenthau, W. F. Ogburn, J. F. Rippy, T. W. Schultz, and J. A. Wilson.

of some were permanent. With the planting of seeds and the cultivation of plants, these groups grew in size and became more stable. We called them "communities." The people of a community spoke the same language and had the same habits. Kinship ties were strong throughout. There were many face-to-face contacts daily.

With the appearance of domesticated animals, such as the donkey, the dog, and the horse, together with mechanical devices of transportation, such as the travois, the sled, and the cart, the territories of groups increased in size. Over such an enlarged area fewer persons were in personal daily contact with any large percentage of all the inhabitants of the territory.

The growth in size of the territory inhabited by groups with identical culture, speech, and habits was dependent upon transportation developments. Transportation and war led to conquest of territory inhabited by people with alien customs. Thus the community led to the state. Until long years enabled assimilation of different peoples, states were characterized by insurrections. The forces of coherence for these large territorial groupings were many, including military force, travel, trade, and diffusion of culture traits.

These trends are of interest for the Harris Institute because they suggest how peoples have been held together; or, conversely, what the forces are that have disrupted such large groups. Translated into the concept of world community, we want to know what the factors are that will hold a world community together against disruption. Obviously, the peoples of a world community cannot have face-to-face contacts as they do in the small village community. Neighborliness and kinship are restricted to small groups. Nor will they speak the same language for some time. Can the radio, television, the airplane, the printing press, and literacy bind the peoples together? Can the world community have an *esprit de corps* which will hold it together against the local loyalties of some of its subdivisions? With such a knowledge of the factors of coherence, we may ask whether these factors may be developed in the world community more rapidly by planning and social effort than by waiting upon the normal course of events. Such a normal evolution might involve many more wars and might require a very long time.

II. MEANING OF THE TERM "COMMUNITY"

A recent article entitled "World Government Now?" contains the following statement: "Constitution-making is always the end of a

process, never the beginning. Political science is based on the truism that society precedes the state. In layman terms this simply means that men must live together, form common habits, and cooperate on the functional level before government can be instituted among them. Through cooperative living plus common habits and loyalties men come to feel and act as though they belong together. This community, as the sociologists call it, may codify its standards of behavior, refine its administration, and set down in a constitution what it will recognize as political authority. Constitution-making is the final step in establishing a regime of law and order. Only where basic law and order already function can men sit down to draft a constitution with any chance of success."[1]

It will be noted that in this statement the terms "co-operation," "community," "society," "regime of law and order," "state," "constitution," and "government" are used. Some persons have assumed that positive political steps in making a world constitution may establish the conditions under which a world society and a world community may develop. Others believe that only when world co-operation has created a world community and a world society can there be a regime of law and order, a world state, and a world government.

It is clear that these terms conceal many ambiguities. It is possible that a careful examination of the sociological concepts intended by them might clarify current discussion.

Such an examination might disclose that it is more difficult to define these terms as entities which either exist or do not exist in a given social situation than as variables which are more or less present in all or most such situations.

There is, for example, some *co-operation* among citizens of different states, even among citizens of enemy states (as in exchanging prisoners of war), but there is more co-operation among citizens of a national state and even more ordinarily among residents of a city.

Similarly, there is some *community* among all peoples who are in direct or indirect contact with one another by means of communication, transport, and exchange. But there is more community among the people of a state or a city where communication, transportation, and exchange are more abundant. Biologically, the entire organic life of an area is called a "community," the term referring to the functional relationships which naturally develop so that each organic

1. N. A. Pelcovits, "World Government Now?" *Harper's Magazine*, November, 1946.

type occupies its particular niche. Socially, however, the term usually implies some degree of awareness of the entire community by the members.

There is some *society* among people who directly or indirectly recognize common objectives and common symbols. International lawyers have always recognized a "society of nations" or "family of nations," of which, in the opinion of many, not only states but also individuals are members. But there is more society among people organized in limited groups to accomplish concrete purposes such as nations, trade-unions, and social clubs.

There is some *regime of law and order* throughout the world, all of whose members are theoretically bound by customary and conventional international law. But there is more law and order within the better-organized states.

So also there has, in a sense, always been a *world state*, established by the state of mind of statesmen and diplomats who wish to maintain international law, but there have been more perfect states in nations or federations where law and order have been more adequately maintained by effective organs of government.

The unwritten international system of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the League of Nations Covenant, and the United Nations Charter may all be called *world constitutions*. But there are more effective constitutions in the United Kingdom, although in this case it is unwritten, and in the United States, the Soviet Union, and other states which have written constitutions.

The institutions of diplomacy, of the United Nations, and of the numerous international unions have been called *world government*, but there is more government in the national states and the lesser political circumscriptions.

It is suggested that this relativistic and quantitative point of view is likely to be more useful for understanding the world situation and for developing international policy than a point of view emphasizing absolute qualitative differences. The world community might, therefore, be looked upon as the world's population in the continually changing social relations of its members and groups. In other words, the existence of a world community in this broad sense might be assumed, and investigation might be devoted (1) to determining the aspects of those relations which may be most usefully treated as variables, as parameters, or as constants; (2) to discovering methods of describing and measuring these variables at a given time and their

trends in time; (3) to establishing the effect of variations in the character, changes, and rates of change of one variable upon others; and (4) to discovering the probable influence of alternative policies of the nations and of the United Nations upon these variations and their consequences. Such investigations might disclose whether the world is moving toward more or less *solidarity*, and whether it is moving toward a unitary, dual, or multiple patterning of social and political *integration*. It might also disclose the aspects of the world community, manipulation of which might contribute to whatever world order may be desired. It might even suggest practical changes in the world order which would better adapt it to human and national wants under present conditions.

III. MEASURABLE ASPECTS OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY

It is suggested that four aspects of the world community lend themselves to treatment as quantitative variables whose trend might be roughly measured.

1. *Degree of material unification.*—The material contact among people in different sections of the world varies with the abundance of *communication* of ideas and processes, with the abundance of *transportation* of men and goods, and with the extent of economic specialization and *exchange*. The amount of such contacts varies in time, in place, and among different groups and classes of people. Both the pattern and the amount of such contact has important effects upon the independence and interdependence of groups. The concepts of technological and strategic distance among the various nations and other groups and the construction of isochronic maps of communication and transport systems may contribute to measuring this variable. In general, the more abundant the contact and the less segregated the pattern, the more the world population is a community.

2. *Degree of cultural uniformity.*—The assumptions, values, and behavior of people are in considerable measure a consequence of the culture in which they have been brought up. The various cultures of the world exhibit different degrees of similarity and difference. Are cultures becoming more or less similar throughout the world? It is not easy to express these qualitative differences in quantitative terms which will permit an answer to this question. In general, the more uniform cultures are throughout the world, the more the world's people is a community.

3. *Degree of social solidarity.*—Some groups of people are friendly; some are hostile. Some identify themselves mainly with local symbols, some with national symbols, and some with international symbols. Some people in many countries may today identify themselves in some degree with a few universal symbols such as "human rights," "science," "peace," "international justice." There is both a patterning and a quantitative variation among people in awareness and acceptance of such universal symbols. Identifications and loyalties may to some extent be gauged through the measurement of opinions or expressed attitudes. Is there a trend toward greater homogeneity of world opinion in respect to the most discussed universal symbols and purposes, and to what extent can a homogeneity of attitudes be implied from a homogeneity of opinions? People may be reticent about expressing their attitudes, or they may attribute very different meanings to the same symbol. In general, the more all people are aware of, and identify themselves with, the same symbols and purposes, the more the world is a community.

4. *Degree of institutional integration.*—The people of the world are organized in states, churches, businesses, families, and political, professional, recreational, and cultural associations. Some of these are opposed to one another, some co-operate, and some are in hierarchical relations. The pattern and degree of opposition, co-ordination, or subordination of organizations might be measured. In general, the more the people of the world are organized into universal institutions, the more the world is a community.

IV. TRENDS AND POSSIBILITIES OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY TODAY

Description and measurement of the variation of each of these aspects of the world community may make possible a study of relations among the variables and the effects of policy upon them. It should not be assumed that it is desirable to make the world more of a community in all its aspects. The broad question of goals and values is, however, involved in the determination of policy, and an examination of the consequences of change in one or more of these variables may contribute to judgment upon values. If we know where we may be going, it may be possible for us to judge whether we want to go there.

V. TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

The foregoing analysis suggests that discussion might profitably be centered around the following topics.

1. *World community, world society, and world government.*—The meaning of these terms as entities and as processes and their relation to one another. Which of these processes is most subject to human control?

2. *World contacts.*—The methods of describing the pattern and measuring the quantity of communication, transportation, and exchange in the world. What are the present trends in this regard? What effect will an increase of world contacts have upon culture? Upon loyalties? Upon institutions?

3. *World culture.*—The patterns of technology, language, custom, and values prevailing among peoples of the world and the tendency of these patterns to become more or less alike. What effect will increasing homogeneity of culture have upon material contacts? Upon loyalties? Upon institutions?

4. *World loyalties.*—The pattern of friendship and hostility among the peoples of the world; of identification with major symbols such as the nation, the United Nations, international law; and of support for major policies, such as the control of the atomic bomb, the prevention of war, and the maintenance of national sovereignty. What effect will increasing loyalty to universal symbols have upon material contacts? Upon culture? Upon institutions?

5. *World institutions.*—The pattern of government in the world and the relation of the nations to the United Nations and its affiliated organizations. Is the trend toward the subordination of nations to the United Nations, or is it the reverse? What effect will increasing institutional integration have upon material contacts? Upon culture? Upon loyalties?

6. *World policies.*—What changes in the world community would better adapt it to human wants under present conditions? What policies might contribute to such changes?

Is it desirable to increase communications, transportation, and trade throughout the world? What would be the effect of the policies of UNESCO, ICAO, ITO, and the International Bank and Fund in this regard?

Is it desirable to make culture and opinion more homogeneous? If so, how can this be done? If it is undesirable, how can it be

avoided? What are the probable effects of the policies of the United Nations and of UNESCO in this regard?

Is it desirable to develop more loyalty to universal symbols throughout the world? What effects might the development of common standards of law, of education, and of opinion have in this regard?

Is it desirable to establish a world government and, if so, in what fields? What is the probable effect of the policies of the Security Council and of the General Assembly in this regard? Should the development of political institutions precede or follow activities in the fields of economics, culture, and social welfare?

WORLD COMMUNITY, WORLD SOCIETY, AND WORLD GOVERNMENT: AN ATTEMPT AT A CLARIFICATION OF TERMS

By Louis Wirth*

I

THE quest for a free, peaceful, and just world in which all men can develop their capacities to the fullest and enjoy the blessings of an advancing civilization is the professed aim of more than a few Americans and other members of the human race. This goal has been variously formulated, sometimes as the building of a world community or world society, and sometimes as the construction of a world government or world state.

These terms, while designed to aid us in defining the objective toward which we are to move, themselves introduce an element of confusion into programs of action and thus become obstacles to the realization of the ends which they symbolize. There are those, for instance, who believe that we already have a *world community* and that what is necessary is to develop a corresponding *world society*. There are others who take the existence of a world society—or at least an embryonic world society—for granted and regard the creation of a world government or world state as the urgent need of the present. And since a regime of law and order is the characteristic mark of government and is indicative of the existence of a state, they would proceed to formulate such a body of basic law or a constitution for the governance of the world and thus bring a world state into being.

Clearly, if a world community already exists, it is superfluous to spend effort to bring it into existence. If a world society is already at hand, it is obviously stupid to be waiting for it to emerge. This, of course, still leaves open the question of whether a world community or society is a necessary prerequisite for the effective operation of world government and the effective functioning of a world state. It also leaves open the question of whether the framing of a world constitution is a necessary or desirable step in the building of a world community. Furthermore, it leaves unanswered the question as to

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whether a world community can be deliberately built, or whether it is the unwitting product of growth and unintended activity. It also leaves open the issue as to whether, if a world community or society were in existence, a world government or state would be necessary at all for the attainment of a free, peaceful, just, and prosperous humanity.

Disagreements as to the ends to be striven for as well as to the most appropriate means to be employed in the pursuit of the ends will persist as long as this confusion continues to plague us. The confusion, however, by which mankind and the intellectual leaders of mankind are beset in the attempt to work out the problems of the contemporary world are of two kinds: (1) the ambiguity of the terms of discourse and (2) the differences in judgments concerning the facts and the relations between the facts. It is the purpose of this paper to deal only with the former, although it will be difficult to avoid at least some reference to the latter, especially since it is impossible to discuss terms and the relations between terms without alluding to the objects or phenomena which they designate and the relations that are supposed to exist between these objects or phenomena.

Agreements regarding objectives and programs of action will obviously be impeded as long as the parties to the debate talk *past* one another instead of *to* one another. There may still be disagreement as to the values to be achieved and the procedures to be employed to achieve them even after the terms used in discourse have been clarified, because there may still be errors of fact, of logic, and of theory. But the least we can do to facilitate the realization of such hopes as we share is to provide ourselves with fairly precise categories of thought and of communication in terms of which we understand ourselves and our fellows.

II

The controversy that exists concerning whether a world community must precede a world state, whether the two develop simultaneously, or whether the world community may be expected to arise out of a world government rests to a large extent upon the meaning ascribed to the term "world community." Though the terms "state" and "government" are by no means unambiguous, there is on the whole less confusion incident to their use than there is in the case of the term "community." The confusion in all these instances is, of course, largely due to the circumstance that these and most other words we use in social-science discourse are also terms current

in common speech and often reflect the universe of "common sense."

But even the common-sense meaning of the terms "state" and "government" carry the connotation of more or less formal organization, whereas the term "community" connotes, if it does not actually denote, the absence of formal association and organization and of legally sanctioned or regulated living-together of men. Indeed, we even speak of plant and animal communities, where formal, deliberately contrived, and legally sanctioned organization is precluded.

When the plant and animal ecologist talks about a community, he is referring to the aggregation of living forms knitted together by symbiotic ties into a web of life. Through their involvement in the struggle for existence in a given habitat, the various individual members and species of organisms acquire a spatial position and a place in the division of labor which gives to each its peculiar character and function and to the total community the semblance of an equilibrium.

The sustenance and reproductive relationships which the individual organisms and types of living things develop with one another and with the habitat as a whole give the plant and animal community an internal interdependence and a distinctiveness from other communities which leave the external observer with the impression of the separate identity of each community. The bonds that bind the individual organisms and varieties of plant and animal organisms together are the functional interrelationships which are essentially competitive. When we talk about the "law of the jungle," we mean the war of each against all. This state of existence, if it can at all be called social, rests on what Kant has called man's "unsocial sociability," that is to say, upon a set of conditions under which each organism strives to achieve its own ends and only inadvertently confers some benefit upon other organisms, but through this inadvertent by-product of its own selfish striving creates ties of mutual interdependence with others. Such a condition of interdependence does not call for either awareness, communication, or the existence of or agreement on norms.

The symbiotic relationships which underlie every plant and animal community are either those of (1) *mutualism*, where the functions of one organism or variety of organisms are beneficial to others and vice versa; (2) *commensalism*, where the benefits derived by one are a matter of indifference to the other; or (3) *parasitism*, where the benefits derived by one imply harm to the other. Classical examples

of each type of symbiotic relationship are readily available from plant and animal ecology.

A special case of an animal community often cited as a model for mankind is the peculiar symbiotic relationship obtaining among the members of colonies of social insects. Even there, however, the order and cohesion that prevail are based not upon communication, mutual awareness, and the acceptance of social norms but rather upon the morphology and elementary reflexes or instincts which are built into the organisms and which operate automatically.

III

The human community, too, rests upon a similar ecological base, but it should be noted that human communities are never merely ecological units. Upon the ecological base there are always superimposed economic, cultural, political, and moral or ethical levels of interdependence. The human economy is never without some rules of the game. There is always present some degree of awareness of the other. There is always some measure of conscious control. There is language, symbolic communication, and some approximation to mutual understanding. There are rights and duties, claims and expectations. There are not merely tropisms and reflexes but also habits and sentiments, customs, institutions, shared norms, and values. In short, there is not merely symbiosis but also some degree of consensus.

One of the persistent interests, however, among students of man is the attempt to differentiate between a community and a society. In a sense these two terms have become polar concepts in the efforts to understand human social life. When we use the term "community," we seek to isolate and to emphasize the physical, spatial, and symbiotic aspects of human group life, whereas by the term "society" we wish to bring into focus and to stress the psychic, deliberative, rational, normative, and consensual phases of group existence. When we are dealing with human beings as aggregates of population distributed in space and in relationship to resources, it is useful to employ the concept "community." When, on the other hand, human groups are thought of as held together by communication, by the bonds of interest, and when they move toward common collective goals for which they require a common understanding of symbols and a sharing of common norms, we are dealing with a society.

It should be noted, however, that every human community is always something of a society. It is difficult to conceive of human

beings living together in close physical contact with one another without engaging in communication, especially if the physical contact persists over a considerable time. And, as Dewey has pointed out, there is "more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common."[1]

We do occasionally find instances of two or more groups of people living next to one another but having little if any direct physical contact. The etiquette of the classical caste system was a case in point, as was the "silent trade" in the course of which adjoining communities exchanged goods without communication or direct physical contact. The diffusion of modern technology through the more or less impersonal market on a world scale is another approximation to such a case. Although the market mechanism does involve communication of some sort among the participants in commerce, the physical and social distance between producers and ultimate consumers is immensely greater in the modern world market in capitalistic civilization than it was in earlier times. This is not to say that there are not some survivals of the intimate, personal market to be found today; but it certainly is not representative of typical economic relations in the modern world.

While every community tends to generate some element of society, the reverse is not so obvious. The people scattered over the face of the earth who share, let us say, a common interest in some esoteric belief or body of knowledge but who may never have met can perhaps be said to live in a simulated community, but the ties of such a community will at best be tenuous. In such instances where the bond of cohesion among individuals rests upon shared beliefs based upon communication, it is proper to put the accent upon the polar concept of society. Conversely, where the bonds linking individuals rest upon spatial contiguity, upon a division of labor, and upon competition in the market, it is preferable to put the stress upon community. What makes every community at least an embryonic society, however, is the fact that any involvement in reciprocal relations among human beings calls for some kind of communication and generates some degree of consensus.

1. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, 1915), p. 5.

IV

In a sense, the concept "world community" is a contradiction in terms, for the community is most frequently conceived as a territorially limited *local* unit. We do not ordinarily speak of an individual as belonging "to more than one community, except in so far as a smaller community of which he is a member is included in a larger of which he is also a member."[2] More particularly, it has been taken as the mark of a community that "one's life may be lived wholly within it, that all one's social relationships may be found within it."[3] In that sense a community is an inclusive, relatively integrated territorial group as distinguished from the segmental and widely ranging ties and identifications of society.

It appears, therefore, that in the traditional conception of community there are implicit the notions of territorial compactness and closeness, intimacy of contact, and relative self-sufficiency. These criteria apply readily enough to most human settlements in an earlier stage of civilization; but it is difficult to find modern communities which in their economic, social, and political life can be sharply delineated by narrow local bounds. Modern technology, economy, political organization, and even culture tend to encompass the earth. We can see this more clearly if we recognize and attempt to trace the intricate and far-flung networks of interrelations which are associated with such a relatively compact unit as a metropolitan region. The limits of such a region must be more or less arbitrarily defined in terms of retail and wholesale trade area, commutation area, newspaper-circulation area, and service area of the central city. To delineate the "communal" boundaries of an entity as large as a national state would obviously lead to even greater complications.

Barriers to the universal spread of technology, science, and culture are, of course, still formidable. Tribal, racial, national, linguistic, religious, economic, political, and other differences do still divide the world into separate regions. But, on the other hand, there remain few self-sufficient, internally homogeneous islands some inhabitants of which, at least, have not been drawn into the universal currents of modern life; and these few remaining islands are being rapidly submerged.

2. Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921), p. 163.

3. Robert M. MacIver, *Society: Its Structure and Changes* (New York, 1931), p. 9.

The overwhelming trend is from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*;[4] from social groupings based upon "status" to those based on "contractual"[5] relations; from homogeneous aggregates held together by "mechanical solidarity" to heterogeneous aggregates based upon "organic solidarity" and a divison of labor;[6] from "primary groups"[7] to secondary groups; and from the "folk culture"[8] to urban industrial civilization.

The bonds of the market certainly are not so personal and intimate as are those of kinship and close local association, but they do organize life over ever wider areas approaching the limits of the universe. There are still local dialects, but there are also world languages. There still is rumor and gossip, but there also is ever greater reliance on news. There still are local cultures, but there is also an approximation to world civilization. There still are local, county, state, and national governments, but there are also emerging world political institutions, however feeble. We even find more or less successful appeals made by statesmen to the court of "world opinion," to the "conscience of mankind," and to the loyalties and duties of "world citizenship." These phrases may as yet be merely figures of speech, but in critical situations in the recent past they have demonstrated their power to move men's thoughts and actions.

V

The central issue which makes the concept "community" relevant to the problem of peace, world order, and progress is the indispensability of a basis for effective co-operation and collective action among the nations and peoples of the world. In this connection it might be pointed out that the cohesiveness of a group derives, or is widely believed to be derived, in part from its antagonism to other groups. This function of external conflict as a factor making for internal integration has been dramatized by William Graham Sumner, and others before him, notably Gumplowicz, as the in-group versus out-group relationship. It has been suggested that if the whole world were to become a single community, the organizing and beneficent effect

4. See Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (5th ed.; Berlin, 1922).

5. See Sir Henry S. Maine, *Ancient Law* (London, 1861) and *Village Communities in the East and in the West* (New York, 1889).

6. See Émile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York, 1933) and *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (New York, 1915).

7. See Charles H. Cooley, *Social Organization* (New York, 1909).

8. See Robert Redfield, *The Folk Culture of Yucatan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941).

of conflict would be lost and, hence, that such a world could not long remain an integrated unity unless it picked upon some extra-mundane body for its opposition.

Here it may be in point to emphasize that such local community cohesion as we now have is sustained only in negligible degree by conflict with other communities. There is no evidence available to me on the basis of which students of local communities could arrive at the conclusion that intracommunity solidarity is significantly furthered by intercommunity conflict. It is highly questionable whether external conflict is an essential ingredient of internal community cohesion, and it is at least plausible that adequate equivalents for external conflict can be found in what Simmel calls the war against "inner enemies." And if we do not actually have ready-made "inner enemies" at hand, we can always invent them. We have, of course, a considerable literature tending to support the proposition that nation-states are never so strong as when they are threatened by external enemies. Whatever the facts may be on a national and international level, there is nothing to support the assumption that local communities gain an appreciable measure of their internal integrity through external conflict.

VI

If we are to apply the lessons we have learned from the structure of community life on a local scale to the problem of organizing the world, it will be helpful, then, to think of the community in terms of a series of processes and levels of interaction.

In its most elementary sense the community is a habitat which sustains a population. The symbiotic relationships or the competitive co-operation which the occupancy of a common habitat demands creates a common ecological base upon which social relationships may develop.

Upon this ecological base human beings tend to build a technological order, a division of labor, and an economy. Such an order inevitably calls forth a set of norms and institutions which control the participants. These controls are initially for the most part unconscious. Later they tend to become conscious and formal. When such an order becomes crystallized, it takes on political forms, of which the law, the state, and the police are symbolic. Throughout this process communication goes on, and a set of common understandings, values, and ideals and a body of loyalties develop, based upon participation

in common experiences and the generation and dissemination of common symbols. From this foundation there emerges the beginning of a moral order in which individual and group conduct is controlled not so much by external coercion as by uncoerced consensus.

Thus we pass along the continuum from community to society, from a form of living together in which the members of the aggregate have not merely conflicting and parallel interests but also common or shared interests. A community thus might be regarded as a state of existence, whereas a society is a state of mind.

VII

A serious misunderstanding often stands in the way of rational discourse about the world community. It is naïvely assumed that likeness of characteristics makes for integration, whereas heterogeneity impedes integration. The fact is that similarity of traits may also be the occasion for more intense antagonism, whereas differentiation of traits may be the basis for a mutually beneficial division of labor. We see this situation in the plant and animal world, where we have what is known as "like commensals" and "unlike commensals." The hardest wars are often fought between "like commensals." If the trait of belligerency were universal among men, it surely would not make the creation of a peaceful world easier. All depends, therefore, upon what traits are similar and what traits are different.

Similarly, it is often naïvely assumed that the more contacts we have with one another and the more intimate these contacts, the less occasion there will be for conflict. It should be noted, however, that frequency and intimacy of contacts can become the basis of conflict as well as of harmony. To know one another better is often to hate one another more violently. To be sure, a common language and a common culture facilitates mutually intelligible communication, but it also makes possible conflict in areas of life in respect to which we were formerly indifferent. The more we know one another and the more frequent and intimate our relations with one another are, the more opportunity there also exists for disagreement, for irritation, and for overt conflict.

VIII

In building a world community or world society, we encounter the problem of "community organization." From what has been said before, community organization is in part an unconscious develop-

ment in interaction on a symbiotic basis of competitive co-operation, but it is in part also a product of deliberate construction, of education, of facilitation, of communication, of the building of institutions and other formal controls, and of participation in organized life. Attention might be directed at this point to the history of the community organization movement. In the United States this movement is about two generations old. It began with the surveys and studies of actual communities as they existed in England and America, such as Charles Booth's survey of London. In the course of these studies it was found that communities had organization or structure quite apart from any deliberate and concerted effort to create such structure. The actual problems of social life of these communities were discovered, and organized efforts were undertaken to remedy some of these undesirable conditions of life by bringing incongruities into mutual accord and by building new programs of action and initiating new control devices. It was the deliberate effort to create and manipulate the institutions and services of communities in the interests of more wholesome life that became known as the community organization movement.

This takes us back to an interesting discussion which went on during the eighteenth century among the Scottish moralists concerning the relations between the "natural order" and the "civil order." They raised the question as to the extent to which a community was an organism or a natural entity, as over against the extent to which a community was an artifact, that is, a contrived entity. While a full discussion of this problem would take us too far afield, it is an issue of significance in the light of present-day discussion concerning the need for building a world society. It has been argued, for instance, that it is useless to attempt to build a world society, for, if one is to exist, it will come into being as the unintended end product of the participation of people in some common enterprises on a world scale. I am skeptical of this argument because we have learned from local experience that, whereas sometimes a formal organization may impede a natural development, it is also true that formal organization may facilitate and guide such natural processes.

In struggling for the emergence of a world community and a world government, therefore, it is well to keep in mind that we already have much to build upon. In many respects the world is already drifting toward a community. In other respects it can be helped to do so or can be impeded in this process.

There is, for instance, a reciprocal relationship between world trade and world political organization. The more trade we have, the more rules and regulations we will need and develop for carrying it on; and, in turn, the more we subject ourselves to commonly accepted rules and regulations, the more easily world trade can be carried on. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that these rules and regulations are always beneficent; they may be stupid and lead to the emergence of trade barriers. Similarly, the more of a common culture we have, the less we need formal law and the easier it is to enforce such law as there is. On the other hand, the attempt to create a common rule of law in areas where no such law existed before itself enlarges and deepens the sphere of a common culture. The formulation and adoption of the Constitution of the United States has probably been an important factor in the emergence of a "national community."

Even in highly integrated local communities we find some deviations from the accepted norms in the form of crime and other forms of social disorganization. The very issues, however, for public discussion and public action which such deviations pose furnish occasions for increasing community solidarity. Indeed, it has been pointed out by Durkheim that it is precisely in the attempt by communities to prevent and punish infractions of social rules that these communities reaffirm and strengthen their solidarity. We should not expect, therefore, on a world scale any more than on a local scale, to find complete and unvarying adherence to existing social norms. Rather, we should be prepared to use these occasions as opportunities for creating a world opinion, a world conscience, world-wide concerted collective action, and a sense of belonging to a world entity.

In building the world of tomorrow, therefore, we must start with what we have. We must take the world as it is. We cannot expect to start with a clean slate. If we see the ingredients of a world community in a series of forms of interaction on a universal scale—actions which formerly for the most part were carried out on a local, regional, or national scale—we can measure the progress in world solidarity and integration as we go along. The world community upon which a world society will ultimately have to rest will not automatically come into existence by making a world constitution or even by having such a constitution formally accepted; but, on the other hand, neither need we wait until the world is ready for a universal regime of law before making progress toward peace and order. Between the inevitable and the impossible there lies a realm of the

feasible. On this we must keep our eye, for it is this area that provides the opportunity for deliberate intervention and sets the limits for such intervention.

We have already a number of embryonic world institutions. They are indicative of the degree to which we have achieved a world community. For the time being they are still feeble; but they represent a great advance over what we have had before. We shall probably not achieve in our lifetime anything even approximating the ecological, the economic, the cultural, the political, and the moral integration which we have achieved in communities on a local scale. But even some progress in that direction on a world scale is better than war or the permanent division of the world into two potentially warring camps.

DISCUSSION OF CONCEPTS

COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY

MR. KIMBALL YOUNG: It seems to me that Mr. Wirth makes too sharp a division between the word "community" and the word "society" at the outset. He says, for example: "When we use the term 'community,' we seek to isolate and to emphasize the physical, spatial, and symbiotic aspects of human group life, whereas by the term 'society' we wish to bring into focus and to stress the psychic, deliberative, rational, normative, and consensual phases of group existence" (p. 12). Then later (p. 17) he says that "a community thus might be regarded as a state of existence"—I don't know exactly what he means by that—"whereas a society is a state of mind."

Yet in the end these distinctions are glossed over. In touching the important problem of the role of conflict in integrating the community, he says that he finds no striking evidence of the integration of local communities through conflict. I wonder, however, whether he has not shifted ground from the problem of the world community to the problem of local societies. In terms of these psychic factors, are not aggression and conflict important in the integration of national societies? It seems to me that any sociological analysis of the possibility of developing a world community or a world society dare not ignore the historical evidence that conflict has been one of the chief ways of integrating national societies or communities. What *integrating* principle might there be for a world society?

MR. WIRTH: I hope that you don't take me too literally in these definitions that I cite from other people. I have tried to bring together some representative ones, and I hope that I have at least left the impression from what I have said that I don't care very much about the division into these polar concepts of "community" and "society." For analytical purposes that is, perhaps, a useful dichotomy to make, but what I hoped would be emphasized here is the fact that there are certain more or less hierarchically arranged processes of interaction; that perhaps the lowest ones of these, those which I call the "ecological" ones, are the ones that underlie all the rest. There isn't too much we can do about them except in so far as we intervene by technological means or formal organizational means;

whereas in these higher levels of interconnectedness between the units that make up a community we can do a great deal. What I think we need to see is that, if these concepts are going to be meaningful and if they are going to be useful for exploring the field and giving us further knowledge and insight, we need to see them in terms of levels and processes of interaction of various kinds which I assume from the standpoint of content will be analyzed in detail in subsequent papers. But I don't mean to give the impression that in a community we have one state of affairs and in a society another, because I have never seen a society that is not also something of a community; I have never seen a community that is not also something of a society.

I think we would do better, very much better, if we as scholars or scientists or even as social engineers and statesmen kept our eye on the specific processes involved rather than on these polar concepts. I think they are somewhat confining and somewhat antiquated for our purposes.

Mr. Albert Guerard: Would you call them two aspects of the same thing instead of two radically different concepts?

Mr. Wirth: Yes, except that in some cases we find the one so relatively negligible in importance that we don't need to pay very much attention to it. In other cases, let us say in an international scientific society or cult, it is fairly futile to conceive it as an ecological entity. We can, of course, spot the members on a map, and to that extent it can be shown to have a spatial base. But beyond that how much more can we do with an ecological analysis? I would say very little. The important thing to know is the motives and goals that bring these people together and the specific form of organization that they have developed for collective action.

Mr. Robert Angell: As I understand it, in terms of these polar concepts, we do not need to build a world community, because we already have one. What we need is a world society.

Mr. Wirth: That is essentially correct. I hope I have exhibited these terms only sufficiently to permit you some latitude in discarding them.

Mr. Angell: I wish you had been bolder and said that the wrong term had been used for this conference, because I think that is essentially what your remarks point to. Is that right?

Mr. Wirth: I would not quite agree to that. I think it would be a

mistake for us to assume—Mr. Potter has emphasized that very forcefully in his paper—that we can deliberately create anything that we please and that it will work. I think we have to take some account of the distribution of world resources, the distribution of world populations, the differences in standards of living, in degrees of technological development, and a lot of other things; and these are not factors that can be affected by pious resolutions. It is useless to say, "Let us now solemnly resolve to create a world community." A world community is not built that way. On the other hand, it seems to me that it is just fatalistic and certainly paralyzing to say that there isn't anything we can do to modify our existential base. We can do that too, as even the feeble efforts of some of the embryonic international organizations have already demonstrated.

But I think you are essentially correct. What we are talking about most of the time is a world society, not a world community.

Mr. Wright: I am a little alarmed at Mr. Wirth's suggestion that it did not make much difference whether we used the term "community" or the term "society" or some other term. It seems to me, for the purposes of communication in this conference, that we ought to reach agreement on the meaning of these terms.

Mr. Wirth: I agree that it would be very nice if I could assume the authority and say to everyone here that henceforth, when we use the term "community," this is what it shall mean or what I shall interpret it to mean. I hope we will come to that point anyway without my saying so. But I think it is necessary to emphasize that we have two ideal poles and that all social reality floats somewhere between them. We can by analyzing the specific processes of interconnectedness between units of ecological and social life show whether we are moving in one direction or the other, and I anticipate from having looked at the papers that this is what is actually going to be done.

All that I hope to have done here is to call attention to some of the background of this discussion, namely, what is centered around the use of the concepts "community" and "society" and that they have sometimes been used very loosely. I think if we can realize that the plant and animal community is a good prototype of the way in which to use the term "community" and that the International Law Association is a good prototype of "society," then I shall be content.

CONTACT AND CONFLICT

MR. WRIGHT: Might we not use these terms as different variables? Is there not more community as there is more contact? We apply the term "community" especially to local groups where people are close together in space, where there is a great deal of contact among them, even though there is not much awareness of the whole among all the members. On the other hand, is there not more society as awareness of the whole increases among all the members? This may be true in a church or a nationality whose members are widely separated and maintain little contact. Clearly, there cannot be a society if there is no contact at all. There is no society which includes both Earthians and Martians. On the other hand, there may be some society where there is very little contact, as in the world society of philosophers, but there is little community. With this usage "community" and "society" would be distinct variables which may, however, be to some extent mutually dependent.

I think Mr. Wirth suggested that, if the rate of community development exceeds the rate of society development, there is likely to be conflict or even war. In other words, the problem lies in the rate of change of these two variables. There cannot be any society at all unless there is some community; but if contacts are increasing very rapidly and the persons coming into contact are not developing with equal rapidity an awareness of the common interests of the whole, conflict is likely.

MR. WIRTH: I would agree virtually up to the last point. I would not agree that, if we have more of the element of community without the corresponding element of society, we will have war. I think we have known of a good many cases—perhaps Mrs. Benedict, Miss Mead, or Lloyd Warner can indicate what some of them are—in which there has been a great deal of interdependence without very much of a body of consensus to regulate that interdependence. I am thinking, for instance, of the suggestive cases that Grierson brought together in the "silent trade," where we have long-continued contact of an indirect sort, very well guarded against personal intimacies, which produced a kind of accommodation between peoples which did not lead to overt conflict but which also did not lead to very intimate contact among peoples. Such contact does not necessarily lead to war or the equivalent of it.

MISS MARGARET MEAD: If we take a situation of up-and-coming

"silent trade," and somebody in one group starts marrying some of the women from another group, that might be defined as an increase of community. People are getting into closer communication, and the danger of armed conflict following is very great. That is, we may see an upset in one of the states of equilibrium which has been maintained on a very tenuous basis and then further upsets with increasing communication. Does not Mr. Wright refer to a situation in which there is increase of communication without an increased pattern of intercommunication?

Mr. Wright: If communication develops rather slowly, then we have regulation taking place along with it; in other words, "society" growing with the growth of "community." I think of such a case as the Europeans coming to America. There had been no community between those two groups before Columbus. The Europeans came to America, and the relationship was what we call "imperialism." Imperialism, it seems to me, is the usual consequence of a rapid development of contacts between two previously isolated groups with very different efficiencies of military technique. Imperialism implies open or potential conflict. In studying primitive peoples, it seemed to me that, where contact developed so rapidly that there was no opportunity for a system of regulation and a consciousness of society to develop between them, there was almost invariably warfare.

Miss Mead: Or would one substitute the word "conflict" for "war" so as to include other forms of disharmony?

Mrs. Ruth Benedict: We have stressed "rapidity of contact" and the strain it puts upon the peoples involved. But the quality of the contact is even more important. The spread of the Moslems throughout the Negro world of North Africa in the Middle Ages was rapid, but great mixed kingdoms grew up speedily with writing and art and architecture which owed their inspiration to the Moslems. The rulers and the common people, however, were black. Rapid and civilizing contact is possible, but it demands a philosophy which regards the two peoples as mutually complementary and not as conqueror and conquered or as exploiter and exploited.

Mr. W. Lloyd Warner: We may have a situation in which there has been very intimate and close contact between groups for hundreds and maybe thousands of years, and yet there is continuing warfare. There may be kinship ties, there may be close economic relations, there may be all the relations that ordinarily promote intimate

social interactions, yet there is continuing warfare. I think of the blood feud, for example, as a good case in point.

MR. WIRTH: Let us come closer to home and take our own domestic relations court. Have we ever seen a situation in which the tenseness and venomousness are so great as among a couple who have lived together for years and then split up? It seems to me that there is no guaranty of peace in intimacy of contact.

MR. WARNER: Among some tribes which I have studied, if they are quite remote from each other but know a little about each other, there is not very much conflict; but, as they get nearer to each other, the rate of conflict increases until they are near neighbors, when mechanisms develop to prevent open conflict from taking place. But it is not just rapidity of contact, or what we have been calling "community" without "society," that causes conflict. Closely organized societies exist within which there is warfare.

MR. WRIGHT: If we have conflict going on within the group, would we call such a group a "closely organized society"?

MR. WARNER: It depends on how we define the term. I specified some of the points making for society: real connection by kinship; real connection by ritual and myth; real connection on an economic level; sharing of certain institutions in common—yet the tribes have continuing warfare.

CULTURE AND LAW

MR. TALCOTT PARSONS: I would like to take issue with one statement that Dr. Wirth made: "The more of a common culture we have, the less we need formal law" (p. 19). It would seem that the experience of highly developed and complex societies is that they develop formal law as one of their most important integrating features. There is a possible implication in that statement that law is a bad thing, that it is only the second best when real common culture breaks down. I don't think that is a tenable view of the societies in which the great systems of law have been developed, either Roman or English law. In cases of that sort the development of law goes *pari passu* with the integration of culture.

MR. WIRTH: I want to emphasize there the word "need." I did not make any fact statement that the more of a common culture we have, the more law we have—that probably would be so—but I have said that the more of a common culture we have, the less law we actually *need* for peaceful and orderly living together among the

members. Despite the fact that we *need* less law, we may get a lot more of it. Studies of informal societies, beginning, let's say, with the family group, show that we don't have very much formal regulation. As a matter of fact, such regulation as exists is virtually all in the realm of informal etiquette. But despite the fact that we need little law where cultural relations are intimate and many cultural characteristics are held in common, it is likely that we get more law than we need.

I am not saying that law is a good thing or a bad thing. All I am saying is that it is possible for us to visualize societies in which we get along with a minimum of formal regulation and in which formal law may actually destroy and undermine existing informal relations. I think we have seen cases of that. I was not making a fact statement. I was making a statement here of what I thought was the *need.*

Mr. Parsons: I would not doubt at all that the two may be in conflict and often are; nevertheless, I think I still would take issue with your statement about the need. It seems to me the need for law is a function of the scale of complexity of organization, and it is very important not to think of law as solely or even primarily concerned with the settlement of conflicts. The functions of law in defining situations, defining rights and expectations and obligations, are just as important as the question of conflict itself.

Mr. Wirth: I can say only that I disagree. I think you are using the term "law" to reach down into ceremonial institutions and ceremonial practices. To be sure, we get a lot of these, and we probably have a great need for etiquette and ceremonial practices, but I am trying to differentiate, in this paragraph at least, between formal legal enactments enforced by coercion rather than by self-discipline; between situations where the control is external as over against internal. I think in most intimate groups the control is internal rather than external, and all I have ever read leads me to believe that that is so.

LAW AND TRADE

Mr. Henry S. Bloch: Mr. Chairman, I am confused about the preceding sentence on page 19. I can understand that "the more trade we have, the more rules and regulations we will need and develop for carrying it on." But Mr. Wirth continues—"and, in turn, the more we subject ourselves to commonly accepted rules and regulations, the more easily world trade can be carried on." That may

be so and will be so if the rules and regulations are of such a nature as to increase world trade. It is, however, quite conceivable that rules and regulations will be of such a nature as to restrict world trade.

Mr. Wirth: I thought I had qualified that in the following sentence. Obviously, the rules and regulations that do emerge are not always conducive to the facilitation and expedition of trade. They may actually be barriers; witness, tariffs.

On the first point that you made, I think that, in so far as I know the history of law and commerce in juxtaposition to each other, it could be definitely stated that, as the volume and the extent of trade are increased, the volume of formal control of a legal sort to regulate it has increased *pari passu*. In that respect I think trade is a different kind of phenomenon from intimate social relations, because trading men deal with each other impersonally. Indeed, our whole capitalistic system proceeds on the assumption that there are no human feelings and sentiments in trade relations and that all we have to rely upon is self-interest and price. Hence we need enforcement of norms through contractual and other formal regulatory devices. That was the point that Sir Henry Maine tried to make in his *Ancient Law* and in his *Village Communities in the East and West*, namely, that, as we move from status relationships to contractual relationships, we get more and more formal regulation of an external sort.

Mr. Bloch: It would be possible to say, "The more trade we have, the more rules and regulations we will develop for carrying it on," and then continue: "However, it is not necessarily true to say that the more we subject ourselves to commonly accepted rules and regulations, the more easily world trade can be carried on."

Mr. Wirth: We shall make that emendation in the paper.

CONFLICT AMONG MODERN STATES

Mr. Jacob Marschak: I wonder whether the historians would not help us. We talk about plants and animals and primitive tribes. The problem we face now is more modern. Perhaps we need not go earlier than the fifteenth century to study the national states and the consolidation of conflict boundaries among them. I ask a question similar to the one that was raised concerning the dynamics of conflict between tribes. What caused France and England to get consolidated during this period? Another question: What caused France and England to be in conflict for a couple of centuries, or France and Austria? The categories which we have then to use may still be the same—

society and community—but sharpened a little so as to speak in terms of these modern entities, these states, and not only in general concepts. It is very important to think in general terms, but perhaps additional material could be supplied by historians who know the dynamics of the last four or five centuries. I am curious to find, for example, whether the increase of conflict, which, according to Professor Wright, lags behind the development of law, has indeed taken place during the last four or five centuries. Why did we succeed in overcoming the conflicts of the Middle Ages among the various small communities, and why did we create the conflicts between national states?

MR. WRIGHT: The Hundred Years' War between France and England followed a rapid development of means of navigation and trade. Two societies had developed more extensive contacts with each other without developing any corresponding sense of a common society.

MR. MARSCHAK: Consider the situation between the United States and Russia. Is there any hope that we shall fare better than did France and Austria in the sixteenth century?

MR. WRIGHT: Hasn't there been a great increase in the contact between the United States and Russia in the last generation? During the nineteenth century the United States and Russia were perhaps the most isolated from each other of any of the great powers in the world, but they were in conditions of traditional friendship. Serious controversy seems to have begun when a considerable migration of Russians to the United States began in the 1890's. Sentiments of mutual antagonism increased, leading to the denunciation of the commercial treaty in 1911. With the rise of communism in Russia and its propaganda in the United States, antagonisms have increased. I think in this instance there has been a development of conflict in proportion as contact has developed without a corresponding sense of common society.

IS A WORLD SOCIETY POSSIBLE?

MR. RICHARD P. MCKEON: One point requires emphasis if the contradictions in which we are becoming involved are to be resolved. Mr. Wirth presented it as a paradox in the opening part of his statement; namely, that we are met to discuss the possibility of a world community at a time when some men think a world community already exists because material and technological advances have great-

ly shrunk the world, while others regard the problem of setting up a world community as one of our most arduous tasks. In this paradoxical situation the terms used to state the problem are involved in the same paradox. A community depends, as John Dewey points out, on common things and communication. It has been suggested in our discussion that a community is sufficiently established by mere contact, whereas a society depends on things in common and communication and, on a higher level, on awareness of what is in common. In a society there are means of judging, of regulating, and of protecting what is in common.

I doubt whether we shall facilitate discussion of the problem of world community by moving back and forth from one extreme to the other along the continuum between community and society. The problem of world community may, on the other hand, be treated in terms of the plurality of communities present in the world community. Our problem turns on the possibility of a world community or of a world society. In discussing that possibility—and this explains why Mr. Wirth may have seemed to be contradicting himself—either term may be used: a society is a conscious and controlled community. The problem is whether a world society is possible when the communities that must make it up live under different political organizations, are regulated under highly divergent economic systems, are committed to ideologies that seem antagonistic, and esteem cultures that are quite distinct.

One form of the problem would be: Must a world society unify all these communities? Is it true, as we have recently learned from speeches in the United States Congress, that we are approaching an opposition of ideologies in which a world society will emerge only by the triumph of one, or is it possible to set up a world society which will bring together communities highly diverse in all the respects that I have enumerated and yet unified in a society and perhaps even in the institutions of a world government?

The words which we are defining are not the problem, but the words may permit us to differentiate the many communities that now make up a world which modern means of communication have made a loose physical community but not yet a society.

Mr. Wirth: Mr. McKeon has well expressed the difficulty I was in. I might say that in every paragraph I was tempted to say, "Now, what does this mean from the standpoint of our problem?" But I understood from Mr. Wright that this was to be merely an opening

discussion and that the purpose of my paper was to raise these questions about the key terms among which we are differentiating to permit us to talk univocally, so to speak, about the many problems that we encounter here. I had to resist the temptation to give my solutions in terms of programs of action. It was a difficult one to resist.

If I may just reiterate one point I tried to make along the lines that Professor McKeon has indicated, I am trying to say that, when we are talking about "community," we are stressing the fact that it is "symbiosis" or interdependence that holds us together as over against the situation in a "society," where "agreement"—the conscious agreement and deliberate effort to work for an identical goal that is consciously shared by the participants—holds us together.

When it comes down to a practical question as to how we can extend and weave the communal basis of human life among the human race all over the world—separated as they are in different habitats, living under quite different physical, material, and economic conditions—into something like an integrated unity which is governed by common ideals or governed by common norms, then the real political questions and questions of social engineering will arise.

If I may anticipate something that may come up later, I would say that the minimal prerequisite for that kind of condition, which I assume all of us are working for, is an agreement on at least one thing, namely, the agreement not to resort to violence in order to enforce any agreement or any rule. If we could have that minimal agreement, that force or violence be not the arbitrator of differences, then I think that we have the minimum prerequisite for world unity.

Mr. Wright: Shouldn't you say no violence of one part against another, but possibly violence of the whole against a defiant part?

Mr. Wirth: Yes, that is what I mean to say.

Mr. Wright: Mr. McKeon questions the advisability of considering society and community as polar. I agree. Both of them seem to me conditions which may exist in the same group in more or less degree. If we mean by "community" some degree of material interdependence and by "society" some degree of moral agreement, it seems to me the concepts are less polar than parallel. An increase of one of these conditions is rather more likely to increase than to decrease the other. There is not likely to be much agreement unless there is some interdependence. I admit that a rapid increase of interdependence may make agreement more difficult to achieve.

MR. WIRTH: I think we can have agreement without interdependence.

MR. WRIGHT: Can we have agreement unless we have some contact?

MR. WIRTH: No, but contact can be quite remote. There are readers and admirers of George Bernard Shaw living in all parts of the world. They form a kind of society of worshipers of George Bernard Shaw that have never met together. I suppose in the study of mass communication we will find that there are millions of people all over the world listening to the same thing and not in direct contact with one another. That is one of the problems that Mr. Angell points out in his paper which is another case in point. In other words, there is no mutuality there, but they are exposed to the same focus of infection, whatever it may be. That is about all they have in common.

CRITERIA OF SOCIETIES

MR. THEODORE W. SCHULTZ: We might go a long way in accepting your concepts, but how do you identify a society? Take India for your raw material. What does the word "society" mean if you try to apply it in the political sphere, the economic sphere, and so on?

MR. WIRTH: If I understand the situation in India, which I don't claim to do, I would say the test of an emerging society there would be the participation of the major parties involved in the framing of a common constitution and the adoption of certain elementary common norms for representation of their respective strengths in something like a parliamentary body, and their willingness to allow that body to arbitrate the differences between them so that they would not resort to internecine warfare. That would be, to my way of viewing it, the decisive sign of the growth of an Indian national society.

MISS MEAD: I think that the use of the word "agreement" complicates things, if we imply something further than agreement on who is a member of the group and who is not. Agreement should not imply some picture of political rationality where people have lifted up an ideal of a common society but only the answer when you ask a man, "Are you a member of a given Hottentot community?" or, "Are you a member of the International Stamp Collectors?" or "Are you someone with settlement rights in the state of Texas?" In each of those cases if what he says and what the other members of his own

group say and what members of other groups relatively concerned say are in agreement, we can then begin to define societies; but if we add to it an ideal view of the society, we are immediately hamstrung in our definitions. A great number of the societies of the world in the past have existed as organized wholes but have not had the sort of agreement that we are setting up here as desirable. We are mixing a norm and a description.

MR. WRIGHT: Isn't "awareness" a better term? Can we have a society unless the members are each of them aware that there is some kind of unity?

MISS MEAD: You mean, what if some people think they belong to India and some people think they do not? If we took the present situation in India, we would have a great deal of awareness of society without agreement, and there would be difficulty in welding a society out of the descriptive elements of who is in it and who is out.

THE NORMATIVE AND THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH

MR. PENDLETON HERRING: It seems to me that Mr. Wirth has performed a very helpful and necessary function. For the purpose of this discussion we might accept his definitions.

He also did something else, and I think he sneaked up on us a little bit when he did it. He expressed value judgments several times. On page 18, for example, he raises the question whether a world community can be built. It seems to me that, in terms of his definition, a world community cannot be built. We can observe its development, but it cannot be built if we accept Mr. Wirth's working distinction between a world society which is normative, which is deliberative, which is rational, and which we can talk about, with the assumption implicit that maybe we can do something about it, and the conception of community which is not normative but can best be approached in analytical terms on the basis of observation. I think those distinctions are important.

In a group like this some of us will be talking in analytical terms and some in normative terms. Consider our attitude toward war. In analytical terms it is an open question whether war is a good thing or a bad thing. Looking at it historically, we may find that war has had a highly integrative effect. My personal opinion would be that the Civil War, for example, was as important as what happened in Philadelphia in 1776, perhaps even more important in building our "national community." Although, looking back over the last five or

six hundred years, we might agree that war had been on occasion a valuable centralizing force, yet we are gathered together today because most reasonable men would agree that war has reached the point where it can no longer be considered an integrative force.

In such a group, when talking about world community and world society, we are dealing with concepts that can be approached in rather concrete terms. The normative approach to a world society is in one realm of discourse, but analytical observation and the sociological approach to the community is in a rather different realm.

Mr. McKeon: Mr. Wirth said that a community is possible without a society but that a society is not possible without a community. Therefore, to talk about a world society is necessarily to talk about a world community. But in the biological communities based on "symbiosis," which Mr. Wirth is so fond of finding, the communal aspect is discovered in their local isolation; and in that minimum sense of "community" there is not—and I take it that he is saying there cannot be—a world community. A world community depends on the establishment of communication to overcome distances, and it can be built only by the conscious effort to build a world society. Planning is an essential step.

This distinction carries me back to what Miss Mead said, since such differentiations are in complete disagreement with her argument. It is not merely membership in a society which should be sought as a criterion. The peculiarity of a society is awareness of a different sort, and in particular the creation of a democratic society is, as Dewey put it, an intellectual problem. The sequence of the argument in Dewey's *The Public and Its Problems* itself illustrates this point. Dewey begins with a search for the public and eventually undertakes a search for the Great Society. The public is apparently there among human associations, but the important problem is to find it; the Great Society is also there, and the important problem again is to isolate it.

This search for a public which only communication can create is not a mistake but a profound insight. The effort is to discover the social (and I am making the distinction between community and society); the search is for the social elements in the world society which will build the world community; that is, for the machinery or the instruments or the institutions which will make explicit the bonds and purposes which are common to the peoples of the world and which will, as a result, overcome the difficulties of distance and the

difficulties of cultural divergencies. It is the social elements that we are looking for. That is a process of discovery and creation, not merely of recognition of membership. We are investigating precisely what characterizes the groups and the individuals that will enter, or have entered, into the world society.

MISS MEAD: I think that is the same point made by Mr. Herring. If we are going to use the world society as normative, as the world we are going to build, that is one thing. If we use it analytically to describe what has happened or is happening in all sorts of human beings in the past and the present, that is a different thing. I thought Mr. Wirth was introducing a value judgment in his emphasis on agreement and the rational research. I am not saying that that is objectionable, but I am saying that we cannot characterize all societies that have existed on the face of the earth in those terms. If we are going to use terms scientifically, then we should employ criteria capable of describing all societies at all times.

MR. MCKEON: I should deny the distinction, as I understand the term "society," between the normative society and the existing society, because to discover society as a factual existence is to search for the exemplification of some of those normative regulations that are disclosed by the normative examination. In other words, the distinction between "community" and "society" involves precisely the important recognition that values are themselves facts and that the normative does exist, to be looked for as well as to be promoted.

But, in pushing this point, I may be misstating your position, Mr. Wirth.

MR. WIRTH: Not at all. I think I would agree with that thoroughly. I think it explains what I have in the back of my mind. It is, however, one of those paths that I felt it was not my province to explore.

I might tell a story if an anecdote is permitted here. For some years some of my students and I have been working on what we call societies or voluntary associations in the city of Chicago. We have made an inventory of about thirteen hundred of those organizations. Among the organizations, organized for every conceivable purpose under the sun, some of which have nothing to do with one another and some of which overlap, one struck me as particularly fascinating. It was listed in the telephone book in Chicago until a few years ago. It had this intriguing name: The Independent Organization of Unorganized Independents.

It seemed to me that that was symbolic of the drift of our age and of the problem that we face. We know that as lone individuals we don't amount to anything in this great universe, and it is only in so far as we are incorporated into and are participants in the pursuit of some common interest, subject ourselves to some common norms, that we literally become personalities. By such associations and identifications human beings become men, aggregates become groups, and cultures are identified as cultures. And yet all of us have in the back of our minds the gnawing fear that, by joining these organizations, we will lose our identity or that each one of them will monopolize our loyalties.

It seems to me that that is part of the problem which, concretely speaking, is the problem of sovereignty—local, state, national, and world sovereignty. Once we get to world sovereignty, we don't need to talk about sovereignty any more because there is no other group to challenge it. That is, I think, another way of putting the dilemma which Mr. McKeon has emphasized and which I certainly keenly feel.

AGREEMENTS TO FIGHT

Mr. Charles Morris: Suppose we had a society organized to settle disputes by war or conflict. I am attempting to sharpen that issue of "agreement." If we are going to take "agreement" as the criterion, it seems to me we could conceivably have agreement upon conflict as a method of procedure, as in criminal gangs.

Mr. Wright: "Trial by battle" was a recognized procedure in medieval law.

Mr. Wirth: I would like to make a footnote to that if I may. We know a little bit about criminal gangs, and there is one characteristic feature that the layman does not understand about these criminal gangs; namely, that they have very rigid rules within the gang. If you are "yellow" in the gang or if you betray the gang, there is inexorable punishment that is inflicted upon you. They do have a code within the gang. I cannot visualize a society organized to settle its own internal conflicts by war. If it were, we would call it something else, namely, punishment, perhaps.

Mr. Morris: It certainly could settle its internal conflicts by show of force or by actualities of strength.

Mr. Wirth: I cannot see that any such society would have any endurance.

MR. WRIGHT: There has been what international lawyers have called for four centuries a "society of nations," but before the Kellogg Pact war was a recognized means by which members of this society might settle their disputes.

MR. GUERARD: The people who belonged to society in the ancient regime were people who settled their disagreements by duel. There was a code of the duel as well.

MR. WRIGHT: Mr. Morris' hypothesis of an agreement to fight seems to me a common occurrence. A definition could be adopted which would deny the title of "society" to a group which tolerated violence among its members; but in such a group the members may be aware of the whole, they may recognize a body of rules, they may have normative standards, and at the same time they may consider war an appropriate method for dealing with certain kinds of controversy. This has been true of some primitive societies, as Mr. Warner pointed out, of the society of nations, and, in lesser degree, of football, prize-fighting, dueling, and other societies.

MISS MEAD: Don't we define war as conflict between societies? I thought that was a matter of definition. If it isn't, maybe we had better define war. I assumed that war was armed conflict between groups that were recognized as societies. When we had fights between the king's men and the cardinal's men in France, we called that a fight; when we had within a regular society dueling organizations which threw things at each other without . . .

MR. WARNER (*interposing*): You mean that the southerners really defined the Civil War correctly?

MISS MEAD: If the South had won, we would have had a different definition.

MR. WRIGHT: There is an interesting provision in Magna Charta. The barons and King John agreed on certain things and provided that, if the king should not observe these requirements, the barons might distress and injure him and seize his castles, saving only his person and that of his queen and those of his children.

MR. ANGELL: To hark back to what Miss Mead said a moment ago, I would like to inquire how we develop membership in a society if not by adherence to some norm.

MISS MEAD: Sometimes just by knowing the name of it. I am not quite sure what this argument is about. What I thought was happening and what Mr. Herring said he thought was happening was that Mr. Wirth had included in his definition certain value judg-

ments; that is, a statement of what we want to build rather than an analytical description of what it is.

If we look at a big patch of country in New Guinea, we might call it a community because articles of trade spread over it, women spread over it and are married from one group to another, trade routes spread over it, but we would not call it a society. We cannot find even villages that we could call a society because they don't know where one group ends and another begins. Conflicts are patchy because there is no way of organizing a large group against another large group. We can say that there is no political form there which we could call a society. There is an enormous amount of common agreement on values, there is an enormous amount of common culture in that area, but there are no organizational forms that make it possible to say A belongs to X community or X village or X unit and does not belong to B. No lines can be drawn so as completely to distinguish one society from another. Nationalism has become one of the most marked of those lines in the modern world. One of the things we are working for is a situation in which every individual will be defined as a member of the world in some way or other. We may not be able to get there in any other way than by agreement on norms, but there are societies that have gotten there by other means. They have gotten there because they have had a name and well-organized warfare and knew where their language stopped and the other language began.

Mr. Marschak: We have called ourselves "humans" for many centuries. Does it mean that we are members of human society?

Miss Mead: To the extent that we call ourselves members of the human race and would organize in any form, yes. I only referred to the question of the membership in relation to the question of agreement. Mr. Wirth suggested that agreement was the criteria of a society, and I did not want to mix up the kind of agreement we want for the future with the kind of agreement we have had in the past. If we just agree we are a Hottentot and kill all the people who are not Hottentots, that is not necessarily the norm toward which Mr. Wirth wants us to work.

QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE CONCEPTS

Mr. Wright: It seems to me that Miss Mead's remarks suggest the value of recognizing different degrees of society. If we accept the terminology of the international lawyers and say that for four cen-

turies there has been a society of nations, certainly it has been less a society than the society of the United States after the Civil War. In other words, we should recognize "society" as a variable. We have very little society in those groups within which, while there is a certain awareness of the whole, war or other violent conflict is recognized as an appropriate procedure for dealing with internal conflicts. There is, on the other hand, a great deal of society in those groups that are so closely integrated that internal war is out of the question.

MR. HANS J. MORGENTHAU: I want to say a word about the qualitative differences among societies. It seems to me this is a point which has not been sufficiently stressed in this paper. Mr. Wirth seems to have made a more or less quantitative analysis of the terms "community," "society," and "culture." In this connection I want to come back to the sentence which led to the controversy between Mr. Parsons and Mr. Wirth: "The more of a common culture we have, the less we need formal law." The need for formal law does not depend on *how much* culture we have but on the *kind* of culture we have.

We had, for instance, a great quantity of common culture in Italy and Germany in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but we had great need for formal law. Nor was it easy by virtue of strong cultural ties to enforce such law as there was; quite the contrary. In other words, what we had was linguistic civilizations or ethnic civilizations, but we did not have what really counts—political culture, a political community.

Since we have agreed to discuss these substantive problems in a terminological frame of reference at this moment, I would suggest that one ought to distinguish in quantitative terms between different kinds of civilizations, different kinds of cultures, and different kinds of communities and societies. What is really important, what is really relevant, for our discussion here, from the point of view of a world state, is not the *quantity* of contacts which exist today in the world but the *quality* of contacts which exist. That is to say, aside from the fact that we have a community of trade, of communications, etc., do we have also a moral, intellectual, and political community?

In this connection may I call attention to Mr. Wirth's value judgment on page 15, which seems not to be borne out by history and is the result of a quantitative rather than a qualitative approach to the problem. "We even find more or less successful appeals made by

statesmen to the court of 'world opinion,' to the 'conscience of mankind,' etc."

One has to be very careful in pointing to such verbal tributes to a world-wide moral community. It has been said that "hypocrisy is the tribute which vice pays to virtue," so it may easily be that appeals to common interest and to world citizenship serve primarily the purposes of the national communities, so as to make it appear as if the national interest were identical with the common interest of mankind. I am not aware of political situations which have demonstrated the power of those concepts to move men's thoughts and actions on behalf of a world community as over against a particular national community.

Here again it seems to me that the mere quantitative approach which speaks of culture as such and of society and community as such rather obscures than elucidates the problem.

Mr. Wirth: I might make a few comments on that. If Mr. Morgenthau thinks I am interested in a quantitative approach in my paper, I wish to state that I certainly have no such intention. If it appears to be so, it is a slip of the pen, for which I apologize. What I mean to say roughly is that, the more informal and ceremonial control we have, that is, informally sanctioned regulation of conduct, whether it be on a local scale or on a wider scale, the less resort we have to have to formal and legal regulation. Indeed, I think it has long been a truism in our field that, when we introduce formal specifications of conduct, we sometimes destroy the very vitality of the informal relations that previously existed. This could be easily demonstrated in the analysis of family relationships.

All I am hoping to say is that there are a number of levels or, if you wish to use Mr. Wright's term, "variables" that go into the content of the term "society," and there are also some that go into the content of the term "community." Let us say we start out with common understandings, meaning that people use the same symbols in such a way that they talk *to* one another rather than *past* one another; that they evoke the same images and refer back to the same experiences or similar experiences. These common understandings get intertwined with mutual claims and expectations as soon as we get norms in the society which all people respect. After a while we may find that society has grown territorially and numerically to such a point that we no longer can rely upon these spontaneous responses to be automatically in operation. Then we insist on formal law and

ordinance. Formal laws and ordinances define the *minimum* standard of conduct; they never define the *maximum* standard of conduct. That is, we don't pass a law that the iceman shall be a generous man. All we do is pass a law so, say, that he shall not give forty-nine pounds of ice when he charges us for fifty pounds. That is a formal thing. That is not quite like custom and regulations of an informal sort which define the whole range of human conduct.

On this question of slipping in a value judgment, I did not understand Mr. Herring to say that I mixed up my definitions with value judgments. I did sneak in my notions of how terms *ought* to be used and even what ought to be done in the world, and I apologize for it. I do think there is a value judgment involved in all these things, but I don't think it can be said to lie in the definition, in an attempt to define what are the attributes of a society. We have the question as to how a given term as defined fits a set of conditions in an actual human society.

If, for instance, some fictions such as the "world society" or the "League of Nations" or the "high court of mankind" or the "conscience of mankind" are current among us, as I believe they are, it should be noted that these fictions themselves, if given sufficient currency, might be inducements to a kind of action of which we had never before considered ourselves capable. I think such fictions have the power to make us do things.

As far as citing cases is concerned where these slogans, if you want to call them that, have been effective, I think we need only to mention the social, religious, philosophic, and political movements of world-wide sort in which these slogans, symbols, and fictions have proved effective. I certainly think that, in the case of some of the phrases in the Atlantic Charter or in the International Relief Organization, we have instances of actions which are not all based upon the appeal to immediate narrowly conceived national self-interest. The point is that people were moved in the direction of doing some of these things which certainly did not immediately coincide with the recognition of their own interest. I think a good many cases like that could be cited if we wanted.

RELATION BETWEEN ASPECTS OF CONTACT AND REGULATION

Mr. Karl Polanyi: We have drifted away from the discussion of contacts, and I think it is because we had reached a large measure of agreement. We agree that increase in contact per se does not make

for peace, nor does it make for conflict, and it seems to be fairly agreed that the *quality* of this contact somehow is in question.

The quality of the contact is a difficult thing to handle. It is a vague idea, but one can make it clearer. We mean more contact on some matters and less on other matters. That brings us nearer to the question of conflict and conditions of conflict. Peace is a question of the relationship of the various aspects of contact.

We have been discussing how we are to get a world community, but I doubt whether we are really quite decided whether that is strictly what we want. What we want seems to be rather the avoidance of war, but war might be avoided in many cases by having less community in some of its aspects. I am thinking especially of political and economic contacts. We might consider the problem of regional organization of the world instead of ignoring everything that does not fit into abstract universalist conceptions.

Mr. Guerard: As a way of peace?

Mr. Polanyi: In some aspects, yes; not in all. For instance, economic regionalism certainly has not the dangers of political regionalism.

Mr. Marschak: Mr. Wright's working hypothesis suggests measuring the lag between contacts and general legal regulations. He suggests that in some way or other the amount of contact can be measured and in some way or other the legal regulations can be measured, and then, if one lags greatly behind the other, there will be war. We have this working hypothesis. We want to test it. On this we have not heard enough from the historians. I suspect much available information on the various phases of this hypothesis. I was impressed by what Mr. Morgenthau said. On the basis of mere schoolbook knowledge, may I venture the Greeks. The Greek states had lots of common culture, common symbols, common language, I don't know how much common intercourse, but they had lots of contact, especially common culture, yet they had wars. Then came Alexander and the Romans. Conquests were followed by organizing a system of heterogeneous cultures. The thing which was said by Mr. Wirth was perhaps correct. Those empires had to use much more police regulation than did more homogeneous groups. The same thing is perhaps true of the Mongol Empire, which was very heterogeneous and, if we have to believe Marco Polo, quite definitely had a lot of policing.

I don't think we should stay away from value judgments. We want

to discuss not only causes and effects but also what is good and what is bad. So I don't see why we should not make a value judgment and say here that "this particular war which threatens us is a bad thing." Then we ask ourselves how to avoid it. In order to answer the question of how to avoid it, we want to learn whether hypotheses of the type Mr. Wright suggested are valid and useful.

If I understand him correctly, the issue would be approximately this: If it is true that conflict between the Russians and the Americans is growing because the maintenance of legal regulations by a world court or world organization or world government lags behind the development of material contacts, then there are two ways to avoid war: Either increase the effectiveness of these organizations or cut down the contacts, reduce migration, trade, communication, etc.

Mr. Wright: Mr. Marschak expresses my view, and I think Mr. Polanyi did also. If we regard war as a consequence of the lag of social awareness and common standards behind material contacts and interdependences—and, of course, this hypothesis needs further testing—then obviously we could reduce that lag by reducing the contacts, by "uninventing" the radio, by "uninventing" the railroads, by "uninventing" all the other devices by which contact among nations has been increased in recent history. It is extremely difficult to "uninvent" anything, and that is the difficulty of promoting peace by this method. The other method would be to increase the awareness of interdependence, the sense of social solidarity, the acceptance of common standards and regulations. Because of the great difficulty of "uninventing" the means of contact which we have all over the world and of decreasing the degree of material interdependence, the latter is the more practical approach to the problem of war.

Mr. J. Fred Rippy: I was going to say just about what you said better. I don't think it is possible to reduce the contacts. I think they will have to be regulated somehow. As I read history from 1800 to the present, contacts have vastly increased, and, when I look at the balance-of-power forces within a given nation, I don't see any way to reduce the contacts. I don't see any way, for instance, to isolate the United States in view of the power setup that we have here and the forces that are thrusting out.

Mr. David Riesman: I agree we can't "uninvent" what we have, but we can time it. If I understand what Mr. Polanyi was driving at, he was anticipating, and I will continue to anticipate, our future course of discussion by raising this question. Mr. Marschak asked

about historical examples. Let us take the American "melting pot" as such. Here we had people who began not as a society, and an attempt was made by ideology to make a society of them; and Margaret Mead has described in *Keep Your Powder Dry* the disastrous results of that ideology for second and third and other generations of Americans.

Now, since we no longer have immigration, we seem to be doing the same thing and to be exporting the "melting pot" on a world scale; but here we have the difficulty that we lack the legal possibility of unification. We, therefore, inevitably build up counterresistances against us. The leaders of such resistances, if they listened to the tone of discourse here, would probably characterize it as imperialism.

If that is so, then wouldn't it be the part of wisdom to watch, as I say, the timing and quality of our contacts. This might mean expanding in one place but pulling in our horns in another.

Mr. Wright: I entirely agree with that. I think we must recognize that an important part of the policy of national states has been to prevent contacts. They erect customs barriers, they adopt individualistic languages so that their people cannot understand other peoples, they make travel difficult, and they censor the press, radio, and films. Probably more political effort has been expended in erecting barriers than in breaking them down, and that may at times have contributed to peace. The problem is where should barriers be erected and where should contacts be encouraged, where should understanding and regulation be promoted and where may they be neglected in order to maintain the proper relation between material interdependence and social consciousness, between the development of community and the development of society among hitherto distinct peoples.

Mr. Guerard: Just at present, for instance, our resistance to propaganda is a form of attempting to keep the peace by stopping contacts. We don't want Russian ideas.

Mr. Wright: If the "Iron Curtain" were impervious enough, then we might have peace. If it were as impervious as the Atlantic was before the time of Columbus, then it would guarantee peace between the societies separated by it.

GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY

Mr. Guerard: I wish to ask Mr. Wirth about the term "government." In his first paragraph we have had three terms—"community," "society," and "state." I know the three terms merge, but I

can conceive of a state without a community or society—the Congo Free State, or present South Africa, is a state without a community. Can you conceive of a society without government?

MR. WIRTH: Yes, I can, certainly without government in the sense I have indicated, namely, formal regulations and formal coercion and formal sanctions enforced by a monopoly of violence on the part of one segregated body.

The real question is: Does a world community or world society need to be built? Can a society be built? If so, how? What would be the timing and the priorities in the process? Assuming that we don't start with a clean slate but with a jumbled state of affairs in which we have some tenuous consensual ties but also have a great deal of interdependence on a purely unconscious basis, what is the wise thing to do?

Perhaps the analogy of the contact between men and vehicles in street and highway traffic would be in point. I have as one of my avocations the avocation of city planning, and one of the problems we have in cities—and we can think of the world as a great city—is the random behavior of the automobile which we cannot in the near future "uninvent," as you say. I don't think that some of the conditions under which we must live are reversible; in other words, we are not going to get rid of them; therefore, we have to do something about them. There was a time not so long ago in city planning when signs were put up all over, "Stop, Look, and Listen!" After a while we learned that these devices did not do too much good; that it would be better to *engineer* safety into the road and into the automobile by brakes, better visibility, and so forth, and by separating highways and making underpasses and overpasses than it would be to use this psychological appeal.

That would seem to me to be on the level of the kind of regulation that takes place in the case of trade and commerce and migration and intercourse of various kinds among peoples on a world scale. Upon the existing technology of international or world contact we always tend to build some kind of legal order. In the traffic case the questions arise: Should we have a traffic policeman at every corner? Should we have speed traps to catch the offenders?

We can get a certain amount of obedience to regulations, that is, to communally accepted regulations, by having traffic police all over the place, and we might be able, conceivably, if we had enough of them, to stop all the accidents and to stop all violations. But that is not

enough. It seems to me we've got to have something more than that. What we have to have, too, is a set of settled habits, settled values, accepted norms, which express themselves in "the courtesy of the road," so to speak, and which express themselves also in the "ethics of the road," where we can call a man a "road-hog" if he drives in the middle of the road or drives recklessly. That is better than to have a policeman there to force him to be decent.

The ecological, the technological, the legal, and the moral order—all of them are present in almost any community. It is the part of wisdom, it seems to me, to rely as much as we can upon the ecological, the technological, and the moral order and to use the legal order as sparingly as we can because of what we know will be involved in carrying it out. Another way of putting that is in the old proverb, "The price of obedience is the surrender of authority." That is, if we really want others to obey, the best thing to do is to give up if we can every coercive claim to their obedience.

I would certainly not say that we don't need law and formal regulation and formal constitutions, but I think there is the danger of becoming obsessed by the magic of law and the miraculous hope of what it can do without the foundation of an ecological, technological, economic, social, and moral base with which the legal order must be congruent.

WORLD CULTURE

By MARGARET MEAD*

THE term "world culture" may be defined as the patterns of technology, language, custom, and values prevailing among peoples of the world and the tendency of these patterns to become more or less alike. We may ask what effect will increasing homogeneity of cultures have upon material contacts? Upon loyalties? Upon institutions? The following significant sentences are taken from the committee's statement, "The World Community":

"In general, the more uniform cultures are throughout the world, the more the world's people is a community."

"In general, the more all people are aware of, and identify themselves with, the same symbols and purposes, the more the world is a community."

"In general, the more the people of the world are organized into universal institutions, the more the world is a community."

As an anthropologist, I would rephrase these statements as follows: "In general, the more the people of the world recognize *certain* symbols, values, and purposes as both their own and those of all the other peoples of the world, and give to those symbols, values, and purposes a high place, the more the world is a community." The shifts involved in this rephrasing are three. The word "uniform" is removed, because attempts to see analagous values and institutions, from one culture to another, as uniform have proved to be extraordinarily self-defeating. The very words "uniform" and "uniformity" are incongruous with the complex nature of cultural phenomena and with a recognition of the importance of pattern. A culture is characterized not only by uniformities in the behavior of its members but by all the sorts of *regularities* which may be seen in the ununiform and dissimilar behavior of its members, by the fact that the contrasts between the habits and beliefs of different groups are nevertheless systematically related to each other, so that even the criminal and the insane will be found to express, in some recognizable form, the cultural emphases. A single culture may comprise a very large number of deeply contradictory, contrasting, discrepant themes,

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provided some over-all recognition of commonality or community makes each individual member feel that all these behaviors, in spite of their diversity, are parts of the same over-all culture to which he gives allegiance. This is true at the simple and obvious levels of the differentiation between men and women and by age groups, even in the simplest primitive culture, and it is also true when we reach the enormous differentiation of religion, style of life, occupation, and philosophy which characterizes any great complex culture. How far such differentiation can go without a breakdown, what the order of breakdown is which may occur, and how it may be forestalled are all questions on which we have as yet very little data, but they are questions which can be investigated. We can say, on our present data, that it is possible to build strong, well-integrated cultures in which differences of great extent are recognized as parts of a whole. And we can, furthermore, say that those cultural trends which occur during periods of rapid culture contact and intermixture of peoples, which are trends toward uniformity—as complex and apparently irreconcilable value systems characteristic of different cultures are atomized and simplified during periods of culture contact—themselves breed competition and various sorts of conflict. The idea of nationalism is a conspicuous example of a "uniformity" within which societies incomparable in almost every respect can compete in maximizing their national prestige. The idea of the "one true God" for whom a single religious system speaks is again a uniformity, within which two competing world religions can communicate, compete, and struggle for dominance, but not an idea within which several religious systems can live in harmony.

The emphasis on the peoples of the world identifying themselves with the same symbols, values, and purposes is shifted to an emphasis on the need for them to recognize *certain* symbols, values, and purposes. This opens up the whole question of which symbols, values, and purposes they should so identify as both their own and those of others. In general, it may be said that it is important that these symbols be symbols of the wider general framework within which the various systems of the world can be seen as differentiated but integral parts rather than as unrelated or competing or contradictory elements. Certain characteristics of this framework, which will in turn partially define the nature of the symbols, values, and purposes with which it must be associated, may be suggested. The framework of ideas should be of a sufficiently high level of abstraction to include

cultural values which are at the present time seen as competing or, at the best, incompatible and irreconcilable. For the idea of one true God, with a specific prophet and institutional forms which are superior to all others, there would be substituted a belief in the value of religion, so phrased that all religious systems would be able to identify with it, plead their causes in terms of it, and communicate with each other through the symbols which would develop. For the idea of national sovereignty, which decrees that all nations will compete with one another on a single scale, ideas of cultural integrity would provide a framework within which such competition could be dissolved. For the ideal that every people in the world should have "three square meals a day," or 2,600 calories a day, would be substituted the ideal of adequate nutrition within a given physical and social environment for peoples with given constitution and occupation. Each purpose would be so phrased that the very different aspirations and practices of the people of the world could fall within it.

The third shift in phrasing involves changing the word "same" to the phrasing "recognize . . . as their own and those of all other peoples." This shifts the emphasis from the demand for similarity in the *content* of the values and purposes to the *relationship* between each people and the over-all set of values. Under such an emphasis each people of the world, whatever their political arrangements, or their major religious orientation, or their current political ideology, would be able to use different and locally appropriate ways of establishing loyalty and enthusiasm for the set of world values without doing the violence to their own cultural tradition which is involved in an arbitrary acceptance of an as yet unrealized and alien content. "Freedom of religion" in a country like the United States means one thing to Protestant peoples and another to Catholic people, and yet, within that stated value, a certain minimum of peace is preserved. If we could realize such a degree of peace for the world, it would take us a long way in the direction of a world system within which war would be a lessening threat. Perhaps the importance of this point can be best illustrated from the field of art, when there is an attempt to establish the value of art as background for greater understanding among peoples. For any people to learn to value the art product or the art canon of a people very different in culture is a long and difficult task, but to teach the people of each country who are interested in using paint and pallet, chisel and wood-carving tool, that the

artists of other countries have a comparable relationship between hand and tool and finished work of art, even though the finished works of art seem so incomparable, is a much easier task, and one which does not risk alienation from one's own cultural values which are necessary to give depth and strength to the work of the artist within each country. Artists from different cultures can then communicate among themselves as artists recognizing a single value but many different styles.

Thus, in order to further the development of a world culture, we would work toward the development of over-all values, within which each people could see both themselves and all other peoples as understandable and tolerable parts of a whole, to which each, in a *different* way, owed a comparable and reliable but not uniform, identical, or necessarily even similar loyalty.[1]

If we consider the term "community" as applying to a group of persons, so that we are dealing with a scientific abstraction in which the units are individuals rather than units of human behavior, as they are when we use the term "culture," the same principles can be shown to apply.

In the statement on "The World Community" this sentence occurs: "Through co-operative living plus common habits and loyalties men come to feel and act as though they belong together." Here the key words are "co-operative" and "common." Analyses of the co-operative behavior of different primitive societies have made it possible to compare those situations where individuals co-operated for a common goal, each performing an identical and similar function, or performing complementary and diversified functions. The strongest co-operative systems, and the ones which would seem least likely to break down into destructive competition, are those in which individual contributions to the common goal are differentiated in many ways. The word "common" may be also construed as uniform, identical, or similar, or as involving quite diversified roles. We can think of a society in which all individuals have in common the same kind of assertiveness, or of societies in which certain ages, one sex, or caste or class has a set of habits which are complementary to those of another, where one assertively initiates and the other compliantly performs, or we can think of the even more complex situation in which there are a large variety of different sorts of habits, all used some-

1. I shall return in a later section to the matter of uniformities, especially in the technological field, as facilitating and impeding understanding.

times by each person in the society, in situations where it is agreed that they are appropriate. The word "common" would then apply not at a simple level to a certain sort of assertiveness or accommodation but rather to a *common* recognition of the appropriateness of a variety of interrelated types of behavior. The word "co-operative" would cover different as well as similar contributions to an end valued in common, though nevertheless perhaps valued in different terms.[2]

Our material upon the constitution of functioning communities also reinforces this emphasis upon the value of diversity rather than uniformities within a community. The one-class suburb, the dreary expanses of "homes for heroes" without shops or churches or community facilities laid out in Britain during the last war, the undesirable qualities of housing projects where all the residents come from one income group, the one-industry town—all provide abundant data on the unsatisfactory quality of such ways of living. It is rather the highly diversified community, in which living and making a living, at many different economic levels, in many different ways, are fitted together, which is today the goal of the town planner and the sociologist. Such uniformity of habit as makes it possible for traffic to work, for pennies to be left on unguarded newsstands, for children to wander safely on any street at dusk—yes, but these are the uniformities which make it possible for the doctor and laborer, the housewife, the teacher, the plumber, the electrician, the factory worker, the waiter, the market gardener, the policeman, and the preacher each to perform different roles part of the time, and similar roles at other times, within the framework of a highly complex, diversified community.

However, if we were to accept these principles that diversification of cultures within an over-all set of world values, which while differently interpreted and differently executed, were all valued by the

2. There are interesting reports on the various efforts which were made to help and hinder the return of Japanese-Americans to the Pacific Coast after the war. Careful research has shown that, while the groups who felt it most important that the Japanese-Americans should return and the groups who opposed their return were, in these separate terms, completely irreconcilable, if an emphasis was placed on the good name and good standing of the city or town, a common denominator could be found. This community loyalty was sufficient to muster community support from all but a fringe of extremists whose opposing attitudes were no longer significant, either for the over-all smooth functioning of the community or for the specific goal of a peaceful return of the Japanese-Americans. Many individuals who could be appealed to in terms of the over-all community value cared for their community in ways which others who answered the appeal would have felt as most uncongenial, and yet it was possible to muster the support of both groups.

peoples of the world, there would still be questions in the opening statement, "The World Community," left unanswered. Even if we admit that uniformities are not a goal and may in fact seriously impair the attainment of a goal of a world community, because they not only impoverish but lead to competition where competition is destructive rather than to co-operation, we are still faced with the question: What uniformities *are* occurring and what is their probable contribution to the possibility of a world community?

We may first consider such uniformities as the use of money, with the possibility of single currency, only modified to suit the unit needs or carrying or shopping habits of different peoples;[3] telephone systems which work in the same way, airplanes, trains, and boats, hotels and post offices and banks, food service places and barber shops. What is the difference between having these thin networks of very similar facilities spread over the world, in which the traveler and the immigrant can make initial moves with great ease but from which, however, the step to the local intricacy of custom is very great, and having a growing similarity but not identity of technology, such that the traveler and immigrant knows that there will be money and telephones, trains, and planes, hotels, post offices, and banks, but must expect to find them very differently set up. The network of identical hotel dining-rooms for the moneyed American and European traveler before the war facilitated travel and reduced immediate hostilities to the strangeness of new environments but interposed a wall between the traveler and any understanding of the peoples among whom he journeyed and sojourned. If, however, the details of living are at the same time identifiable but different, as one learned to find a mailbox under a tobacconist's shop in France or to "push Button B and get your money back" in a British telephone booth, the traveler or immigrant is enabled both to function well enough so that he is not hopelessly alienated by this environment and to learn, as he makes change, mails a letter, or makes a telephone call, something about the style and tempo of the people among whom he is living.

So here, again, it may be argued that the greatest facilitation of growth toward a world community will come if the technological revolution proceeds in such a way that each culture, or at least each culture area (Spanish-speaking South America, as opposed to each

3. New Guinea peoples like to carry money in the ear, and any money smaller than a shilling is unsuitable. In Bali the market-going woman changes Dutch coins into long strings of Chinese cash, because the Dutch cent is too large a unit for buying most of her supplies, etc.

South American country), is able to embody some of its distinctive values even in the material details of structure and function. At the same time the very fact of technology—of lights which will turn on if only the switch can be located and if it can be ascertained which way it moves, of stoves which can be lit or switched on, of telephones which ultimately connect one with someone at a distance—can provide a familiar and reassuring medium within which the incurious can learn more about other peoples and so communicate better with them.

A second aspect of this question of growing technological uniformities centers about the danger that technological changes (especially when they begin to affect deep-seated working and living habits of a people by, for example, individual wage scales instead of family labor, altering the method of food preparation or childbirth, or substituting the automobile for the family parlor for courtship purposes) may, if introduced without time for adjustment and assimilation to local patterns, invoke resistances which will express themselves in retroactive movements, nativistic cults, minor and atavistic nationalisms, separatist movements, impoverished and unstable personalities, etc., which in turn will impede the development of world community. An insistence on each idea which is to be exported, whether it be the setting-up of a telephone system, a bank, a spinning mill, or a child welfare clinic, passing through the hands of specially trained persons who are thoroughly representative of the culture of the locality which is to receive the new piece of technology or applied science is the only effective device of which I know to insure that its introduction will not impede rather than advance the sort of approximation to twentieth-century technology which is an aspiration of the more advanced peoples for the dependent peoples and an aspiration, too, of those high civilizations which did not participate in the first stages of the technological revolution.

In the third place, uniformities, especially of material objects and the habits which are related to them, have been extremely valuable in the United States, where the problem was the development of a culture to be held in common by adults coming to a new physical and social environment from many very different environments. Understandably, Americans are bound to feel that a pattern which turned millions of diversely speaking newcomers into loyal Americans in such a short time must be a very valuable and useful one. But two cautions are necessary here. In areas of extreme immigration some

sorts of uniformities, either material or nonmaterial, will almost invariably be invoked. But the needs of a receiving country are quite different from the needs of peoples, who at home in their own countries nevertheless wish to become part of a commonly valued world. There will be a danger that Americans will overvalue technological similarity, as was seen during the occupation when German culture tended to be valued above French culture because of the superior sanitary arrangements. Wherever they find them Americans may acclaim those people who appear to have or want most the same technology, as advancing most rapidly toward membership in a world community, and they may back up with disproportionate enthusiasm the efforts of those groups in other countries, who may be alienated from their own culture in their effort to force Westernization upon their peoples prematurely. Useful correctives to this American attitude may be a vigilant awareness that, while it is natural, it is also ethnocentric and a conscious emphasis on the quite different sets of uniformities which France or an Islamic country, for example, might seek among other peoples of the world.

It is necessary for this generation to work at high speed if the whole of the modern world, if not the whole of humanity, is to be rescued from destruction. It has been found most efficient where science is to be applied to human affairs, dependent as it is upon human nervous systems and human learning for implementation, to work simultaneously on a clarification of our major sense of direction, on basic research which will increase both the clarification and the methods for directing social change, and upon immediate practical steps which will both develop a supporting climate of opinion and facilitate the directions in which we are seeking to move.

In this connection it seems important to emphasize some of the steps which may be taken to develop a world climate of opinion favorable to the development of world community—a better phrase I feel than "*The* World Community"—for there is no need for a definite or indefinite article when there is known to be only one such phenomenon in the universe. Each step should be inspected in terms of its internal consistency with the over-all set of values and evaluated as a long-term as well as a short-term measure. Among such steps one might list the development as rapidly as possible of ways in which one or more world-wide organizations become individually meaningful to every person in the world, to the school child as he enters a schoolroom or puts a date on his theme, to the citizen as he

posts a letter, pays his taxes, reads a book, or picks up a newspaper. There are innumerable devices, well known to historians and political scientists, which have aided in the sense of common membership in previous societies which have been assembled from adjacent, relatively hostile, or unrelated bits into a whole.[4] Types of organization which include whole occupations or interest groups throughout the world, but which will have a symmetrical relationship with other such world-wide organizations, should be encouraged. Varieties of overlapping regional organizations different for each function can be very valuable if they are seen as growths toward a world culture and not as mere administrative subdivisions, dependent in their varying size on the varying budget of different governmental agencies. Elections for world organizational functions, through which the peoples of the world learn that the issues involved are important, should be encouraged, and devices by which individuals can be nominated in one country, but might run for election in a second country,[5] could be experimented with. The functions of large-scale business enterprises which cross existing national borders should be articulately explored rather than relegated to arguments between opposing political ideologies alone. Religious groups which provide a great source of moral force but often conflicting and discrepant operations in this field should be encouraged to reassess their peculiar strengths and weaknesses in promoting a sense of world community. Unless there is a definite attempt to introduce such measures, *pari passu* with the development of an over-all sense of direction, and the encouragement of the necessary basic research, the urgency of the actual world situation may be such that the best efforts of the social scientists may fail.

In summary it may be said that world community seems most likely to be attained by working toward certain over-all abstract and inclusive values, within which the different peoples of the world, who now see one another as separate, competitive, or unrelated, will be able to feel themselves a part, the cultures of each regularly related to the whole to which all give allegiance in different ways congruent with their own cultural values. Thus we would be working toward the type of multidimensional world culture, within which there would be interdependence of diverse values rather than a world in which any one interest or function so dominated the others that single value scales, competition, and destruction were the concomitants.

4. This is a point which has been particularly emphasized by Frank Tannenbaum.
5. A device which has been suggested by Gregory Bateson.

I have not attempted in these introductory remarks to deal with the assumption in the statement of the problem that we are approaching a greater homogeneity in world cultures at the present time. To discuss this subject properly demands a presentation of types of heterogeneity which result from primary and secondary types of culture contact, which make it possible to contrast the character structure—and thus the culture—of the inhabitants of Topeka or Sioux City or Pottsville with that of the character structure of very slowly changing cultures such as we find in most primitive and isolated societies. For the word "homogeneity" to apply to Eskimo culture, Chinese culture, and modern American culture, considerable requalification and refinement is necessary. Any complete consideration of the question as set will have to face the types of personality which are emerging all over the world under technologically and politically accelerated culture contact and the very special problems which they present.

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DISCUSSION OF WORLD CULTURE

MR. WRIGHT: In a small committee that discussed this afternoon's session we agreed it would be best to use the word "community" in the sense used by biologists; that is, a group of people who are in some degree of material contact with one another through geographical proximity or regular means of communication and transportation. When we wish to suggest the existence among the members of a group of some sense of solidarity or of belonging to the whole, we might use the word "society." The title of the Institute, "The World Community," was given with that thought in mind, though I fear some inconsistencies of usage crept into the initial statement. We wanted to be objective, and we assumed that there is a "world community" in the sense that there is a certain amount of contact and of material interdependence among all the peoples of the world. The problem is: Do we want to develop that community so that it will be more of a community and even a society?

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

MISS MEAD: Those who have read my paper may recall that I have used the word "community" in a different sense. I did not understand it was to be used in the ecological or biological sense, and I used it more or less as a value statement as does a town planner or sociologist when he contrasts a motor slum, for instance, with a well-integrated group of people living together as a "real community." So in my paper the word "society" should be put in place of the word "community."

The problem given me was "*World Culture:* The patterns of technology, language, custom, and values prevailing among peoples of the world and the tendency of these patterns to become more or less alike. What effect will increasing homogeneity of cultures have upon material contacts? Upon loyalties? Upon institutions?"

That might be regarded as a sheerly analytical question to which one could give, in the light of what one knew, a descriptive, nonvaluational answer. I might have so taken it and concerned myself merely with the question of the degree of similarity or dissimilarity or homogeneity developing over the world. However, we also were

presented with quite a long statement on the world community which contained a number of statements which also implied value. I took them to mean that world community was a goal we wanted to reach and that these statements said that this was the way to get there.

In rephrasing these evaluating statements, I threw out the word "uniform" because we have found in anthropological studies that the idea of uniformity is exceedingly unrewarding. It has been found to be more rewarding to look at the behavior of a group of people who share a common tradition and to observe the systematic regularities in that behavior rather than merely to observe the uniformities. To observe the behavior of the master and the behavior of the slave, the behavior of men and the behavior of women, the assertiveness, the nonassertiveness, the compliancy, and to recognize that, while middle-class values may be discrepant with lower-class values, all are recognized and all are included in one system. It seems more profitable, scientifically speaking, to speak of *regularities* rather than of *uniformities*. The idea of regularities is more congruent with human culture as we use the concept.

I should stop there because somebody used the word "culture" in connection with political and economic behavior. I use the word "culture" to include the whole of traditionally transmitted behavior in any group. I would regard a separation out of the political institutions, the economic institutions, and the linguistic institutions as merely a further degree of abstraction which anthropologists and some social scientists use to analyze this total traditional behavior.

Anthropologists generally find that the idea of regularity and diversity, of dovetailing, interlocking, complementary diversity of behavior, is far more useful in describing a culture than is the picking-out of uniformities. Furthermore, even the very simplest cultures have enormous degrees of diversity within themselves. It is the diversities, the complementary characteristics, that give the culture its strength. On the other hand, when, as in culture-contact situations, the complexities of two cultures meet, and both of them can be seen in the same frame of reference, there is a tendency toward uniformity and competition, very often destructive competition, because of the oversimplification that results when two incommensurable complexities are brought close together.

The suggestion that we would move closer to a world society if we had greater uniformity has, therefore, to be scrutinized in the

light of the fact that increasing uniformity increases the possibilities of competition and of conflict and does not necessarily make for greater integration and understanding.[1]

For instance, nationalism is probably one of the great uniformities, and a very small country and a very large country, a very rich, diverse country and a very poor country, and a very old country and a very new country can all compete with each other in terms of the idea of nationalism. The idea of "one true God" is another uniformity that we have sometimes had recourse to as a possible (I was going to say "unifying") integrating factor in the world; but it is the most magnificent source of conflict also, of course, because all we need are two peoples, each with the "one true God," to get an unlimited amount of conflict rather than any degree of understanding.

So that, if instead of working toward uniformities one worked toward frames of reference within which diversities could be fitted together, the evidence that I handle as an anthropologist suggests that we would have a better chance of integrating the world into a world society than if we emphasized these simple single ideas like nationalism, for instance, which make it possible for people to reach so many conflicting positions.

I included the word "certain" in that statement to read: "the more the people of the world recognize *certain* symbols, values, and purposes." The question is: Are we discussing uniformity? Or are we discussing what will be integrating ideas? Are there certain values and certain symbols which could be valued by all peoples so that they could fit in their diversities together? If so, one of the criteria of selection would be the extent to which they *are* unifying ideas.

"Freedom of religion" is a much more unifying idea than "one true God" highly specified; that is, specified as to which Scriptures he was manifested in, who was his prophet, and which commandments he insisted upon. But the idea that freedom is important or even the idea of respect for religion is the sort of framework within which we can put diverse and, on a simpler level, conflicting ideas.

Also, I changed the phrases "aware of" and "identify themselves with" to the phrase "recognize certain symbols, values, and purposes as both their own and those of all the other peoples of the world." We do not want one value system with which everybody would

1. Gregory Bateson, "The Pattern of an Armament Race," Parts I and II, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September and October, 1946.

identify himself in a direct line relationship, but we want each people to realize that there is a relationship between themselves and those symbols that might become world symbols. It is a shift from a concrete position to a relationship position which may be illustrated from the arts.

If we take a group of American children and try to teach them to appreciate Chinese art, we don't get very far. We don't get very far if we try to take a group of American adults and give them Chinese music. But if we have a group of people who have been taught to paint or carve or draw and then give them some experience of Chinese drawing or carving or painting, they can say, "That man is trying to do something with a pencil or something with a tool that is something like what I am trying to do." Even though they add, "The thing he produces is awful," according to the usual opinion in one country of the artistic products of another, they can still say, "I never would make it like that, and I don't know why he wants to make it, but apparently the making is comparable."

If we could think of a world system in which people learn to value the fact that other people value certain ideas rather than to agree on common, concrete symbols or values, we would have an order of homogeneity, an order of understanding, which I think would be more valuable than an attempt to make everyone accept a single common symbol.

Then I took the word "community" in the other sense that I mentioned earlier and compared what we know about the difference between "uniform" communities, where the people belong to one class or follow one occupation, and highly diversified communities. This is the ordinary American sense in which we have a "community" chest, and perhaps it might be simpler to say "town" at this point.

We know a great deal about the differences between large towns in which almost everybody follows the same occupation and is limited to very much the same way of life as compared with the degree of integration in the kind of town where many people make their living there as well as living there, where there is a high degree of interdependence, of diversified functions instead of simple functions. Quite a few people here have lived in Washington or Hollywood and know what a one-industry town is like; even when it is diversified in every other count, they know what the singleness of occupation does to the social life and what it does to the pace and

tempo and character of the community, if we can call any one of them that in its valuational sense.

So, whether we think of a culture made up of items of behavior systematically patterned, or whether we think of a town made up of people in elaborate functional relationships to one another, in either case greater strength seems to come from systematic diversity, interrelated diversity, than from a breakdown into simple competitive uniformities.

In the one-class town we find significant things. For instance, we have materials on families with incomes of $15,000 a year in wealthy suburbs and in small communities where there are only two or three families with such an income. In the latter case the family has an upper-class psychology and a high degree of security and serenity. In the wealthy suburb each family is keeping up with the Joneses to a degree that one would normally associate with a $5,000 income. There are so many people with the same income that we get a highly competitive pattern. Their income does not reduce the need to compete, because there are too many people with the same income.

That may seem a mundane illustration, but it shows how the introduction of uniformity into a situation carries its own penalties.

From the standpoint of building a world culture within which all the different peoples of the world will be able to live with a sufficient degree of recognition of their joint participation in that world, we must appreciate the place that diversity can play. Each part must be seen as a part of the whole, a different but necessary part of the whole, so that the whole is never complete without all the parts.

What makes a world culture? Just a sum of two hundred up-and-coming cultures? Well, then, if we destroy one, we have one hundred and ninety-nine. It does not make much difference. But if we build our picture so that each culture in the end contributes an element that no other contributes and then value our whole, we cannot withdraw or slay or mop up or wipe out any one of those elements without the whole feeling the loss. One of our principal problems is to give each people in the world a sufficient investment in the whole so that they will be willing to work to preserve it.

After I had made all these value statements, however, I was still faced with the question: What is happening? What uniformities are spreading? What is the significance of the trend? I took technological

uniformities particularly for the reasons that Mr. Riesman brought up earlier.

We can look at the technological uniformity that is spreading over the world, the electric-light bulb, the telephone, the motorcar, all of these technological inventions which have a high degree of similarity because of the nature of the technological process. We can say, on the one hand, that it is a good thing to have them spread all over the world; then people can move from one place to another: they reach for the telephone, and the telephone is there, and they reach for the electric-light switch which is there in a known place (of course, it never is in the United States). The capacity to move freely from place to place, with similarity in all the mechanics of living, will facilitate travel, will facilitate interrelationship, and, of course, will enormously reduce the irritation of Americans wherever they go. We must always add that.

But there is always the possibility that, if we standardize the external aspects of life, the material aspects of life which technology makes possible, we may travel with exceeding ease but introduce a very firm barrier between ourselves and the people of the country we visit. This may be true whether we go as a commercial traveler or as a State Department official or as a tourist or as a student. I do not consider that we build a world community just by letting people travel abroad. We must consider what happens when they travel abroad if we want to think of how a world society may emerge.

We probably have all experienced the difference between going into another country where there is a first-class hotel and going into another country where there isn't a first-class hotel. If there is a first-class hotel, our relationships with people will probably be on a much lower level than in one of those funny little hotels we provincials used to stay in in France after the last war.

So it is possible that if we had areas—and such areas may very well develop, especially in the international field—where there is one language, where the techniques, the arrangement of rooms, and all the living conditions are highly standardized, any greater relationship between people may be impeded. It has been suggested that a dichotomy might grow up between the travelers and the stay-at-homes on this basis. The well-traveled might actually contribute to a split in understanding, to the increasing ethnocentrism of the others.

On the other hand, as our technology, our international procedures, our system of education, or our baby clinics spread, each of these inventions might be put into the hands of nationals of the country or members of the local culture. Then these techniques or procedures will inevitably be altered as they pass through culturally different hands. Thus, each person who meets a member of another society who handles a telephone or handles a committee will be faced with that difference in a way that becomes real to him. This may be a device for enormously increasing the comprehension between different cultures.

If we go to England and meet a telephone, we are faced by two perfectly enormous objects called Button A and Button B. If we make a mistake before anyone will explain it to us, we are told gently but inexorably "to press Button B and get your money back." It is very frustrating at the time, but we learn much about the British character as we do it. By the time I had done it five times, I learned a lot about questions in Parliament and the whole British system of insisting that people learn their way around.

So, as the uniformities spread over the world, and they will—baby clinics, nutritional standards, all the standards of natural science, technology—I think we should hope that in every case they be intrusted to a group from the local culture so that we will end up with Chinese telephones and Chinese automobiles and Chinese committees and not superficial, thin-layer versions of American committees in China or something Chinese in America.

There is an extraordinary danger if we encourage and foster—and we are likely not only to approve of but also to foster—the spread of uniformities over the world, either technological or sociological procedures, and especially procedures that alter people's ways of living. If we introduce motorcars into a society where the girls have been chaperoned and where the chaperoning system is dependent upon stationary dwellings and is utterly unadjusted to motorcars, or if we introduce food patterns that will upset relationships between parents and children, we will set in motion over the world the type of behavior which in primitive societies we call a "nativistic cult" and which we know as "nationalistic movements." A people whose habits are threatened by such changes will respond by overemphasis on the past and on consolidation of their customs, slowing down the process of developing communication at just the points where it is needed.

The historians can certainly give examples here. The fact that Ireland went back to its former language is certainly a loss in international communication. It was very nice for the children because they could talk a language their parents could not understand, but it certainly did not increase communication between the two generations in Ireland and over the world.

So there is a danger that the technological engineer may push a given population too far and then get a reaction which enormously slows down the process of building a world society in the very places where it probably would be felicitous.

In addition to having some idea of a direction in which change might go, and whether that direction should be aimed at uniformities or aimed at quite abstract frameworks within which a large number of superficially conflicting systems may be recognized as complementary diversities; and in addition to recognizing some of the necessary steps that we ought to take to prevent the inevitable uniformities in technology from doing harm, it is also important to realize that we want a climate of opinion in favor of the direction of change that we are taking. That climate of opinion will consist of an effort either to reach uniformity or to maintain a great variety of means of reaching a functional and interrelated diversity.

This group might make a number of semiconcrete suggestions of ways for creating climates of opinion favorable to the creation of a world society. One of the things we need is more ways in which individuals can feel themselves identified in some way with some symbol which means the world.

The idea of a United Nations means one thing to people to whom government is a father and another thing to people to whom government is a mother and still another to people to whom government is a boss. Nevertheless, the United Nations stands there as a symbol that can be reinterpreted in all those different ways. If we had devices by which the child who enters the classroom, the clerk who stamps a paper, the citizen who puts postage on his letter when he sends it out, anyone who gets a passport, by which every individual in his acts, would get some picture of belonging in some sort of world-embracing organization, that might create the climate of opinion within which it would be possible to go further and faster in world organization.

It is important to consider to what degree regional organizations —whether they are economic or professional or cultural in the

UNESCO sense—may contribute to the development of this sort of integrated but diversified world. If we look at the history of the United States, we will see that if a regional group grows out of the particular needs of that region, and then other regional groups grow out of the situation in other regions, and then they are built together, we get a different sort of integration than the sort we get if we start with the world and divide it up into four quarters, or six if our agency has enough money. That sort of regionalization, which we have had in the United States between competing governmental agencies with different budgets, might very well develop in the various world organizations. It leads to competition and confusion in most instances, because the regions are artificially equated, because they are subdivisions of a budget. On the other hand, if regions are units that had been built up and gradually put together because they fitted together, we get a very different picture.

Then I would hope that we might make some sort of recommendation about the integrative force of different sorts of economic organizations, including those evil things called "cartels." We should look at them in terms of what they do to bind groups together and not on sheerly ideological grounds. Certain forms of business organization which on many ideological grounds could be heavily condemned are nevertheless making for certain sorts of integration over the surface of the earth.

Certain procedures might bring to the peoples of the world some sense of world issues. Elections are a very good instance of that. To an anthropologist, one of the important things about an election is that people get out and argue about the importance of being elected and that it is a place where issues are brought to people in a way that no world issue is actually brought to people today without a national coloring.

Finally, I would like to come back to the point that Mr. Riesman anticipated today—that we have found in this country that, on the whole, uniformity is a good tool. He said we had had perfectly horrible results. That is an evaluational judgment. I don't consider the results are so horrible as that. I think in this country we have done an incredible job in taking adults from other cultures and from other economic circumstances, and in many cases from a religious background that was quite incompatible with that which they entered, and making them into Americans. We have done it by rather super-

ficial uniformities, but we were working on adults who came as individuals into this country.

If we took our enormous dependence upon soap and different kinds of shoes and an Arrow collar and a haircut and the whole series of things that we have used to impose on a heterogeneous mass of people coming from different older homogeneities into this country, if we took that as a formula for the world and, as Mr. Reisman said, export the "melting pot," we would be doing something completely different. We would be dealing with people who are at home and want to stay there. Americans find it hard to believe this to be possible. Their picture of foreigners is of people waiting in line to get into the United States. With a large proportion of the peoples of the world trying to deal in their own way with these problems, such as industrialization and urbanization, to believe that export and imposition of technological uniformity would be the same order of solution that we have got in the United States would be very dangerous.

UNIFORMITY AND DIVERSITY

MR. WRIGHT: The word "uniformity" might be applied to evaluations of different degrees of generality. It is one thing to say that the world should be uniform in the sense that all people admire the same form of haircuts, but it is another to say that the world should be uniform in the sense that all people define a certain effort of individuals as artistic production and have an appreciative feeling about that effort. As I understood Miss Mead, she thought that it might be desirable to have uniformity in the latter sense—in the sense that everyone can define an American artist working, a Chinese artist working, and an Arabic artist working as efforts to produce art and can assume the same attitude toward efforts to produce art whatever form it may take.

MISS MEAD: Not "the same attitude"; he simply puts them within one frame. He says: "Well, he is an artist too. He isn't the kind of guy I am, and he does not do it the same way, and he isn't making the same thing, but it can be brought within a common frame." He still has to realize that the Chinese won't work at the same speed, and it won't mean quite the same thing, but it will be embraced within a common frame of reference.

MR. WRIGHT: But he defines it as art, and, having defined it as art, he has a certain reaction that it is a noble occupation or whatever it is.

Miss Mead: Yes, comparable but not identical or even necessarily very similar.

Mr. Harley F. MacNair: Isn't Miss Mead arguing that Americans should become less provincially minded apropos the remarks made with respect to art?

Miss Mead: No, I would say that is just as true of the Chinese as it is of the Americans, just as true of a Russian or a Frenchman as of an American. I am talking about provincialism in the sense that each country has certain things that have proved valuable to it and others that haven't, and we have to assay the field very carefully before we recommend our formulas to the rest of the world, especially when America is such a different thing from the rest of the world.

Mr. Polanyi: I think that Miss Mead is rightly insisting on diversity and variety of values and that she considers this an attitude which should become general. The valuation of variety per se is the opposite of emphasizing the value of uniformity. Diversity is what we need and should stress as a constitutive feature of world civilization.

TOLERATION AND APPRECIATION

Mr. James Luther Adams: Is it assumed that community or society is established or more nearly approximated if people recognize the common ultimate category of the activity; if not, what is the presupposition? Does the fact that one community recognizes certain activities of another community to be religious ritual necessarily bring the two communities any nearer together?

Miss Mead: I am starting where we are. I am not saying that a community that contains Catholics and several kinds of Protestant and Jewish religious groups is more of a society, a more integrated society, than, say, a society that is completely Catholic or completely Methodist, because that is a much more complex problem.

I am starting with the world as we now have it, which contains a large number of mutually irreconcilable elements if they are faced on the simplest level, and I am suggesting that we can raise our level of abstraction within which we include them. Instead of saying of Methodism and of two brands of Baptist theology that one is right and the others wrong and that we will fight until we die over it, we might consider Protestantism as a value including them all. If we include the Catholics, Protestants, and Jews in the Jewish-Christian

tradition, we have a value in which more religious diversities can in some degree be embraced without continued conflict. If we say both religion and rejection of religion are things of the human spirit which should be respected, we have got to a still higher plane. In saying "higher," I do not mean "more good," but I mean levels of abstraction in which more diversities can live without necessary conflicts one with another.

Mr. Derwent Whittlesey: Where will you aim—at the highest level or at the lowest possible level?

Miss Mead: I would aim at the highest, because I would think that each culture in the world had developed some potentialities of human beings better than others. So, from the point of view of the conservation of human invention and human experience, I would aim at the highest level. From our social experience of which kind of groups of people fit together best and stay fitted, I would aim at diversity rather than uniformity, because the uniformity is likely to produce competition.

Mr. Marschak: Isn't what you are advocating called "tolerance"? Tolerance rather than uniformity or diversity. Again a non-historian should not dare to answer this question, but isn't it true that world empires as a rule had tolerance, including even Islam, which started in an intolerant way but which spread and maintained its stability as a tolerant community? The Roman Empire and the British Empire were tolerant. Perhaps it is true that one condition of the supersociety is tolerance. Or is the Spanish Empire a counter-example?

Miss Mead: I would use a more positive word than "tolerance"; I would use "positively appreciate and give a place to."

ACCOMMODATION AND NATIONALISM

Mr. Schultz: But your comments are pretty largely around the word "accommodation." In terms of a theory of accommodation and in that setting what you said appears valid. You use the terms "certain symbols, values, and purposes" which will achieve a society, and then you stressed the terms "integrating" and "unify."

Miss Mead: Not "unify."

Mr. Schultz: "Integrating" was your term? Integration by accommodation might be contrasted with the kind of world we have had in more recent history, in which integration has been nationalism. We might ask ourselves whether you are not putting up a com-

peting theory which may well have real merit. If I take you into a real world and consider India once more, is there any way of achieving this integration in India without nationalism, given the realities in that part of the world today? Can you integrate the communal systems that are a part of that society by "mere" accommodation? Aren't you forced to something very different, something akin to what nationalism has been in recent history in Europe?

Miss Mead: There may be somebody here who knows a good deal more about India than I do, but it seems to me a perfect case. On the one hand, we have Hinduism, which was one of the most inclusive and eclectic systems in the world and would say to any people with any bunch of gods one likes, "Come right in and sit down there, and, if we just don't eat your cooking, it's all right." The history of Hinduism is a history which emphasizes the enormous incorporative inclusiveness of pretty nearly everything. In Islam, on the other hand, we come upon the thesis that "there is no God but God, and Mohammed is His prophet, and if you don't like it, there is going to be trouble." So we have meeting in India those two positions. They have gotten into one spot, and the spokesmen of the world say to India, "You have to make up your mind about this." India is under a situational pressure, and within that it is possible that the only formula that anybody will apply to India is to get nationalism by civil war. That, however, is India in the world. We are talking about the world with the assumption that neither Mars nor Venus is going to affect public opinion.

Mr. Schultz: I was trying to put to test your theory of accommodation. It seems to me it makes a lot of sense in trying to relax the nationalism that plagues us in the Western scene, but, when we put it to the test in another part of the world, I don't see how we can break through with a theory of accommodation as you have outlined it.

Miss Mead: Maybe I am not understanding, but it seems to me there is a difference between a group of people sitting down and saying, "How are we going to integrate the whole world?"—it will have nothing vis-à-vis it, nothing over it, and nothing beside it—and what is possible within India at the present time with nationalisms all around it. We are trying to think here about how we could organize one world. The problem in India is two competing groups inside a world organized in competing groups, and it is exceedingly difficult out of that picture to get a formula for India alone.

Mr. Rensis Likert: Wouldn't your plan work the same in both cases? If Americans, for example, are determined not to be tolerant, or, even more positively, friendly or accommodating, your plan won't work. If in India one group or the other group refuses to be tolerant, your plan won't work. The conditions for building a society don't exist in India. If such conditions don't exist, we are going to have conflict.

Miss Mead: Only we have an essentially different problem, and I think we ought to face it. In organizing one unit with no other competing units in existence, the problem is different from that of organizing a unit that is still part of a whole group of competing units.

STANDARDS OF EVALUATION

Mr. Bloch: You spoke about "diversity" and "uniformity" and said "recognize certain symbols"; but the instrument of recognition is a standard of comparison, a standard of evaluation, and the more uniform we can make that standard of comparison or evaluation (evaluation means evaluation of concepts in comparison with a neutral concept), the more we are likely to recognize such values and appreciate them. This is the key problem in any comparative study of differing social organizations.

Miss Mead: Not one standard for the measurement of all but some common standards. Freedom of religion and freedom of speech, for instance, do that for this country, and they are not the same thing. They are two common standards that we can apply to a great many different forms of behavior.

Mr. Angell: I think Miss Mead's concept of a framework is too weak. I think that one must have some over-all uniformity. She doesn't want to call it uniformity because she thinks of uniformity as likeness, but uniformity can also mean that which is common. It strikes me that Miss Mead's artists in America and China do have a uniformity in common, which is an appreciation, if they are sculptors, of how one molds one's material and expresses one's self through it. There is something in common; it is something that they both share. It is true that the art produced is not alike, but that is not necessary for a degree of uniformity. We must remember the distinction between the like and the common.

Miss Mead: I am not objecting to the common. I am objecting to getting at commonness by likenesses and similarity.

Mr. Parsons: It is perhaps relevant to remark that common val-

ues may directly sanction diversity. A striking example is that the fundamental sentiments about the roles of the sexes are shared by both sexes. We don't have women having all the ideas about what women should do and men about what men should do, but each has sentiments about the role of both sexes, and I think your idea of diversity is entirely compatible with a system of common attitudes in all approaches so far as that is possible.

BARRIERS TO, AND FORCES OF, INTEGRATION

MR. WINFIELD RIEFLER: Are there not two aspects to this problem of integration? It seems to me that Miss Mead has addressed herself to removing barriers to integration. A common religion is a tremendous integrating factor. By getting religious tolerance, we remove that barrier as an integrating factor. Tolerance and appreciation of diversity remove a lot of barriers to integration, but they don't integrate. Hasn't Miss Mead really addressed herself to considering—in the here and now—how we can remove a great many barriers, but don't we still have to face the very difficult problem of what we will use as an integrating factor in a world society?

We can't use religion—the diversities are so great that the most we can hope for is religious tolerance. We can't use nationalism—the barriers are so great that the most we can hope for is tolerance of different nationalities in some less divided state. But where are we going to find the force that integrates a world society, that makes the world function as a whole once we have removed these barriers? I think that is the other side of the shield.

MISS MEAD: Of course, there are two sides to that. One side would be what sort of values we discuss, and the other side is what sort of organizational structure we will have to implement those values starting from where we are now.

MR. SCHULTZ: We have not discussed the values; we have only discussed the negative side—the removal of barriers.

MISS MEAD: I would say that freedom of religion in Rhode Island was an integrating factor. Rhode Island had a common value, and one of the latest expressions of it is quite fascinating. Rhode Island removed all settlement laws about a year ago, so that the whole United States could move into Rhode Island tomorrow and claim relief if they wanted to, which is fantastic but is a continuation of Rhode Island's set of values. Freedom of religion is a positive thing. I am talking about not only getting rid of the intolerance of mutually

intolerant religions but acceptance by the mutually intolerant religions on a higher level in an evaluational sense.

MR. PITMAN B. POTTER: I am troubled by Miss Mead's reply to the concrete case of India. I have the feeling that in the world at large we are confronted with something like the situation in India. Liberal pedantism and dogmatic intolerance are clashing in the world at large just as they are in India.

MR. MCKEON: I should like to return to Mr. Riefler's example because it seems to me that the case of religious intolerance is a perfect illustration of the operation of positive integrating forces as well as the removal of barriers to integration. Tolerance is widely possible only when such positive forces are operative. Religious tolerance took its earliest form in Great Britain at the time when it was extended to all sects except the Catholics. The Catholics were included in religious tolerance only when the differences between Catholicism and Protestantism ceased to be viewed as a political danger. Consequently, when there was an integrative force that made it possible to tolerate the two sects, religious tolerance came in. Much the same was true of the spread of tolerance—and the limitations put on it—in the United States.

The problem of tolerance in the world situation is very much like the problem of India. A series of tolerances can be established when we find the frame within which those tolerances will operate, and the grave difficulty is that in the case of many tolerances the formulation of the tolerance is itself a disruptive force. Both the Soviet Union and the Western democracies favor freedom of the press, but the freedom of the press is so defined that in terms of the Soviet conception the Western press is not free, and in terms of the Western conception the Soviet press is not free. This is not a mere propaganda difference. It is rather an illustration of the fashion in which tolerances can emerge only when there is a frame within which we can agree about the scope of the tolerance, not by locating its object, whether it be religion or the press, but by defining the manner in which "freedom" operates.

MISS MEAD: We are partly faced here with a time-perspective problem. As this problem was posed to me, it did not say, "What are we going to do with Russia in the next five years?" At the moment that seems to be what we are discussing.

MR. MCKEON: The problem is illustrated in the older problem of religious tolerance.

Miss Mead: It makes a difference whether we say, "What kind of world do we want?" Or, "Are there situations in the present world of the order of India, and what in the world can we do with them, provided we want a world of Type A or a world of Type B?"

If we say that a world of Type A is a world in which diversities are fitted together, and a world of Type B is a world in which one uniformity conquers all the others, and that B is more desirable than A or A more desirable than B, then our decision about what we try to do, granting that we may not be able to do it, will be different.

If England, at the time when they could not tolerate Catholicism because of the political strength of Catholicism, had decided that, therefore, they wanted a 100 per cent non-Catholic world and would go out and fight every Catholic country until they burned them up to get it, the results would have been different than if they had decided to treat the Catholic people with tolerance if it were not too dangerous.

Mr. McKeon: The problem can be considered on the most general basis of your analysis. If we take the arts as an example, to get away from the intricate examples of religion and the Soviet Union, it is not enough for the Western world to say, "He pushes a pencil; he is a funny guy; I don't like his art." That kind of tolerance is a poor basis for a world community as opposed to the possibility—and it is a possibility—that we can understand the art of India and the art of China. That would make a community of appreciation. The other would make a community of toleration in the sense that these queer guys can go their way but that we can't hope to communicate with them.

It seems to me it is the other part of integration and community that Mr. Riefler is seeking, that is, how shall we, once we stop shooting Chinese for indirect cultural consequences related to their habit of pushing their pencils as they do, learn to discriminate what is good and what is bad in Chinese art?

Miss Mead: I thought of those two as steps. We establish our common rubrics by an understanding that he is an artist too, as a step toward a world within which we would finally include in our definition of art Chinese art, Indian art, and Western art, and by that time people would be able to appreciate that complexity and all the contrasts in it as part of one common diversified whole. That was the time perspective with step one emphasized first.

Mr. McKeon: I see no evidence that that is the way in which cul-

tures evolve. Returning to the religious example, when Christianity appeared on the world scene, it presented a problem not unlike one aspect of the problem in India. The Christians were an uncomfortable people who refused to enter into the pantheon of the Roman religion, and their conduct did not satisfy current religious or civic requirements. They were not good citizens. They were persecuted. Yet a world empire emerged out of the resulting antagonisms, not by the development of an appreciation of what was common between paganism and Christianity but by the emergence of a Christian culture. The positive element was contributed by a complexity of historical forces.

If we are to plan a world community, we must learn something about the mechanisms by which not merely is a diversity appreciated but diversities are united in larger wholes. We must pick our wholes a little better, or at least by less violent means, than history has employed in the past.

Mr. Riefler: Can't we push that illustration further? Christianity was a tremendous integrating force, but the church was very wise in allowing a great diversity of practice underneath. It incorporated a variety of pagan rituals and thus met both tests. It preserved diversity but not that diversity which threatened integration. Over all there was an integrating force that was operative.

Mr. Parsons: From the point of view of the society of the Roman Empire, Christianity was a disintegrating force—a very serious disintegrating force.

Mr. Herring: It seems to me essential to keep in mind the various standpoints from which such relationships may be considered. I would agree with what Dr. Mead has said in so far as we in the United States are concerned; that is to say, we are looking *at* our culture and we are looking *out from* our culture to the other parts of the world.

In this culture of ours we have preserved a high degree of diversity and yet achieved a working degree of unity, and that to me is the meaning of American democracy. It is a system that makes diversity compatible with the unity required for "getting on with the job." Dr. Mead, I think, is suggesting that more of that would enable us to understand the rest of the world, and I think she is right. This problem of world relationships, however, is not simply our relationship to the rest of the world. We can understand our fellow-men "no end,"

but we would still be a long way off from world community because the relationship of the rest of the world to us is also involved.

So one question I would raise is whether it is possible to envisage in this attitude that Dr. Mead expresses—and it is really the traditional attitude of Western culture and rationalism with overtones of Christian charity—sufficient dynamism to link us with the rest of the world and to attract the rest of the world to us? Can this country in our present stage of development be linked to other parts of the world in quite different stages of political development?

One thinks, for example, of Sun Yat-sen's statement that we go from military unification to a stage of political tutelage and then to self-government. The problem of the world at the present time, it seems to me, is the relating of societies that may be in these very different stages of development. The problem not only is that of understanding and of accommodating ourselves to other societies but is also that of attracting them by some dynamic force or some myth or some creed or some positive factor that would serve as an integrating force in the terms that history has exemplified. In other words, my main question is whether we have in our own value system what it takes to get this larger unity.

THE UNIFYING POWER OF ABSTRACTIONS

Mr. Morris: We have had a dynamic tradition of exactly the type you mentioned. Whether it will continue to live for us, and therefore for other people, is certainly a relevant problem, but in terms of great historical forces of the sort we seek, our value system has certainly been dynamic.

I think Miss Mead has been calling our attention to problems of our widest objectives as opposed to the question of what to do next. I think that in the scientific community we have an illustration of the sort of thing she is talking about. On what does the unification of the scientific community rest? Well, it rests in a common commitment to seek reliable knowledge and then a commitment to use methods which prove best for realizing that goal. I think that is the only unifying force necessary within science, and it permits enormous diversity. What unites scientific scholars is not agreement upon a specific set of propositions but agreement upon goal and method. There may be conflict, rivalry, competition, and tension within the scientific community; it has diversity within a unity which is made possible by the larger kind of abstraction whose power Miss Mead

is pointing out. It seems to me that both in our own national tradition up to date and in the scientific community there is some indication that this sort of abstraction does have power.

Mr. Riesman: I wonder if we do not have today a propulsion in the notion that life itself is an art, the most difficult and most important of all arts, an art that today is perhaps not only difficult but almost impossible. If that realization should spread, as it seemed for a time to be doing in this country, might we not have something which could crystallize world opinion at least until roads are found toward tolerance for the specific arts of living of the various cultures?

Miss Mead: I want to go back to the word "accommodation" because I think it is important. I suspect it comes out of a sphere of discourse I don't understand. I am not proposing the order of tolerance that says if a system should arise in the world which would make the pursuit of the sort of goal we have been discussing impossible that one should just sit around and tolerate it. It could have been argued that naziism, if it had spread, would have threatened every one of the sorts of goals that I have been discussing. The countries that valued those goals could therefore only suppress it, using whatever methods were necessary, though I grant what Mr. Herring said earlier, that war is probably no longer a tenable solution if we can possibly avoid it.

I am not advocating accommodation in the sense that one should value anything that is around the place in any form. It has sometimes been said that in a democratic country one can permit people to question everything except the premise of democracy. There is something to be said for that position. If we say that we value a diversified world, we may have to crush a group of people who are becoming strong enough to threaten a diversified world. So I am not talking about just the milk of Christian charity, about sitting around and liking anything that grows up, or about accommodation in that sense.

Mr. Schultz: Have you pulled out of anthropology anything that will really integrate except political ideas such as nationalism? The rest seems to boil down to the milk of human kindness. I raised the test case of India. A number of solutions have been suggested but in a most abstract fashion. Can you give them any concrete significance, any meaning in terms of past historical situations, to which we can tie our knowledge and our thinking today?

Mr. Wright: I wonder if we could throw at Miss Mead the answer

which Julian Huxley tried to give in the formula of "evolutionary scientific humanism." He thought that was about the broadest and the most widely accepted unifying standard you could have. Everybody is a member of the human race, so everybody ought to have an interest in human beings and their welfare. Then, as Mr. Morris said, scientific method has been accepted as a pathway to truth. Finally, we have had to recognize that there are no absolutes, that everything is relative, that we live in an evolutionary world where everything, including values, continually changes. Huxley thought he had a formula which might serve to unify the various civilizations that exist or may exist, but he immediately ran into opposition. The spokesman of the Yugoslav government thought that formula unacceptable because too narrow. It did not, he said, embrace "dialectical materialism"; in fact, he thought it in opposition to "dialectical materialism."

I wonder if Miss Mead could give her reaction to that formula; can the anthropologists see in it anything that might meet the challenge which Mr. Riefler and Mr. Schultz have presented.

Miss Mead: The difficulty was that Julian Huxley was giving his particular position—partly British, partly Western—which would naturally be met by opposition from the rest of the world. I don't believe that one civilization can give a formula that will spread throughout the world without force. None of us doubts that if one country wants to conquer the world and takes conquering the world as its dynamism, that might happen. We could sit here and argue whether we can get the best results for the world by going out and conquering it, and having first a military dictatorship, then political tutelage, and then constitutional forms, ending up with as high a degree of uniformity as we can get. The other method would be to have a set of values that will be built up from different societies.

It is much more difficult to envisage any initial steps in a situation as dangerous as the one we are in. It is a very different kind of goal because it means that we will never get these final abstract phrases until each civilization has made a contribution to them. It means that Western Europe cannot think them up for the world any more than China can think them up for the world. We have thought them up in large lumps. We have had integrative forces in Christianity, in the Chinese Empire, and in Roman law. I am arguing that the next step has to be contributed to by each of those and many others.

Mr. Herring: I can see how a certain impetus might come from our society as an expression of social forces with which we are famil-

iar. There are many of us here who want to understand the rest of the world, and I think there is some impetus for that in the line that you take, but is there any impetus in Chinese society or in the South Sea Islands so that the process might also work in the other direction? Is there any impetus in these other societies toward attitudes of understanding and search for integration which are, I think, expressed in our society at this stage?

SURVIVAL AND UNDERSTANDING

MR. MARSCHAK: It seems to me that we exaggerate the importance of understanding one another's ways of life. The problem is much more brutal. It is not true, I think, that American farmers do not understand the way of the life of the Russian farmers, and vice versa. Perhaps the Russian farmers use less soap, but by and large they do the same type of work and have the same type of living as the American farmers. The same is true of industrial workers and even of soldiers and of policemen and of artists and, of course, of scientists. Americans and Russians understand each other. It is perhaps more difficult with the Orientals, but those who have lived in China have learned to understand the Chinese. Perhaps the problem is not one of cultural understanding but a more brutal one. I suggest three possibilities, two bad ones and one good one.

The two bad possibilities are these. The first possibility is that there is a geopolitical difficulty, an antagonism which has very little to do with ideologies or values, conflict of power between two countries which occupy, each of them, one-third of the world.

The second possibility is the ideological conflict, not in the sense that people believe in different values, but in the sense that the governments are organized differently. We had examples of this during the French Revolution, when there was a decade of wars based on the difference in constitutions. We now have it again. We have fifth columns and all the difficulties arising out of this. I think the solution of this problem is neither obstructed nor helped by studies of cultural evaluation.

The third possibility, the good one, is the one which I think Mr. Riefler suggested and which is also a very brutal one: simply the desire for survival. It is possible that the fear of death which now threatens peoples and governments of all countries may prevail and that the love of living or the desire to survive may be an integrating force.

Perhaps these brutal political, even biological, problems of who shall survive are the ones which bother us and not the problem of understanding one another's ways of life.

MISS MEAD: I would really like to say this fairly definitely. I am not talking about charity, tolerance, understanding, or cultural understanding or anything of that sort. I am trying to talk about what sort of a final world is most likely to stick together once we have it, and just that one point. I am not talking about appreciating anything just for the love of it. If you are a town planner and you have the choice of putting all your lowest-paid workers over here in one lump, your middle class in one lump, one kind of industry in another lump, or to diversify your whole living structure so as to have all sorts of people together, which one is going to keep streets clean, have less juvenile delinquency, fewer fires, is a technical problem. I am handling this cultural problem in the same tone of voice.

If we aim at uniformity, we may have to have one part of the world fighting another; we may possibly be saved by a fear of atomic and biological warfare. This would be a temporary integrating force which would save us for the next step—the problem of what we are aiming at if we are to make a final world. What kind of a world would be likely to live and likely to last? I am not talking out of Christian charity and appreciating the Chinese at this point at all, but simply what do we know about types of societies that are most competitive and most destructive? It is those societies which have the largest uniform value scales that kick each other in the face. But look at a society like China with enormous interlocking systems. It has lasted a very long time. I am talking about survival. I am not talking about any milk-and-water sentimental tolerance.

MR. LOUIS GOTTSCHALK: The history of nationalism indicates, I think, that where we already have something in the way of a national unity, we may permit various religious, linguistic, and cultural diversities to exist. But our problem is: What are the means, the avenues, by which to achieve that unity within which diversity is permissive? With regard to nations, that problem is not easy, but it is certainly easier than with regard to the world as a whole. Even in countries that are diversified in religion and in language, like Belgium and Switzerland, we have a common culture, a common history, certain common symbols, and a certain amount of police force to keep them unified. Without these unifying factors, it seems to me, the problem of permissible diversities is rather gratuitous. The problem

we ought to be tackling is: What unities already exist or can be cultivated that will make it possible for the world to reach that state where diversities are permissible?

MISS MEAD: If that is what we want. If it isn't what we want, we could discuss the other problem.

FIRST STEPS

MR. WARNER: Suppose we accept Miss Mead's proposition for the purposes of discussion. As I gather it, she says that we ought to have a goal where diversity is recognized, not because we want to be good but simply because, if we accept that as a goal, we are more likely to get a unified society and a way of acting together in a world community. If we accept that as a proposition for a moment, then it seems we may get further if we ask this question: How do we get there?

I don't quite see how we can maintain a respect for diversity and appreciation of what it does for us if we haven't some way of instrumentalizing our respect for diversity.

MR. MACNAIR: I hope it is not impertinent to ask a question which I consider fundamental to the whole discussion. I refer to the point just made and the personal pronoun that the speaker of the evening and everybody else is constantly using: who is meant by "we"? We are constantly talking about "we." Are we speaking here as a bunch of college professors? Are we speaking here as a bunch of Americans who are trying to agree among ourselves upon a system for the whole world? It seems to me that *we*, whoever *we* are, have a tendency to be talking in a vacuum. Is it impertinent to ask, Miss Mead, who is "we"?

MISS MEAD: I only meant this group. I was given a definite mandate by the chairman of this group to present one anthropological view of a particular problem. I may have slipped, because I have a tendency to use inclusive pronouns, but the "we" I would attempt to use would be this conference, and, as I understand this conference, we are a group of social scientists who have been called together once to think about something.

MR. RIEFLER: Whatever pronoun we use, as a practical matter to get from where we are to a more unified state of the world, I think we ought to consider the next five years. That may not have been part of Miss Mead's speech, but it is a very important part of world unity. If everything goes to pieces in the next five years, there is no

point in discussing a long-range program at all. So I would like to reiterate the question that was raised a while ago: What practical proposals can we make to bring about during the next five years that state of affairs where some diversification can be tolerated within a unified world?

DEMOCRACY AND WORLD UNITY

MRS. BENEDICT: One of the things that the Western Powers have been emphasizing constantly is that we will assure democracy throughout the world, including Japan, by insisting on free elections. In American life the two are almost synonyms; popular elections are our most trusted instrument for realizing democratic values.

In view of the diversity of cultural arrangements in the world, however, it is unusual to find great human values implemented always by the same instruments. A political instrument so complex as Anglo-American popular elections is necessarily rooted in traditional habits of thought and behavior which are not duplicated in most of the world. For this reason general elections in India, for example, have constantly been sources of weakness rather than strength even when their fairness was guaranteed by British supervision. Generally in the world free elections are not an efficient instrument of democracy unless a nation is able to put into effect the Anglo-American premise that a minority is allowed to build itself up into a majority if it can. If its minorities have experience only of "going underground" when they are defeated, democracy is hardly effectively implemented by elections, however they are supervised.

MR. YOUNG: What is your alternative?

MRS. BENEDICT: In eastern European and in Asiatic nations I suggest that we re-examine our position, which is currently that popular elections have an absolute moral value. These eastern countries give this high moral value to community consensus rather than to rule by the majority. Their political ideal is expressed by including even the ruler in this consensus, and they express it in the constantly recurring phrase: "that the will of the ruler be the will of the people." If, as Dr. Mead suggested, we can be wise enough to consider seriously such alternative instruments for furthering democratic values as have been evolved in different nations of the world, we should have more chance of success than if we insist on their adopting our instrument. They can use our tool only after they have been conditioned by experience. Their social arrangements will have to be radically

changed before, for instance, they can democratically run even their local affairs by a party of the "ins" opposed by the "outs" as we do in the United States.

MR. RIEFLER: Does that mean that you suggest we should accept democracy for eastern Europe?

MRS. BENEDICT: I suggest that we concentrate our criticism of these European—and Asiatic—countries upon their examples of failure to observe universal democratic values, that is, upon their concentration camps, their purges, their communal violence, and shape our policy to underwrite greater economic and international security. If we are clear in this, and accept it in domestic and international policy, it will not be necessary for us to insist that they copy our election techniques. We rightly trust popular elections in the United States, but other instruments for achieving democratic values should not be ruled out. Certainly, consensus as an instrument of democracy is an ideal which has had an honorable history, and, where it is the traditional technique in any country, it should be taken seriously.

MR. MARSCHAK: Federations have existed built of states with different political mores and institutions. The German Reich included three republics, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, in addition to the kingdoms. In this country, on the other hand, no state can proclaim itself a monarchy. I wonder whether there are any precedents for a large degree of political tolerance as between the constituent states of any federal government.

MR. KENNETH E. BOULDING: As a temporary resident of Canada, I may say that, perhaps more than any other place in the world, Canada exemplifies the thing that Miss Mead is talking about. We have in Canada a country that does not make any sense economically, politically, religiously, ethnologically, or linguistically, and yet which holds together surprisingly well. The underlying situation in Montreal is precisely what exists in Calcutta or Jerusalem, and yet we sleep quietly in our beds. I am trying to find out why it is. It seems to me someone might study it with some profit. I suspect that the reason is that Canada did not get the blessings of independence quite so early as others and that, because of the dominance by foreign powers, the various groups in Canada—no doubt for Machiavellian reasons—were given some sort of political security. That security is at the back of this whole business. As a matter of fact, security is much more important than democracy. All this claptrap about democracy just makes me tired, really, because it is so divisive, and it

is so obviously going to blast the world to pieces, and particularly because of the high-and-mighty attitude we take about it.

As far as I can see, what happened in Canada is that for reasons of their own, goodness only knows why, the British authorities succeeded in giving to the French a certain feeling of security that has persisted. And it has persisted even with other groups to some extent, though it does not quite extend to the Japanese.

But if we are talking about the next five years, security may be the real question. We have to say to the Russians, "Within these boundaries we will defend the Soviet system," draw the lines, and then say, "These are the prescribed boundaries, and we will defend it. We don't like it, but we will defend it," as the British government said to the Catholics of Quebec, "We don't like you, but we will defend you"; that is, "you have security." As a result of that, Canada is there today. Instead of all this batting democracy around the world, I think security will be much better. But the trouble is that all the rest of the world is afraid that America is going to spread its democracy and that makes them feel horribly insecure; and, because they are insecure, they are missionaries.

This is another thing that is bothering me, and maybe you can throw light on it: Do you include missionaries in the over-all view?

Miss Mead: I think missionaries are spreaders of uniformity.

Mr. Boulding: I thought so! The thing that bothers me is that the more reasonable we are, the less likely we are to be missionaries and the less we get anywhere, and the only thing that makes people get anywhere is being unreasonable. The thing that produces missionaries is insecurity, and that is in our values. If we feel insecure about our values, then we will be missionaries all over the place because we have to convert everybody else in order to insure our own security. The whole trouble with the "sweetness and light" which we represent is that we are so intellectually secure because we are so reasonable that we don't want to persuade anybody else of anything; therefore, it is the people who are not intellectually secure who will inherit the earth. That disturbs me a great deal. I don't know whether there is any answer to it in anthropology.

Mr. Gottschalk: I don't believe that what the world wants at the present moment is security. If security were what the people in India wanted or what the people in Palestine wanted, it seems to me that they would try most of all to preserve the British Commonwealth of Nations. If security were what the Communists of China

wanted, they would want most of all to secure the unity rather than the disunity of China. I don't know what the world wants, but I doubt that it is security.

MR. BOULDING: I don't mean personal security but security for the thing that one values. On the whole, people don't value themselves very much. That is the whole trouble with the world; people don't love themselves, and they can't possibly love their neighbor.

MR. WRIGHT: I would like to ask Mr. Boulding why or how did the Catholics of Quebec become convinced that the British Empire was interested in their security?

MR. BOULDING: That is just what I don't know, and I can't find anyone who knows, either. I can't find anyone who knows anything about Canada.

MR. EVERETT HUGHES: The answer was quite simple. The British were afraid the French would join us in the Revolution if they did not give them their security.

MR. WRIGHT: I am quite sure if we could convince the Soviet Russians that Mr. Baruch's plan was designed for their security, we would have a very much happier world.

MISS MEAD: I would like to relate an experience I had with a seven-year-old boy a few weeks ago who had been listening to the radio with great care. He heard us mention the Soviet Union, and he said, "I hope we wipe Russia off the face of the earth."

"Why?" I asked.

"If we don't," he said, "they will wipe us off. Sooner or later, they will be stronger than we are and will wipe us off, so we had better wipe them off first."

"What would you think," I asked him, "of a man who looked at you and said, 'That boy isn't very big yet, but, if I let him grow, he will be big enough so that later he will kill me, so I'd better kill him now!' "

"I'd call the police," he said.

"Let us take all the police out of it, and then what would you do?"

"I'd tell other people, and they'd get him, because it would be wrong for him to try to kill me."

"But you want to wipe out Russia?"

"Yes," he answered.

"But you have just said it would be wrong to kill."

"But there isn't any law to stop me."

That is another way of saying what Mr. Boulding has been saying,

I think—that there isn't any law. The little boy went on to say, "If you are all alone with a rat in the closet, just you, and it is hard to kill the rat, it would be better to get a lot of other people too, because, if we alone wipe out Russia, the other countries won't like us later," which I thought was a very profound remark.

Mr. Boulding said we ought to guarantee within limits the safety of the Soviet Union. That "we" I think ought not to be the United States. If there were a possibility of a "we" that was the world, the whole world, including the Soviet Union—the British Empire at the time it was guaranteeing rights to French Canadians included the French Canadians whether they liked it or not—a wider whole guaranteeing something to a piece of that whole is the sort of thing that we could think about.

What I have tried to say is that our direction determines the means that we use and that if our goal is a uniform world and if we believe that that is the best thing for the world, then the means that we will take to implement it very likely will be quite different from the means that we will take if we believe in a diversified and a highly functional, complex world. We go at it differently if we want a different result.

As I understood the order of this program, we would discuss our major direction first and then, if we reached any consensus about our major direction, we would discuss the immediate threats and dangers to reaching that direction and the relationship between the measures we might be forced to take and the direction in which we wanted to go.

ARE CULTURES BECOMING MORE ALIKE?

Mr. Wright: We have been discussing the desirability of cultural diversity in the world. I would like to ask: Are cultures in the world becoming more or less similar? Not what we want, but what has been the trend in the last three or four centuries?

Miss Mead: I don't think we know the answer to that. I don't think we even know the answer, for instance, to whether in present European culture we are dealing with a cosmopolitan overlay of a basic diversity or a superficial diversification that has gone through stages of greater similarity, of greater diversity, and then an underlying older layer of greater similarity. I don't feel that for the world, and especially if one includes what we know of our various primitive societies, that we know the answer. I do not believe we would be

able to predict what we will think is diversity a hundred years from now. Historians in different periods have recorded such different things. If we emphasize technology, we get one sort of picture; if we emphasize social organization, we get another sort of picture; if we emphasize religious beliefs, we get another. It may be that a hundred years from now what we call "diversity" will be a speed of learning, the way in which our neurological networks are set up, or something that we don't even know how to discuss. Because each period has evaluated diversity and similarity differently, I don't believe we can answer that question scientifically.

MR. WRIGHT: You don't think there is a standard of measurement?

MISS MEAD: There is no adequate collection of the data.

MR. SCHULTZ: Has there been progress toward integrating forces? Leaving aside all these possible variations that have been historically popping up, is the world today more likely to reach the stage of being integrated than formerly? Are there four or five big pieces now rather than ten little pieces farther back?

MISS MEAD: There is not any doubt that we have increased the areas of our sets of political conventions and that that has made it possible to bring larger numbers of people into relationship. We have steadily increased our capacity for political integration until we have got to the possibility of organizing two worlds. I don't think there is any doubt we have got to that stage. The question is whether the next step is a more difficult step than any step the world has ever taken. That is a question I don't think we know the answer to.

MR. WARNER: If we accept the working definition of culture Miss Mead gave at the beginning of her discussion, we can say that there is much less diversity than there was formerly. We only have to think of what has happened to the cultures of the world in the last two centuries. There has been a tremendous reduction of cultures. Western civilization has been destroying other cultures. With all the social changes that have taken place in the spread of Western European civilization, things have happened to the social structures of other communities as well as in their technology. So I would say there is much more uniformity at the present time than there ever has been. I think it could almost be demonstrated quantitatively.

MR. WRIGHT: I agree with Mr. Warner on that. If one takes the period since the Renaissance, since the age of discoveries, when for the first time there was continuous communication among all the

large segments of the world, there has been a spread of the idea of science, for one thing. People everywhere recognize that the secrets of nature can be discovered by a certain method. There has also been a spread of the ideas of humanism. Other cultural ideas have spread pretty generally among the main cultural centers of the world. It would be an extremely difficult thing to measure, but I think what might be called a world culture has begun to develop, slowly and with a good many setbacks at various times in various parts of the world, but during the last four or five centuries several ideas have achieved almost universal acceptance.

Miss Mead: I would feel more that they were developments of threads and that it was possible that we could draw them together. Science is one of them, but if we look at Japanese science, it is extraordinarily unconvincing as showing whether a contemporary Japanese physicist is more or less unlike the contemporary American physicist than his predecessor of four or five generations ago was unlike an American scholar in some other category. But the American physicist and the Japanese physicist can talk together in a way that their predecessors could not, and that talking together is of enormous importance. These lines of science or humanism or nutrition that are developing around the world are certainly the lines along which we could hope to build a world system of communications.

Mr. Wright: Isn't there an understanding among the Japanese that if they want to build battleships or atom bombs or anything else from nature, they have got to pursue what we call "scientific method"; or if they want to cure disease, or do other things in which science has triumphed in the West, although they may act in a different way, aren't the Japanese convinced that that is the method by which to do these practical things that they may want to do?

Miss Mead: They have learned to do it that way. This is probably merely a question of what we are defining: whether we are thinking about whole cultures or about the threads of development of certain sorts of political institutions, certain sorts of technology, certain sorts of approaches which are netting themselves over the world and are certainly the lines within which a world society or aspects of a world society can develop. I don't think there is really any basic disagreement here.

Mr. Rippy: It seems to me that the world is moving toward material uniformity with accelerating speed. One great dynamic force

moving it toward material uniformity is corporate capital and the technology it can control. It seems to me this movement has been more rapid each year, and it won't be long until material conditions will be quite uniform.

Mr. Parsons: I would like to add to that by calling attention to the implications of these material conditions for social organizations and social structures on a long-run basis. I think there is no doubt but that modern, scientific technology can deeply penetrate a society only by transforming that society itself in some of the most basic aspects of its organization, that the structure which is required to operate this type of system is such that the society has to adapt itself. That includes profound repercussions in the family and the kinship relations. This process goes so deep that it is a major, perhaps the greatest, source of backfiring and of all sorts of disturbance in the process. I think it is a major factor in Japanese nationalism and aggressiveness. The same is true in Germany, which was industrialized with great rapidity and underwent very profound social changes from the mid-nineteenth century on.

So I think the process by which Western technology has spread throughout the world is a far less superficial thing than one might think, but it is also something that is sure to produce an enormous amount of disturbance as it really penetrates the Orient.

RELATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL TO SOCIAL CHANGE

Miss Mead: May not this difference in stages of technological development be awfully significant? May not things happen as in the backwoods of America, where people that never had telephones got radios and thus skipped a whole stage in technological development; or in the factory system or trade-unionism which one country borrows from another. So that in one way we may have greater uniformity after the whole world has accepted scientific technology, but differences may arise from the fact that different societies have accepted it at different stages. The Russians, for instance, are said to be copying Eton and abandoning coeducation just at the time that the English are broadening their public schools and introducing coeducation into the school system. Coeducation may be a natural result of the sort of changes we have had in our society, but, when things are going backward and forward in different societies, there is a possibility that a hundred years from now, after the whole world has been influenced by our machine technology, the enormous discrepancies

in accommodating to it in the different societies may present us with even greater diversity and more trouble than we have now.

MR. BLOCH: The last point brings out what I wanted to say: that a development means something entirely different in different countries. I, however, take exception to the statement that the Russians are copying Eton. Absence of coeducation does not mean acceptance of other peculiarities of Eton. In France the schools created by the French Revolution were not coeducational in principle, and we may find there a more interesting comparison. Although scientific development seems to have certain similar effects in all societies, in reality political and social processes continue to differ. We have differed this evening on the question whether political techniques, such as free elections, can be exported or whether security mechanisms used against inner enemies can be exported from one realm to another. Take, for instance, the notion of contributing to solution of the race problem by forbidding people to agitate against the minority. That is considered a very important factor in eastern Europe, but the method is not very easily exportable to the U.S.A. Political techniques, especially election methods, cannot be exported as can pure technology.

MR. WRIGHT: I am somewhat disturbed by Miss Mead's answer to my question when she said that we don't even know whether in Europe, for instance, we are dealing with a set of superficial diversities and a fundamental similarity, or the reverse. That means that we don't know where we are or where we were, and consequently we can't know where we are going. Furthermore, even if we know where we want to go, we can't know whether we are going there. We have, however, been making prescriptions on the assumption that we do know these things. I am very much disturbed.

MISS MEAD: I hope so.

MR. WIRTH: It seems to me we ought to answer that before we try to prescribe for the future.

MISS MEAD: If we don't happen to have the data to answer?

MR. WIRTH: I suppose the first step would be to get the data to answer it. Maybe that ought to keep us busy for a few months, to say the least.

MR. WRIGHT: I would like to ask Mr. Gottschalk whether Europe has been becoming more or less culturally unified during the past few centuries.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: We historians have a way of assuming that

things are so until the other social scientists unsettle us. Historians have generally gone on the assumption that in recent centuries there has been a tendency toward the Europeanization of Europe and also that there has been a general Europeanization of the rest of the world. If there hasn't, we will have to cut some courses out of our curriculums.

SYMBOLS OF THE PAST

MR. MACNAIR: Apropos Mr. Rippy's remarks it is worth observing from the point of view of history that, while the Japanese made such rapid progress in a comparatively short time technologically, at precisely the same time they were making almost equally rapid progress backward toward an ancient ideology. I don't believe there is a parallel in the history of the world to Japan's rapid advance along materialistic, technological lines and equally rapid retrogression to a very ancient ideology. I don't mean to infer that Japan's attention ideologically was directed entirely to the ancient past, but certainly its predominant ideology was toward the past at the time it was making such rapid progress technologically. I think that was a cause of the explosion.

MR. WARNER: We know a number of cases where new technologies and the resulting disturbances have led to strong movements attempting to re-create the past. People hope in that way to recover a sense of security during a period of trouble and anxiety when they are shaken by the new things in their culture.

MR. MACNAIR: To a considerable degree a similar process is now under way in China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. China is trying to do approximately what Japan did along materialistic lines—to have an industrial revolution. Now Chen Li-fu in his new "Life" movement is trying to resurrect the ancient Confucian thought.

MR. WRIGHT: I am interested in the assumption that the ideological trend in Japan and in China is backward. I suppose that means it is becoming less and less like our culture.

MR. MACNAIR: No, I am not assuming to judge of the basic value of the *kami* worship in Japan or Confucianism in China—far from it. I am simply saying that in Japan, from the latter years of the nineteenth century to Pearl Harbor, there was a revival of an ancient system of thought, that is, emperor worship, the so-called *Bushido*, and everything that went with it. In the case of China, the people

at the top, the most dominant individuals, are trying to twist the ideology from Western thought and democracy to the old values of Confucianism. I am not presuming to criticize Confucianism or emperor worship. I am merely saying that chronologically, historically, they are ancient forms of thought.

MR. HUGHES: I wonder whether we would consider that China was turning the clock back if she were to espouse Christian ideas.

MRS. LOUISE WRIGHT: Did not the Japanese turn the clock back for a modern political purpose? In that sense is it fair to say that they were going backward?

MR. MACNAIR: I did not say that they were going backward. I said that they were paying great attention to materialistic technology and for their own purposes which they found in the old system of thought. This made a marvelous foundation for nationalistic propaganda, far stronger than anything in the West I should say.

MRS. BENEDICT: It is fantastic, but there exist certain documents, interviews, and letters from Herbert Spencer advising the Meiji hierarchy on how to capitalize on emperor worship in order to make Japan a strong national power.

MR. RIPPY: I don't think the modern technology necessarily turns the clock back. It is a device that might be used for different purposes. Argentina, for instance, is the most technologically modern of all the Latin-American states, but the head of that state has turned back and is governing ideologically in terms of the fourteenth century. Maybe he fears the disruptive force of industrialism. His, however, is an imposed procedure. Dictators do that. I don't know that it would occur if one did not have a dictatorial system.

MR. HUGHES: That is the thing I meant to question by the example of Christianity. This turning to the past for unifying symbols to adapt to new situations does not have to be a conspiracy of a dictator at all. It is one of those human phenomena that we know about. It might very well be a conspiracy and a propaganda device in Argentina, but apparently there is something there that one can propagandize on. In other cases it arises as a very lively sort of religion. I don't think we ought to dismiss it as turning the clock back at all. Seeking a symbol in the past is not the same thing as turning the clock back and trying to restore the past in its entirety. Usually, if it is a real movement, it is a search for a symbol that comes up out of the people.

Miss Mead: But it may be a mechanism that produces greater diversity.

Mr. Hughes: Yes, indeed; not necessarily artificially induced at all.

Mr. MacNair: Regardless of the truth of the general statement, in the two instances that I cited, the movement did not rise from the people. It came from the top in the case of Japan and is coming from the top at the present time in China.

Mr. Rippy: Also at the present time in Argentina.

Mr. Wright: A good illustration of this looking-backward can be found in the history of British constitutional development. As I recall, they were always restoring the good laws of Alfred or of Edward or of Henry centuries later.

Mr. Hughes: In the West every group that wants to do anything is restoring primitive Christianity. Maybe it is artificial.

UNION OF THE UNLIKE

Mr. Morgenthau: It is clear that there may exist a discrepancy between technological development, on the one hand, and political and moral development, on the other. This conclusion is borne out by the general situation of the world from the political and moral point of view. If we take the situation that existed from 1648 to the partition of Poland at least, if not to the beginning of the French Revolution, and then again from 1815 to 1914, we will find that the world then was much closer to the ideal which Miss Mead has postulated than it is now. Even though the technological development was primitive in the period from 1648 to 1772 as compared with our own, yet there was exactly that kind of living-together of different entities, each conceding to the other the right to live according to its own conceptions. What we had then was a society of princes with the same code of honor and the same conceptions of national interest. We had a situation which Gibbon described as one of temperate and indecisive contests between states which were all agreed upon maintaining the European state system. If we compare that situation with the present one, we see how much farther we are removed from the idea you postulate than we were two hundred years ago. The question was raised whether we had records of political systems which had embraced widely divergent subordinate units and the example was given of the Germanic Confederation. Two other examples should be mentioned in that context. One familiar example is drawn

from the contemporary international field. Various international unions dealing with labor, communications, and similar technical subjects have been established during the past century. They embrace widely divergent types of states, governments, and political philosophies. One point commonly made in connection with them is that they prove the possibility of co-operation among states with widely divergent constitutional, cultural, and legal systems. Their success is, however, explained by the fact that the functions of these unions and agencies are strictly limited. They do not try to deal with the underlying diversities of legal systems and cultural patterns but are careful to leave them intact. Another example, familiar to all of us, is that of the Swiss Confederation, where there is great diversity among the Italians, French, and Germans. These illustrations suggest that it is possible under special conditions to have international co-operation while tolerating or positively encouraging cultural diversity.

Mr. Wright: The encouragement of great cultural diversities in the Soviet Union itself has frequently been referred to.

Mr. Marschak: I can understand how we can have a federation between a constitutional monarchy such as England and a republic such as the United States; both countries accept the general principles of tolerance. But is it possible for one part of a world society to be based on tolerance and for the other to be based on intolerance, or does tolerance mean that we have to forbid intolerance? Freedom of religion in Rhode Island did not mean that one was free to be intolerant of religion.

Mr. Potter: I think we do here reach a point which we should leave until we come to "Political Institutions."

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Mr. Wright: At this stage I will ask Miss Mead to make any concluding remarks that she wishes to make.

Miss Mead: I think that two major cleavages have been turned up this evening. Some of us wish to examine distant goals while others are so preoccupied with the present predicament of the world, which is so pressing and so immediate, that any discussion about distant goals seems useless, whether that predicament is seen as a threat of war that would annihilate the whole of modern civilization or possibly the whole of the human race, or whether it is seen in the less dramatic form of an inevitable conflict between ideologies. The latter

group seem to imply that discovery of relationships between ends and means is not important enough to waste time on. It probably isn't if the house is on fire. It is a question of one's estimate of how badly the house is on fire and whether there is a danger of not saving it at all. Then it settles down to a question of leaving arguments about ways and means until later.

A second question was raised by those, including myself, who opposed the group which felt that the question of diversity and uniformity was not merely an expression of an ideal but that a certain amount of data could be advanced to say whether a society could be better integrated with more or less diversity in it. I considered that I was presented with a technical problem of implementing a value position. One world was valued; how would we get there? Some of us, however, saw my statement as merely an expression of Christianity, or liberalism, or democracy, or Anglo-Saxon culture, that is, as a value statement rather than a technical statement. We are likely to get into that position continually, and it will be important to discriminate when we are expressing a value preference and when we are bringing our particular scientific disciplines to bear on a value goal which we have all assumed.

WORLD ECONOMIC CONTACTS AND NATIONAL POLICIES

By Kenneth E. Boulding*

A "COMMUNITY" is a group of people all of whom feel some degree of responsibility for all the others. This degree may be very slight indeed, but the difference between zero and a small positive quantity in this case is of great significance. The world at present consists of a number of national communities. The members of each national community, in so far as they are conscious of belonging to it, feel a slight sense of responsibility toward any other member of the same national community but usually feel no responsibility for people outside the national community. The responsibility which a conscientious citizen of Maine feels for a Californian may be very slight, but the difference between this degree of responsibility and the responsibility which he feels toward Mexicans, Chinese, and Japanese is precisely the difference between the future world community and the present world chaos.

It is the main business of political institutions to express the sense of responsibility which is the essential concept of community. This is, of course, particularly the case with responsible government; responsibility in government, however, goes deeper than the matter of the *form* of government; it is a matter of the *tests* according to which the actions of those in positions of political power are judged, by themselves or by others. Three rough stages of responsibility in government may be distinguished: (1) Government which judges its actions only with reference to some group in the society governed. The extreme case would be a completely nonresponsible monarchy in which the king ruled in his own interests alone without any regard to the interests of his subjects. (2) Government which judges its actions with reference to the effects on the whole population in the geographical area in which its jurisdiction runs. Democratic governments approximate to this principle, though they may "weight" the different groups in society somewhat differently; thus a southern legislator does not usually give the same weight to a Negro interest as to a white. (3) Government which judges its actions with reference to the

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effects on the whole world population, without confining its interest to people living within its own geographical jurisdiction. The growth of a sense of world community will inevitably force our criteria of judgment of governmental policy and actions further and further toward the third type.

It should be observed that there are distinct signs of movement toward world-responsible national governments. The Monroe Doctrine, the British Commonwealth, the growth of the feeling against "aggression," the development of international institutions—all are signs, feeble as they are, that national governments no longer take it as an axiom that their actions are to be judged solely according to the effect on their own citizens but that the effect of the actions of national governments on the citizens of other nations must be taken into account, however little weight may be given to it. The British Commonwealth, for instance, consists mainly in a certain tradition or habit of mind of mutual consideration in the framing of policies on the part of the constituent governments. If the British government, for instance, wishes to protect British butter producers by restricting imports, it will clap a tariff or a quota on Danish or Dutch imports without even so much as a "by your leave." In regard to New Zealand, however, it will be very tender; there will be conferences and discussions, and some attempt at least will be made to come to a mutually satisfactory arrangement. The sense of responsibility which the government at Westminster feels for the people of New Zealand, slight as it is, constitutes the difference between the Commonwealth and the nations outside. This sense of responsibility is to a considerable extent mutual. The development of a "world community" would not necessarily imply the creation of elaborate world political organizations, though it is true that the more national governments are committed to international obligations at all levels of policy, and the more their powers are hedged around by supernational authority, the better chance the world community has to grow in the minds of men. The "World State," like all others, is primarily a state of mind, a habit of behavior. Formal institutions of world government in this stage of development are mainly important for their effect in creating habits of behavior on the part of national governments in conformity with the sense of world community.

To narrow the matter down to questions of economic policy, there are several points which should be discussed. First, to what extent does the division of labor and the development of a world-wide com-

plex of exchange relationships make for, or against, a world community. The English classical economists were, of course, cosmopolitan in outlook, especially Ricardo and Mill (Adam Smith less so); the Cobdenites regarded the extension of trade as the greatest force making for world unity and peace. Even Marx held this doctrine, though his views on nationalism are not very consistent. Since about 1860, however, there has been a strong reaction toward nationalism in economics, beginning perhaps with List and achieving academic respectability in the neo-mercantilism of the Keynesians. The view that trade is an important source of conflict and even of war is very commonly held, particularly among noneconomists. There is perhaps a certain paradox here; the division of labor, as Durkheim pointed out, may create more integrated, organic, interdependent society and yet may expose that society more and more to the dangers of disintegration, breakdown, and *anomie*.

The conflict between the cosmopolitan and the nationalist view in economics is a case in point. The free-traders argue, and rightly, that the widest possible specialization creates the greatest wealth for all. The protectionists, on the other hand, feel that a high degree of specialization exposes the national economy to a degree of instability in prices and employment which is not worth the long-run gain from extreme specialization. In the struggle between the international economic order, as represented by a universal gold standard, free trade, free movements of capital and population, and a nationalist economic order based on nationally managed currencies, protection, restriction of immigration, exchange control, the latter has been winning hands down. The basic reason for this is probably the desire to insulate national economic systems from world movements, especially of deflation and depression. It is by no means fanciful to interpret the whole "flight from the free market" which has been so characteristic of the past few decades and has expressed itself in labor unions, cartels, agricultural organizations, and the like as well as in commercial policy, mainly in terms of the fear of deflation and the desire to protect one's own interest group against a general deflationary movement outside. We have here a case in which the absence of any world economic authority, especially in the monetary sphere, actively militates against the adoption of policies by national governments which are consistent with the concept of a world community. In the event of a world deflation, for instance, like that of the thirties, no national government can afford to be indifferent to its internal consequences.

The tragedy is that the only thing which most national governments can think of to do in such an emergency is to try to insulate their national economies from the world movement by protective commercial policy (tariffs and quotas), exchange depreciation, and the like, all of which intensify the general world depression even while they may succeed in forcing temporarily some of its consequences on other countries.

The conclusion toward which the above argument seems to tend is a depressing one—that national economic policies adapted to the needs of a world community are unlikely to emerge unless world deflations can be avoided; and we may well ask how any economic authority can be set up on a world scale with sufficient power even to co-ordinate, much less control, the policies of national governments. The only weapon of economic policy which is strong enough to deal with the problem of monetary instability is the power to create or destroy money through the operations of the governmental budget. This, however, is the most jealously guarded prerogative of sovereignty—if the nations can be persuaded to yield this, we have a world community already! And it is difficult to see any series of small steps by which we can get from where we are to that final renunciation of national independence which is the beginning of a real world order.

This brings me to the second question, out of which perhaps a more hopeful answer may emerge. Are there any national economic policies which do not intensify international disorganization, and which are at the same time reasonable answers to the internal problems of the national economy? The future of the world community and of man himself may depend on finding answers to economic crises of a less world-disorganizing nature than most of the policies in common use. In this connection it should be observed that the position of the United States, as far as the Western world is concerned, is of crucial importance. The output and trade of the United States is such a large proportion of world totals that any depression originating within the United States will be propagated internationally. Indeed, more than any other factor it is the fear of a new depression originating in the United States that prevents other countries from giving more wholehearted support to an international monetary or trade authority. Each nation wants to reserve the right to protect its internal economy from deflationary forces originating within the United States. If the rest of the world had confidence in the internal mone-

tary stability of the United States, a good many of the obstacles to freer international trade would be removed. Hence the success of the international economic order depends very much on the success which the United States enjoys in its internal economic policy. If the newer techniques of monetary and fiscal policy are successful in preventing any further repetition of the 1929–32 experience in the United States, the whole international atmosphere in the Western world may be expected to improve.

One should not perhaps close these brief notes without a glance at what promises to be the greatest obstacle to world unity—the relationship between the Western, capitalist world and Soviet Russia. The most pessimistic view of this relationship is that we have here an unreconcilable conflict which can end only in the destruction of one or the other parties. The most optimistic view is that we can reach a kind of Peace of Westphalia situation with a fairly stable compromise based on the geographical division of the world into two spheres of influence, and a mutual realization on the part of each party that the effort to subdue the other is not worth the cost. There is nothing inherently impossible in the optimistic view, provided that the two systems both work reasonably well. Any serious breakdown on the part of either system will tempt the other into aggression. A problem may arise, however, if the productivity of the Russian economy increases. Because of the foreign-trade monopoly of the Soviet state, there may be irregular and unpredictable exports of various commodities from the Soviet Union which would create temporary dislocations in the price structure of the Western world. It might perhaps be necessary for Western countries to form an organization of their own for trading with the Soviet Union in order to absorb and spread more evenly the stock of commodities which the Soviet Union might throw on the world market.

A final note may be added by way of cautious optimism regarding the effects of improved means of communication on the growth of a world community. The thing that binds a community together is *contact* of its individuals one with another, directly or through third parties. The means of communication have clearly imposed physical limits on this contact in the past. The extreme limits of any stable political unit are fixed by its means of transport. The community may not, of course, expand up to its physical limit, for there are psychological factors which also limit the size of the community. Thus in Canada there is a great deal of coming and going between

Vancouver, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal, Halifax—Canada is very clearly a creation of the railroad. Yet Canada is also limited psychologically: Montreal is nearer, sociologically, to Vancouver than to Buffalo. In all countries today it is the psychological factors, not the physical factors, which limit the sense of community. Nevertheless, the very fact that the physical barriers to the development of a world community have largely disappeared is itself hopeful. The development of air transport is particularly significant in this regard; one might expect to see a sense of world community develop strongly among pilots who take off for India today, for Africa tomorrow.

The very development of these rapid but still rather expensive means of transport presents, however, a severe sociological problem, in that people tend to get divided into those who get around and those who stay at home. There is danger of great tensions developing between the "getters-around," the leaders who move already in a physical world community and who will continually tend to become world citizens, and the "stay-at-homers" who in every reaction and perhaps in envy of their more fortunate and mobile brethren will develop even more extreme parochialisms and in self-defense will resist all efforts to break down exclusive loyalties. This divorce of leaders from followers may already be seen at work in the churches and in the labor movement; it may develop also in nations. No program looking toward the development of world community can afford, therefore, to concentrate on the top leadership alone. It is particularly important that world-mindedness should be developed at intermediary and secondary levels of leadership—local ministers, mayors, local labor leaders, ward politicians, etc. This perhaps is a job for UNESCO!

DISCUSSION OF WORLD ECONOMIC CONTACTS

Mr. Wright: I am sure Miss Mead convinced many of us that it was desirable to have a variety of cultures in the world, from the points of view both of complementing and of stimulating one another. There was some difference of opinion whether this variety of cultures could be maintained, as in a natural biological community, by competition where each culture would find its niche in the total order, or whether it was necessary to have a sort of universal culture which would maintain the peace between the multiplicity of cultures within it.

There was some difference of opinion on what is the trend. Some of us were convinced that, since the Renaissance, Europe has been not only Europeanizing itself but Europeanizing the world. Others thought a universal culture was beginning to develop through a process of mutual accommodation and assimilation of aspects of many cultures by each of the cultures.

Professor Kenneth Boulding will lead the discussion on the subject of "Economic Contacts."

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Mr. Boulding: I am in the embarrassing position of being in close approximation to a world citizen; that is, I was born and reared in the cosmopolitan city of Liverpool, I am a Quaker, and I am a resident alien of the United States living in Canada.

I would not say that we were *trifling* with some of the deepest emotions, but at least we are skating on dynamite, because we are dealing with some extremely explosive emotional situations in these meetings. Professor MacNair hit the nail on the head in the discussion yesterday evening when he asked the question, "Who are *we?*" because fundamentally the problem of world society is a problem of grammar. It is a question of "Who are *we?*" because the main difficulty that we run into is that the most powerful "we" group—which I understand is a technical term of sociologists—is not all-inclusive. That is the main reason why *we*—meaning the world—have chaos.

The person I cannot get out of my mind these days is the young man who dropped the first atomic bomb. I suppose he is a nice young man, characteristic of American manhood, yet the odd thing is that,

if he had been ordered to go and drop it on Milwaukee, he almost certainly would have refused. He might have been well enough trained by the Army to obey instructions even in that case, but I suspect he might have refused. Because he was asked to drop it on Hiroshima, he not only consented but he became something of a hero for it. I imagine he was quite handsomely rewarded. Of course, I don't quite see the distinction between dropping it on Milwaukee and dropping it on Hiroshima. The difference is a "we" difference. The people in Milwaukee, though we don't know any of them, are "we," and the people in Hiroshima are "they," and the great psychological problem is how to make everybody "we," at least in some small degree. The degree need be only extremely small. I don't think we have to love our neighbor with any degree of affection. All that is necessary to create the psychological foundations of a world society is that people in Maine should feel the same degree of responsibility toward the people of Japan or Chile or Indo-China as they feel toward California. That is pretty small, really, but it is apparently enough to create the United States. It is one of these cases where the difference between zero and almost an infinitely small number is extremely great. I don't know whether that is true mathematically, but it seems to be true in political science.

I think it is the main problem of government to provide institutions to express the feeling, however slight, of mutual responsibility. I might add that I think the concept of responsible government is much more fundamental than the concept of democratic government; in fact, democratic government is a subspecies of responsible government. We shall make a mistake if we say that our particular form of responsible government is the only one and go out and propagate it. Democracy is perhaps the most satisfactory expression of responsible government that the world has yet devised, but I don't think we can be terribly satisfied with it.

You can distinguish, I think, three stages of responsibility. There are governments which are not responsible at all; that is, which judge their actions only with reference to the governing group—the absolute monarchy, the absolute dictatorship. I am not quite sure whether they ever existed. I suspect these are abstract cases which one cannot find in reality, for the most extreme dictatorship or monarchy has some slight sense of responsibility. The crucial problem here is the test which is applied to the actions of government, that is: What is the test which the decision-maker applies to deter-

mine whether his action is good or bad? We might conceive an abstract case in which the only test was whether it benefited himself.

The second state is that of national responsibility, in which the actions of government are tested according to whether they benefit the national group. That is, on the whole, where we are now. If we discuss here—perhaps not here because we are so enlightened—but if we discuss in most groups whether a particular act of Congress was good or bad, the criterion according to which that act will be judged is the criterion as to how it affected the people living between the forty-ninth parallel and the Rio Grande, and the Atlantic and the Pacific, and, if it affected adversely the people living outside those boundaries, we would not take that into consideration except by indirection. I think that is the stage in which most of us are.

Then there is a third stage in which government judges its actions in respect to their effect on the world as a whole. This is what I should call world-responsible government, and I think it is important to point out that we could have world-responsible governments without having a world state, without having a world government in a technical, organizational sense. Of course, world government in a technical, organizational sense would immeasurably strengthen the sense of world responsibility, but the situation is quite conceivable in which we had a world of national states all acting according to this principle without any overriding authority whatever, though I think that is utopian and not at all practicable. But I do think it is important to think about it at the present moment when we seem to be so far from any world state on an institutional basis. A world institutional basis is perhaps the last thing we will get to, and we can move toward world-responsible government even at the national level.

The difficulty we run into in the world community is that the only real governments are those of national states. National governments live and move and have their being in the political sphere, and the world institutions are extremely embryonic. It is indeed doubtful whether they have really come out of the womb. Consequently, we cannot expect much from world institutions at present in the way of positive action. Their main influence may lie in the modifying effect which they exert on the actions of national governments. The more we can organize the expression in public opinion toward the world-responsible standards of judgment in matters of national policy, the closer we will be to the world society; and there are certain hopeful signs in that direction. A sense of responsibility outside the immedi-

ate national responsibilities is, I think, growing, although I am prepared to stand correction on that rather optimistic statement. We get it in things like the Monroe Doctrine in a limited sphere. The British Commonwealth is also a good example of it.

I was very much impressed when I was studying the economic policy of Britain in the agricultural sphere a few years ago to discover what the Commonwealth actually meant in terms of the behavior of the people who are responsible for British government policy. It is a sort of tradition of behavior. If the British government wants to protect its agriculture against New Zealand, it will be very polite, and there will be all sorts of conferences and "by your leave, may we do this," you see, etc., and an effort will be made to come to some kind of mutually satisfactory agreement. But if the British government wants to protect its agriculture against the Danes, it just slams the door in their face; it does not have to be polite to the slightest degree. That is all the British Commonwealth is, as far as I can see, in respect to political action. I think with the development of the United Nations there is a certain sense of world responsibility as a criterion of government action, and, though it is not very much developed, it can develop.

All this, I suppose, is political science, and in this I am a strict amateur. These are perhaps the ramblings of an amateur, but I do feel we shall not get down to the bottom of this problem unless we get down to what is, I suppose, a problem of social psychology.

Somebody said yesterday that the "World State" is a state of mind, and, if we are really going to develop that state of mind, we must know what kind of state of mind it is. It is a state of judgment; that is, a question of what are the criteria by which we judge political policies. That is the essential problem, and that, I suppose, is a problem of education in the broadest sense of the word. The trouble with education, however, is that it tends to become increasingly a national monopoly, devoted not to producing world citizens but to producing national citizens. The business of the educational system of the United States is to produce Americans. That is laudable, but it isn't quite adequate. And the same with every other national system. We have to get national systems that will produce Americans-plus and Canadians-plus and Japanese-plus.

I don't want to be misunderstood here. I am not really enthusiastic about a "World State." I am horrified by the thought of a "World State," really. I am much for the same thing as Miss Mead. I would

like to break down all these big countries into little pieces. The United States is far too big; it ought to be divided into six countries. I would even like to divide England into three countries. Real benefits might be derived from breaking down these big units into little ones that can develop around cultures of their own. Consider, for instance, the extent to which the political life of the United States is stymied because it includes several potential countries each one of which stops the others. Consider also the great benefits which might have resulted from the secession of the South. The United States can thank their lucky stars for the existence of Canada, for it certainly saves the United States a great deal of trouble. So that I am not for great political units, but I do think we have to devise some means for preventing the little units from acting in a little way.

Now perhaps I ought to come down to matters of economics, though I am not quite sure how important economics is in this connection. I have a feeling that economics has less to contribute to our problem than the other social sciences. Maybe the economists will want to lynch me for that. First there is the question of the extent to which the development of trade and the extension of the market are forces making for world unity. That is, do we get people together by getting them together, or do we get them together by keeping them apart? The question was raised yesterday, and it is a very crucial question. The only thing that enables the British Commonwealth to survive is the difficulties of travel, for, the more the Colonials and the British mix with each other, the less they like each other. There is a very real problem as to the extent to which increased communication produces harmony and the extent to which it produces—to use the sociological term that I just discovered with great joy—*anomie.*

The classical economists on the whole believed that the development of international trade would bring about peace, though I am not quite sure whether one should include Adam Smith, oddly enough, in that category. Adam Smith was quite a nationalist. But certainly the point of view which is generally known as the English classical school regarded the development of the world economic order as a step toward world unity. As a matter of fact, even Karl Marx did that, although his views were not very consistent. He certainly regarded the development of world trade as leading to the destruction of the national community, and perhaps his most remarkable unsuccessful prophecies were as a result of that belief.

Since about 1860, however, there has been a very strong reaction, both in practice and in theory, and we now find that quite respectable economists are on the average a good deal more nationalistic than they were a hundred years ago. We ought to inquire into this because there may be some very good reasons for it. As Durkheim points out, although the division of labor creates this integrated, organic, interdependent society, it also exposes society to certain dangers of disintegration. The conflict between the cosmopolitan and the nationalist view in economics is a case in point. The success of "protectionism"—using that term extremely broadly—is largely, I suspect, a result of the desire to insulate national states against world movements. Although it is perfectly true, as Adam Smith and others pointed out, that specialization on an international scale, as well as on any other scale, leads to an increase in total production and an increase in the standards of life, it is also true that specialization exposes one to certain instabilities. It is perhaps the instabilities of the highly specialized system which has resulted in that flight from the free market, which is, I think, the most dominant economic phenomenon of the last one hundred years. Socialism is merely an aspect of this. We get it in every field of life: the development of labor unions, the development of cartels, the development of agricultural cooperatives, and the development of protection in commercial policy. We are terribly scared of the free market, and the reason is perhaps that the free market, while it is unexcelled as a mechanism for giving us a high rate of economic progress, and a reasonable structure of relative prices, is subject to wild and unreasonable fluctuations in the absolute level of prices, ranges, and incomes—what we might call the monetary level. It is in particular, I think, the fear of downward movements in the absolute level—that is, deflation—which is at the back of this "flight from the free market."

I think we see it in every field, even in the labor movement. The proposition that the function of trade-unions is to stabilize money wages rather than to redistribute income is a useful interpretive principle. Certainly in the case of protectionism and what we might call nationalist economic policy generally we can see that principle at work. The periods of increasing protectionism on the whole have been the periods of world deflation or the periods just immediately following them. Of course, we often have a little time lag between the cause and the result. This protectionism is not wholly unreasonable. When we are faced with a world deflationary movement, no national gov-

ernment can afford to neglect it, simply to let things happen, because in any kind of free-market economy deflation is tremendously destructive.

This is the thing which the classical school overlooked, all except Malthus, but he soon dropped out of sight as far as anything sensible that he said is concerned and has hardly been heard of since. But what we usually understand by the classical school was obsessed by the view that the absolute level did not matter. It is quite true that, if we increased or decreased all prices and all wages by an equal amount, we would be where we were before. Adam Smith recognized this and pointed it out very clearly. Therefore, the classical school really lost interest in the processes of inflation and deflation. But they forgot that the movement from one absolute level to another is tremendously destructive either way, although much more destructive when it is a movement down than when it is a movement up. It is astonishing how well capitalist institutions can survive inflation, although severe inflation probably weakens them, but deflation is tremendously destructive. The reason for this is quite obvious; it is simply that we cannot have a profit system without profits. The trouble with the profit system is not that people do make profits but that they don't. In a highly deflationary period it is almost impossible to make profits because the profit-making process is that of increasing the value of assets, and, if the price of assets is continually declining, profits will tend to disappear. We get a tremendous shift in the whole distributional system away from profits to other forms of incomes. If my memory serves me right, total profits were negative in 1932 in this country. Free markets simply cannot stand that sort of thing.

As a result of the fear of deflation we get neo-mercantilism. Many realize that mercantilists were not so vile as Adam Smith said, because the mercantilists were extremely conscious of the virtues of inflation as opposed to deflation from the point of view of the workings of a mercantile economy. Hence protectionist commercial policy is not merely the ravings of the politicians, and the economists' sneers at it have been rather unjustified because of the fact that protection is the only thing which a national government can think up to do when it is faced with a world deflation. It is an attempt of a national economy to insulate itself, and, for reasons that I cannot go into now, a free economy is always likely to be subject to deflation in the absence of deliberate checks on it by governmental policy.

The only thing that has saved the free economy has been wars, fantastically enough, because war itself is a pure fact of social pathology. There is nothing inherent about this influence of wars, but it is just the fact that war is the only thing which is capable of creating an emotional state which will make Republicans consent to an unbalanced budget. If it had not been for its wars, capitalism would never have gotten anywhere. It would have bogged down in hopeless deflation long before it practically got going. The fantastic thing is that Malthus saw all that in 1819. It is almost like a revelation, but nobody knew what he was really driving at.

The conclusion of this is rather depressing because it means that, in the absence of effective international control of world deflation, world-responsible national economic policies are unlikely to emerge. I assume that such policies are what we want at this particular stage of the world's history? That is what we want to work toward because we cannot have a world state. That is just crying for the moon. We have got all these countries, and we have just got to put up with them; they are very real, and they probably are not altogether bad things. There is a lot to be said for them. What we want is not the destruction but the redemption of nationalism. How can nationalism be turned into useful channels instead of continuing to flow in these terrifically destructive channels?

Then we have a real, almost insoluble, problem that we won't get world-responsible national policies unless we have some sort of world organization. That is the real paradox. I suppose we have to ask ourselves the question, "What is the minimum of world economic government—the absolute minimum—which will prevent the world from blowing itself to pieces?" The difficulty is that the minimum is awfully big in this case because the minimum we have to have is a world monetary policy, and monetary policy is the most precious attribute of national sovereignty. They write in the *New Yorker* that the cost of peace is one grain of national sovereignty, but that one grain is very difficult to get out of people, and particularly where the grain is monetary policy.

There is, however, a more hopeful point of view. The United States is such a large part of the Western economy that if the United States can solve its internal problems, and particularly if the United States can prevent acute internal deflationary movements, then the whole world problem becomes very much easier. The tremendous fear which the rest of the world has of a new depression in the United

States, because they realize that the last depression originated in the United States and dragged them all into it, results in diffidence about any kind of world monetary organization, the pure lip service which is given to it, and the development of things like the Canadian Wheat Agreement which fly right in the face of world organization. Other national states try to devise means of insulating themselves from a depression which may originate in the United States. Of course, it may be that this fear is groundless. Every generation of economists is, of course, concerned with the problems of the last generation, and it is just possible that the experience of the 1930's was something quite peculiar in history and will not occur again.

This may seem too optimistic but I am being led to something like this conclusion by a study of age distributions. If we take the age distribution of the thirties, we discover that the proportion of the population in the United States of working age was abnormally large; that is, the children had begun to disappear and the old people had not arrived yet. We were in a peculiar transitional phase, which is sufficient to account for four million unemployed, directly, and indirectly I suppose it might account for even more of the unemployment problem of the thirties. That won't occur again. The thing that will save us is the multiplicity of consumers, especially of old folks. It is just possible therefore that the problems of the rest of the twentieth century, as we begin to get an inkling in England, are going to be totally different from those of the first forty years. My crystal ball is very cloudy indeed, but it is possible that all this emphasis on unemployment and underconsumption is the result of the relatively horrid experience we went through in the thirties and that each generation learns exactly the wrong lessons. Now we have no fear of inflation in the way the last generation was afraid of inflation. That is how we may get it. We may not have any serious unemployment to contend with for the rest of the twentieth century. Perhaps that is too optimistic, but there is a real possibility there, especially as we develop our monetary-fiscal techniques. I think we understand the problem of unemployment and depression much better than we did twenty-five years ago. The advance in economics in the last twenty-five years has been quite spectacular. The pronouncements of the economic conferences that took place after the last war in Brussels seem now like the babblings of the Middle Ages. The expansion in economic understanding has been so substantial that there are some

grounds for qualified optimism in the economic sphere, perhaps even in the political sphere.

The most we can hope for in the world at the moment is, I think, a situation something like that which happened in 1648; that is, a situation in which we more or less divide the world into geographical spheres of influence and decide that neither of us can really lick the other. The world is probably big enough to be divided geographically, provided that a mood of political skepticism and indifference prevails and that nobody wants to go around being torch-carriers. It is very important from the point of view of achieving this type of equilibrium that both the systems should work pretty well. Any serious breakdown of either system will result in great temptations to go in for imperialistic expansion of some sort or another.

We are coming to realize now that the socialist type of economy has its own particular cycles and problems. We don't really solve anything very much by going socialist. The old Adam is still there, as is the general fact that each generation learns precisely the wrong things from its predecessors. There is a cycle within the Soviet Union just as there is here. The Soviet cycle has even the same periods as the capitalist one. I suspect, if we are going to have another depression, we will see an outburst of communism in the Soviet Union and another famine.

To close on a note of cautious optimism, the increase in communication which comes from modern technology has produced an unprecedented situation in the world. One of the things we really have to decide, almost in our generation, is how unprecedented we are. I suspect that we may be more unprecedented than we think. There really aren't very many analogies between our civilization and others. For one thing, all previous civilizations operated on a complete shoestring; the more we read, the more we realize the fantastically thin margins on which these civilizations survived. We don't operate on a shoestrong, really; it is very much of a rope. We might hang ourselves with it; but at least it is much more than a shoestring, because of our tremendous agricultural productivity. Our soils can probably survive the destructions and calamities which swept earlier civilizations off the face of the earth, provided we don't lose our agricultural productivity—provided that Iowa holds out. We have a civilization that can be restored from Iowa, almost, if all the rest of it goes to pieces because of the extraordinary labor productivity in agriculture which we have. I suspect that, as technology improves, we

reach a critical point in human relationships after which we don't have a "pressure" system any more.

If I may apply an analogy from economics to political science, we can distinguish very sharply between what one may call pressure economies and vacuum economies. The pressure economies are the sort man has always been used to, where the total of consumption and accumulation is always pressing on the lid of unemployment, where the great problem of economy is to screw down, to keep the toothpaste in a tube that is under pressure. We have to have interest rates to suppress the accumulation, and perhaps we even have to have unequal distribution of income to suppress consumption in order to hold it down. The problem of holding on the lid of a toothpaste tube is altogether different from getting the toothpaste back into the tube. If planned consumption and accumulation are less than the economy is capable of, then its problems become totally different.

We may find in the political sphere, also, that, once we reach a certain point, political problems become less important. This is something I have not followed out, and perhaps somebody can help me on this; but I do feel that, with the expansion of modern technology, we may get to a point where, much to our surprise, all these extraordinarily intractable problems of nationalism and the rest suddenly seem to melt in our hands.

I may be too optimistic about that, but I think I am an example of it. I am one of the most completely denationalized people I know. It is odd because I was reared in England, which is the most nationalistic country in the world, and all my education was devised to turn me into a good little Englishman. We had Nelson *ad nauseam* and the extraordinary perversion of history that one gets in the English schools, and all the hoop-la and "God Save the King" were directed toward making me a good little Englishman. It had a completely opposite effect. I just revolted to the point where I am not emotionally sure of myself on this subject, and I suspect that may happen to others also and may happen rather suddenly. Sometimes it does happen that we feed people a lot of buncombe, and all of a sudden up it comes! I think this may happen to nationalists. You see, it is so obvious, once we state it, that it is really much more in conformity with truth and much more sensible to be human than it is to be British or American or German or anything with that qualification. People may realize that.

Just one last point. There is a very real danger in the situation of developing world consciousness among world leaders because it means that the tension between the leaders and the led is increasing. I have observed it in a number of fields. You can see it in the church. It is extremely interesting in Protestantism particularly. The leaders of the churches get around, they go to conferences, they go to ecumenical meetings, and the Methodists meet the Baptists and the Lutherans and everybody. They sort of like each other and have a real feeling of community. But the result is that the leadership drifts away from the local church. In every Protestant denomination now we find that the gap between the leadership, which is world-minded, and the local church, which is parochial-minded, is tremendous. We find it in the labor movement. The leaders get around, and they meet employers, and they meet one another and go to conferences and all the rest of it, but the boys at home don't.

I feel that that is a terribly dangerous situation, that if anything will lead to the destruction of our society, it is probably that. The leadership may drift so far away from the boys back home that there will be a tremendous upturn and a revulsion in the direction of extreme nationalism, extreme parochialism on the part of the people back home. How to prevent that, I think, is the greatest task that we have to face.

THE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

Mr. Wright: Mr. Boulding has cast so many pearls before us that it is hard to know where to begin. It seems to me that the thing he said first and the thing he said last—the gap between the leaders and the led—have a very interesting relationship. At first, he commented that there had been a movement from responsibility of the kings to themselves, to responsibility of the rulers to the people over whom they had jurisdiction.

That called to my mind a paper by Dean Pound of Harvard some years ago in which he pointed out that international law had been tremendously weakened by the rise of democracy. When there were absolute monarchs, there was a community of kings, and each king was responsible to that community, so there did exist a certain internationalism at that time, and international law had a certain vitality in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. With the rise of democracy the rulers became responsible only to the people, and the people had no sense of internationalism at all. Consequently, the rise of

democracy resulted in less responsible governments, in the sense that governments were responsible to a lesser area than they were formerly.

MR. RIPPY: Mr. Boulding mentioned the Monroe Doctrine and the British Empire as illustrations of a movement toward a world community. I cannot see anything in these except the in-group versus the out-group, the in-group becoming somewhat larger, the Pan-American group.

MR. BOULDING: The extension of the in-group is hard without much in the way of formal organization. That is why I used these as illustrations.

MR. RIPPY: Another point. Your love of small units seems to be pure romance.

MR. BOULDING: That's right; it is.

MR. RIPPY: Corporate technology is destroying the small units. In your reference to trade as a means of increasing world contacts, I think you should add foreign investments. If I remember correctly there are $60 billion invested outside the frontiers of the advanced nations. There are probably about 10,000 economic units operating in foreign nations, and they are in contact with millions of people. That is a factor probably more permanent than the trade factor.

Then you spoke of these contacts causing trouble, that the British Empire would get along better within itself if it could just keep Englishmen from going to the outlying parts of the world.

MR. BOULDING: And vice versa.

MR. RIPPY: That is romance, too; that can't be done; the external contacts are bound to increase.

Then you spoke of Mr. Marx's prophecy. I am not defending Mr. Marx, but, when you say a man's prophecy has not been fulfilled, you must not fail to take into account the time element. If you give it long enough, it may be fulfilled; that is to say, the destruction of nationalism.

CAUSES AND CONTROLS OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM

You refer to the great fear of instability as being the primary factor in increasing economic nationalism. I think there are two other factors. One is the desire on the part of the so-called "backward" nations to enlarge their share of the benefits of technological advance, and the other is their desire to increase their security by means of technological advance.

MR. BOULDING: I think I agree with most of that. In regard to the last point, I was not suggesting that this is the only factor. This is an important principle, but there are a great many others as well. Economic nationalism is an extremely complex phenomenon which I as an economist cannot treat alone; it is a political, psychological, and heaven knows what sort of thing. It is quite true that to some extent it has been the result of a desire on the part of mainly agricultural countries to industrialize, and there is a reasonableness about that which is quite apart from the thing I have been discussing here. It arises from the fact that the most certain sign of an advancing society is a depressed agriculture. In a society which is advancing rapidly in agricultural techniques the proportionate resources in agriculture continue to decline, as we have seen it over the last hundred years. The way we get that is by making agriculture less profitable. Hence the agriculturally advanced parts of the world have a tendency to be squeezed, and naturally they dislike that.

There is another fact which is perhaps mainly sociological. The agricultural areas of the world *are* the industrial areas. There is a sociological relationship which results in the world not really being divided into industrial and agricultural regions but into productive and unproductive. The productivity of agriculture in the industrial regions is much greater than it is in the nonindustrial regions. That is a very important contributing factor, but it does not quite account for the sort of protectionism that we had in the thirties, the protectionism that grew up in Europe and in Britain. We have to account for that by the anti-deflation principle, I think.

MR. RIPPY: It only accounts for it in so-called "modernized" areas.

MR. LLOYD METZLER: Protectionism did not grow so rapidly in that period anyway, did it?

MR. BLOCH: We have talked about economic control mechanisms because they are easier to talk about than cultural control mechanisms, although we know that we also need the latter. We mentioned monetary control mechanisms which require a diversity in qualities; we may need an anti-deflationary policy in one country and an anti-inflationary policy in another. It seems to me that we also need, in order to solve our problem of technological advance, a military control mechanism for the world. Such a control is necessary from an economic point of view if technological advances are to be used for the advancement of the people. It seems to me, therefore, that two

basic control mechanisms are necessary: one is military and the other is monetary and financial.

MR. BOULDING: There is also the problem of controlling migration. It is a different problem and a very difficult one.

THE MEANING OF RESPONSIBILITY

MR. POTTER: I would like to examine Mr. Boulding's idea that responsibility is the basic principle for procedure and for hope. When I first read this paper and ran onto "responsibility" in the second line, I felt instinctively that this was rather pious romanticism, or romantic piety. Then, when I read on, I was seduced by the argument and have been to some extent this morning. But on reflection I want to question very sharply whether that theory is a sound explanation of the development of the community, either in the national sphere or in the international sphere. I take two test cases.

I am fairly sure that the Monroe Doctrine did not spring from a sense of responsibility for Latin America on the part of the United States. It was a self-defensive effort, to put it at its best. It may have been something even more positively selfish than that, but I should not think it manifested any great degree of social responsibility.

A better example still is again found in this part of the world: the formation of the United States under the Constitution, from 1787 to 1789. The states strung up and down the Atlantic Coast organized a union not because they felt any responsibility for one another but for reasons much lower in the scale: either because they wanted to avoid the injuries which could be done to them by the behavior or misbehavior of one another or because they thought they might secure mutual advantages by some degree of mutually convenient co-operation. There was little sense of responsibility.

I think that this interpretation would hold for the establishment of international institutions. You may find a few traces of world responsibility or international responsibility, but there has been an enormous development of international co-operation on the level of mutual defense or at least accommodation. This makes a great difference as to what we can look forward to. If we have to depend upon the development of a wider sense of responsibility before we can get a world community, not to mention a world administration, we will have to wait a long, long time. We may, however, get co-operation on a lower level.

MR. WARNER: What do you mean by "responsibility" as you have been using it?

MR. POTTER: I have been using it in the sense I understood Mr. Boulding to be using it: some solicitude for the welfare of other people.

MR. BOULDING: It is a sense of in-groupness, a sense of belonging. It need have no more content than that. Certainly "solicitude" is entirely the wrong word. The people of Maine are not solicitous about the people in California and still less about the people of Alabama. It is a question of grammar, as I said in the beginning; it is a question of who are "we"; it has hardly any content whatever. That is the odd thing about it. Maybe, if you like, it is purely nominalistic, maybe it is just linguistic, maybe it is just a matter of words which have no content whatever, but it is important because the words exist. I would even be prepared to accept that.

While I am on these remarks I would like to say that I think "piety" and "romanticism" are about the only hope we've got. They are very great unifying factors and great human needs, and the whole trouble with our drivel sort of intellectual, humanistic society is that it does not provide piety and romanticism. Hence we get nationalism or Masonry or Shrinerism, all examples of the same sort of thing. They fulfil the same sort of need of dressing up and being romantic, and, as a matter of fact, we can add piety also if we like. We cannot afford to despise either piety or romanticism. I mean that very seriously. We belong to an unpious and an unromantic civilization; or rather an unpious and an unromantic segment of society, and a very small segment of society. Let's realize that our sort of sophisticated, intellectual, university culture is a teeny-weeny segment of humanity, and we have to be terribly careful about generalizing from our teeny-weeny segment to the whole. Most of humanity is both pious and romantic, and that, I am sure Miss Mead will agree, has to be respected in some way.

MR. WRIGHT: "Responsibility" is used commonly in a very different sense from that in which Mr. Boulding used it. In law, responsibility means the same as liability; it means that, if we don't act up to certain standards, we get it in the neck by some external power. Possibly the duality of meaning of "responsibility" is something that we ought to have in mind. Some people might say we can't get this sense of responsibility without a world state which will punish or reprimand us if we don't live up to the standards.

Mr. Boulding: We must distinguish "moral responsibility" from "legal responsibility."

Mr. Potter: I refer to the phraseology in the first paragraph of Mr. Boulding's paper: "The members of each national community, in so far as they are conscious of belonging to it, feel a slight sense of responsibility toward any other member of the same national community but usually feel no responsibility for people outside the national community." If "for" does not mean "for the welfare of," I don't know what it means. On the problem of whether the majority of the people in the world are romantic and pious, I can only say I have not found them so. Perhaps I have had unfortunate associates. But on a purely historical basis I submit that national and international institutions and co-operative systems have been based on calculations of mutual defense and mutual interest rather than on considerations of mutual service.

Miss Mead: I think Mr. Boulding would feel that if a group of people became a "we" group even for the most nefarious reasons—they might be pirates or gangsters—that the "we-ness," once established, could be translated into this thing called moral responsibility.

As an illustration, back in the early thirties a young New Zealander in Japan was arrested for dangerous thoughts and held incommunicado quite a while before the British Embassy knew about it. The Japanese handling the case studied the history of the Englishman in the Embassy who had to handle it. When the case came up to the Embassy, the Japanese said, "He is a New Zealander," and this very, very young Englishman said, "Is he a New Zealander? Is he from Devonshire?" The Japanese had miscalculated.

It is that degree of miscalculation on the part of the Japanese that we are talking about. In spite of the lowest grade of mutual self-interest starting a "we" group, and despite the enormous amount of antagonism within it, moral responsibility means each standing up for the rights of others as they have already been defined. There is really little relationship between the original causes of association and the final behavior of the associates.

RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

Mr. Marschak: I felt the charm of Mr. Boulding's presentation—the sense of irony, the sense that we must not take ourselves too seriously because we mean very little. Possibly the trouble with the world today is that nations feel too much responsibility to the world.

There are Communist parties in the world who maintain certain ideals, and the Russian government represents them and supports them. The capitalist countries also have certain ideals. They do want to save other people's souls. There is too much concern with each other. The Catholic church and the Austrian emperor at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War were very much concerned, not with Austria but with Europe, and the king of Sweden was concerned with Europe instead of being concerned only with Sweden. It seems that world wars may spring from too much cosmopolitan outlook. The main powers want to decide the problems of the world rather than problems of something less than the world. Probably nothing can be done about it, and this is just the danger in our situation.

In his written paper Mr. Boulding pointed to the Peace of Westphalia as a solution. After the Thirty Years' War—and perhaps that war could have been avoided—Europe agreed to say that Protestant kings would have Protestant subjects and Catholic kings would have Catholic subjects. That lasted for a time until people forgot the difference between Catholics and Protestants. Something similar may happen again: not a bad solution.

Mr. Donald Taft: Isn't it true that developing and broadening the base of the sense of responsibility is usually due to the fact that someone, even though it be only a leader or two, recognizes an interdependence?

Mr. Charles Hardin: I am a little troubled by Mr. Boulding's remarks because I cannot quite see what the role of nationalism is as he understands it. The solution at one time seemed to be to reduce national states to counties, or even less if possible; at others to recognize the terrific importance for the rest of the world of what we do with our own internal economic problems; and at others to criticize the action of national governments which may disturb the channels of trade or erect economic barriers. Does he want more or less national power?

This relates also to the problems of responsibility and world community. Suppose we cannot get minimal agreements for international monetary control or international military control in the foreseeable future. Must we not then rely on national power, and might it not be that in the United States the development of national power as an aid to conciliatory diplomacy would be one of the things which we should work toward?

This raises the question of what national governments can do.

Does Mr. Boulding believe that government is limited to action in a negative sense such as putting up barriers to trade? I should think that if we had government based on party responsibility in this country, for example, it would at least be conceivable that we could approach some of our international problems a little more consistently. I am thinking of the support of scientific research which seems to be in part a governmental problem; I am thinking of the development of our own natural resources which seems to be another part of the international problem because we can act internationally only on the basis of the strength we can muster; I am thinking of a consistent foreign policy and of such things as governmental control of rationing and prices in order to use what we have to best advantage in foreign fields. All of this relates to the political concept of responsibility or to the answerability of government to the electorate through general elections rather than to limited cliques and groups, each one pressing for particular interests.

So the question that I am raising is whether, in terms of what might be possible to achieve for the world community within the bounds of even fantastic imagination, creation of a stronger national government in the United States might not be pretty high on the agenda.

Mr. Morgenthau: I must say that I find Mr. Boulding's analysis of the present international situation rather unrealistic. Mr. Boulding has said that the best we could hope for is a situation like that which existed after the Thirty Years' War in 1648, when a number of powers realized that they could not conquer each other and succeeded in maintaining a relatively stable situation for almost a hundred and fifty years.

First of all, the situation after 1648 did not exactly exemplify a peaceful world. As the chairman has shown in his *Study of War*, there was continuous warfare in the century and a half following the Thirty Years' War. Furthermore, I think an analysis of the situation as it existed in the second half of the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century shows that the situation today is much more dangerous for the peace of the world or even for the existence of the world. The balance of power which Mr. Boulding thought was a stabilizing element of the state system after the Thirty Years' War no longer exists.

There are five factors which have destroyed the relatively beneficial effects which the balance of power exerted in the centuries fol-

lowing the Thirty Years' War. First, after the Thirty Years' War there existed a European balance of power, the individual members of which could direct their vital energies to non-European countries. The possibility of deflecting the struggle for power into non-European countries permitted the balance in Europe to remain intact. Second, today instead of a European system there exists a world-wide power system with two great power blocs opposing each other inflexibly. Neutrals have virtually disappeared, and the alignments on either side are for all practical purposes final. Thus realignments and new combinations can no longer provide for that flexibility through which in former times the balance of power, once disturbed, could be re-established. Third, in the period from the Thirty Years' War to the first World War, Great Britain held the key position in the balance-of-power system, able to limit the struggle for power on the international scene by throwing her decisive weight onto one or the other scale. Great Britain was thus capable of preventing major conflicts, even of making armed conflicts altogether impossible under the provision that she and the other powers played the game of the balance of power according to its rules. In the fourth place, there existed during this period a moral consensus, a kind of tolerance among the princes who fought for power only according to certain generally accepted rules and within certain agreed-upon limits. They all operated within the same European community, the same Christian republic, and this moral framework, common to all, exerted a limiting influence upon the struggle for power. And, finally, today there exist the technological means of conquering the world, of actually destroying the balance of power. In the period after the Thirty Years' War, even if a prince would have wanted to destroy the balance of power and to gain what was then called universal monarchy and what we call today world domination, he could not have done it because he did not have the means to do it.

So it seems to me that the comparison between the contemporary situation and the situation of 1648 is not at all favorable to the former. We are incomparably worse off today than the nations were after 1648, and, if one wants to make a historical comparison at all, one would have to say that we live in the year 1615, before the outbreak of the great religious war rather than after its termination.

MR. HERRING: I agree that the balance-of-power conception was fortified by the technological nature of warfare at that time. One could not conquer because one did not have the technology to keep

an army of occupation supplied over a long period. So there was a close relationship at that period between the technological nature of warfare, the nature of the economy, and the nature of politics. From that period on we have had the development of military logistics in the kind of economy which has made total war possible. In other words, the difference is not based principally on the attitude of rulers but on technology.

MR. MARSCHAK: Mr. Boulding did not say that we are as well off as in 1648. He said if we had something like 1648, we should be happy. He knows the ideal he strives after is a very modest ideal.

MR. WRIGHT: Mr. Herring suggests that that would mean "uninventing" many things.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I do not believe that the balance of power was the means of preserving peace. I would say that the unbalance of power was a better means of preserving peace than the balance of power which was more likely to result in war. Wars come more often when both sides feel sure of victory than when one side is obviously superior. This is not merely a historical reference. Today, as long as there is no doubt whether the United States or Russia is stronger, we will have peace, but, as soon as it is doubtful which is stronger, the possibility of war will become greater.

MR. WRIGHT: I don't know that I quite agree. If you mean, and I think most writers do mean, by a stable "balance of power" a situation in which each state is convinced that aggression would be faced by a combination of insuperable power, then I think a stable balance of power would make for peace.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: That is "unbalance."

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, if there were only two powers. Where there are many independently acting states so there is a possibility of shifting weights from one side to the other, there may be balance. Each state knows that aggression will bring a coalition against the aggressor so that it cannot succeed. Of course, such a situation seldom exists. Rulers are continually arising who will not believe, until shown by a war, that the insuperable condition will develop. So the balance seldom remains stable. Other factors, such as the tendency of an equilibrium to polarize about the two most powerful states, as in the case of Russia and the United States today, also makes for instability, as Mr. Gottschalk points out.

MR. GUERARD: As a student of history, I am in agreement with Mr. Boulding on the balance of power. The Peace of Westphalia did

not settle the balance of political power. It did settle one question. It marked the end of a hundred years of religious war. Mr. Boulding's idea is that we might arrive at a balance in that form, where each side would have to recognize it cannot defeat the other; in that sense, I think that 1648 would be a very good precedent. Naturally, the wars went on. The Spanish war went on, the wars of Louis XIV went on, but the question of religion was settled in Europe. It was settled in the form that each state might have its own religion. But the fact that Europe became pro-eclectic had the effect of making the states pro-eclectic also. The fact that there was Protestantism across the border made it possible that liberty of religion within each of the states could exist. That might be a fairly hopeful precedent.

As a student of history, I am also very much interested in the statement that we always learn the wrong lesson, because we are using retrospective history, looking backward. The only form of history that would be helpful according to that principle would be prospective history, which is the idea of creative evolution; we have momentum but that momentum is applied to conditions that evolve. We are creating history. The study of history ought to be a study of creation in the past.

Mr. Wright: Mr. Guerard's statement suggests that history develops by Hegelian dialectics. The antithesis of Protestantism to Catholicism was synthesized after a century of war in the sovereign state. The sovereign state will probably create its own antithesis, and a new synthesis will in time develop.

ASPECTS OF RESPONSIBILITY

Mr. Parsons: Might we come back to the definition of "responsibility" and try to go a step beyond the points made by Mr. Marschak and Miss Mead, with which I fully agree. Sociologically we might consider responsibility, on the one hand, as an aspect of a definition of the situation and, on the other, as the quality of the motivation involved. Our objective should be to alter the definition of the situation so as to emphasize certain areas, in which responsibility has not previously been operative to an adequate degree.

If we study the processes by which extensions of the area of responsibility have developed in the past, it is clear that there have been several different types of processes involving different motivational patterns. One fundamental type of this process is the spread of what we might call an "idealistic movement." The great religious

movements have been major agents in introducing wider areas of responsibility, of "we-ness." Modern nationalism, however, has developed by quite a different process. If we take the development of British nationalism, the primary agents of that process, for example, Henry VIII and Elizabeth, were certainly not romantic idealists. It was a process of consolidating a political structure around which certain sentiments in the population grew up, not the imposition of a system of sentiments as such.

So I think there are various alternatives open. The main point I want to make is that I don't think we need to tie ourselves to a particular quality of movement or sentiment in discussing this question.

Mr. Riesman: Just because, as Mr. Boulding pointed out, we do constitute so insignificant a fraction of the people, we should not be intimidated by the word "realistic." We should be just as utopian as we can. Therefore, I think the word "responsibility," if we couple it with the word "respect," which I take it was in part what Dr. Mead was talking about, is our issue. This seems to be in part an educational problem, as Mr. Boulding said, which can be put in economic terms along the line he already started to work out. We may think of the psychology of countries in different phases of the population cycle. There is a hypothesis for that in the Notestein scale. In countries of high growth potential we have one psychology, in countries of transitional growth another, and another in countries of incipient decline. It can be predicted that these countries will always hark to their past situation rather than to the future.

In my last class I put to my students, most of whom are veterans, the question: "What is your feeling about the future? Do you think, as I do, that a depression is simply out and that a war is not out?" I did not put it precisely this way because I did not want to guide the answer. But they all agreed with me. They felt that depression was simply impossible. Maybe John Taber can give us one, but otherwise it is out. War, however, is something we cannot be responsible for, because we can have no control over it. We have learned that depressions are unnecessary; we have not learned that wars are unnecessary.

There is, however, a relation between the two: we avoid depression by war; you get kissed when you go to war, and you don't get kissed when you go to a flophouse.

That means that we face two realistic problems of education. One is that we no longer need to have a "scarcity" psychology, and I

would like to ask what might be done in the adult education field to show people in this country the relationship between war and keeping the economy afloat. In the second place, again an adult education problem: what can be done about this split between the cosmopolitan and overmanipulative leader and the parochially led who force the leader to say in an international conference, "Boys, you know how it is; I've got Congress, I've got Iowa"; and since he is created by a system in which he is responsible only to Congress and Iowa, he is stuck.

Mr. McKeon: Our discussion has followed a rather curious dialectic. We have chosen a series of terms by means of which we hoped to simplify the statement of our problem, only to discover that in each set of terms the entire problem and all the ambiguities of its formulation can be rediscovered. The word "responsibility" is an excellent example of that kind of splitting of meanings. I should like, therefore, to talk about the split which I think has led to the chief difficulties in our discussion.

The word "responsibility" may mean—and we have talked primarily about that meaning—a sense of concern for a predicament or a need. In that sense the "citizen of Maine" may feel responsible for the citizen of another group, that is, he may feel a sense of identification of interests sufficient to suggest or even induce action. It is well to bear in mind, however, that the word "responsibility" has another connotation. When the need is not immediate or physical, when it is not something that one can do something about or something that one can do against someone else, the word "responsibility" refers to a conviction concerning what would be good for, say, the "citizen of California," which usually involves a theory of values as well as a theory about California. A sense of responsibility then becomes disruptive even before it is necessary to face differences concerning what ought to be done for the man in the other region. Once those two meanings are separated, I think the difficulty of finding a sense of responsibility on a world scale is clarified. Examples of both senses of "responsibility" are easily found.

Mr. Boulding's paper ended on a very heartening note and with a very heartening word, the word UNESCO. I have just come back from the first regional conference on UNESCO in Denver. About a month earlier the first national conference on UNESCO took place in Philadelphia. In both places the participants in the conferences exhibited vast enthusiasm. They were conferences composed of dele-

gates of large, frequently national, organizations. In both cases more than a thousand people were present. The ultimate constituency was therefore a thousand multiplied by the membership of the organizations represented. The delegates were, on the one hand, uninformed about UNESCO, but, on the other hand, they felt great responsibility, in the first sense of that word. These were people who were anxious about the world. They did not know what to do about the world; they wanted to be informed. But, as soon as the information began to be presented, the other meaning of responsibility appeared. They knew some things that ought to be done, and they were concerned that some things were not being done.

The program of UNESCO is in its formative period. It is only five months old now, and it provides a developing illustration of these two meanings of responsibility. Where the problem is one of the physical community, the program is perfectly clear; it is concerned with problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation of educational and cultural institutions. Schools should be rebuilt. Materials should be furnished for education and research. Personnel should be trained. A world community is impossible if the educational system is destroyed. A popular library system should be developed. Means should be found of establishing a minimum level of education. The natural scientists likewise know what they should do. They must discover new resources for living for the population of the world in parts of the world in which those resources do not exist or are not utilized.

The program was built up easily until it became a question of projects in the social sciences, humanities, philosophy, and creative arts. Most of the disagreements concerning program occurred in those fields. Where there was some agreement, as in the creative arts, the experts expressed marked differences of opinion concerning the procedure to achieve the world plans on which they had agreed.

This difference suggests the need of a distinction in discussing the idea of nationalism. The problem of nationalism is not treated adequately by substituting "diversity" for "uniformity." Here I must insist that Miss Mead has not clarified the word "culture" by insisting on the anthropological definition and claiming the word for anthropology alone—"culture" has an intellectual dimension which is not adequately treated in anthropology and which has been the subject of philosophic analysis for a long time. It is necessary to differentiate the meanings of nationalism and internationalism in terms

of "culture." There is a need in the world for a diversity of cultural interests, for cultural nationalisms and even cultural subnationalisms. The problem of nationalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries arose from an unholy alliance of economic and cultural nationalism. One result of that alliance is that cultural arguments have been used for economic segregation. The advances in technology may have suggested the need for international devices to separate regions for economic reasons—that is, to save a particular region from a world depression—or, conversely, to remove separations to prevent the first incidence of disaster. The discouraging part of Mr. Boulding's paper, for me, was not its piety or romanticism but its neglect of the cultural diversity that Miss Mead and all of us want to preserve. A framework of mechanisms and controls may be necessary to prevent questions like those of monetary control from disrupting what might otherwise be a fruitful interplay of diverse cultural agencies.

Mr. Wirth: On the question of responsibility, Mr. Boulding seems to leave open the question of how interest is to be determined. Do we mean that the government is interested in what is to the interest of its subjects as it sees it, or as its subjects see it? These might not be the same. We have to recognize the fact that men are interested in things which are not, from our standpoint, for their interest.

I would like to suggest in this connection a very helpful linguistic tool, with which Max Weber has provided us. He made the distinction, which I think is fundamental, between what he called the "ethics of conviction" as over against the "ethics of responsibility." By the former he meant a kind of dogmatic expression of what ought to be done with an ideal like, say, a Bill of Rights, without indicating what might be involved in its implementation. By the latter he meant giving due consideration to the wider implications of any policy that might be adopted, and also the instrumentation of that policy.

Let me give an illustration from a field in which I am at the moment interested. Some time ago there appeared a very interesting book by a southern journalist, W. Hodding Carter, called *Chip on My Shoulder*. Hodding Carter is a southern liberal newspaperman, as liberal as they make them, and he has always resented the fact that northerners have interfered with his liberalism by saying, "This is what you ought to do about the race problem in the South." He has also resented the fact that people like himself have been called by northerners "phony liberals" because they won't go out all the way.

He raises the question: "Supposing you people were living in the South, what would you do, how far would you go? It is easy enough for you in the North to get up in mass meeting and make a speech and say that the Negroes ought to be treated like human beings, but what would happen to you if you made that speech on the steps of the Capitol at Atlanta?"

It seems to me here is one of the problems of responsibility that we have to face. It is not merely in Weber's phrase a question of expressing a "conviction" but of action which tends to translate this conviction into actuality. This linguistic tool that Weber offered us might have application here.

Mr. Wright: It seems to me we have clarified some ambiguities. We have recognized legal responsibility maintained by external force and moral responsibility maintained by conscience. Mr. McKeon has pointed out that in the latter sense there is the moral responsibility in which the conscience is aware of a broader group distinguished from the moral responsibility in which the conscience to realize its ends strives for power. Mr. Wirth has distinguished for us responsibility satisfied by conviction from that satisfied only by effective action after giving consideration to its most remote implications.

We have also had no less than six suggestions of how a broader responsibility or definition of the situation might be achieved. We might have a society of kings that feel responsibility to one another, as Pound said the kings did in the seventeenth century. Perhaps the Soviet Union in its conception of the Big Five in the United Nations has exactly that idea; that secret conclaves of the rulers of the Big Five may create a society of rulers which by unanimous consent can maintain the responsibility of each.

Mr. Taft suggested, as did classical economists during the nineteenth century, that awareness of interdependence would create a broader responsibility. Then there was the idea that an equilibrium of power can create a broader responsibility: people may come to realize that they cannot expand by their own force and feel constrained to accept limiting rules for their security. Fourth, it was suggested that the sense of a broader "we" group might grow out of a moral consciousness by governments of the needs of the world as a whole. Then we had the idea that governments could not realize such a broader responsibility unless their people did because, in an age of democracy, the governments are immediately responsible to their people. Consequently, this broader responsibility cannot be expected

unless some form of world government develops able to maintain by adequate, coercive authority certain standards which represent this broader responsibility.

MR. BOULDING: I might say that any wit I produce is just an "iron curtain" to conceal my ignorance. I have learned so much in the last half-hour that I am not prepared to digest it in five minutes. I will have to go home and think, which is exactly what this conference is called together for.

I believe the really significant thing which has emerged is the pluralistic concept of "responsibility." The speaker who disturbed me most was Professor Marschak. There is a very real problem here as to the type of responsibility which enables people to live together and the type that does not. I believe we need to do a good deal of thinking about the distinction between these two types.

I feel, in my own thinking, I have rather confused them; I still feel, however, that the basic problem remains the "we groupness," or whatever one would like to call it. Perhaps the word "responsibility" is too strong and has too many other connotations—but the basic psychological problem seems to me this sense of belonging. The fact that we don't have that, but have the sort of thing which Professor Marschak and others have mentioned, this kind of aggressive responsibility, the feeling that we want to go out and save people's souls or social systems, is what produces conflict. This, I think, is a violation of the "we-ness"; perhaps psychologically it results from the thing that I mentioned yesterday, the sense of insecurity of our own fate, the fact that we want to comfort ourselves by having more people believing as we do.

You may remember the classic quatrain from the "Hunting of the Snark," which goes:

> The valley grew narrower and narrower still,
> The evening grew darker and colder;
> 'Til merely from nervousness, not from good will,
> They marched on, shoulder to shoulder.

There is something of that in our present situation.

I feel there are two types of missionary enterprise. I am still enough of a Methodist to want to be a missionary, and I don't feel that Miss Mead's solution is practical, because it does not give expression to the missionary spirit.

I feel that the reason we are so scared is not only the development of the atomic bomb but also a fear that an age of religious warfare

may be developing. The conflict as it is setting itself up between the two great economic systems bears an unpleasant resemblance to an era of religious warfare, and that is perhaps why the solution of 1648 is so much in our minds.

The story that Miss Mead told about the bright little boy of seven gave me the "creeps" because it is so horribly representative of little boys of seven everywhere. How can we prevent the sort of oversimplification that just says, "We have got to smash the Russians"?

Aren't we faced really with two alternatives; either we do go out and bust the Russians, or we allow the Russians to bust us. In either case we set up a world state based on imperial force of some kind and a ruling class which will just go out and bust people of one kind or another. I suspect that the former solution recommends itself, secretly perhaps, even to some people here; but the trouble with it is that we can't do it without sacrificing the values that make the present society really acceptable and beloved.

It is all very well to talk about strengthening the United States and strengthening anything else, or even to talk about the imbalance of power, but, after all, what does balance of power ultimately depend on? It depends on romanticism, for national power is essentially a romantic feeling. You see, we take the nation so much for granted that we never think about it, yet there isn't anything so romantic as the concept of national power, which is all based on the love of country. It is a very definite emotional complex that is fostered by all kinds of rituals and is a thing which people value and are prepared to die for, and that people do die for. It has a tremendous panoply of ritual and ceremonial and deep religious feeling, if one would like to put it in that way, to support it.

But where does it come from? That is the question that puzzles me. The answer is: It comes out of history, often out of the accounts of history, if one likes; but, having got it, one has it. Then how does it disappear? And it does disappear. It disappears when the nation takes its power and its love for granted, and then, by and by, people stop loving their country. Countries can go on for a long time after they are no longer loved. Sooner or later all countries are no longer loved, and the reason is that they take this for granted; they become rationalistic, and they despise romanticism and the rest of it and say, "Let's be realistic and hard and cold-blooded about this and just use our power," without seeing that the power depends on this intangible emotion.

Take a thing like conscription, for instance. It seems to me there is very real danger of the modern state, in the endeavor to increase its power, undermining the foundations of that power in the psychology of its people. I think conscription is a very good example of it; that is, the moment the state becomes the thing that pushes you into the army, that pushes you around, it begins to undermine its own foundation in the affections of the individual.

I am tremendously ambivalent about this thing. I am in a very bad psychological state of mind, really—I both hate and love the national state, and in particular the United States. Oddly enough, living in Canada this year has revealed to me that I am a sort of queer kind of American. This is where I feel at home. I am attached to the Constitution, that is exactly what it is, and yet I am horrified by the United States. I am horrified by the atomic bomb and by Nagasaki and Hiroshima, and I am horrified by this thing which I see developing, this using the thing which we have here for purposes of increase of power. I am rapidly becoming a good middle western isolationist, because it seems to me that the old isolationist United States is much more of an object of love and much less the object of fear than this enlightened, progressive, international looking, interfering, missionary United States that is coming out of all this blasted education.

I frankly don't know what the answer to it is; that is one reason why I wrote the paper, because I am in the unfortunate position of a specialist who is getting kicked out of his speciality, and I'm in a mess! Here I am, a technical economist, of a purely theoretical kind, and I have just suddenly come to the realization that there is no sense in being a technical economist of a purely theoretical kind. But I have never read any political science; I am an ignoramous, and I am appalled by it. It has taken thirty-seven years to become a political economist, and I will have to spend the rest of my life becoming a political scientist before I get to be of any use to anyone. There is so much to know. Because of the multiplicity of circumstances we have to know everything, and we can't. It may very well be that the most critical thing we have to face is the question of short cuts in education. How can one cover in one year what ordinarily takes four? I don't know.

Mr. Wright: That is an interesting point. Mr. Boulding has pointed out that the frightening warmaking national state rests upon a romantic sentiment rather than upon the crass materialism of

economics. This reminds me of the finding that what we can most nearly call warfare among animals and primitive peoples is more likely to rise from the sex drive than from the desire for food.

ECONOMIC CAUSES OF INSTABILITY

Mr. Schultz: Despite Mr. Boulding's insistence that economics was relatively secondary, he did recognize that "some" economy was necessary to achieve a world society. Such a minimum might be achieved by institutions which would give us economic stability. Despite his disclaimer, he hung a great deal on that idea as his paper proceeded, and at one point he referred to an international monetary authority. At that juncture in his presentation such an authority seemed the all-important thing to achieve a world society.

This leads me to ask: In terms of Mr. Boulding's appraisal, just how important is economic stability in the whole problem?

I am reminded of Harold Laski's lecture at Princeton University last fall. He argued that if we could only obtain economic welfare, that is, essentially the same standards of living over the world, political tensions would disappear. I would deny it. I would argue that political tensions are not so neatly related to economic conditions. Nor is economic stability necessarily as important as I thought Mr. Boulding made it to the world society that we are striving for. If I am right, then it raises the question of whether we may not be developing wrong expectations.

The second question is internal to Mr. Boulding's case. He said that world history between the two wars may have been quite unique, that we may now be trying to achieve stability only because we found so much instability, and that in fact we may be in for a long period when we must deal with the classical problem of resource efficiency from an economic point of view. I think there is a measure of truth in that, but it raises this question: Can "mere" long-run economic efficiency be of primary importance to the task of achieving a world society?

Third, isn't there inherent in the development of our society technologically, in the added skills of people, in the accumulation of capital, great economic uncertainty in the sense of what it does to the structure of society, to all the institutions of society? The effects of modern technology may be more adverse to the forging of a world society than are short-run fluctuations, which I call cyclical problems, the instability problem as you identify it.

India is on the verge of industrialization, and the way that this may push people around and what it does in the creation of tensions seems to me very great, as it was when it worked its way through some of our Western countries.

MR. BOULDING: I am very glad you raised this, and I think I agree with it. The problem of economic stability at the present moment is not so much what may by the best forecasts happen; it is rather the fear of economic instability derived from past experience. We have had two very severe deflations within the living memory of old people, and these have left a very strong mark, I think, on the psychology of the people who lived through them. The fear of instability, particularly the fear of deflation, is at the back of a lot of the timidity to enter into international agreements.

Whether to get economic stability we have to have an international organization is a question the answer to which, I think, depends on the length of the run we are looking at. It may very well be that over the next twenty years we won't run into the problem, but it always is on the horizon. It may be, on the other hand, that we don't need an international organization for this.

Let me put it in this way: The main economic business of government in the monetary sphere is to act as a governor; we need something in society which will inject an inflationary force into the system when the rest of it is deflating, and a deflationary force when the rest is inflating. We can have a lot of governors, provided they will act on the same principle; therefore, there is no inherent reason, I think, why we have to have an international currency. The great problem is the psychological one of how to eliminate the fear of instability, and I suspect that an international organization might have a very important part to play there.

I agree with Professor Schultz that the instability question is not one of the major economic questions. The great economic questions of the world are: First, how to extend the best techniques to the areas that don't have them. The world is divided into two parts. Perhaps a quarter of it, or perhaps less than that, enjoys the high techniques, high productivity, and the remaining three-quarters, or maybe nine-tenths, doesn't. There is the question of expanding the better techniques to the Far East and to eastern Europe and to Africa. I think, in the long run, that is the dominant economic question.

Then we run into the Malthusian population problem. We see it operating almost as close to home as Puerto Rico, where we go in for public health, and the results are catastrophic. In India and China

they haven't begun to think of this problem. There may not be an industrial future for India. They may not be able to produce the agricultural surplus to support industry with the increased population that the slightest surplus is going to permit. It may very well be that from the long-run point of view the population problem is the really critical one that the world has to face. Of course, in relation to that, there is the migration problem. I am very much disturbed about that because there is no very simple solution. We don't solve it just by permitting free migration anywhere and everywhere, because if a country is really under Malthusian pressure, migration does not do it any good.

Someone made a study of Poland and found that, for every Pole that emigrated, two little Poles did not die. In India and China emigration is even more futile. From the point of view of human welfare this is a critical question. It is a question, however, whether it is a real source of world disorder, simply because the poor people are too poor to cause any trouble. With the present situation in India and China, I don't see how either of them can cause any real trouble in the world for a long time to come, because they are so overpopulated that, the moment they begin to get any improvement in techniques, the population will rise rapidly, the agricultural productivity will go down, and they will have famines. They are just in a trap there. It is pretty bad from the point of view of the Indians and the Chinese, but it may not greatly disturb the world society.

Mr. Schultz: I accept as far as you have gone. But should we not ask: What really brings about the world tensions that we cannot now handle and resolve with the institutions we have? We are saying that these long-run economic problems do not necessarily bring the tensions that may cause the catastrophies we are afraid of. You feel, as I do, that we may get the causes of economic instability in hand; it isn't certain, however; we may need international institutions beyond what we have plus some sense in the United States, but it may well be that the economic factor in bringing about political tension will be less. The question now becomes: What are the sources of the political tensions that are likely to upset us? If we can identify them, we might begin to build.

POLITICAL CAUSES OF INSTABILITY

Mr. Boulding: I think that in the economic sphere the tensions are distinctly ideological. The real cause of tension in the world is that there are two very different ways of looking at economic life and

social life in general and that the accommodation of these different ways with each other is extremely difficult.

MR. WRIGHT: You would admit, wouldn't you, that the immediate cause of tension is the rivalry for power? You ask, "Why does a group want to have power?" And you answer, "It is for promoting its way of life rather than from any desire to control particular economic resources."

MR. BOULDING: I should imagine so, because, from the point of view of resources, the world is not divided so badly. We could conceivably get along economically with a divided world. If either the Russian sphere or the Western sphere were removed to another planet, we could both get along quite comfortably, I imagine.

MR. GUERARD: The war in 1939 developed between people who were in harmony; both the Western Powers and Germany were anti-Communist, and yet they started fighting instead of uniting against communism. If Truman had been in power then, we might all have sided with Hitler, but at that time we didn't.

TECHNOLOGICAL CAUSES OF INSTABILITY

MR. BLOCH: It seems to me that one cause of the fear and tension lies in the fact that world conquest is now a technological possibility. Mr. Schultz and Mr. Boulding have pointed out the importance of economic instability. Whenever you say "economic instability" in the United Nations, you meet objections from people who think economic improvements are more important than economic stability. Economic stability as understood by economists in the U.S.A. is not universally understood in the same sense and, even if understood in the same sense, does not constitute everywhere the primary issue. In certain cases preparation for war can be used as solution to economic instability.

I am asking whether we would not do better if, instead of putting the two empires on different planets, as Mr. Boulding proposed with tongue in cheek, we made it technologically impossible to achieve world conquest by, for instance, the prohibition of the means of mass destruction. That, I believe, is a political as well as a real economic issue. In addition to that, there are many complementary problems, such as internal economic problems and the placing of cultural, social, and political taboos on warfare. I would like to ask Mr. Boulding whether he thinks it technically possible, if the political decision is made, to eliminate through an international system of control the

weapons of mass destruction, and whether that would make impossible the kind of world conquest that some of us fear and some of us hope for.

Mr. Boulding: You are using the term "economic stability" in quite a different sense from the one we have been using. We are using it in the sense of the stability of price levels and outputs and so on, on a rather short-term scale. Of course, we don't mean to imply that long-run improvement in standards of life is less important than short-run stability in output.

In regard to the other point, granting the present psychological division of the world, I don't see how we can abolish the war technology. It just exists; that is, short of a political organization that makes war impossible.

Mr. Bloch: If we abandon hope for an agreement to prohibit the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and to accept a system of control, it seems to me useless to discuss anything else.

Mr. Boulding: We have to look beyond the possibility of an atomic war, because an atomic war may not wipe out humanity altogether, and there may not be such a war. The danger may be just this human curiosity. If we let the scientists piddle around long enough, someone may push the button that will put an end to it all without war. But we've got to look at the situation. How can we preserve, even in the midst of a new war, some individuals who are not entirely carried away by it, who refuse, even in the midst of war, to break all bonds with the enemy?

Mr. Bloch: I am not suggesting that we should not look beyond the possibilities of war. My idea was that one of the main purposes of this discussion is to consider how the kind of conflict which would lead to that war may be avoided. I wanted to see whether we could not pin down the problem to this one question in technology, to the solution by an agreement, not only a moral pledge not to resort to violence, but also technologically to eliminate the dangerous aspect of our systems, to make technology useful instead of dangerous.

ECONOMIC INEQUALITIES AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Mr. Herbert Emmerich: It seems to me there has been insufficient attention to the problems left, not by the advance of technology in subnormal areas, but by the destruction of technology in bombed-out and economically affected areas. What does that do to economic and political tension? We have also failed to consider what

hopefulness there may be in the international economic organizations that have thus far been established—the World Bank, the World Fund, the International Trade Organization in process of becoming. May not these organizations alleviate some of the tensions in the world and create a more balanced technological advance?

MR. WHITTLESEY: I seem to have sensed, perhaps quite wrongly, that some of us think the world society toward which we are working has to be a static society. I think that is a false hope; also an unnecessary hope. Our society as it exists now in the national states is not static. Why should we expect a world society to be static?

What brings about world tensions? I do not for a moment discard or discredit the ideological and sociological causes of tensions, but nobody thus far has said specifically that one source of ideological and cultural differences that produce world tensions is an unequal distribution of resources both of population and of power, actual and potential. Unequal distribution of resources is bound to cause some peoples to have less than other peoples. If those who have less get the notion that they want more than they have, I can't see how to avoid world tensions until they get what they want or have been repelled.

We seem to have had quite a little experience of tensions in the last generation, and I don't know that we are any farther along than before in preventing them; but, at any rate—and this is the thing I want to underline—whatever we achieve at a particular moment is bound to be impermanent because human existence constantly alters the relation between societies and natural resources. That is inevitable, and, as those relations are altered, there spring up new bases for world tensions. Isn't the only thing that we can hope for a mode of society which will be able to handle those tensions as they occur by some means other than war? Any further expectation than that seems to me not merely romantic but downright idiotic.

I was much interested in the remark that agricultural wealth and industrial wealth were likely to be found in the same area. There is a perfectly good "earth" reason for that in the current bases of industrial society; namely, coal and petroleum. They are found in sedimentary rocks where also most of the best soil occurs. Both types of production undoubtedly keep growing because each supplements the other, but the notion that, by some magic, society can distribute wealth equally, as let's say, to make South Africa the equivalent of North America in riches and productivity seems to me too much to hope for.

Mr. Wright: In connection with Mr. Whittlesey's suggestion that tensions are always going to be with us, I recall the comment that was made in the Commission on International Tensions at the recent National Conference of UNESCO in Philadelphia. It was said that tensions, while they may be the cause of war, are also the cause of progress. If we did not have any tensions, we would have a static society.

Mr. Avery Leiserson: If we should agree that the sources of tensions are ideological rather than economic, would we not shift the problem to a level where it is relatively unsoluble? Neither the Russians nor we are likely to give up our preferences for our systems taken as wholes. Should we not, therefore, work within some other kind of organizing force or system of values?

Might not both parts, for example, develop a preference for cultural diversity in the world. Given that preference, what, from an economic point of view, are some of the irreducible minima around which we might forge a program, not necessarily of joint collaboration but of action by the Western world, if the Soviets refuse to collaborate, to show that it wants a world order rather than just an American system or a capitalistic system?

Mr. Riefler: The discussion has cleared up most of the things that were bothering me. In the original presentation I was bothered by the emphasis on the surplus of present society. It seemed to me that it applied only to a "we" group which is in fact very, very small. If one took the "we" group as world-wide, the picture would continue to be one of scarce resources and no surplus. Certainly the problems of China and India look insoluble if we hope to introduce techniques of production that will really take care of their population growth. The militarization of Russia has been taken out of the hides of the people. It does not in any sense represent a utilization of a true surplus. In the West we have had temporary surpluses over the last generation or so. They are now being rapidly eliminated.

As I see the future in this country, our present budget is two-fifths for the Army and Navy. Any surplus that we can possibly have may well be needed and grabbed by the military. Atomic developments really indicate the need of a terrific reorganization of industry and living patterns to reduce vulnerability. The real danger to our economy, given this horrible context, is that we in a democracy will not recognize the reduction in our standard of living that will be necessary to create the surplus required by the existing power situation.

It is dangerous to think of world economy simply in terms of surplus or of the efficient utilization of resources.

The problem we ought to be wrestling with is: Where are these current tensions located and how can we surmount them? How can we avoid the drain on economic resources implied in the power picture? I personally think that the Fund and the Bank are well set up and adequately financed to deal with monetary problems. They have written into them for the first time a sense of international economic responsibility. Before the war when the problem arose of central bank co-operation to mitigate depressions especially in their international aspects, no official body was specifically responsible by mandate, law, or charter for initiating and carrying out an international approach to the problem. The central banks, notably in 1927, got themselves into difficulty because the action that seemed to be required to promote international stability was different from that which seemed to be required to maintain sanity in their various domestic markets. They attempted to meet both requirements and came out very badly. They did not act clearly on either line of responsibility. We have set up in the Fund and in the Bank, and are trying to set up in the I.T.O., international institutions, with international managements. The Bank and the Fund have means with which to operate. Within the limitations imposed by their charters they can act responsibly, almost in the legal sense of the term. That is a tremendous advance. I think these institutions are relatively adequately financed and equipped with instructions sufficient to do their job. This is a new experiment and a great advance.

Personally, I have felt that they do not go far enough, that we need a deeper conception of the problem. I think it is terribly important for the Bank to operate constructively and not simply as an agency for pumping out funds during the period of reconstruction. I have always felt that these institutions alone are still inadequate to cope with the whole problem of instability of raw material prices. This problem may require comparable international institutions to operate in that field. I agree that this type of institution is directed only toward the problem of economic instability in a world that is politically stable and secure. These institutions have little to offer in a world of tension and instability.

RELATION OF ECONOMICS TO POLITICS

Mr. Polanyi: I think levels of economic theory and political theory are related. There has been, for instance, a remarkable dearth of

constructive political thought in our time. The explanation lies in our bountiful inheritance from the nineteenth century which was economically minded. We are trying to live on the scant inheritance of political thought from the nineteenth century when effective political thinking was at an all-time low because laissez faire was by definition a denial of the political problem. There are no political problems if a laissez faire economy works.

One of the effects of this may be our premature universalism in politics. In the nineteenth century universalism was at least logical. If we have a working world market, we have a universal system. This may have some connection with the present tendency to disregard the political implications of some outdated international economic institutions.

I don't think we can or should "uninvent" technological devices, but we might have to uninvent some of our sociological and economic devices. In the domestic field we are really uninventing a part of the laissez faire economics, but in the international field we have not yet really started doing that; we are doing rather the opposite. The more we see that at home we have to handle the economic problem judiciously, the more the missionary spirit of international laissez faire seems rampant.

It has been overlooked that the gold standard, which was the basic institutional formula for making a world market viable and possible at all, had important political implications. The need for national currencies has been practically overlooked. It has been overlooked that an interdependent world market has two sides to it: it means that economic changes and cycles in one country may affect other countries. The colonial revolts of the nineteenth century were partly efforts of the victims to establish political government in order to protect themselves against cultural disintegration caused by the world market.

We are in danger of falling back in this emergency on the universalist leavings of the nineteenth century when we say we must have world government, politically or monetarily, or both. In doing this, we may be suggesting something that is neither possible nor even desirable, and we may be overlooking the intermediate solutions. We have not given much thought, for instance, to regionalist solutions. The political problems involved in regional arrangements ought to be carefully considered.

Mr. Wright: It can be shown statistically that the nineteenth century, that is, the century between the Battle of Waterloo and the

Battle of the Marne, was the most peaceful century that Europe has enjoyed, probably even more peaceful than the celebrated *Pax Romana* of the Antonine Caesars. During that century there were more serious wars in the Americas and in Asia than in Europe. It seems to me that that can be accounted for by three conditions. One was the ability of Great Britain to maintain the balance of power because of her relatively invulnerable position, her great naval and economic power, and her restrained policy. Practically no European war could occur unless Great Britain wanted it. I think that Britain felt that the wars of Italian and German unification were on the whole desirable. All the European wars put together during that century were little more costly in casualties than our Civil War.

The second condition making for peace was the one which Mr. Polanyi spoke of, the separation of economics and politics. The period of mercantilism when governments used economy as an instrument of power politics had been broken by the Smithian economics, and the period of socialism, when governments controlled economics, had not yet come in. In general, economy went on by individual initiative, without much interference or guidance by governments.

The third condition was that Europe had a very advanced technology, a much more advanced technology than the rest of the world, and consequently could exploit the rest of the world and the rest of the world could not do anything particular about it. European nations could work out their aggressions and ambitions externally, not against one another. It seems to me that those three factors were outstanding in accounting for the extraordinarily peaceful period of European history during the nineteenth century.

There has been a change in all these conditions. The balance of power has been broken by the relative reduction in the power of Britain and the decrease in the number of great powers which can throw their weight to one side or another in a crisis. I don't think we can bring back a stable equilibrium of power. The separation of economy from politics has been abandoned in a measure in most countries. Certainly the Soviet Union is likely to continue a totalitarian economy. Modern technology is spreading over the world. Mr. Boulding thought the major long-run economic problem was to spread efficient, economic technologies over the world, and I think he suggested that that would tremendously increase the difficulties of the political problem and probably lead to wars. It will be likely to increase overpopulation in some countries, and it may give some

countries which lack any great sense of responsibility the technology to wage effective war. Certainly Europe can no longer dominate the external world. These changes have occurred and have contributed to making the twentieth century up to date the most bloody and warlike in European history.

MR. BOULDING: Perhaps Mr. Riefler answered Mr. Emmerich to some extent. I don't know enough about these new world organizations to judge how effectively they are going to function. I have an uneasy feeling that they are a little peripheral. They may not quite correspond in magnitude to the size of the problem they have to deal with.

I would like to say a word on what Mr. Whittlesey has said. I am not quite sure how important the unequal distribution of natural resources is really. I suspect that the unequal distribution of cultural resources is much more important. I made a study of European agriculture a few years ago and discovered, very much to my surprise, that the yield of crops in Europe has practically nothing whatever to do with the soil; it has everything to do with sociology. There was a belt of high yield which extended across the middle of northern Europe, from northern France into eastern Germany, with extremely diverse soils and so on, and then the moment one went across the eastern German frontier, flop, the yield halved, and the odd thing about that was that it did it in 1913 and did it also in 1936, but the frontier had moved a hundred miles farther west; that is, in the twenty years that the Poles had the "Corridor" the yield of crops halved. Soil on either side of the frontier was, of course, the same.

There is something disturbing here. The economic case of the Nazis in Europe and of the Jews in Palestine is exactly the same. Here are people who don't know how to do something that we can do, and, by gosh, we are going to move in and show them! That is their case. You can't merely say that everyone has a right to his own culture. Somewhere there must be a medium between the point of view that we have to leave everybody to stew in his own juice no matter how bad the juice is and the point of view that there are things which are clearly better than others and we have to be missionaries about them. We just can't allow the Arabs or the Poles or the Indians to live the way they do, because it is not right that people should live like that. It is the people who don't live like that who feel that, and we can't stop them from feeling that. We can't prevent the way the Jews feel about the Arabs, or the way the Germans feel about the

Poles, or the way we feel about nearly everybody. The economic missionaries—who are not really economic but sociological or cultural—do go out over the world and say, "You ought not to do things this way; you ought to do them this way because it is a better way to do it." We can't avoid that.

Perhaps the only way to solve the problem is to recognize the situation and to say, "We do say that these are better techniques"; but then we run into this responsibility business, the meaning that Mr. Marschak raised. I am very much worried about it because I have a good deal of sympathy with people's desire to stew in their own juice. If the people of Quebec want to have the kind of life they have, well, I think they ought to; I think it is a terrible kind of life, but then I am all for variety, and I don't know, maybe I'm wrong. That point of view is pretty hard for any intellectual to come to—the view that the kind of society he represents may not be right or may not be right for everybody.

I am afraid I am getting away from economics again. I don't seem able to avoid it today because I do really feel that the economic aspects of the problem we are considering are in a way peripheral. That perhaps brings me to Mr. Polanyi's point, for which I have great sympathy. I am an economist looking for a political theory, and I just can't find any. I can't find anything in political science that corresponds to the kind of ferment and excitement and interest that is going on in economics, this tremendous extension of insight that has been going on the last twenty-five years.

I want to throw out an idea to the political scientists. Isn't the difference between the economic way of looking at things and the political way of looking at things the difference between what economists call perfect competition and what they call oligopoly? The economist looks at society mainly under the aspect of perfect competition. Of course, he cannot be satisfied with his models because society isn't like them, but if society was molded after what the modern economist would really like, it would be "multilithic"—if I may manufacture a perfectly horrible word—a society composed of innumerable interacting parts, the behavior of each of which does not affect very much the life of the others. The moment we move toward oligopoly, we pass from an economic way of looking at things to a political way of looking at things in which we study the relationships of large groups, each of which can affect the action of the other.

As an economist, I detest oligopoly, and that is why I detest

politics so much. That is why I have a secret hankering after laissez faire and pure competition in politics. Maybe a system is impossible where states compete for citizens, but, if only we could destroy the geographical basis of political life, it might be conceivable. We've got it in French Canada. French Canada is an ideal nation; it is a nation without frontiers, without armies, without wars, yet with strong national feeling. And in a way so are the Quakers a sort of nation. I speak of this with some experience. If we could remove geographical frontiers, nationalism would lose most of its sting. We've got an analogy here in oligopoly. Oligopoly is dreadfully unstable and always leads to wars, e.g., price wars, and there is a very great similarity between a price war and regular war in the general underlying situation. We get rid of price wars by destroying the geographical basis of oligopoly, for example, through the basing-point system. This destroys the geographical frontier of our competitive areas, and we get competition all mixed up geographically. This involves certain social costs but at least eliminates price wars.

I would like to throw this out to the political scientists. Isn't there a line of thought here along which we might find some answers to the twentieth-century political problems which seem so terrifically insoluble.

Mr. Rippy: It seems to me that one of the major problems is to prevent competitive nations that are falling behind or that feel they are falling behind in the competitive struggle from seizing their weapons, or else to prevent them from falling behind. This is still a competitive society, and how are we going to transform it into a co-operative society?

Mr. Boulding: I am not sure that it is the nations that are falling behind that cause the trouble. If we take the European situation, we see that, of all the large nations in Continental Europe, Germany had the highest standard of life. As for technology, the productive triangle which stretches from northern Italy and takes in about all Europe worth considering economically, includes the whole of Germany. The German economy really wasn't at all bad, and the economic system of the Germans wasn't at all bad; but the thing that is so disruptive is the failure of the political organism to provide expression for the missionary spirit. That is the trouble with twentieth-century Europe. The Germans have been suffering from repressed missionary impulses. They felt they had something good, and they wanted to go out and propagate it, and everybody said, "Oh, no, we

are going to do all the missionary work," or else, "You must not do any missionary work," and it created this terrific tension.

MR. WRIGHT: I believe that the small states of Europe, especially Switzerland, Denmark, and the Netherlands, had a higher standard of life than even Germany. In general, imperialism is an expensive business, and the countries which were not spending their resources in power had a higher standard of life.

MR. RIPPY: I said "falling behind or that feel they are falling behind." I think that the Germans did feel that they had got a late start with reference to England and perhaps even to the United States. There was feeling as well as actuality.

MR. BLOCH: Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg had a high standard of living compared to other countries for the same reasons that Evanston, Winnetka, and Glencoe have higher standards of living compared to Chicago.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND THE WORLD SOCIETY

By Robert C. Angell*

MY TASK is, I take it, to scrutinize the far-flung process of international communication with a view to determining whether or not it is contributing, or may contribute, to the growth of consensus among the peoples of the world. Implicit in such a statement of the task is a definition of communication that is at variance with the word's original meaning—to make things common. We shall here mean by it merely the passing of ideas from one mind to another. The receiving mind may not accept the ideas, and even the originating mind may not believe them. One further explanation should be made. I have not dealt with communication that takes place within the boundaries of one nation but which refers to the people of another nation, though admitting its great importance. It seems to me that the inclusion of this in the scope of international communication would so broaden the problem as to rob this paper of all unity of conception and treatment.

I shall hardly touch upon the movement of people from country to country. This, of course, is actually one form of communication. During the war it was a very important one, because large numbers of men spent long periods away from home among strangers. But in peacetime the bulk of contacts of this kind are made by two groups of persons: businessmen and tourists. The contacts in both cases are fleeting and segmental. Since the visitors from abroad do not stay long enough to settle down into a life-routine, they frequently show all the instability and impulsiveness that sociologists characterize as *anomie*. They neither make friends with natives nor win their admiration. Exchange of students and professors is a different matter. Long residence and involvement in a way of life shared by natives produce real fellowship. But such exchange goes on in such small measure at present as to be a very minor factor in the general situation.

Though most of us undoubtedly believe that the volume of international communication is increasing year by year, we cannot assume

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that to be the case. The difficulties of measuring the volume of communication across national borders are, however, very great. For some media we can obtain statistics; for others, we cannot. The discussion will proceed in terms of six channels of communication under two main heads. Point-to-point communication includes mail, on the one hand, and cable and radiotelegraph messages, on the other. International telephone traffic is not large enough to be significant. Under mass communication I will include wire and wireless press dispatches, short-wave broadcasting, moving pictures, and magazines and books. Most of the trends that I will give are for the United States alone. It seemed impossible to assemble world-wide data at this time. I do not make the assumption that the trends for the United States are typical of the world, but I do assume that we know enough about the peculiar position of the United States in the world to be able to make rough corrections and thus arrive at some conception of global trends.

The figures on foreign mail for selected years (Table 1) show very

TABLE 1*

Outgoing Foreign Mail (Except Publishers' Second Class) Handled by the United States Post Office Department

(In Millions)

Year	Pieces
1923	217
1927	300
1931	297
1936	178
1939	175
1945	1,745
1946	860

* Source: *Cost Ascertainment Reports* and *Appendix*, United States Post Office Department.

clearly that point-to-point communication of this type is closely related to the movement of persons. It is evident that immigrants into a country continue to write relatives and friends in the homeland for years after their migration. But, as the tide of immigration slows up and then ceases, as happened about 1930, there is a direct reflection of this process in the dispatch of foreign mail. Just before the recent war it is evident that the lessening number of immigrant letters was being offset by a rising trend, probably in commercial correspondence. The peak war figure (1945) again shows the importance of the movement of persons, this time members of our armed services; and

the decline in 1946 reflects their return home in large numbers. Whether these men made friendships abroad that will keep our mail communication higher than it was before the war for some time to come is an interesting question to which we cannot give an answer.

Since mail communication is so closely tied to migration, the world trends in mail communication may be estimated from a consideration of population movements around the globe. The declining birth rates in Europe in the twentieth century have slowed down the outward movement of population that was so marked until World War I. The flight of refugees before Hitler and the forced movements of peoples incident to the war and its aftermath are not likely to give rise to extensive mail communication for the simple reason that those who have migrated have left few of their own kind behind. In other parts of the world I am not aware that there has been any sharp variation in trends. My conclusion would therefore be that person-to-person mail communication throughout the world is declining somewhat but that this is offset in part by increasing business correspondence.

No one series of data can give the picture with respect to cable and wireless or radiotelegraph communication for the United States because of the differing ways in which the data have been gathered. The three series given in Tables 2, 3, and 4 are not comparable with one another, but together they give a strong indication of the upward trend in this type of traffic since the turn of the century. There can be no doubt that, so far as the United States is concerned, there is a constantly increasing flow of messages of this kind to and from the remainder of the world. And there is no reason to suppose that we are unrepresentative of the global situation in this regard. Because we industrialized earlier than most parts of the world, it can be argued that the trend of recent decades in the United States understates rather than overstates the world trend.

From a consideration of the data so far adduced it would appear that the decline in mail communication is probably not being offset by the increase in cable and radiotelegraph communication. Though the latter was growing rapidly just before World War II, only about one two-hundredth as many words were being transmitted this way as by mail (assuming the average letter to contain three hundred words). In the absence of counterevidence, we must assume that the world will tend to revert to something like this pre-war situation.

Point-to-point communication is, however, probably going to be only a minor factor in the development of the world society. Al-

though sociologists are impressed by the superiority for purposes of social integration of the intimate type of communication that is represented by personal letters, it is obviously the mass agencies of communication that, because of their tremendous reach, hold the greatest hope for world understanding.

TABLE 2*

MESSAGES TRANSMITTED BY OCEAN CABLE AND RADIOTELEGRAPH COMPANIES

(In Thousands)

Year	Ocean Cable	Wireless (Includes Marine)
1902	5,869	155
1912	5,841	285
1917	6,451	420
1922	9,063	2,365
1927	13,987	3,778

* Source: *Census of the Electrical Industries.*

TABLE 3*

MESSAGES TRANSMITTED BY RADIOTELEGRAPH COMPANIES (INCLUDES MARINE)

(In Thousands)

Year	Messages
1926	3,585
1929	5,092
1932	4,497
1935	6,521
1938	8,484
1941	8,656

* Source: Federal Communications Commission, *Statistics of the Communications Industry in the U.S., 1944*, p. 145.

The best index I have been able to discover of international newspaper communication is the foreign press traffic transmitted by American companies engaged in the cable and radiotelegraph businesses. These figures, given in Tables 5 and 6, show a great increase from the period of the twenties to the period of the late thirties and early forties. There can be not the slightest doubt that, so far as the world situation is reflected by press messages to and from the United States, newspapers have been constantly improving their foreign coverage. Though our press is undoubtedly able to afford greater

coverage than the press of other nations, there is no reason to suppose that the trend shown is not a world-wide one.

International short-wave broadcasting was developed in the thirties by European countries and by Japan. Before Pearl Harbor the

TABLE 4*

CABLE AND RADIOTELEGRAPH FOREIGN TRAFFIC (OTHER THAN PRESS TRAFFIC) TRANSMITTED BY ALL TYPES OF COMPANIES (EXCLUDES MARINE)

(In Thousands)

Year	Messages	Words
1938	13,521	240,285
1941	12,128	276,007
1944	14,565	537,140

* Source: Federal Communications Commission, *Statistics of the Communications Industry in the U.S., 1938, 1941,* and *1944.*

TABLE 5*

TRANSOCEANIC PRESS MATTER RECEIVED AND TRANSMITTED BY CABLE AND RADIOTELEGRAPH COMPANIES, 1920–28

(In Thousands)

Year	Words Incoming	Words Outgoing	Total
1920	10,706	4,171	14,877
1924	13,545	5,254	18,799
1928	17,526	8,839	26,365

* Source: Adapted from Willey and Rice, *Communication Agencies and Social Life,* p. 171.

United States did very little in this field. There were then seven "licensees" operating transmitters a few hours a week, but only one of them had been able to obtain a subsidy sufficient to cover costs.[1] All this changed very rapidly with our entry into the war. We soon caught up with the European countries, and ultimately we surpassed them. The war peak was reached in 1944. The Russians were then beaming more than 90 hours of broadcasting a day in 37 languages through 15 short-wave transmitters.[2] In the same year Great Britain

1. Llewellyn White and Robert D. Leigh, *Peoples Speaking to Peoples* (1946), p. 43.
2. *New York Times,* April 27, 1947.

was transmitting almost 110 hours a day in 39 languages, and the United States more than 153 hours in 34 languages.[3] All three have reduced these schedules considerably since the war but are still maintaining a level infinitely higher than before the war. Russia is now operating short-wave transmitters 42 hours a day in 30 languages, the British Broadcasting Corporation, 88 hours in 46 languages, and "The Voice of the U.S.A.," 57 hours in 25 languages over 36 transmitters.[4] Our broadcasts are sponsored by the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs of the State Department. At the moment it appears certain that Congress will greatly reduce our national effort in this field.

TABLE 6*

FOREIGN PRESS MATTER RECEIVED AND TRANSMITTED BY ALL COMPANIES OPERATING CABLE AND RADIOTELEGRAPH FACILITIES, 1938–44

(In Thousands)

Year	Messages	Words
1938	925	69,524
1941	1,252	108,282
1944	1,035	142,625

* Source: Federal Communications Commission, *Statistics of the Communications Industry in the U.S., 1938, 1941,* and *1944.*

I have been unable to obtain statistical data on the international exchange of films. Until the early thirties it seems clear that almost all traffic was outward from the United States and that the foreign market was very profitable to Hollywood. With the advent of the sound picture, language barriers became more important. The competition between American and foreign films became keener outside the United States. British films were the only ones that could invade the American market. In the late thirties somewhat more than two hundred foreign-produced films were shown in this country yearly,[5] while between 35 and 40 per cent of the world revenue for film rentals was received from outside the United States by American distributors.[6] At the present time foreign nations are trying to build

3. *Education on the Air: 16th Yearbook of the Institute for Education by Radio, 1945,* p. 40.
4. *New York Times,* April 27, 1947.
5. See *President's Annual Report to the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America,* various years.
6. *Ibid.,* March 30, 1942, p. 53.

up their own moving-picture industries and are forcing their own exhibitors to keep a certain ratio between domestic films and the importations from Hollywood.

Although magazines and books are not such pervasive agencies of mass communication as the newspaper, the radio, and the moving picture, they cannot be ignored. It makes little difference whether such printed matter is in the original language or translated, whether shipped abroad or produced abroad. The main point is that the indigenous culture of one country is communicated to another. World interchange of books has been going on for centuries. There is every reason to believe that there has been a steady acceleration of the process. Although American book publishers have sold a very small percentage of their product abroad, many pirated editions in other languages have been issued. European publishers have been far ahead of ours in cultivating foreign markets. With respect to magazines, on the other hand, we have been the most successful. *Reader's Digest* publishes seven foreign-language editions, and *Time* and *Newsweek* publish English editions in foreign countries. It is said that in a few parts of the world *Reader's Digest* outcirculates any domestic magazine. Because of the expense of magazines and books, several countries including our own have set up library and reading-room facilities in large cities abroad. We have seventy-five of these in forty-five foreign countries, and it is estimated that they serve three and one-half million readers a year.[7] This seems to indicate that there are large numbers of persons abroad to which every nation can cater by supplying them with accurate information about its own people and with representative examples of their creative writing.

The immediate future may see some important changes in the amount of international mass communication. Radiotelegraph, which is fast replacing cables, is likely to be used increasingly for multiple-address broadcasting. Britain and Russia are showing the way in this field. By this technique news can be beamed to all the press-receiving stations over a wide area in a single transmission. It is now mechanically possible for any publication in the world to receive 100,000 words of foreign news daily. With respect to short-wave radio, we may expect that other European countries and the oriental nations will enter the field in competition with Russia, Britain, the United States, and France. If we drastically cut down our efforts of

7. Ferdinand Kuhn, "Letting the Whole World Know," *Survey Graphic*, XXXV (December, 1946), 493.

this kind, we shall be taking a course that others probably will not follow. In the field of motion pictures, the future may not see a greater number of films crossing national borders, but the chances are that there will be more exchange among nations and less domination by Hollywood. There will be more interaction. Probably the same may be said for magazines and books. Our book-publishing industry awakened to our backwardness in cultivating foreign markets and for a time operated the United States International Book Association. It is likely that the success of our magazines in invading foreign territory will stimulate competition from other nations. There is also a real likelihood that truly international magazines will emerge, drawing on contributors from all over the world, and publishing in different languages.

Thus far we have been concerned merely with the amount of communication flowing from one nation to another. But quantity is not nearly so important as quality or content. If most of what is passing back and forth is on subjects unimportant for international good will, or if it is warped to the degree that no good purpose is served by its transmission, then quantity is of no significance whatever. Before one can deal with the crucial question of quality, it seems necessary to formulate a theory of international communication. If our aim is to achieve peace among nations, we should ask ourselves what, under existing conditions, are the essential functions of such communication.

It seems to me that the basic need is to communicate the way of life of different peoples to one another so as to achieve three objectives: (1) an appreciation of the common human qualities underlying cultural differences; (2) an understanding of the central values of other cultures; and (3) a realization that the different value systems of the world's peoples are each compatible with the universal human qualities even when not compatible with each other. The achievement of these three objectives would not insure world peace, since many of us who understood how the Nazis got that way still felt we had to go to war with them. But appreciation of the fact that the different cultures have at least a common basis in human nature (and many pairs of cultures have more than that) would give all peoples more tolerance toward one another and more hope that incompatible value systems could gradually be modified.

My whole argument rests upon the existence of what I have called common human qualities. This idea was developed some forty years

ago by Charles Horton Cooley, under the concept of human nature. He said:

"By human nature, I suppose, we may understand those sentiments and impulses that are human in being superior to those of the lower animals, and also in the sense that they belong to mankind at large, and not to any particular race or time. It means, particularly, sympathy and the innumerable sentiments into which sympathy enters, such as love, resentment, ambition, vanity, hero-worship, and the feeling of social right and wrong.

"Human nature in this sense is justly regarded as a comparatively permanent element in society. Always and everywhere men seek honor and dread ridicule, defer to public opinion, cherish their goods and their children, and admire courage, generosity, and success. It is always safe to assume that people are and have been human.

. . . . . .

"There is no better proof of this generic likeness of human nature than in the ease and joy with which the modern man makes himself at home in literature depicting the most remote and varied phases of life—in Homer, in the Nibelung tales, in the Hebrew Scriptures, in the legends of the American Indians, in stories of frontier life, of soldiers and sailors, of criminals and tramps, and so on. The more penetratingly any phase of human life is studied the more an essential likeness to ourselves is revealed.

" . . . The view here maintained is that human nature is not something existing separately in the individual, but a *group-nature or primary phase of society*, a relatively simple and general condition of the social mind. It is something more, on the one hand, than the mere instinct that is born in us—though that enters into it—and something less, on the other, than the more elaborate development of ideas and sentiments that makes up institutions. It is the nature that is developed and expressed in those simple, face-to-face groups that are somewhat alike in all societies, groups of the family, the playground, and the neighborhood. In the essential similarity of these is to be found the basis, in experience, for similar ideas and sentiments in the human mind. In these, everywhere, human nature comes into existence. Man does not have it at birth; he cannot acquire it except through fellowship, and it decays in isolation.[8]

We may, I think, take it as a principle that, the more adequately

8. *Social Organization* (1909), p. 28 *et passim.*

communication conveys to the people of one country the human qualities, similar to their own, of people of other countries, the greater the chance of co-operation among nations. In the long run world peace can rest upon nothing less than a sense of fellowship among the members of the human species. World political organization must be based upon a world moral order, and that moral order can develop only as peoples come to feel that they are fundamentally similar enough to have common objectives.

Appreciation of the human nature of the peoples of other countries requires the visualization of them in intimate association, since it is there that human nature is developed and most clearly manifests itself. The communication must be so vivid as to make American parents realize, for instance, that the loyalty of African natives to their family circles is very similar to our own.

So far as the second objective is concerned, the need is merely that the central values of other peoples be clearly understood. I emphasize values because, following Toynbee[9] and many other writers, I regard the value system as the core of any culture and its most important feature so far as relation to other cultures is concerned. I do not think that it is very important to communicate instrumental aspects of culture because it is not necessary that they be accommodated to each other. If we can come to some *rapprochement* with Russian communism, for instance, it is of slight moment whether we eat the same dishes or make automobiles in the same way, or even realize that we do not.

One might suppose that the third objective follows from the other two—that those who have been convinced of a universal human nature and have been informed regarding the cultural values of other peoples will conclude that the values of these peoples stem in some way from human nature. With this supposition I do not agree. We are likely to grant the fundamental humanity of other peoples, but we are likely to believe, unless the contrary is demonstrated to us, that they have been fooled into accepting cultural values which, in the last analysis, are incompatible with human nature. We do not give them credit for the same consistency between values and human nature that we assume to be axiomatic for ourselves. It is essential, therefore, that this relationship in foreign cultures be communicated. This is a most difficult task, since it involves the whole theory of life involved in each of these other cultures. This theory cannot be

9. Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).

grasped through Sunday supplement simplifications, but only through mastery of moral, philosophical, or religious thinkers.

Adequate communication means the making of things truly common. In relation to any of our three objectives, this requires the transmission of the facts as available to an unbiased observer on the scene to those in other lands for whom such facts are important for the maintenance of peace. With any such criterion in mind world communication today is woefully deficient.

In the first place, little passes from culture to culture that leads to an appreciation of our common human nature. In wartime there is positive propaganda to undermine any such idea. Japanese and German inhumanity is treated, not merely as a part of their attitude toward out-groups, but as an ever present aspect of character. In peacetime things are better. There is little negative propaganda of this kind, but there is likewise little positive communication. Occasionally, a newsreel shows family life in some foreign land in an appealing light; more rarely a short-wave broadcast or a magazine article may emphasize the human-nature traits possessed by men of other nations. But most of us who really appreciate how fundamentally similar men are throughout the world have probably been influenced by either prolonged residence abroad, intimate correspondence, or great novels and plays. As already indicated, it is likely that the amount of intimate correspondence across national borders is decreasing. We may hope that the exchange of students and professors will soon show a sharp increase. The growing popularity of cheap editions of good foreign novels is a hopeful trend. If Dostoievski, Victor Hugo, and our own Thoreau were to become available at low cost in all countries, the common human nature which underlies cultural differences would be better appreciated. Documentary moving pictures are a new medium from which we may expect much also. As far as international radiobroadcasting is concerned, there is no reason why each country should not frame its programs with the specific objective, among others, of showing to the world the essential humanity of its own people.

Our norm for adequate communication is even less well met in the field of cultural values. It is not that there are not broad crisscrossing streams of communication; it is that they are mostly biased. Newspapers, magazines, radio, and the movies all play important communicative roles, but they do a remarkably poor job of conveying the true cultural values of one society to others. The breakdown

can take place at any stage in the process: before formulation of the matter to be communicated, either by selection or by distortion; during the passage from one country to another, by censorship either as it leaves or enters; and after arrival in the country of destination, again by selection or distortion.

Newspapers find their problem much more aggravated today than before World War I. Then there was a fairly free flow of news around the globe. News services had their correspondents all over the world, and they transmitted their messages in the main without hindrance. The importance of censorship and propaganda was learned, however, during the first war—a lesson that was acted upon more effectively by Dr. Goebbels than by anyone else. Today there are many nations where correspondents are not allowed to travel freely, and where all that they write is subject to censorship. But adequate communication is not distorted only by such repressive measures. Our own news services are likely to send abroad a disproportionate number of sensational items, thus misrepresenting us to foreign peoples.

The same countries that control the outflow of news also control its inflow. Fearful of what certain items may do to domestic morale, they carefully screen what goes into the newspapers and see to it that distortion is employed when that seems expedient. Even the so-called "free countries" like the United States and Britain do not allow foreign radiotelegraph companies to maintain reception facilities within their borders.

It has been suggested in a report to the Commission on Freedom of the Press that newspapers need to form syndicates across national frontiers to supply signed background and interpretive articles concerning events abroad.[10] At present only a few large papers can afford to have men stationed abroad to provide such service.

Magazines and books probably give a much truer exposition of foreign cultures and their central values than do newspapers. The books and articles of native authors who make sound interpretations of their own culture are frequently translated and pass successfully into foreign markets. The United States is now trying to obtain this result in another way—by publishing a Russian-language magazine, *Amerika*, for Russian consumption. Another variation is for writers to make prolonged visits in foreign countries and then to portray for their countrymen the essence of the other cultures. Goethe inter-

10. White and Leigh, *op. cit.*, pp. 87–88.

preted Italy to the Germans; Lord Bryce, the United States to Britain; and Pearl Buck, China to the United States.

Short-wave broadcasting is much less reliable from the standpoint of intercultural understanding. Nations have used this medium as a weapon in the war of propaganda. One reason for this is that radio reception is hard to prevent. Material that would have no chance of appearing in a foreign magazine or newspaper or on foreign moving-picture screens may be put on the air with considerable likelihood that it will reach its mark. Countermeasures are not every effective. "Jamming" is likely to be resented by the citizens of the nation attempting it, and forbidding citizens to listen to foreign broadcasts is likely to whet their curiosity. A second reason that short-wave transmissions have often been propagandistic in tone is that they are not money-making enterprises. Since the state has to subsidize them, the government quite naturally regards them as a tool of foreign policy.

To the degree that a nation regards short-wave broadcasting as a means of penetrating the defenses of other nations, it will represent its own cultural values in such a way as to have the desired effect upon those at whom the programs are beamed. Whether the attempt is to convince the listeners of the magnanimity of the sponsoring nation or of its ruthless power, the probability is in either case that a true picture of national values and national aspirations is not given. People cannot rely upon their radio receivers to give them anything but a biased version of the essence of other cultures. One way of rectifying this distortion would be for nations to enter into agreements to exchange broadcasts over each other's facilities. Each could then hold the other to something closely corresponding to the truth.

Because of censorship in the receiving country, moving pictures are almost never allowed to exaggerate the virtues of the originating nation. Of course, such censorship sometimes prevents the showing of even a truthful picture. But perhaps the greatest reason for an unfavorable impression is that a nation does not always put its best foot forward in its films. That is certainly the case with many of our Hollywood movies. I was once seriously asked by a London detective whether it was safe to be on the streets of Chicago at night without a gun. R. H. Heindel found that 583 out of 1,000 British school children obtained more of their ideas about the United States from the moving pictures than from any other source; and that 705 believed

that our pictures give a true impression of American life.[11] What an opinion of us they must have! It has remained for a British Member of Parliament, Robert Boothby, to put the thing in a nutshell: "Anyone who suggests that the American films portray the American way of living is an enemy of the United States."[12] We can perhaps hope that foreign competition will force us to make better pictures, thus saving us from our own self-depreciation.

If present communication channels are pitifully inadequate in giving a clear and accurate conception of the central values of foreign cultures, they are a fortiori so in giving an appreciation of the connection between the values of other cultures and human nature. However much each nation realizes that it is to its interest to try to persuade foreigners of the humane basis of its own system of values, it seems to believe quite as strongly that it must prevent others from persuading its own people of the corresponding fact. Hence we resist the propagation of Marxism just as Russia resists the propagation of the principles of our Bill of Rights. It is only a very rare book, like Professor Northrop's *The Meeting of East and West*, which gets the problem squarely before the people of the world. It seems visionary to hope that many persons in every nation can be brought to understand that the various value systems of the world are like separate stalks growing from the same root, but only this would seem sufficient to initiate the accommodation process that could produce a world moral order.

The picture that I have painted of communication in the world today is bleak indeed. Yet I would not leave the impression that there are no hopeful features in the situation. I will mention three.

In the first place, unbiased communication cannot altogether be prevented in the modern world. Literacy is growing by leaps and bounds, and a literate person may ferret out the truth even against great obstacles. The late war has brought millions of people into close contact with foreigners, and some of these contacts will be continued. The differentiation of classes in all the great states creates communities of interest across national boundaries that give rise to communication. We have a Communist party; perhaps there is still in Russia a group with capitalist sympathies. Finally, even the most seclusive society has to send abroad political and economic repre-

11. "American Attitudes of British School Children," *School and Society*, XLVI (December 25, 1937), 838–40.

12. Quoted in Ruth A. Inglis, *Freedom of the Movies* (1947), p. 4.

sentatives, some of whom will bring back truths about the outside world.

Second, no nation can afford to isolate itself in the modern world because it will be technologically outdistanced if it does so. The attempt will be made by some countries to accept scientific and technological advances while excluding all political, moral, and religious influences. This attempt can hardly be a complete success. Modern radios will bring in distant broadcasts; modern techniques of industrial management imply democratic principles.

The third hopeful circumstance that I see involves perhaps a little wishful thinking. It is my belief that there is a growing sense of professional ethics in the communication field. I believe that there is more sober self-control by newspapers and news services, more realization on the part of moving-picture producers of their international responsibilities, more inclination on the part of governments to make their short-wave broadcasts as accurate as they would like to have those of other countries. In short, I think that I see a trend toward honest communication. UNESCO has been founded to promote such a trend, and its first year's projects seem intelligently conceived to this end.

The shortcomings of world communication today are so many and the signs of future improvement are so few that many believe that the chances for world peace would be greater if we cut off communication between nations altogether, or at least eliminated the most propagandistic media. This is indeed a doctrine of despair. It is a doctrine I find repellent, but I agree that we are in a real dilemma. Free communication may make for sharpened conflicts; but we can never hope to get to one world without communication. The whole problem is one of world morality. Communication needs to be governed by international moral standards. Paradoxically, such standards can only develop through communication. While they are a-building we take a grave risk. It is, in General Eisenhower's phrase, a calculated risk, and probably the greatest one in history. But we must take it. We must hope that adequate moral controls will develop faster than misuse of world communications.

The only practical suggestions I have to offer are by no means new or original. It may be worth while, however, to gather them together into a unified program that we Americans might, as a beginning, seek to carry out in this country:

1. Encourage further study of the international communications

problem. Nothing is more important than to bridge the cultural chasms between nations; yet we are profoundly ignorant of how to go about it.

2. Increase the flow of international communication. We should maintain our war-made contacts throughout the world and work to reduce barriers like high postal rates and communications charges, tariffs, quota restrictions, and censorship.

3. Foster a greater sense of international responsibility among those performing communications functions. Our press and our motion pictures have often done a disservice to the cause of international understanding by misrepresenting this country to foreigners.

4. Foster particularly the exchange of creative works of literature, both fiction and nonfiction. These works leave a deeper impression than other forms of distance communication. They enable us really to put ourselves in other peoples' positions.

5. Foster exchange of students, professors, and other professional men. There is no link with foreign lands quite so strong as this one.

6. Support UNESCO. Through this organization we may hope that the efforts of Americans can be integrated with those of other nationalities to achieve a vital world community.

This is a far-reaching program. It will not be effectuated without a great deal of work on the part of a great many people. But ours is a time that calls for a superhuman effort to avert interhuman tragedy.

DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

MR. ANGELL: To summarize my paper, it appears that up until World War II letter communication throughout the world was decreasing because of the slowing-up of migration out of Europe. I conclude that migration is perhaps the chief cause of international letter-writing and that, when migration slows up, internatinal letter-writing slows up. However, cable and radiotelephone communication were increasing right up to the war and, of course, through the war. We may expect, I think, that they will go on increasing. However, cable and radiotelephone communications are largely for business purposes and probably do not do much in the way of knitting peoples together. They constitute, rather, a secondary form of communication and are rather materialistic in content. They do little to communicate from one culture to another what I think is central—values.

Mass communication, as distinguished from point-to-point communication, has been increasing by leaps and bounds, and there is every prospect that it will continue at a high level. It probably will not continue at the level that it reached during the war, but it will probably never drop back to what it was before the war.

I did not ask the question in this section whether or not it is better that there should be more communication, because later in my paper I do distinguish types of communication. It seems to me that the total amount of communication is really not the important question. The important question is: What types of communication are growing and what are shrinking?

The heart of the paper contains a theory of communication in relation to the world situation. I suggest that there are three main services which communication might perform. I go back to Professor Cooley's rather well-known treatment of human nature and say that if we can get down far enough below the veneer of culture, the peoples of the world are not so very different. They do have certain human qualities which are due to the fact that they all, when young, had to associate with other people. They had to develop a sense of loyalty

to their immediate groups. They had to develop a sense of justice and friendliness and kindliness. Therefore, there is some basis for a feeling of humanity throughout the world and a feeling of fellowship. But, of course, that gets covered up by the differing cultures of the world.

Communication might make us aware of the humanness of other peoples in other cultures, to make them understandable to us as persons, and as persons not very different from the persons in our own society.

We cannot let the matter rest at human nature, however, because the different cultures and value systems conflict so much. Communication might also make us understand one another's value systems and help us to obtain an appreciation of them—even though we don't agree with them. We might be able to see how these other people feel and why they feel that way. This is the sort of thing that all intellectuals have done to some extent, but it needs to be done by a much broader section of the population.

The third function of communication is perhaps a little difficult to grasp. It is not enough to understand that other people have human nature or that they have different values. We must understand that their value systems are based ultimately on human nature just as ours is. Springing from a common soil, so to speak, are differentiated shoots, and we must give other peoples as much credit for consistency as we give ourselves. They have as much right to their value systems as we have to ours; and, going down to the roots, there is a basis upon which we can build a feeling not only of tolerance but of positive appreciation and good will.

You can see that I am stressing value systems, and I am quite frank to say that I have been led to do so by the writings of Professor Toynbee and of other authors whom Dr. Parsons discusses in his book. These authorities think that value systems are really the heart of any culture. We have to begin our problem of world adjustment and accommodation through understanding the various value systems. Mr. Marschak questioned that when he said that perhaps an accommodation among value systems is not the most important thing; perhaps the problem is just a struggle for power. If that is true, then there is no virtue in my analysis at all.

Next I attempt an evaluation of the content of present-day communication from the standpoint of the theory I have just outlined. I come to the conclusion that international communication today is

rather inadequate to perform any of these functions. We are not acquiring a sense of the common human nature of all the peoples of the world; we are not gaining an understanding of the value systems of other people; and we certainly are not learning that their value systems stem from a common soil and are, perhaps, just as well derived from that common soil as is our own.

In this section there are two omissions, one of them deliberate; one of them I was not aware of until this conference. The first one is that I have left out all consideration of communication within a country concerning another country; for instance, all consideration of how American writers talk about Germany. I felt that when we get into that question we open up such a large area of discussion and controversy that it seemed best to avoid it. Those men in America who write about Germany must have obtained their ideas about Germany from somewhere. Therefore, there was international communication at some point, and it is at that point that my paper deals with the problem.

The second point that is omitted is the differential in communication as between leaders and led. That is a very good point, and one that I might have discussed. It is probably true that communication is functioning better as regards the leaders than it is as regards the led and possibly that differentiation would introduce new complications into my treatment.

Lastly, I discuss future trends and possibilities. I point out three aspects of the problem which I think are hopeful. First, we cannot altogether prevent accurate communication across national borders. It will seep through in spite of attempts to block it. I recognize, however, that it can be blocked rather effectively, so that this alone would really not give us much hope.

Second, I believe all nations of the world want technological advances; they will therefore keep the door open for communication about technological matters. If they keep the door that far open, they cannot altogether prevent the seeping-in of political, ethical, and religious ideas. If we have modern radios and use them, it is hard not to get foreign viewpoints. If we try to get modern ideas about management-labor relationships, such as those developed by Mayo at Harvard, we can hardly help but get a few democratic notions along with them. The attempt sharply to separate the technological from the evaluational or normative area of communication is not likely to succeed.

The third aspect of communication which I consider hopeful is perhaps wishful thinking. I have the hope that the people who are in charge of communication in the world today, who are running our newspapers, our movies, and our radio programs and who are in government positions where those things are in question, may be acquiring a greater sense of professional ethics than they have had in the past; some of the type of responsibility that Mr. Boulding was talking about. I hope that they are trying to see matters from the other side and are trying to give the truth to others as they would like to have the truth come to them.

I suggest the dilemma which I think we are in. Some of you may not agree with me. We have got to have communication in the world, especially in the realm of norms and value systems; on the other hand, until we develop loyalty to world norms, our communication may be very badly misused. We really face a risk. If we increase communication, we may actually increase conflict. But, if we don't increase communication, I don't see how we can ever get the moral order in the world which seems indispensable under modern conditions. I think we have to increase communications and take the chance.

At the end I put together a few ideas in the form of a program. This is the sort of thing UNESCO has been getting out, and it may provide material for discussion.

ACCOMMODATING INFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION

Mr. Warner: I agree with Mr. Angell that mass communication has increased a very great deal. Three factors seem to account for this: first, technological improvement has made it easier to communicate across international lines; second, with technological improvements we have developed economic relations that have led to forms of communication that were not previously used; and, third, certain people have made a positive effort to communicate to the masses of other nations. Mass communication has created a situation, I think, that may be hopeful.

When a whole people know that they must communicate with another people, then it becomes necessary for them to understand the systems of behavior and practices of the other people sufficiently to enable them to fashion their own symbols so that they can be understood. Two things then seem to happen: a self-awareness develops

not only in the individual but in the culture. A whole people has to become more aware of itself and at the same time more aware of other cultures. So a series of accommodations, or adjustments, are made when one culture tries to influence another.

This implies that international systems of influencing begin to develop, leading to some kind of larger world integration. Obviously, this could work in a negative way, too, but my guess is that if we have to find out what we are ourselves, and if a society has to find out what it is itself and what other people are like in order to exchange symbols, then these positive accommodations will take place and the original society will be changed. I think the United States presents an example of that. In our efforts to relate ourselves to other people so that we can get our ideas over to them, we have found out more realistically what we are and what other people are. This leads to better understanding between us and other nations. Some of the behavior at this conference may be related to that very fact.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I want to address myself to the point that Mr. Angell deliberately left out; that is, the problem of communication among people inside a country about another people outside. Such communication can perhaps be more easily controlled than communication within a people about themselves. Unfortunately, the major effort as far as the teaching of history is concerned has been generally of an *intra* rather than of an *extra* nature.

The writing and teaching of Western history since the invention of printing may be divided into three stages. Through the Reformation, history dealt largely with the church and the common experience of Europe's people through the church. (That common experience may be what people have in mind when they say the Western world was at one time more united than it is today.) Then came the period of Enlightenment, when historians usually dealt with the problem of humanity as a whole. Since then there has been an intensification of nationalism, with the result that historians are interested mainly in their own countries. In the United States there is serious danger that we will talk more and more about American history and less and less about the history of other countries.

UNESCO, I suppose, is consciously operating to teach the people of one country about the people of other countries through the exchange of teachers and the distribution of materials.

MR. ANGELL: I recognize the importance of that problem. It did not seem to me to come under the head of international communica-

tion, but perhaps it does. Certainly, such teaching would be very desirable.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: It hasn't been done much as yet. We ought to have people from other countries coming in and teaching us about their countries.

MISS MEAD: We might drop the word "international," which implies that the communication is between national units and is oriented or channeled and controlled by national considerations, and instead take the term "cross-national communication"—that is, the problem of getting communications across national boundaries, however permeable or impermeable those boundaries happen to be. With that change, we would still be facing the reality that national units would to an extent control and color the communication, but we would emphasize our interest, not in communication among nations, but in communication among peoples with different cultures. That is a semantic point that we can do a little propaganda with.

As a second point, Mr. Angell confined his discussion to words and codes based on words. I think it is important to consider the enormous effects of visual communication, the increase in moving pictures and in still photographs. If we are going to talk about our common humanity, the thing that we have most in common, after all, is our bodies. We do very peculiar things with them when we try to put them into words. Actual pictures of people, not distorted by language, establish much more rapid communication than is possible when we have to write a letter in a language that one of us does not naturally speak, or read a book, or even deal with a translation into our own language.

MR. ANGELL: I did mention documentary films.

MISS MEAD: This is not a criticism, but I think we ought to give greater weight to the possibility of what the still- and motion-picture camera has done to communicate across national boundaries.

As a third point, I would like to comment on Dr. Warner's remarks. Early in the war when we were attempting to set up a training school within one of the Intelligence agencies, it was suggested that we should start the indoctrination period, which was going to end up with understanding the Japanese, with a lecture or so on the Americas. That was promptly nipped in the bud by the head of the agency, who said there wasn't the slightest need of telling Americans anything about Americans. That was a common attitude that ran

through many of our older military minds, and it was transcended eventually by a device that just fits what Dr. Warner was saying.

I did a memorandum in England on the American soldier and the British civilian. It was picked up by the British and put into an indoctrination pamphlet for their army. This looked like the wrong thing to do because I was talking about American men and British women. They gave it to British men, which looked like a magnificent state of bungling. The British system of indoctrination permits signed articles; consequently, this pamphlet says, "This is what an American woman, an anthropologist, says; you read it and then make up your mind." It was then picked up by the American indoctrinational authorities, who started it out, "Wouldn't you like to know what the British soldier is being told about you?" Under that heading everything that I might have wanted to say to the Americans got said.

Mr. Potter: Mr. Chairman, I just want to make a little point concerning the disposition of Mr. Angell to leave out business communications. I am convinced that that form of transnational communication ought not to be disregarded. In correspondence among business people with regard to manufacturing and marketing, many world problems come up for analysis, discussion, and appraisal; the matter of recruiting labor and expert staff; the matter of securing supplies of raw materials and equipment; the matter of transportation, delivery facilities; and, much more important, the settlement of business disputes.

I just had a study made of the use of arbitration in international business disputes. Along those lines there is a rather rich interchange going on. I should certainly say that the advertisements of English manufacturing concerns and French manufacturing concerns in American magazines, and vice versa, do contribute to international awareness, and perhaps appreciation and understanding, to a very notable degree and on the value level. If we get an English manufacturer stressing the superiority of quality and durability in British hosiery in comparison with flimsy American products, we get an issue raised at least.

Mr. Wright: Mr. Potter's point raises a distinction which Mr. Angell made, that some forms of communication make for a world society and some make against it. Mr. Angell tended to stress those forms that made for it. I don't think we ought to ignore in this problem of communication those that make against it. Some business

communications, in raising the competitive spirit, may be causes of friction and conflict.

MR. RIPPY: Communications concerning investments should also be included. Many thousand companies have investments in other countries, and they are in touch with millions of people continuously.

EFFECT OF INTRANATIONAL COMMUNICATION ON INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

MR. JEROME S. BRUNER: I think the problem of communication within a country about another country is very central to the effectiveness of international communication. From the point of view of the credence put in news, we are much more likely to believe what we read in our own papers or hear on our own radio than what we hear over the short-wave radio broadcasting from another country.

If we study the communications trend in the United States over the last forty years, we find more and more centralization. The press has become more monopolistic; the average number of papers in cities of 25,000 and above is half what it was at the turn of the century. Communication about Russia in this centralized press is monolithic, setting up widespread and stereotyped beliefs which cannot be effectively challenged. Communications from outside are rejected, and the primary sources of information are carrying information which is a great oversimplification of Russia. This is only one example—a serious one.

It seems to me, therefore, that one of the important terms in the equation for understanding these processes of international communication is communication within a country. It is here that the well is most effectively poisoned. This seems to me quite important for an understanding of international communication.

MR. ANGELL: That is true. Though it does not qualify as international communication, this type of communication does qualify as a conditioner of international communication.

MR. WARNER: I wonder whether there is more well-poisoning by the press now than previously. It may be that we are more aware of the world and that we are communicating with the rest of the world more than we were in times past because of the mass influence at the present time. All that we say about the press is doubtless true and is also true of the radio, the motion picture, and of industry, yet people are communicating in such a way that they are learning about one another. They are influencing one another in a way that they never did previously.

COMMUNICATION BY TRAVELERS

MR. WRIGHT: I believe Mr. Angell mentioned communication through traveling persons. There has been a great deal of talk about the value of exchange of students. It seems to me that a very important study could be made of the influence of communication by studying, for example, the types of persons that traveled from the West to China: first the missionary, then the trader, then the soldier; later the traveler for pleasure. There have been few students going that direction but many in the other direction. By studying the types of individuals who travel, one might discriminate the kind of communication that makes for peace and the kind that makes for war.

MR. ANGELL: I had in mind that certain types of people are much more valuable from that point of view than other types, especially those who will settle down and live in a foreign country without disruptive intent. I don't suppose the missionary has had disruptive intent, but actually that is about what it comes to; and I think that the student or the professor who goes abroad to absorb another culture does produce a great deal more international communication in my sense than do these other types.

MR. WRIGHT: The method of the Jesuits in China during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries presents an interesting contrast to that of the Dominicans. The Dominicans tried to spread the Gospel by compelled Europeanization. The Jesuits, under Father Ricci and others, thought it necessary, like modern anthropologists, to study the culture of the people thoroughly, especially the language, before they attempted to exert influence. The Jesuits' knowledge of astronomy greatly impressed the Chinese. They rectified the Chinese calendar, and later some of them became close advisers to the emperor. Perhaps if the pope had been willing to co-ordinate ancestor worship with Christianity, China would have become a Christian country. The Jesuits had a great influence in China during the seventeenth century because of their understanding and sympathetic attitude. The rites question eventually broke it up, but for a time there was very important communication from Europe to China through this relatively small group of Jesuits.

MR. PARSONS: Would it not be fair to say that the generally friendly disposition of Americans toward China, however imperfectly it was carried out in actual contact, was primarily a result of

the missionary contact? If our contact had been primarily through business channels, a very different popular picture of China might have emerged in this country in our time.

MR. WRIGHT: In the Institute of Pacific Relations there has often been a contrast between the American and the British relations with China on just that ground. American contacts with China were mainly through missionaries and educational institutions, whereas the British contacts were through merchants and investors. The "Shanghai mind" was formed among the British commercial community, and it did not make for sympathetic understanding.

MR. ANGELL: I would agree with Mr. Parsons that, as between businessmen and missionaries, the missionaries are probably better contactors; but wouldn't you agree, Mr. Parsons, that probably professional scholars are even better?

MR. PARSONS: That might be. I was not going to advocate a revival of the missionary movement, but I do think the missionaries were people who, however ethnocentric or religio-centric their attitude, had a certain interest in the country for its own sake, a relatively disinterested attitude.

INFLUENCE AND INTERESTS

MISS MEAD: This question of channels raises the problem of whether we want to encourage cross-national communication to follow specialized fields of interest. Chess players from different countries can talk to each other, and baseball players, and physicians or physicists, but it still leaves us with the problem of communication between groups who cannot use any of those channels or frames of reference for communication.

I think Pearl Buck realized that when she started the East and West Association. This group has had a checkered career, but in her original statement Mrs. Buck was trying to use common humanity as a means of communication. Communication may concern quite simple things, like the fact that people eat and children play and mothers put babies to sleep and that muscles get tired when people work, and not rely entirely on specialized spheres of discourse.

MR. WRIGHT: Concerning the influence of predispositions formed by education or other forms of internal communication about other peoples, I recall a study made by Dr. Timothy Ting-Fang-Lu a few years ago. After examining several hundred elementary history and geography texts, he concluded that the average American

child would think the Chinese were a strange people who wore queues and ate rats. The missionary contact would develop a different picture. The numerous Americans who put their pennies in the contribution boxes to pay for Chinese missions probably got an impression of China as a country which had great possibilities and which they ought to help.

MR. ANGELL: The quotation I have from Heindel, who made a study of the British children's ideas about America on the basis of our movies, is a similar case. They have a complete misunderstanding of us.

MR. RIPPY: What is being discussed may be important, but it won't help much in our key problem. We seem to be discussing how to make friends with and influence foreigners. I don't think we can influence them against their interests as they see them, nor can we influence them against their government's policy. So when we come up against the power situation or a struggle for resources of the earth or fanaticism of belief in some economic or political system or fear of other nations, how are we going to handle that situation? I don't think we can influence it in this personal way.

MR. WRIGHT: May we not effect the way in which they see their interests and we see ours?

MR. RIPPY: Well, we might, but we will have to prove to them that we are not trying to put something over on them; they will have to see that it is to their best interest.

MR. WRIGHT: Why is it that we look upon one country as an enemy which must not be helped because aid might be used for hostile purposes but another country as our friend that ought to be helped?

MR. RIPPY: Half the time we may be right; the other country would use its resources for war.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: This business of influencing and making friends with foreign people is the thing I had in mind when I suggested that the influence might be in the other direction. In case of the Chinese there is a great mass of data showing how Jesuit missions in China affected Germany and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with such things as porcelain and fireworks and cloisonné and flower gardens and interest in Confucius and so on. America can influence the foreigner, but the foreigner can also influence America.

MR. BRUNER: I would like to question one point that Miss Mead made, and also Mr. Angell, on this matter of common humanity. It seems to me that the best way of getting people interested in one an-

other is for them to share a very *specific* common self-interest. Take the problem of an American baker and a French baker getting together or an American woman and a French woman talking about their common problems. The chances of their influencing each other in terms of the interests which are present in their daily lives are infinitely great. To talk to the average person in France, for example, about America *in general* we found was unsatisfactory. On the other hand, if we would send over an American trade-union leader or architect and have him talk to his opposite number over there, we would get a bond which could increase understanding because each could follow through on his interest. A permanent self-interest was involved in their relations with each other. I am afraid people are not terribly concerned about the fact that *all* people eat and *all* people sleep and others have children who cry.

MISS MEAD: The two occupational groups you mention, the French bakers and the French women, constitute over 50 per cent of the French population. What are you going to give the women to talk about except the fact that babies cry or don't cry? They are not bakers or printers or miners.

The Canadian Broadcasting Company has been trying to run women's broadcasts and to have women from all parts of the world speak. They were badly stymied to find anything that they had in common because they were talking about women in universities and higher education for women, and women in the medical profession, and all these special spheres of discourse. Then they took up vacations and discovered that in most countries women did not have any. But it never occurred to them in the whole of their planning that in all countries, women, at least some of them, had children.

MRS. WRIGHT: I wondered what Miss Mead meant by saying that women were only interested in talking about babies and whether they cried or did not cry. I found in France that women were very much interested in the political situation, which involved taxes, welfare organizations, juvenile delinquency, educational institutions—in spite of the fact that the women had just been given suffrage. They were interested in a great variety of subjects, and I found when I went back eighteen months later that they were still concerned about what to do with their vote.

MISS MEAD: All I meant to say was that, while we are extending and developing specialized channels, we are also faced with the problem of mass communication in the sense of symbols which can be hu-

manly applied to large groups of people. We can't reach them all by having bakers talk to bakers and politicians to politicians.

Mrs. Benedict: Why not propose having American men talk to French men? Why don't we have a men's international program? It is just as meaningful, certainly, as a woman's program.

Mrs. Wright: Because men won't listen.

Mr. Morris: We might even have the French women talk to American men, and vice versa.

Mr. Morgenthau: I am very much impressed with this discussion, but I have some doubts about its relevancy to the problem of a world community. I think Miss Mead's point was very well taken. We can look at international communication from two different points of view.

Look at it from the point of view of mere technique and ask yourself: How am I going to improve that technique? In the same way you can ask yourself: How am I going to improve railway and air communications? On the other hand, you can ask yourself: What kind of international communications will be needed to bring about a world community? The two problems are not identical. We live in a world which is dominated by power politics. That is to say, by national entities which follow their own power interests. If, under such conditions, we improve international communications, we will not get a world community but, on the contrary, we will only strengthen the competitive forces which at the present time tear the world apart. In other words, by improving the technique of international communications, we simply forge another instrument to be used in the struggle for power which is going on in the world today. It seems to me that we ought to pay some attention to that power political contest within which at the present moment international communications operate.

HUMAN NATURE

Mr. Wright: Mr. Angell emphasized three lines which he thought should be included in the content of international communication to make for a world society; that is, to make people everywhere aware of their common human nature, to make the people in one culture aware of the values in another culture, and to make them realize that these values in other cultures, no less than their own, spring from human nature. Could we discuss that question?

Mr. Young: The proposal to appeal to human nature and hu-

manity raises the question of a theory of this subject. I yield to no one in my admiration for Charles Horton Cooley, but I think he assumed a kind of instinctive good will and sociability that few psychologists today accept.

If we view original nature as malleable and human nature as a social product, there still remains the problem of frustration and anxieties that cannot be ignored. Cooley's notion of the primary group is very pertinent in this connection. If I read the recent studies on culture and personality correctly in terms of the basic primary group, namely, the family, there are wide variations in maternal care, in the values of the child and the family, in the question of rejection or acceptance of the child, in the manner of nursing and of putting to sleep. We ought to re-examine the Cooley theory of human nature in relation to the theory of comparative primary groups to discover whether there are universal liknesses on the basis of which everyone could communicate with everyone else.

I would raise a second question, whether in any case this approach has any relevance to international relations, for I doubt very much whether either human nature or the primary group is universal in quite the way Cooley thought of the matter. He was really projecting his own views regarding small-town life in the mid-America of his day.

MR. WARNER: I cannot agree with Mr. Young. When we have had experience with various kinds of people from various parts of the world, and have studied their personalities and their social structures, including the family, and the other social relations within which they have their experiences, we inevitably come to the conclusion that there is a vast amount of common human nature. When we ask why, the obvious things come to mind: we all have more or less the same kind of bodies and the same kind of experiences. While there are great diversities in social structure, nevertheless, the similarities are exceedingly great. Family structures that vary greatly have common basic elements within which people have the same kind of experiences. That is one part of the evidence for a common human nature.

The other part of the evidence is that, when we talk with these people and see them as personalities, we discover the same kind of personalities that we find in our own culture.

So I think we can depend upon this factor called "common human nature"; in other words, people are organisms with similar experiences which have been internalized by living in their groups.

MISS MEAD: I think the list of qualities included in the Cooley quotation are of an order that we would not use today. The capacity for "sympathy," for example, varies enormously between different cultures: members of some cultures are capable of sympathy, some of empathy, some of neither. These are cultural characteristics rather than basic human nature characteristics. Mr. Angell speaks of cultural overlay—human nature being covered up by cultures—but human nature is a creation of culture. Since there is no such thing as human nature outside of culture, to talk about culture as an overlay, I think, obscures the issue enormously.

On the other hand, if we attempt to communicate from one culture to another in terms of, say, the problem of rearing children, we can do it, and I have done a good deal of this in cross-national communication. If we describe to a British audience the average behavior of an American five-year-old child, they read it with horror. But if we say to that audience, "We have to bring up children, you have to bring up children, American women have to bring up children, and British women have to bring up children; they both have a squirming baby on their hands that somehow they have to turn into an adult," we easily establish cross-communication, and I have been able to do that with simple, primitive people in the middle of New Guinea. The process of putting children to sleep may differ—it may be done by scratching on the outside of the basket that sounds like chalk on a blackboard—but all children have to sleep sometime or the adults would go crazy.

If we discuss on the level of process rather than conduct, then the common human process, that has to transform a newborn individual into an adult or has to adjust men's and women's demands on each other in terms of sexual and parental needs, becomes in every culture a means of communication.

In addition to our common bodies, there is the fact that we have to eat and drink and reproduce and die and that we go through similar processes of inducting the next generation and maintaining balances between individuals in any generation. There are also character structures dependent on the order of culture in which one lives. The people who live in a relatively stable culture can communicate with other people who live in the same order of culture. The priests of one religion can communicate with the priests of another religion in ways which those outside the religious system of either culture cannot communicate with one another.

We are now going through a period, which may get a great deal worse, in which the old forms of character structure are being destroyed, in which the economic and technological structure rips people up from their homes. The homogeneous groups, the first-generation culture contact groups and the second-generation culture contact groups all over the world who have experienced this have a form of communication which is human, and relevant to the period and to the state of technological and economic change which they express. If we think of these levels of communication over the world—as more and more cultures, especially in the Orient, are broken down by technological forces—we will have possible levels of communication which can be used to build up a greater strength of communication among different peoples.

Mr. Rippy: It seems to me the most important common factor in the mass from the standpoint of creating what we are discussing here is this: The mass can be led. If two leaders are ambitious, what are we going to do with those two when we get them in two different nations?

Miss Mead: I think that is a dreadfully dangerous assumption to make. If we make that assumption, we are reducing relationships between groups to a single scale, and we know that, whenever we reduce relations between people to a single value scale, competition and conflict inevitably result, unless we assume that the behavior of individuals is different in different countries.

Mr. Rippy: Can the masses be led?

Miss Mead: Yes, if we think they are a mass. Enough people think so, probably.

Mr. Rippy: Are there enough leaders who are ambitious in the world to be dangerous to the objective that we are after?

Mr. Wright: If there are a great many potential leaders and if we can confuse the people on who is their leader, then they cannot easily be led by any one of them.

TYPES OF COMMUNICATION

Mr. McKeon: This discussion has proceeded on the assumption that, if communication is to occur, there must be a community of some sort. The problem, then, is how that fundamental community, which in Mr. Warner's analysis arises from the common character of human nature, may be used to build a world community. Since we have proceeded to the discovery of that basic human nature accord-

ing to different disciplines and techniques, we have talked about the community based on human nature and about communication in several ways which I should like to differentiate.

In the first place, communication may be discussed in what I would like to refer to as material terms, that is, in terms of the similarities discoverable in cultural patterns, which are manifested in similarities in modes of communication and explained in turn by basic similarities in human experiences. Communication is possible by virtue of these similarities in the materials of communication. It is tempting to see in the similarities among human institutions and associations a beginning of world community, and yet the means by which such similarities can be utilized to promote world communication and a world society have not been indicated and are far from apparent.

There is a second kind of communication, which I would like to call "instrumental communication," in which the similarities of human nature are not found in the materials of communication but instead are used to make the communications, however diverse, effective. The audience, rather than manner of life and expression, is important. The communication which expresses the art and aspirations of a people should be distinguished from the communication which expresses what they want to believe or which persuades them to accept what they do not want to believe. This second kind of communication has been greatly developed and widely used in the last two decades.

The similarities of human nature may be found both in the forms of life and expression and in the devices of persuasion, but there is, in addition to these, a third kind of communication which we have not talked about thus far, namely, the communication of ideas and ideals which is also based on human nature. For the purposes of discovering the kind of communication that will lead to world society there is insufficient guidance in human nature, in the sense of the traits that men have always had in common or in the problems that men from primitive races to the most civilized society have always faced. Nor are the devices of propaganda, in spite of the fact that the effectiveness of statements, true or false, in initiating action depends on similarities of human nature, suited to achieve that end. What is needed is a third kind of communication based on a community of shared values.

We have not inquired into this third kind of communication,

though we have touched on the other two. It is an inquiry which might be begun in the arts. Art is a means of uniting through their sensitivities—not only the intellectuals—but the peoples of various countries in a community of shared values. Our problem is: Can we utilize such processes in the international realm and influence the understanding of political, social, and economic questions? Since I have spoken of the *material* and the *instrumental*, I shall call this the *ideal* level of communication of what is common in mankind.

Our examples, to go back to the unfortunate lapses in Mr. Cooley's quotation of almost forty years ago, should be sought not in the similarities of legends nor in the similarities of stimuli to action but rather in the great achievements which have brought together men who seemed alien and different before the communication occurred: achievements in literature, art, religion, and ideal constructions. A form of communication is needed to build a community that did not exist before, making use of the common human nature to express an ideal in concrete form.

Mr. Likert: Some time ago an executive of a large company made the statement, "It isn't what you tell people that counts; it is what they accept." I think that is basic to much of this whole problem of communication. The material presented by the radio, motion pictures, and other media, as such, is obviously important. But far more important is the actual content that is accepted by those persons.

People do things that are not necessarily in their best interests. For example, advertising today has influenced most people, including some of us here, to do many things which are contrary to their best interests. How does advertising do this? Certain of the principles and research tools employed by advertising are applicable to the problem of inculcating values which Mr. McKeon was talking about and of building a world community.

One of the most important psychological principles used by advertising is that, in any attempt to change people's thinking and behavior, they must be approached in terms of their major interests, needs, and concerns. For example, young mothers are much interested in material on the care and feeding of infants. To apply this principle effectively requires that data be obtained which shows the character of the major needs and concerns of those people whose behavior and thinking is to be influenced.

Fortunately, excellent research methods have been developed for obtaining these data. The same research methods can be used also to

measure the existing attitudes and knowledge that people have on such questions as a world community. These results, as well as a knowledge of people's major interests, can be invaluable in guiding efforts in every country to build a world community. The data on interests, attitudes, and knowledge can be obtained for a cross-section of any nation or group and for the various segments of the population that make up such a nation. Moreover, they can be analyzed so as to show the results, not only for the rank and file, but also for various layers of leadership, as, for example, local leaders, regional leaders, and national leaders.

Obviously, the ease and accuracy with which these data can be obtained will vary from country to country. It will be relatively easy work in most countries, and accurate data will be obtained readily. In a few countries it may be necessary to work indirectly. In these latter countries the accuracy of the data will be less, but this can be corrected partially by securing several different kinds of measures. The results from each kind will serve as a check on the other measurements.

I am convinced that it is possible to demonstrate that measurements can be obtained of the knowledge, attitudes, major interests and concerns of the people in every nation. These measurements can be used to find the extent to which the citizens of each nation are world-minded. They can be used to discover which steps will be most effective in producing world-mindedness. They can be useful also in showing how to develop certain common values among all people to enable them, as has been suggested, to tolerate diversification. The basic problem that we face is how to persuade those persons interested in developing a world community to make use of the research techniques that are now available.

Mr. Emmerich: There is one thing that ought to be brought into this discussion which may be even more pessimistic than Mr. Morgenthau's allusion to "power politics." We ought to look at the kind of world we are living in and at the growth of a cultural autarchy which may be quite as important as the retreat of the free-trade area.

We seem to be in a situation of deterioration of all kinds of communication except official. That is due to many causes: the general destruction of means of transportation, the nationalistic use of passports and visas, every kind of interference with the foreign exchange business, clearances of individuals on political grounds from a na-

tionalistic standpoint. The result is that the entire realm of communication is now in the hands of the same forces that we described as nationalistic and provincial. The techniques that Mr. Likert described will be used, I think, inevitably for nationalistic purposes—perhaps somewhat confusedly in countries like ours, where our cultural program asserts great moral ends—but they are susceptible of use as propaganda devices in regulating the export of people, literature, and films.

It seems to me that in the kind of world we have, where people have no transportation, no passports, no visas, the problem is not only in how to increase communication but also in how to organize it so that those controlling it will be interested in the aims of the world community and not just in increasing cultural autarchy.

CONDITIONS OF CONSTRUCTIVE COMMUNICATION

MR. YOUNG: I have spent some time in looking over the vast literature on "Culture and the World Community." It raises questions concerning how families deal with aggression, with anxiety, and with other difficulties that arise early in childhood and the importance of that process in the later culturalization of the individual in the group. If these materials have any merit and validity, we cannot assume that all adults have a basis for intercommunication, because all people do have to nurse their babies or feed them otherwise and put them to sleep. I think the development of patterns of aggression through the family and the subsequent conditioning of the individual will have a good deal of effect on him at the adult level. Though we have to assume there is maternal care of some kind and paternal controls of some kind or other, we have such variations that it seems to me that it does limit the possibilities of communication based on some kind of universal understanding or good will. I am not sure that this barrier to communication is of any great importance to our international problem, but I do think we must recognize it; and, in reference to war, it may be important to consider whether people can communicate certain basic attitudes regarding the use of organized aggression.

MR. CLYDE HART: Although it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of developing understandings among all peoples of our common human nature, and of developing more than a tolerance of differences that exist among peoples, aren't we likely to assume erroneously that the problem of building a world community will be solved

when such understandings are developed? It strikes me that the most important thing to be accomplished by full and free cross-national communication is the development in all peoples of a sense of world responsibility based upon one plain and simple fact—namely, that, as far as the economic and other basic aspects of life are concerned, we already have a world community. The only question is how we can develop control systems that will maintain order and secure well-being within it.

Although we still *reside* in local communities and in national states, we don't *live* in them. We live in the world. The present symbiotic community, to use Dr. Wirth's term, is markedly different from the several symbiotic communities that existed three or four generations ago, before the development of modern technologies. Although this fact is patent to nearly everyone, we don't follow out its implications and make the adjustments necessitated by it. What we need to realize, and to make others realize, is the lack of congruence that now exists between traditional control systems and the system of interaction that they are attempting to regulate. Until this realization is made the basis of our policies and programs, no amount of effort to make people realize that they are fundamentally like peoples in all other cultures will go very far toward the construction of a peaceful and orderly world.

In talking about the differences among cultures, I think we almost completely ignored one distinction, which I understood Dr. Mead to make, between the differences that *arise* through the division of labor in the effort to carry out certain collective activities and the differences that *survive* because people formerly were isolated and solved the problems of life in divergent ways. Peoples isolated from one another developed different languages, for example, and, now that they are thrown into communication, these different languages persist. We ought to understand and be tolerant of such vestigial differences, of course. But if we are going to develop control systems that are congruent with the processes they are attempting to control, those differences that arise through division of labor and the effort effectively to carry on collective activities of a cross-national sort, seem to me extremely important. From now until kingdom come, we may use our processes of communication to build up knowledge of other cultures and to develop more general awareness of the fundamental similarity in the desires and interests that people are trying to satisfy through these various cultural forms and still make very little prog-

ress toward a solution of the problems precipitated by the disparity between traditional moral and political systems and the underlying symbiotic and economic community resulting from new technologies.

My point is that we do not keep as fully in sight as we should the necessity that is imposed upon us by the modern developments out of which all our problems grow. If we could still live as isolated, autarchical communities, whether national or provincial, I don't see that there would be much value, other than the aesthetic or the literary, in understanding other cultures; but the fact that we now are obliged to carry on certain collective activities involving peoples who differ culturally is extremely important.

We often stop right where we should begin. Dr. Boulding might have spent a little less time defending his concept of responsibility, which was the premise from which he derived certain conclusions, and more time developing his conclusions as to what can be done to develop and maintain a sense of world responsibility. Fiscal controls are exceedingly important in the development of a world community. After listening to the long discussion on the subject of responsibility this morning, I don't feel I have any better idea about how we can proceed to develop a fiscal control system that will help us to solve some of our world problems. Similarly, we spend a lot of time on human nature and elementary sociological considerations and don't get down to the practical, workaday questions of the direction that should be given the processes of communication if we are going to utilize them in building a political and moral community that is congruent with the underlying symbiotic community.

Mr. Parsons: It does not seem to me that what Mr. Young had to say and what Mr. Warner and Miss Mead had to say were necessarily incompatible at all. There are in every system of socially and culturally structured manifestations a variety of different psychological components and significances for the integrity of the system. Probably, in differentiating factors, we pay more attention to the things that have defensive significance, that are therefore rather dangerous to attack frontally, in the same sense that we don't try to deal with a neurotic patient by arguing with him about his beliefs which are regarded as symptoms. In the areas of more common experience we probably can find better footholds for establishing a kind of communication which has a chance of getting at a deeper level.

The same fundamental problem seemed to me to underlie this morning's discussion. I think there is a certain type of rationalism,

to which Americans are particularly prone, which tends to feel that we must reach agreements on the most general principles and ideological formulas. In so far as current ideological formulas have defensive functions in the social system in which they are current, it is probably exceedingly dangerous to try to reach a settlement that way, because we are touching people at their most sensitive points, but there are probably other indirect channels of contact where that sort of anxiety is not aroused to a comparable extent.

I don't think that this differentiation of the functional significance of different components of a system of cultural values is in the least incompatible with Mr. Angell's insistence on the fundamental importance of the systems of value attitudes. The problem is to analyze that very complex set of phenomena somewhat more fully so as to get a better understanding of its functions in the total society and of the points at which it might possibly be improved for bringing about practical changes.

Mr. Angell: Mr. Parsons has rather admirably summed up my position. It seemed to me that, when Miss Mead talked about similar processes which go on in all cultures concerning the fundamental aspects of life, she was talking about the same thing that Cooley referred to.

Miss Mead: I was using different words, perhaps more appropriate to our present period, that is all.

Mr. Angell: As regards Mr. Young's comments, we are people who have to have help when we are young. All Cooley was saying was that that fact makes other people be nice to us. Maybe not the same people always; but somebody has to be nice to us when we are little, and we grow up with a sense of appreciation and a certain sense of loyalty to those immediately around us because of that service they perform for us. If there is any one thing common to all man, that is it.

Mr. Wright: Perhaps the discussion in the earlier stage of this meeting has convinced us that there is a common human nature that people can communicate to one another about and which might provide a basis for a world society. Mr. McKeon pertinently drew attention to the fact that human nature has several different meanings. It may be appealed to by those who want to use it as an instrument for carrying out their own purposes, or it may provide something that can form the basis of a world community. We now have the question: What are we going to do about it? Are we going to appeal to human nature for the one purpose or for the other, and how?

HOW TO APPEAL TO HUMAN NATURE

Mr. George D. Stoddard: To go back to an illustration that was used on the ease of getting all the bakers to speak to the other bakers or the chess players to speak to other chess players, I recall that, in our Japanese Mission, Mr. Kermit Eby of the C.I.O., who is not a baker or a chess player, as far as I know, was able to get in touch with forty or fifty different types of workers under a different symbol—that is, *labor*. They are interested in their labor problems; they are interested in how to live and how to get enough money. Under that banner, during the thirty days that we were in Japan, I expect that Kermit Eby interviewed personally several thousand labor leaders in all walks of life. He really told them something about our labor institutions. There was no question about the rapport he was able to establish.

I saw the same phenomenon again with some of our teachers in the Mission. Harold Benjamin, since he is not only a school administrator but a fine human being, could go into a school and soon be talking glibly (through an interpreter) with teacher and principal and with school children at any age from five up. He saw in these children the same eagerness, the same desire to please, the same social structure that we would see in classrooms in America.

I suppose the most dramatic illustration is the place of the Negro in this country. It is revealing and sometimes amusing to see the way the Negro college students acquire the expressions, the slang, and the social habits of the campus. Like all other students, they are responding to new social groups. We would have a hard time tracing character or personality back to earlier tribal days.

A second point. There seems to be an implication that if we could clean up Hollywood, we would have a better instrument of cross-national communication. I do not think we are going to "clean up" Hollywood, and frankly I hope that we don't. Recently I saw a part of the British film invasions—one of their best pictures: a crime picture, utterly British. It was Hollywood ten years ago; all the Hollywood techniques were there.

The plain fact is that we are never going to have movies, except of documentary and instructional types, that show the life of the people in its normal range because that does not make a good movie. A good movie means murder. It means tragedy. It means strife. It means all the things that are found in the Bible. Such is the basis of our drama.

Perhaps the best therapeutic reaction is to do just what the British are doing. I knew that this film I saw was not the standard life in the British countryside. It did not fool me at all. Yet I also knew that we could find such people and such happenings among the British people because they have their abnormal maniacs, just as we have. It is revealing to know that, when they do something dramatic, they resort to mechanisms sometimes regarded as Hollywood inventions—and devilish ones at that.

I do not know how well Homer represented the early Greeks; he certainly represented a very selected group of Greeks. As I recall, they were not home most of the time!

There are other movies which are in between. In these we get a good documentary film that also is dramatic, perhaps illustrating the high tragedy of man resisting nature. Some of our war pictures reached these levels. We might, as a part of our cultural transfer patterns, say that these movies are primarily to entertain—to show us a way of escape. Once in a while they will be good enough to show something that is really tragic and important in human nature, and, when that stage is reached, they will be the same everywhere: everybody can picture such villains and such crimes.

That leaves a great area open to what Margaret Mead mentioned—the documentary film and the still picture. They can be of extreme importance. There we have the kind of film or film strip that can be brought right into the classroom. Japanese or German or Russian children should see them as a counterirritant to the morbid or dramatic pictures.

I would agree on the value of having movies placed on an even plane with words and with legal or business transactions as instruments of communication. We might extend that to the three dimensions. What the Japanese liked, a lot of Americans liked; when we said, "This is a beautiful design," we meant that we liked it. The Japanese, like anybody else, could tell when we really meant it.

The same may be true of manners. Even though differently expressed, there are manners which have a certain universal significance. In addition to this helplessness which Mr. Angell mentioned, I expect there are other things that everyone has in common—let's say the source is in the helplessness of the growing child. The crying and the suckling of the early infant days are important because so few Americans, at least, have children—or have so few of them. They forget those early days that happen only to young people and do not

last long. Compare that to the demands on the responsible parent for the education and the welfare of his children throughout many years.

It is sound to use the earliest reactions and troubles as a starting-point of contact and communication, but I should not want to see the process end there. I have seen parents try to get a "child," a twenty-three-year-old veteran, into college with that same intensity of drive that we would expect of a mother trying to get one more bottle of milk for a two-year-old baby. The thing is psychologically persistent.

MR. ANGELL: I know Kermit Eby whom Mr. Stoddard spoke of. He was undoubtedly very good at making contacts, but it strikes me that that sort of professional contact of labor leaders with labor leaders may not go deep enough. Does that get them in touch with each other in terms of anything more than how to organize a union or how to increase the membership of a union? Are they getting in touch in terms of real values that would bring the two peoples together? Maybe they are, but I doubt it.

MR. STODDARD: I rather think they are. So many of these workers are so close to the starving line that it is not just a matter of ideology. It is a matter of searching about for some technique or social structure which will bail them out. That was certainly true of the teachers.

MR. ANGELL: Do you think that, if we had a great deal of that, there would be less likelihood of either the Japanese or ourselves becoming imperialistic in opposition to the other?

MR. STODDARD: I am inclined to believe that. I noticed the other day that the new prime minister of Japan is a Christian. I cannot answer the question, but I can ask it: How has that come about when only 5 per cent of the population of Japan is Christian and 95 per cent Buddhist? We might well have thought that religion in Japan was so pervasive as to constitute a very powerful, if not a decisive, influence on their political choices; still with a little bit of Christianity they turn now to a Christian leader.

HUMAN NATURE AND HUMAN PROBLEMS

MRS. BENEDICT: What I have been troubled by in this discussion is that we lay so much emphasis upon arriving at the common human nature which we seem to assume is covered up by a veneer of culture. The great practical danger in relation to our communication systems, in such phrasing of the problem, is that we will be content

with a common denominator of behavior which is inadequate to the total situation and to basic needs.

If we could only phrase the problem, as did Miss Mead, that what we need is mutual appreciation. All our behavior arises out of the way in which we solve problems that are presented to us in common. We solve our problems differently, and in that process we gain this total attitude toward the world and toward different philosophies, toward different forms of aggression and toward different forms of subordination. With this attitude we could really work on the greatest problem in our Western cultures, which is that we are so absolutistic. We think of Western culture when we talk about human nature. We believe that our solutions concerning marriage or legitimacy of children or adultism of religions are absolutes. We are constantly phrasing these matters as matters of moral consideration. If we could only get in Western civilization the idea that these are results that we have arrived at in solving the human social problems that are presented to all people in the world. Our arrangements about marriage, our arrangements about legitimacy, our arrangements about religion, our dogmas, are particular solutions. There are people who have different solutions. With this attitude Western civilization might be convinced that there are other forms of communication than evaluations by these absolute standards of right and wrong.

I feel that one of the consequences of the difference between getting at basic human nature and getting at the common problems that all people are solving would be that Western civilization might learn something.

Mr. Angell: May I ask why I should have any respect for how anybody else solves a problem if I don't think of him as a human being? The only reason I have any respect for him is that I see he is in some sense like myself.

Mrs. Benedict: Yes. If that is what basic human nature means, it would not limit our communications.

Mr. Angell: That is what it means.

Mrs. Benedict: I would not raise this point if the discussion had not constantly raised it. I don't think there is any point in working on basic human needs or least common denominators for our cross-cultural communication. That communication should be as rich as possible and must be based on a confidence that different national values can be treated as complementary. It cannot be based on a view which regards only "basic" nature as a safe subject.

Mr. Taft: I want to call attention to a point that seems to me implicit in these three needs to which Mr. Angell has called our attention. Certainly the differences in value systems between nations constitute some of the most important sources of international tension. Some of those differences are so great, are so nauseating to the out-group, that it is hard to see how any amount of contact or acquaintance with them could bridge the gap or create real understanding. If, however, we put the emphasis, as I understand we do, on common human nature from which even these tremendous differences have been built, then we clear the air. We have to examine the process of how they developed and how that process may be reversed rather than personalizing and moralizing the process so much.

Mr. Angell: Do you think I moralized the problem?

Mr. Taft: No. You sought to overcome the tendency to moralize the problem. Even the Nazi system and the Russian system can be seen as products of differential experience. Having discovered that, it may be emphasized and popularized. That might be the theme of a really great play. Perhaps it has been. Is that implicit in your concept?

Mr. Angell: Yes, I had hoped it was explicit; but perhaps it wasn't.

COMMUNICATION AND ITS INTERPRETATION

Miss Mead: I would like to take Mr. Hart's suggestion that we get down to ways and means and combine it with Mr. Stoddard's point. Mr. Stoddard suggested that all films are escape films and that we therefore should interpret them as such. Then there is Dick Heindel's study indicating that little English school children actually acquired their view of American life from the films.

When I was in Britain, I compared what little English boys thought of American films with what little English girls thought. English boys thought that pictures like the Hardy family series were filmed right in the home. English girls knew they were filmed in the studio. English boys thought, when the picture showed someone being run over by an automobile, it was a real person. English girls knew that we put a dummy under the automobile. English girls had read our film magazines. English boys had not.

In other words, if we export a piece of our culture without the other pieces, we run an enormous risk of misunderstanding. The real corrective to Hollywood films is the Hollywood film magazine. If people see or read both, Hollywood does much less harm.

If we carry that a step further and analyze British films, French films, and American films, as I have recently had practically every film that has been in this country in the last two years analyzed, we will find that there are enormous differences. We can use those enormous differences for communication. The British film works much more on actuality than we do. Why? Because the British were able to accept the differences within their national pattern.

If we export more of the material instead of less, and more informally and more roundedly, we have a chance to give a wealth of communication between countries. The results might be better than with very specialized material such as was exported to Britain by O.W.I. during the war in which it was "America against a continent that was raped." That was the place where rape came in. The picture of this country which was presented by a good deal of our O.W.I. propaganda was specialized and selected far beyond our ability to select. At the present time the danger of high selectivity, the danger of doing a public opinion research and deciding to needle it like that is so great in terms of manipulation, on the one hand, and mistakes, on the other, that probably there is greater safety in encouraging a wealth of informal flow so that with the Hollywood movie we will have the *Glamour* magazine to correct it.

Mr. Wright: I would like to recall our attention to Mr. Angell's six specific suggestions of what we ought to do: (1) encourage further study of the international communications problem; (2) increase the flow of international communication; (3) foster a greater sense of international responsibility among those performing communications functions; (4) foster particularly the exchange of creative works of literature, both fiction and nonfiction; (5) foster exchange of students, professors, and other professional men; and (6) support UNESCO.

UNESCO AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. Bloch: In connection with the suggestion about UNESCO, I noticed that nobody mentioned educational functions of international labor movements. The World Federation of Trade Unions, W.F.T.U., has not been mentioned. It is the largest nongovernmental organization in terms of general membership, and it also has an extremely broad program. When I was in Europe this summer, I spoke to a rather prominent Dutch Labor party member who argued that it was easier to talk as a trade-union man to other trade-union men

than as a politician to other politicians. There are, of course, other international trade-union movements which do not agree with W.F.T.U., and which also have interests in the educational field.

I would like to know whether Mr. Angell would extend his support of UNESCO to such agencies or groups as W.F.T.U., despite the fact that it has very strong opposition, for instance, from the A.F. of L.

Mr. Angell: That seems to me a strategical question.

Mr. Bloch: Not any more strategical than supporting UNESCO to my mind. It deals with related problems and has the same kind of discussion in many ways, only a different approach.

Mr. Angell: The only opposition, I judge, to UNESCO is that Russia has not joined, if that is opposition.

Mr. Bloch: And the only kind of opposition to W.F.T.U. is that the Russians are in it.

Miss Mead: So, you see, you have a beautiful overlap.

Mr. Bloch: And you see the problem closely in a practical way.

Mr. Emmerich: You also have the I.L.O.

Mr. Bloch: But I believe the W.F.T.U. and the I.L.O. are not in competition. I would like to know what Mr. Angell's position is, since he is so positive that we shoud support UNESCO.

Mr. Angell: That last assumption is not necessarily true. Perhaps I should have considered the W.F.T.U., but the fact is I haven't, I might as well admit.

Mr. Bloch: Do you think it is a subject worth thinking about?

Mr. Angell: Yes, I certainly do. It wasn't omitted with any intention to omit it. If I knew as much about it as you evidently do, I probably would have included it.

Mr. Bloch: I am seeking information, not giving it. May I ask if Mr. Boulding has given it any thought. Toward the latter part of his paper he says: "It might perhaps be necessary for Western countries to form an organization of their own," and he earlier referred to local labor leaders.

Mr. Boulding: I have mostly given thought to the I.F.T.U., the one the A.F. of L. will support. There is an International Federation of Trade Unions which is not international, just as there are world unions which are not world-wide. What does it mean to say "we support the W.F.T.U."? Is there anybody here that belongs to a trade-union? Do you belong to a trade-union, Mr. Bloch?

Mr. Bloch: I don't belong to a trade-union. I am seeking informa-

tion on what kinds of channels for understanding are available for use. Here we have an international channel for trade-unions. I don't mean to consider the W.F.T.U. exclusively. I would just as soon refer to the International Chamber of Commerce if its sphere of operations were under discussion. I am seeking to find out whether there are other organizations besides UNESCO to which thought could be given, although I am not at all opposed to UNESCO.

MR. WRIGHT: I understand that W.F.T.U. is supported by the C.I.O., which has been represented in UNESCO by Mr. Eby. Furthermore, it has been recognized as an international, nongovernmental organization which may consult with organs of the United Nations. So it has an important status.

MISS MEAD: Mr. Bloch's point is, I believe, that UNESCO as a single channel might be narrowing our thought too much. We ought to include a variety of channels.

MR. WRIGHT: I would like to ask Dr. Stoddard whether he thinks UNESCO is especially deserving of consideration among international organizations.

MR. STODDARD: I think its chief value is that it is not special; it is comprehensive, it is omnibus. Mr. Eby has been closely affiliated with UNESCO also, as has Mr. Cruikshank of the A.F. of L. As far as I know, it has enjoyed the support of all the labor factions and unions.

I don't know of the one to which Mr. Bloch refers (W.F.T.U.) but I should think, if it has the same general aims as UNESCO in the more technical sense, we might support it.

MR. WRIGHT: There is a difference in the fact that UNESCO is an official organization. I suppose W.F.T.U. would be competent to become affiliated with UNESCO.

MRS. WRIGHT: It applied for such affiliation at the Paris Conference.

MR. MCKEON: Perhaps we could declare a truce, since one of the purposes of UNESCO is to associate itself with nongovernmental international organizations which can co-operate to the end set for UNESCO in its constitution. When communication has succeeded in removing the invidious distinctions among trade-union organizations, and when UNESCO has succeeded in clarifying and communicating its purpose, there will be no problem in negotiating legal "agreements."

MR. WILLIAM ROGERS: The League of Nations catalogued around two thousand international organizations at one time.

HOW TO ATTRACT INTEREST

MRS. WRIGHT: If I understood correctly, Mr. Angell objected to the approach through professional or vocational interests as not being one which would get at the real values. Is that right? What better way is there to capture people's interest than through their special interests?

MR. ANGELL: I was afraid that the history of 1914 would be repeated. Many times in the world's history peoples of different countries with special interest have joined in organizations and talked together. The French and German Socialists split in 1914, and we had the same situation all over the world. I was trying to confront the real issue, which is posed by the differences between value systems among countries, and to try to think of some way to get those value systems not only to accommodate themselves to one another but to begin to grow together. I thought that this might be accomplished, first, by communicating to each other what the value systems are so that each group would really understand the others, and, second by realizing that each value system has as much right as any other to consider itself a characteristic of the human nature which we all have in common. I just don't see any other way to approach the matter.

MRS. WRIGHT: What are our channels of communication? If we want to tell people about our value system, we have first to capture their interests.

MR. ANGELL: Once we get them to listen, we must not stop with our professional interests but go beyond that.

MRS. BENEDICT: I don't believe anybody was contemplating anything else. If as a nation we are scrupulous not to identify our particular value system with basic human nature, we can communicate it without fear of making enemies.

MISS MEAD: I do think we should keep in mind Mr. McKeon's point. We want to see these different value systems as potential components in our aspiration for the future, not merely as things that have been done in the past or as things of value that we can understand. I think that Mr. Angell probably meant that. We want to see these value systems as components of the world of values in the future, and that will give them each a value of their own within a framework which we all can value.

MR. ANGELL: That is what Mr. Northrop was saying in his book, *The Meeting of East and West.*

FRUITFUL AMBIGUITIES

MR. MCKEON: There is one essential difference in what Mr. Northrop is trying to do and what Miss Mead is speaking of. I would like to suggest—and this is a practical injunction which goes counter to all my instincts as a philosopher—that this process of definition is being carried too far. I would like to put in a word for fruitful ambiguity. There are a great many questions on which we can work to a solution if we don't try to be too precise too soon. We can agree on formulations and on general directions and then carry them out differently. Let's take what agreement we have achieved, recognizing its ambiguity, and define in practice and slowly. The success of most institutions that have endured and the application of most ideals to life can be attributed to agreements made on a relatively superficial level, which permit time in which to work out more precise definitions and more appropriate practices.

MR. STODDARD: It seems to me that that is the function of manners—to agree on the superficial level.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I am afraid what I am going to say will sound very naïve. Mr. Morgenthau introduced the term "power politics," and I want to introduce a still worse term. I want to talk about the "Four Freedoms."

It seems to me that what we are going through now is very similar to what the Roman Empire went through, an experience which led to a new unity in the form of Christianity. Christianity made its greatest appeal on the basis of offering certain goals, certain answers, to human problems in the form of a just God and a merciful God and a life hereafter in which the good would be rewarded and the bad punished. If we can get symbols of that kind and slogans, something of the nature of the "Four Freedoms," then it seems to me that our problem would be to some extent simplified. We would have reached what Mr. McKeon called "agreement at a superficial level." That agreement would, nevertheless, include these problems and would give a direction to aspiration. We did have agreement on the "Four Freedoms" for a while (even Russia accepted the "Four Freedoms"), then Casablanca came along and upset the whole thing. But it does not seem too late to introduce the "Four Freedoms" again.

MR. WRIGHT: As Mr. Gottschalk knows, the original Declaration of United Nations was in a measure based on the "Four Freedoms," and the idea is in the Charter.

EXCHANGE OF STUDENTS

MR. MARSCHAK: Mr. Angell says: "Foster exchange of students, professors, and other professional men. There is no link with foreign lands quite so strong as this one." This is true. The European intellectuals used to say about France that "every intellectual has two consciences, his own and France," and this was really the effect on people who went to France to paint or to study.

It is very essential to bring as many young people here as possible, to let them come here to study and possibly even to get married and to settle down, especially if they belong to the intellectual groups. If they go back, all the better. It is probably a very cheap undertaking. Three thousand dollars is the amount of the highest graduate fellowship in Chicago. At three thousand dollars we could accommodate perhaps a hundred thousand foreign students at an expense which is trifling compared with the armament expense. I don't know what has really happened to those plans which were being developed about a year ago on the sharing of students.

MR. WRIGHT: As you know, the program of the Department of State in that field has been suffering from congressional economies, but I believe that these sufferings may be a little ameliorated by public pressure on Congress.

MR. EMMERICH: That is only a small part of the student exchange. A great deal of it has been through private sources.

MRS. WRIGHT: There are now some seventeen thousand foreign students in this country. The majority of them are foreign government students. That includes Latin America. The Chinese and the Turks and the Indian students are paid for by the government. The Fulbright bill, which will go into effect, I think, in about a year, will make it possible for quite a lot of Americans to go abroad.

MR. BOULDING: I would just like to add a footnote to what Mr. Marschak said in regard to marriage. It does seem to me that the most important channels of communication are between kin. I don't know whether the sociologists would agree with this. Something in Mr. Angell's paper indicated that was so, particularly from the point of view of interpersonal communications. Of course, if we took the whole world complex of personal communication across distances by this or any other means, they would be to a very large extent kinship relations. Having married a Norwegian, I discovered that I married practically the whole of Norway and consequently became very much interested in Norway, though I had never been there. I think

that is one very important by-product of the exchange of students. The thing to do is to catch them at the age of marital readiness and then kinship relations can be established all over the world. I think the experience of the Commonwealth Fund is a nice example.

LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE

MR. GUERARD: In connection with the creation of a world society there is something we can do in our own country. The departmentalized teaching of literature under national heads is thoroughly unrealistic. World literature begins in the nursery and goes on through adolescence. Children do not object to Grimm's *Fairy Tales* or to Andersen's *Fairy Tales*, and young people don't object to stories of Alexandre Dumas. As a matter of fact, American students seem to prefer Dumas to Fenimore Cooper. When we come to the higher kind of literature, we find *War and Peace* more important than *Forever Amber* or *The Egg and I*. This is something that we could forward by making the study of literature not part of the Department of English but part of the Department of Literature. In classical centuries people did not teach *national* literature; they taught *literature*, as we now teach science.

A great obstacle to communication in the field of literature is the language problem, but there are several ways of meeting that. One would be the greater learning of foreign languages. If we insisted a little more, we would find that it is extremely easy to acquire a reading knowledge, especially of languages expressed in symbols somewhat related to ours. The Latin languages are related to ours and so is the German. If a small portion of the time that is at present spent on the so-called classical languages were spent on the modern languages, we could acquire the reading knowledge that would give us access to fine literature. The second method is to translate selected works. At present it is haphazard. I think that should be one of the functions of UNESCO—to pick out the best for translation. The third method is the possibility—well, the absolute necessity when we have cross-national relations—to have adequate linguistic means of communication.

There are many ways; some of them are thoroughly bad, such as the method of translating from one language into all the languages. That may gradually call for recognition of not three or four, not five or six, as at present, but ultimately of fifty or more languages, leading to a complete paralysis of discussion. Even at present, with

four or five languages, we find intercommunication extremely difficult.

The second possibility would be the adoption of one national language; this would be extremely invidious. It would establish a hierarchy of languages. It would be imperialism. In the Preface to his book on *Basic English and Its Uses*, I. A. Richards expresses that idea with admirable clarity. "[A second or world language] must be clear from any threat to the economic, moral, cultural, social, or political status or independence of any person or any people. It must carry no implications of intellectual, technological, or other domination." Brave words; thereupon Mr. Richards proceeds to advocate English (in Basic form) as a world language, thus recognizing officially the predominance of the English-speaking peoples. I. A. Richards is at the head of the Orthological Institute; this strikes me as definitely cacological.

I don't want to discuss here a neutral language, a philosophical language, or a synthetic language. The possibility of such a thing has been demonstrated by a living language, Esperanto, which for fifty years has managed to survive and in which people have actually come together by the thousands in an exchange of communication. That is a demonstration. I think Esperanto could be improved upon, but at the same time it is a definite illustration that the thing can be done. It can be done not purely on a level of material communication but also of the philosophical. A passage from Gomperz' *Griechische Denker* was translated into several languages, including Esperanto, and retranslated by different scholars from those various languages into German, and they found that, after the double translation, less was lost through Esperanto than through any other language. It compels a thorough analysis of thought instead of a continual battle against ignorance. This is an extremely controversial subject, but, remember, we have to fit the language question to cross-national communications.

Mr. Wright: Mr. Guerard's suggestion that Basic English was imperialism may be so. I have heard the suggestion before, but one wonders also whether the export of Western science was not imperialism. If we consider a language as a means of widespread communication, we have to admit that English is much better than, let us say, Irish or any of the other minor languages. So Mr. Richards might defend himself by saying that it is not imperialism; it is simply suggesting that a language which would make it possible to com-

municate with the widest number is a better way, just as science is a better way than magic.

MR. GUERARD: There would be two objections to that. One would be that language is somehow connected with national groups and that one thing that the world is most afraid of at present is the domination of the Anglo-Saxon group. There would be an opposition against that. We are all of us at present flush with victory and power; we are all of us unconsciously imperialistic; and if we do not have the idea that we do not want any advantage for ourselves, that we renounce any kind of privileges, then we will have very great difficulty in establishing a world community.

Technically, let me say that, in spite of the fact that English is very widespread, knowledge of it is very superficial. Foreigners who speak English know English less thoroughly than foreigners who know French. That is the point at which we have the different levels. English, in spite of its advantages, also has some defects that Basic English does not correct. We have a phonetic system, practically unique in the world, a system of spelling which cannot be corrected without destroying all the etymology, and therefore the international character, of the English. Finally, there is the fact that Basic English, perhaps even more than standard English, requires knowledge of idioms. We have, for instance, the title of the well-known book, *Mr. Brittling Sees It Through*, which was translated into French as *M. Brittling commence à voir clair:* "Begins to see through it." It is rather embarrassing.

RESEARCH AND NEGOTIATION

MR. LIKERT: May I ask Dr. Angell to elaborate on two of his points? Research studies on the experience of Latin-American students in this country have indicated that the mere exchange of students does not automatically develop attitudes favorable to a world community. The kinds of experiences that students have determine whether they develop these attitudes or unfavorable attitudes. Loomis is making a study on the subject. I haven't seen the results, but there are some data that indicate that the exchange of students does not necessarily result in the development of favorable attitudes.

I suspect that, if a group of people in the physical sciences were discussing a problem in their field, they would ask themselves: What do we need to know to solve this problem? What research is required to find a sound solution? I wonder if we ought not to spend some time

discussing what is required to solve the problems that we are considering? Not just public opinion research, but all the research in the social sciences that is needed to guide us in our decisions in moving toward a world community.

My feeling is that research can be of invaluable assistance in helping us to achieve success. We are less likely to succeed if we rely solely on the knowledge that we now possess.

Mr. Wright: In our Harris Foundation Institute last summer we had a discussion of communications, and it centered mainly around the problem of increasing the flow of international communications. There was a representative of the International News Service who thought the only important thing was to break down all barriers, to allow a free flow of information of every sort, good, bad, and indifferent, with the thought that that would assure an abundant flow across national boundaries. The Department of State has in mind treaties with as many countries as possible, or perhaps a multilateral treaty, which will permit a more free flow of communications without censorship across boundaries. Perhaps Mr. Angell could comment on that.

Mr. Angell: On Mr. Likert's question, in addition to research in public opinion and surveys, research of whatever kind would be useful here. I think foreign attitudes would be a useful area of research. One thing we ought to do is to discover how unity has been achieved in the world wherever it has been achieved across cultural barriers. Historically, there are a good many examples of it. There ought to be a good book on Switzerland.

Mr. Wright: There is a book by M. Rappard in which he deals with the history of Switzerland during the five centuries before the French Revolution. He thinks that the Swiss Confederation grew out of the desire of each of the countries for security. There was a system of collective security which worked and developed, and out of it gradually grew a sense of Swiss nationality.

Mr. Angell: Another place in the world where we have had research on this subject is Hawaii—on how they have succeeded in putting together an amalgam of people. The hybrid is the normal thing in Hawaii, and there seems to be a coalescence of cultures.

I am doing a little research on our own large cities to see how it comes about that immigrants have been adjusted to our cities as well as they have. That gives you an idea of the sort of research that, it would seem to me, would be fruitful.

MR. WRIGHT: You probably recall that Merle Curti has written a book on the United States from that point of view: How did the United States become a nation?

MR. ANGELL: We were not like the world situation.

MR. WRIGHT: We fought a pretty big Civil War.

MR. HERRING: I recall the University of Chicago series on "Civic Education," edited by Charles E. Merriam.

MR. ANGELL: On my second suggestion, obviously, there is no use in increasing the international flow of information if all we get is more irresponsibility and more international slander from one country about another. If we cannot gradually develop a world sense of morality in communications, then, as Mr. Marschak suggested, we might as well try to stop communication. It seems to me, however, that to stop communication is a doctrine of despair. The only hope is to increase it and at the same time to try, by all the means at our disposal, to foster responsibility. All the agencies that have been mentioned here, Mr. Bloch's agency along with UNESCO and all the rest, I hope would foster that moral order.

MR. BLOCH: I would add here—by not misrepresenting this country to foreigners and other countries to this country.

WORLD LOYALTY

By HAROLD D. LASSWELL*

WORLD loyalty is a positive sentiment of being identified with a symbol referring to mankind as a whole. We classify loyalty as a sentiment because it is more than a symbol of reference; feelings and emotions are involved, and the symbol is "affectively toned." When the affect is love and affection, the sentiment is positive. The symbol of reference to the whole of mankind is taken to refer to a society, actual or potential, which is world inclusive and in which the dignity of man is accepted in theory and, to a very considerable degree, in application. The definition excludes all identifications with a world garrison or prison state in which a few social elements lord it over the others. It also excludes the glorifying of war and of other extreme measures of coercing human beings. To be identified with a symbol is to include it with the symbol of the primary ego as part of the self. Typically the self of a person includes more than the symbols referring to the primary ego, such as "me," "I," "Johnnie," "John." There are also symbols of reference to relatives, intimates, and other persons or groups.[1] A person is positively identified with mankind as a whole to the degree that he includes within the structure of the self a symbol of humanity toward which positive affects are directed.

It is evident that world loyalty is no simple pattern. In any person or group sentiment is always shifting with the ebb and flow of moods and emotions and with changing conceptions of the structure of world society. No doubt we could ignore the complexities of what we call "world loyalty" and proceed directly to consider the factors that influence the occurrence, elaboration, and intensity of the sentiment; very likely there is enough consensus among us to make it reasonably certain that we would be talking about much the same phenomena. But there are some disadvantages in proceeding immediately to these topics without dwelling at some length on the definition. The

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1. A comprehensive statement of the conception of "self" is given by George Herbert Mead, especially in his *Mind, Self, and Society*, ed. Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

aim of our discussion is not only to clarify the relationships involved but to contribute sooner or later to the policies that influence the world community. At some point, therefore, we must think manipulatively and bring into view the alternative means by which world loyalties can be cultivated; or, to put it another way, we must consider how a sequence of changes can be inaugurated or supported that modify current predispositions in the direction of our goals.

This calls for information not only about the factors that affect loyalties in general, or the kinds of consequences that flow from loyalties in general. Rational policies, whether long range or short range, require knowledge of the relative magnitudes of the factors in the situation in which policies are to be initiated and carried through. Hence ways are needed of keeping informed about trends in the dimensions of world loyalty throughout the world community and about the relative impact of various factors that significantly influence loyalty. Trend reports should include information about the progress of experiments of our own devising where alternative policies are subjected to pretest. In order to provide such a continuous flow of global intelligence as a basis for rational policy, we need to devise and put into operation as quickly as possible on as wide a scale as feasible *new institutions*. The new institutions need to use the personnel and procedures adequate to the task of providing a continuing audit of the state of world sentiment, the relative impact of cultural and personality factors upon such sentiments, and the relative effect of world loyalty upon the other component and conditioning factors in the world community. By the perpetual interplay of report and analysis, on the one hand, and of the creative imagining of new alternatives of policy, on the other, a more perfect world society may be brought into being.

For the purpose of making effective use of large-scale (and of intensive) surveys of world loyalty trends, it is essential to accomplish the laborious task of specifying how our broad, initial definition of world loyalty is to be utilized by qualified observers in different parts of the world community. Our continuing survey of world trends will describe some phenomena on a global scale, others on a regional basis, and others on a neighborhood scale. Some data can be obtained by relatively simple, speedy methods—by analyzing the contents of official and unofficial statements, by conducting brief (poll) interviews, for example. Other data depend upon more complicated and often slower methods, such as prolonged psychiatric interviewing or

participant observation in the life of a local community. All available methods of the psychological, social, and historical sciences can be utilized in selected communities at significant points throughout the globe.

If we are to devise, inaugurate, and utilize the results of new agencies of self-observation, the difficulties need to be reduced as much as possible. I shall therefore take the liberty of dwelling at some length upon some of the tasks involved in putting a conceptual definition of world loyalty into operational terms. It is not my purpose to urge that the definitions put forward be taken as final; but, rather, that they shall be regarded as somewhat specific examples of some of the problems involved in establishing a workable relationship between our highest descriptive abstractions and the world trends that we hope to clarify and affect.

World loyalty is a pattern of sentiment; and, if we are to describe the distribution of a sentiment pattern around the globe, appraise the influence of various factors upon it (together with its impact upon other factors in the world community), it is essential to select indices capable of being applied by trained observers. It is evident that no one can directly observe anybody's sentiments save his own. The technical problem of *indirect* observation is to choose indices of other people's behavior that will serve the purpose. (One test of success is whether representative persons agree that the external indices bear a close relationship to what he observes directly.) Without complicating the matter unduly, we recognize that our inferences about the subjective events occurring in other persons are based upon what people say and what they do (including complex patterns of both). Or, to put the point more formally, we can record communications and noncommunications. The communications are composed of symbols (words and word equivalents like gesturing, dancing, painting, etc.). Many activities, like the operation of a lathe, do not necessarily involve specialized acts of communication at any given time; but communication and noncommunication patterns can be found in every degree of complexity.

If we limit our chosen indices of a sentiment as rigidly as possible to communications (such as full statements, slogans, key symbols), we simplify the problem of obtaining a large measure of agreement among our observers (reliability in the statistical sense). Moreover, we simplify the task of posing clear questions, and receiving explicit answers, about the factors affected by and affecting the sentiment of

world loyalty. We can discover the effect of world loyalty upon such activities as contributing to funds, subscribing to periodicals, attending meetings, employing workers, making loans, voting for candidates, acquiescing in certain new residents in a block, sending children to schools with a varied selection of teachers and pupils, admitting into church membership, giving and receiving invitations to dine, permitting intermarriage, etc. It may be noted that the statements selected as indices of sentiment may occur concurrently with acts by the same person which are treated as "effects" of possessing the sentiment and, further, that the index statements may affect the behavior of others, hence augmenting the effects.

If care is taken in applying the indices, it is possible to avoid confusion on the part of observers in describing loyalty, the effects of loyalty, and the factors affecting it. But it needs to be emphasized that the indices that are satisfactory for the appraisal of loyalty are subject to more or less rapid shift. New symbols are continually making their appearance that must be fitted into the index list. Not only symbols like the "United Nations" but new words and gestures expressing indignation or admiration are being introduced. Hence the relationship between the details that we select as indices of the sentiment of world loyalty and the entire context is somewhat unstable. We may call this changing interrelation between index and context the *principle of index instability*. It implies that concept terms, even when given strict operational definitions, are subject to certain ambiguities as we move into the future; the future obsolesces past indices. Only by the continual calibration of the old and new can we maintain a dependable relation between our conceptual abstractions and the concrete circumstances which they purport to describe. From the principle of index instability springs much of the necessity for organizing social institutions to keep an unending surveillance over social trends.

Perhaps the most productive way to deal with some of these issues is to explore the problems that arise in selecting and applying a single index statement. I assume that few will deny that the following is consistent with the definition given above of world loyalty: "My (our) goal is the realization of the dignity of man in theory and practice." This is not proposed as an exclusive index. If anyone dissents from this (or any other operational index), he is at liberty to choose another single or multiple set. The results obtained by the two procedures can be calibrated by applying them to equivalent situations.

THE WORLD COMMUNITY

I. POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

We begin with the problem of determining the degree to which a given political ideology is consistent with world loyalty. Political ideology includes the symbols invoked in justifying an existing distribution of power in a community (the counterideology rejects it).[2]

1. *Political doctrine.*—The most general propositions of the ideology are the doctrine.[3] The political doctrine can be found in authoritative pronouncements, such as constitutions, statutes, treaties, ordinances, administrative and court decisions, treatises, declarations, and speeches. Authoritative statements of doctrine, let it be emphasized, are not necessarily part of the public law of the community (soon to be defined as the "political formula"). The American Declaration of Independence contains principles which are not repeated in the Constitution but are nonetheless part of American political doctrine.

The first problem is to note the frequency of occurrence of affirmations or contradictions of our index statement (or equivalents) in the authoritative statements comprising the political doctrine of any community that is being studied. Consistent statements are often very explicit. There is no doubt in anyone's mind, I am sure, that the following is an authentic occurrence of our chosen index. In the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations it is affirmed that the peoples of the UN are "determined to reaffirm faith . . . in the dignity and worth of the human person." Continuing, the preamble speaks of promoting "the economic and social advancement of all peoples." Though it is doubtful that anyone would dissent from accepting this as a partial equivalent of our index statement, we must admit that somewhere in the world somebody may argue that one may respect human dignity without wanting to advance everyone economically; one may want to advance the poor. Such differences are of no great moment, save that care must be taken each step of the way to record and report data in a form that admits of calibrating any divergencies that spring from definitions or applications.

No difficulty is met in recognizing statements that flatly contradict our index statement in certain bodies of doctrine, such as the

2. The concept of ideology owes its modern vogue chiefly to Karl Marx and his critics. Karl Mannheim developed the term "utopia" as a means of referring to a systematic counterideology. "Myth" is a convenient term for ideology and counterideology. Cf. Robert M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1947).

3. "Doctrine" is here used in much the same way as "credenda" in Charles E. Merriam, *Political Power: Its Composition and Incidence* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1934).

Nazi teaching of an Aryan-dominated globe in which other "races" are permanently subordinated or annihilated. Another example is Mussolini's glorification of war: "Fascism . . . believes neither in the possibility nor in the utility of perpetual peace."[4]

Some statements are inconsistent with our index in the sense that they purport to enunciate a more strict definition of human dignity than we make use of. There is, for instance, an anarchist doctrine that stigmatizes violence by any organized political body as inconsistent with the dignity of man. Only "spontaneous" measures by local communities against certain violators of the mores are permissible after the state has "withered." A more drastic position is that violence, or indeed extreme coercion of any kind, is inconsistent with the basic notion of human dignity. Not only must the state "wither" but cultural traits and individual responses that constitute extreme coerciveness must pass away. Even this, however, is not the ultimate in austerity of doctrine, since it is affirmed in some quarters that man cannot realize his full dignity until he learns to respect the dignity of all living creatures, not only by abandoning the practice of hunting and killing wild animals, but by liberating domesticated animals from the servitude to which they have been subjected by man. And, more, it may be held that human dignity demands that man abstains from exploitative conduct toward all life, whether plant or animal, attaining that delicacy of sentiment expressed in the prayer of the Japanese girl who apologized to the cherry blossoms for having unintentionally bruised and shattered their exquisite perfection.

As a concession to the dominant perspectives of our time and place, we have made use of a more limited conception of human dignity. Though excluding the glorification of violence, we have indorsed the use of extreme measures as a means of protecting a world society which has attained a high level of freedom. But what of revolutionary violence? How shall we deal with a doctrine calling for and forecasting the inauguration of a more perfect world by catastrophic violence? Do we condone willingness to institute a new social structure in which a large part of the older structure is displaced, leaving millions of human beings to be liquidated if they continue to resist? We have already taken the position that large-scale coercion is not in itself inconsistent with human dignity. Let us therefore leave for factual study the claim that human dignity can be advanced by

4. *The Doctrine of Fascism*, translated by I. S. Munro from *Enciclopedia italiana*, XIV (London, 1933), 10.

revolutionary violence in concrete circumstances and accept the use of revolutionary coercion as consistent with world loyalty when professed in the name of human dignity. Revolution in the name of racialism or the "irremediable, fruitful, and beneficent inequality of men" (Mussolini) obviously is not consistent with our definitions.

By making this choice, we expressly recognize that it is in accord with our present conception of world loyalty that world loyalties can be organized around inconsistent doctrines. Potentially incompatible principles of formal power (authority) can be embraced in the name of all mankind. A potent example is the claim that sovereignty ought to lie only in states organized as nations and that nations, when they enter into political association, ought to implement the rights of man. Another doctrine is that all governments, whether world-embracing or not, should abstain from interfering with the proper scope of the church and of certain other private activities in society.

Thus far we have been discussing the problem of noting affirmations and contradictions of our index of world loyalty. We pass now from simple occurrences to the task of describing the position of our index statement in the logical structure of a given doctrinal system. This is the *elaboration* of the sentiment we are studying. The pertinent questions are: Is the index statement derived from statements of higher generality within the system? Are the key terms defined? Is the index statement invoked in the process of deriving statements of lower generality?

Some key terms in doctrinal systems are almost always (perhaps always) left undefined, and the derivational structure typically possesses many gaps and inconsistencies. The Declaration of Independence, for instance, affirms that the "unalienable Rights" of "all men" are derived from the "Creator"; but there are no definitions of "men" or of the "Creator."

A clear-cut example of the assertion that a number of general means are consistent and compatible with the principle of human dignity is in the Charter of the UN:

> We . . . [are] determined. . . .
>
> to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another and as good neighbors, and
>
> to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples.

Besides describing the occurrence of statements harmonizing or clashing with our index statement, and noting the degree of elaboration, another step is necessary, which is the taking into account of the *intensity* with which statements are made in basic doctrinal pronouncements. One index of intensity is *prominence*, which is availability to attention. The UN Charter puts many statements which are consonant with our index in the preamble, a very conspicuous position. Besides position, prominence is given by the use of *emphasis devices*, that is, by the arrangement of the physical channel of communication. The preamble of the UN is once more a ready example, since in officially printed versions the type is so arranged that the eye is directed to several propositions which are pertinent to the present analysis. In addition to prominence, intensity is shown by the *dynamism* of symbol style, one feature being the choice of words that express activity and determination. The UN Charter begins, "We the peoples of the United Nations *determined* . . ." (italics added).

The methods appropriate to the study of political ideology and world loyalty are equally applicable to political counterideologies and, beyond that, to every corpus of doctrine and counterdoctrine in any community. The basic canons of Christianity, Buddhism, and other religions (as formulated by various ecclesiastical authorities) are amenable to the same scrutiny and raise the same kinds of technical problems.

2. *Political formulas.*—In addition to basic doctrine, every political ideology embraces a political formula, a set of fundamental legal prescriptions specifying the composition, mode of recruitment, and formal scope of the organs of government.[5] Although some duplication occurs when both doctrine and formula are examined, since the documentation overlaps (in part, at least), we have already noted that doctrine is not necessarily part of the formula. It is precisely because there are well-recognized divergences between philosophy

5. "Formula" is used in a more restricted sense than "formula" in Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1939). Mosca includes "doctrine" in the scope of the term.

and constitutional law in so many communities that separate investigations are worth making.

The first step is to note the *occurrence* of consistent and inconsistent statements (in terms of our index) in constitutions, fundamental statutes, and court opinions (and in any other relevant authoritative formulations). The Constitution of the United States provided a glaring example of inconsistency with our index statement and with contemporary declarations of political doctrine when it allowed the temporary continuation of the slave traffic. (It might be argued—but we reject the contention, of course—that the Negroes are not "men," hence human beings were not deprived of rights by slavery.)

When we look into the *elaboration* of our index statement, it is important to bear in mind that we are not passing judgment on how policies work out in practice. The Soviet constitution provides in Article 123 that "any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable by law." Article 124 states that "freedom of worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens." We record these as instances of elaborations which are allegedly consistent with our operational definition of world loyalty, since they are classified as "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens"; we do not raise the question of consistency with the freedom of speech guaranteed in Article 125.

In terms of *intensity*, one index of which is prominence, several modern constitutions are notable for the relative length of provisions which relate to human rights.

Without pursuing the matter further, let it be noted that all associations organized for policy-making can be said to have political formulas as well as doctrines and can be explored in the same way. Business corporations, trade-unions, ecclesiastical bodies—all exemplify this point; and a comprehensive account of the world community would include them, together with many other organizations.

3. *Political "miranda."*—The third great subdivision in the political ideology of a community is the *miranda*, which are the legends, prophecies, and ceremonies sustaining the structure of power.[6] The *miranda* include emblems and rites; histories of victory and defeat, villainy and heroism; celebrations of virtue and mission. The tales, songs, poems, plays, and monuments present an image of the self in relation to other selves in the world community during historic, contemporary, and future epochs.

6. Introduced by Merriam, *op. cit.*

In comparison with political doctrines and formulas, the *miranda* embrace a colossal array of symbolic material. It is not the volume, however, that creates difficulties of a technical nature but the type of discourse[7] which abounds in indirect, condensed, and nonverbal statements. Since the range of interpretation is wide, the observer is often in doubt in classifying the *miranda*. Uncertainty is often increased by the existence of opposing doctrinal versions in the same community. An example is the task of describing the "Chronicles of Japan" or *Nihongi*, from certain passages of which was derived the slogan "The Whole World under One Roof" (*hakkō ichi-u*). Does this slogan, and the material from which it was condensed, constitute a prophecy and a statement of determination on the part of the Yamato race to unify the world by force and to maintain eternal superiority? This interpretation was explicitly denied in a widely used commentary before the war, where it was said that "The Whole World under One Roof" does not imply military aggression, as those affected by the materialism and individualism of Europe and America might easily misunderstand it to mean. We are told that it portends the establishment of peace and righteousness on earth, covering the whole world with the illuminating rays of charity, love, virtue, truth, and justice. Actually the text is too ambiguous to admit of a decision whether the method of constituting the world family is by violence or suasion or whether the Yamato race is to form a permanent ruling caste.[8]

In addition to the problems connected with noting simple occurrences of consistent or inconsistent index statements, new issues arise in describing the manner in which the significant statements are elaborated. Elaboration in a stage play, feature film, or novel does not follow the pattern of a doctrinal or legal code. Typically there is a sequence in time during which individualized (or somewhat generalized) figures are introduced and carried through various improvements or setbacks in their worldly position or in their self-estimation.[9] It is essential to describe these ups and downs in order to discover what is being said in this concrete way. Perhaps the leading character does everything in his power to bring about peace

7. Charles W. Morris outlines "Types of Discourse" in chap. v of his *Signs, Language and Behavior* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946).

8. Consult D. C. Holtom, *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism: A Study of Present-Day Trends in Japanese Religions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943).

9. On technical matters see B. L. Smith, H. D. Lasswell, and R. D. Casey, *Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion: A Comprehensive Reference Guide* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946).

among nations, only to fail in the end. Hence what is said, in effect, is that world peace is impossible, or practically so, and that anybody who devotes himself to the cause is bound to lose out. War, on the contrary, may be presented as the most glorious moment in the history of a people and in the life of national heroes. The Negro or other colored races may appear in menial and other inferior roles (in films prepared by whites). In classifying a painting or a monument in which everything is presented at one time, the purport may be equally obvious. Certain groups may be depicted in subordinate roles, confirming an image of basic inferiority.

Many parts of the *miranda* are primarily spoken communication, which opens up new possibilities for intensifying utterance. Intensity in oral discourse is a matter of such devices as intonation and gesture.

It is not to be overlooked that every counterideology possesses its *miranda*, along with doctrine and formula, and that a comprehensive survey of a given community brings in the "wonders" of religion, for instance, in addition to politics.

4. *Political applications: situations.*—Once having estimated the degree to which world loyalty is included in the political doctrine, formula, and *miranda* of a given community, the next question touches upon this ideology in action. During a given period of time what is the place of doctrinal statements in the total stream of official discourse, in the systematic teaching of politics, in treatises and journals devoted to political philosophy, in the conversations of upper-, middle-, and lower- class groups? To what extent is the political formula invoked in disputes, either to settle matters outside of court or to bring them to court, to present claims before the tribunal, and to adorn the opinions of the judges who decide the controversy? How many of the *miranda* are repeated in different age and class groups throughout the community? Note that the "application" of "theory" (doctrine, formula, *miranda*) does not reach the "effect." Indices of effect must be those which enable us to describe whether, for instance, the judge in a court is actually influenced by an "application" of conditional formulas by opposing parties.

In the civilizations—which are by definition literate—most ideological patterns can be ascertained by examining documents. Once we begin to consider ideology in application, we are often as dependent upon the direct observation of persons as though we were scrutinizing a preliterate folk culture. It is not enough to take note of occurrences, elaborations, and intensities of statement in the *Congressional Record;* we watch congressmen on the floor. It does not suffice to ex-

amine the court reports; we take into account the demeanor of judges, juries, counsel, witnesses, and parties. It is not enough to read news stories and editorials, school textbooks and anthologies; we observe the journalist, editor, teacher, student, and pupil in action.

As remarked in connection with the *miranda*, in face-to-face situations the vocal pattern and the speech pattern are valuable indices of the intensity with which statements are made. School textbooks may indorse world unity, but the sarcastic tone of the classroom teacher may nullify the text. The stenographic record of a trial may disclose little of the innuendo with which the credibility of a witness who is identified with a certain race, religion, language, or nation may be undermined. In public places gestures may be unaccompanied by words, as when a child thumbs his nose at a foreigner or at an emblem of the world community.

When we examine an ideology in action, it is particularly rewarding to take note of the dissemination of slogans and key symbols as well as full statements. A slogan is a condensed statement, like "The Whole World under One Roof." A key symbol is a symbol occupying an important place in slogans or completed statements. Key symbols and slogans are the bond of common experience that links young and old, illiterate and schooled, philosopher and man of action, man of action and the rank and file. In our civilization philosophers and lawyers are almost the only elements of the community who dwell in the relatively arid world of doctrine and formula. The man of decision-making position takes what he needs from his technical advisers and relays what he hears in the form of slogans and key symbols to wider circles.

Among the key symbols occupying a conspicuous place in many world loyalty statements are: "world," "humanity," "mankind," "man," "the races of the world," "the peoples," "the human race," "world law," "world justice," "world security," "one world," a "free world," "human dignity," "century of the common man," "the free man's commonwealth," etc.

Some of these expressions refer to groups ("mankind"); others figure chiefly in policy demands ("world justice"); yet others are usually found in nonnormative assertions about trend or about conditioning factors. We may call the first key symbols of *identification*, the second symbols of *demand*, and the third symbols of *expectation*.[10]

10. Categories originally used in H. D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1935).

Complete statements are conveniently classifiable in the same way. "I am a member of the world community" is an identification statement, explicitly including the symbol of all mankind as part of the self of the statement-maker. "I demand world government now" is a demand statement, an expression of preference or determination by the statement-maker. "If we survive, world government is inevitable" is a statement of expectation; it is phrased as a proposition that can be true whether the statement-maker indorses world government or not. (This is aside from the inference that may be drawn that anyone giving utterance to such a forecast wants world government. The "manifest content" of the words does not make this inference wholly warranted. Note that the term "expectation" is used to cover references of a factual sort to past, present, and future in the same way that Stockholm economists speak of "ex-post" and "ex-ante" for expectation after and before a given time.)

When we look closely into the dissemination of full statements, slogans, and key symbols, we are often able to discover marked contrasts among elements in the same community and to take note of trends in the direction of increasing or decreasing disparities. In the United States, for instance, it was noteworthy that during pre–World War II years the professors were more emphatically in favor of "collective security" than men of action or the community at large.

A study of what is said in different circumstances makes it possible to discover the degree to which specific parts of the ideology are part of the *mores*, which are the patterns of right conduct accepted by most of a community. It is possible to decide whether a specific pattern (like not swearing in public places) is part of the mores by noting whether expressions of indignation occur when the act is performed. If criticism of any part of the ideology is responded to in similar fashion, we may count it among the mores. Besides the mores are the *countermores*, which are the patterns of conduct that do occur, and are expected to occur, even though they violate the mores. (Some modes of behavior, such as brutal assault upon a child, may not be expected and may in fact rarely occur; they are not part of the culture at all—they are far too heinous to be admitted.) The third division of the patterns of a culture from this point of view is the *expediencies*, which are matters of calculation rather than moral sentiment. The technical operations of driving a car, for instance, belong here (for the most part).

The advantage of special group and local community studies is

that an ideology can be shown in action through a given time in full detail. *Participant observers* can record what is said without bringing it to the knowledge of the group that they are under investigation. *Interviewers*, on the contrary, work with subjects who are aware that they are being interrogated. When the observer is a *spectator*, the subject has no knowledge of the person or the fact of being scrutinized. (The behavior of a child may be recorded for scientific purposes by a trained observer who sits behind a one-way screen.) We use the term "collector" to describe the observer who characterizes events on the basis of materials which he does not himself create or supervise. (Most history is written by collectors.)

Special group and local community studies can put the application of political ideology in the entire ideological context.

5. *Political applications: persons.*—The next step in describing the distribution of world loyalty is to examine the relation of our index statement to the personality structure of persons chosen as typical or as atypical representatives of the community as a whole (or any part). By personality is meant the basic response patterns of and to the self and the environment. We know that world loyalty, in common with all loyalties, is not inherited but acquired in the interaction between native biological endowment and the environment. During this process the self is differentiated from the not-self. The self, as remarked above, includes the primary ego symbol in addition to the symbols referring to certain persons or groups. The self also includes symbols which refer to other persons and groups who are excluded from it. Furthermore, the self includes demands which are made by the self on the self (and on the not-self). A demand on fellow-professors to work for a free world commonwealth is an example of the former (demand by self on [self] other). A demand on other skills—occupations, professions—to do the same is an example of "demand by self on (not-self) other." The self also includes expectations about each component of the self (and the not-self). Such expectations are optimistic or pessimistic, depending on whether the symbol of the component in question is put in a favorable (indulged) or unfavorable (deprived) light. An example of indulging the self in this sense is the prediction that a world society will be developed in time to avert disaster. An example of deprivational expectation affirms that the world society will come too late.

Methods of varying degrees of intensiveness are available for examining personality structure. We may begin by gathering the

public record. In the case of a President there are speeches, memorandums, articles, books; there are measures signed or vetoed during and before the presidency (if a state governor); we analyze decisions and opinions if the President was on the bench before becoming chief executive. Presently we pass beyond the public record to the privacy and intimacy of diaries, personal correspondence, conversations, and the like. Finally, we may delve into the present and past by exposing the unconscious by the use of psychoanalytic free association, hypnosis, or drugs.

Each method illuminates the boundaries of the self and the demands and expectations bearing upon it in whole or part. Contradictions are frequently revealed between, for instance, the public and the intimate picture. The man who speaks well of "One World" on the platform may be contemptuous of the slogan in private, or vice versa. From the disclosure of the unconscious, we learn whether world loyalties are intensely supported by certain impulses and prescriptions. In some cases world loyalty is a compensation against parental chauvinism. In other persons there are deep identifications with parents who supported the world ideal. Often the demand for world peace implies an effort to escape from an inharmonious mother-father relationship. When the facts are found in the individual case, it is possible to assess the degree to which world loyalties are rooted in the total personality. Perhaps the pattern is a matter of *conscience* (the super-ego, in psychoanalytic terms). Possibly it goes no deeper than political and economic expediency and rests thus on *reason* unsustained by other components of the personality structure. (This is equivalent to one meaning of the term "ego" in psychoanalysis—the perceiving, consciously active part of the total structure.) Possibly there are many hostilities against world loyalty which can be traced to the *impulse* life; the conscience may have some difficulty in guarding against an eruption of hostility and suspiciousness. On the other hand, the impulse life (the "id") can flow in a strong current through the channels of subjectivity and expression that culminate in conduct consistent with our index statement.

It is evident that the world community is strongest when it is supported at all levels of the personality structure. Certainly there need to be rationally calculated aims and means. The conscience can contribute, as can spontaneity of impulse. It is conceivable that the mores of the world community can be imbedded in the super-ego of

all. But the conscience cannot wisely be unbending in its support of symbols that may grow obsolete.

This carries us to the interaction of world loyalty with other factors in the total context.

II. CONDITIONS

The factors that determine world loyalty responses can conveniently be grouped into *environmental* and *predispositional*. No matter where we start in the career line of the individual or the group, there are factors that influence the way in which the person or group will meet future environing circumstances. Whether we consider the environment to be a minute or a day or a year or a decade, we cannot fail to take into account the way in which the individual or the group is organized to act when he or they are first introduced into the environment. (Responses are substantially concurrent with the "environment.")

The environmental factors in turn fall conveniently into two categories: the *milieu*, or the features coming to the focus of attention, and the *surroundings*, or the features which are not referred to at the focus of attention. It is also useful to distinguish between *communications* and *noncommunications*, as we have previously done.

We may sum up the underlying postulate of scientific theories of response in the sentence: "Response maximizes values." In less cryptic form: People act on the basis of expected gain over loss if the value is wealth; or expected margin of increase over decrease if the value is power; or net improvement in respect status if the value is respect; or maximum relative growth of knowledge if the value is enlightenment; or the greatest relative enhancement of moral standing if the value is rectitude. It is consistent with these statements that persons who pursue wealth in the market place adopt the alternative that is anticipated to yield the largest margin of income over outgo; or that persons who pursue power in the arena of politics gravitate toward the alternative that is expected to result in the largest over-all influence on the decision-making process; or that persons seeking respect follow the course that is supposed to lead to the greatest improvement of status.

It is also consistent with the basic postulate of response that unconscious expectations enter quite as fully into many acts as conscious calculation. The man who shapes his career in the conscious

pursuit of money may act in ways which are in fact incompatible with his deliberate aim. Yet this does not invalidate the postulate, since depth interviewing may show that an unconscious sense of guilt for the part of the personality that seeks to accumulate wealth may modify response accordingly and interfere with the single-minded race for dollars. (Guilt means that rectitude is a value demanded *by* the self *of* the self.) Hence the response postulate is not to be construed in the sense of a gross hedonism, in which "happiness" is the alleged state of gratification. It is entirely conceivable that pain is one of the values sought—or even death.[11] In short, the postulate is a logical device which may be used by an active mind to invent hypotheses capable of empirical confirmation or rejection. The operational indices available for the concepts utilized in the postulate are too incomplete and unstable to admit of crucial test.

The advantage of considering the basic postulate of response in connection with the analysis of world loyalty is that the postulate calls attention to the very great importance of "environmental response to response" as a means of affecting loyalty. Expectations about the future are deeply influenced by past experience. Hence, if a given act has brought about changes in the environment that maximize values, the probability is increased that the act will be repeated in what is taken to be a congruent situation in the future. Therefore, the probability is that world loyalty responses will be strengthened in the future if the environment responds to them with greater indulgence than to disloyal expressions.

What is involved may be set forth in a much oversimplified example. A child may receive from his well-meaning aunt an admonition to include all mankind in his prayers. Suppose that the child resists the exhortation and receives a slight reprimand from the aunt (whom, let us assume, he is predisposed to dislike) and admiring support from a sister (whom he is disposed to love). Although some degree of deprivation is forthcoming from the environment (the aunt), it is more than counterpoised by the indulgence coming from another part of the environment (the sister). The probability is increased that the child will respond negatively to admonitions of the same kind coming from the aunt in the immediate future and possibly from anybody else.

11. J. C. Flugel speaks of man as "a pain-seeking as well as a pleasure-seeking animal" in *Man, Morals and Society: A Psycho-analytical Study* (New York: International Universities Press, 1945), p. 151. See also Ranyard West, *Conscience and Society* (New York: Emerson Books, 1945).

In cultivating the world loyalty responses of children, therefore, the problem is in part to provide an environmental response that yields a margin of indulgence over that received for disloyal responses. Key symbols, slogans, and full statements from the ideology of the world society are to be rewarded by affection and by other positive values.

Inconsistent bits of doctrine, formula, or *miranda* are to be less rewarded (including negative rewards). Most of us would agree that the following kinds of responses are in accord with our conception of world loyalty and with the index statement we have used: treating emblems of the free world society with gestures of respect; repeating in the proper manner a declaration of allegiance to mankind; praying for (or declaring for) the welfare of humanity and the strength to attain and protect a free world society; learning and reciting verses celebrating the dignity of man; committing to memory and reciting stories of the heroes (famous and almost unknown) who have benefited all mankind; demonstrating familiarity with contributions made by peoples of many races and cultures; extending nondiscriminatory treatment in face-to-face and letter-writing contacts to persons of many origins and traits; considering careers that contribute as directly as possible to the making of the free world society; condemning statements and acts inconsistent with world loyalty; etc.

As they grow past childhood, persons achieve some degree of emancipation from the immediate environment by "internalizing" and applying the patterns of the earlier environment. Predispositions develop that enable the individual to affect the net result of his activities by what he himself thinks and feels about them. Even when deprived of the respect of others in the current environment, as when he is reviled as an antipatriot and a caste renegade, the person may respect himself so much for acting in accord with his conception of world loyalty that self-respect turns a deficit of indulgence from the environment into a favorable balance of indulgence for the total situation. Such a mature personality can consider the significance of any act of policy upon the fate of the world community. It is evident that, if such maturity is to become frequent throughout the globe, pre-adult environments must be modified to permit the incorporation of the symbols of humanity into the self, together with demands upon the self to live up to a working code in the control of destructive private impulses and in liquidating the cultural patterns that provoke and incite destructiveness.

It is a great advantage to develop world loyalty responses at such an early age that mature personalities are made comparatively independent of the shifting balance of indulgence and deprivation in their environment. However, it should not be overlooked that a continual inflow of indulgence from the environment is a most salutary means of increasing the probability that weaknesses in predisposition are overcome. For this reason it is wise to canvass afresh every institutional situation for the purpose of maximizing the yield of values which accrue to world loyalty responses.

To some extent this is a matter of proper personnel procedures with a view to excluding from the policy-making spots potential criminals against humanity. By their taunts and jibes, by their hatred of moderation and the practical requirements of a decent regard for human dignity, such personalities may discourage the timid, unsettle the partially convinced, and spread destructive apprehensions throughout the institution with which they are associated. The generals and the admirals; chief executives, civilian administrators, and judges; key figures in business in every line of profit-seeking; key figures in labor, agriculture, and the professions; owners, regulators, editors, and contributors to the mass media of communication; the decisive figures in academic, ecclesiastical, and artistic life—all these, and every influential individual besides, need to be chosen from among the personalities who respect themselves enough to respect others, who are relatively free of personality disorder, and who are loyal to the cause of humanity.

To a certain extent this requires the modifying of policy-forming and policy-executing routines for the purpose of protecting the process against the destructive effects of distracting attention from the necessities of the world community and of not permitting the accumulation of frustrations to an explosive pitch. Distractions of attention can be guarded against by perfecting the intelligence processes that furnish the information on which decision is based. World intelligence surveys need to reach all policy-makers; and each corps of intelligence advisers and operators needs to adapt the general material to local and special problems. It is possible to guard against the accumulation of frustrations to a dangerous pitch by examining the tension level as it varies throughout all institutions. There are still giant corporations that engage in management practices that wound human dignity and endanger the evolutionary method of social development. Laggards can sometimes be brought into line by

having their minds centered on the interdependence of what goes on in one part of world society with what goes on elsewhere.

Can we devise ways of modifying our institutional patterns for the purpose of making it more profitable to cultivate the world loyalty response? The use of atomic energy affords an unprecedented opportunity in this context, if ownership can be world-wide and the administration made truly diverse as to social and territorial origin. The possibility even exists of reducing the shock of innovation to those who possess claims to older forms of energy by allowing them to participate in the atomic corporations. Can global insurance schemes, designed to reduce the risk of individual and collective existence, provide a lucrative means of rewarding the friends of globality?

Can we think of ways of changing our institutions in order to make it more respectable to acquire the sentiment of world loyalty? If those who enjoy high social class position join with the admired practitioners of respected skills, something may be done to launch a more abundant growth of cross-boundary associations, official and unofficial.

Can we renovate our institutions of research and information (enlightenment) in the hope of improving the scientific and scholarly position of those who work with cross-regional agencies?

Similar questions arise in connection with every value and institution (in addition to wealth, respect, and enlightenment, we might examine power, rectitude, well-being, etc.). The basic principle is to provide more net values for world loyalty than for alternative responses. If public office, physical safety, jobs, prosperity, social acceptance, moral standing, and other values depended upon world loyalty, there is no doubt such responses would multiply and intensify.

Up to this point we have dealt with the *culminating* and not the *initial* phase of the relation between environment and response. The culminating changes in the environment have a potent effect on whether the response is deemed a success or not, even though the culminating response, as we have pointed out, may contradict the culminating external balance of indulgence and deprivation (when self-approval more than makes up for loss of power, wealth, respect, or other values).

A change in the environment may initiate a response, and a great many hypotheses about factors affecting world loyalty deal with the initial rather than the culminating phase of the E-R (environmental,

response) interaction. For instance, it is frequently said that sermons, editorials, conversational remarks, and the like influence the sentiments of individuals and groups, irrespective of whether the immediate response brings about any subsequent shift in the I-D (indulgent, deprivational) treatment of the responder by his environment. The stream of meditation or the mood of dedication that is initiated may lead to no overt deeds at the time.

One hypothesis may be phrased as follows: *World loyalty responses are favorably affected by exposure to statements that put mankind in a moderately optimistic rather than in an extremely optimistic or pessimistic light.* As operational indices of "moderately optimistic light" we may designate a preponderance of Category A over Category B statements: Category A: "Human nature can, under proper environmental circumstances, develop nondestructive personalities"; "A free man's commonwealth has often been achieved on a small scale in history; hence there is no limit but our ingenuity in discovering how to duplicate the result on a global scale"; "Innate racial differences have little effect on behavior, apart from acquired sentiments and practices about such differences." Category B: "Man is by nature evil, and evil will always triumph in this world"; "The effort to improve man's lot is hopeless; what is gained in one direction is lost in another"; "Man is by nature good, and the good will ultimately triumph in the world"; "It is not necessary to concern ourselves much about any specific situation; in the long run, the good will win out anyhow"; "We can be sure of nothing in this world save uncertainty; we cannot be sure that the design of God or the interactions of Nature will be disclosed to us. By meditation and witness of belief in God (the Gods) (Nature) we may gain enlightenment."

Another hypothesis: *World loyalty responses are favorably affected by exposure to statements that affirm and exemplify the principle of equivalent effect rather than the principle of absolute effect.* Operational indices of "the principle of equivalent effect" are statements of Category A; "the principle of absolute effect" is indexed by Category B statements. Category A: "The effect of a doctrine or a technique depends upon its relation to the community context of which it is a part. Specific institutions do not automatically carry specific value consequences with them. Different results may be obtained by doctrines or techniques that at first sight appear to be identical; and equivalent results may be produced by doctrines and techniques that appear at first to be incompatible. It is consistent with the principle

of equivalent effect that a moral doctrine gives different results when applied by true believers than by hypocrites. It is also consistent with the principle when a technique of production, such as the use of machinery, raises the standard of living in some countries but not in others—where, for instance, energy goes into the manufacture of weapons. The principle of equivalent effect follows from the principle of multiple causation, which emphasizes the *many* factors that *interact* in determining a social result. I reject any single-factor theory of social effect. While we can be *certain* of our moral intentions, we can achieve the world community only by adopting an *experimental*, exploratory, creative attitude toward ways and means. In each community anywhere in the globe the task is to strengthen the tendencies which adjust local institutions to the world community goal. I fully recognize that the world is full of exaggerated claims concerning the superiority of one specific device over another. Inherent effects are attributed to forms of property and other institutions which are in fact the outcome of the unrecognized co-operation of many factors." Category B: "So long as the ownership of the instruments of production remains in private hands, so long the miseries of mankind will endure. Only by socializing the means of production can human beings abolish the ancient scourges of war, unemployment, prostitution, poverty and disease"; "Abolish free private enterprise, and you pronounce a death sentence upon human liberty and condemn mankind to servitude in an all-encompassing bureaucratic order that strangles initiative and paralyses invention even as it hounds the known or suspected critic to the gas chamber, the prison, or the forced-labor camp."

The impact of any statement or body of statements upon a person or group depends in part upon the environmental configuration in which it appears. A faulty loud-speaker system, unseasonable heat in the auditorium, the antics of a child playing in the aisle—these are reminders of the distracting stimuli that influence responses. And we cannot neglect the predispositional (P) context: the audience that hates Catholics may discredit what a priest says.

It is, of course, the aim of communications on behalf of world loyalty to organize predispositions throughout the world community that will be relatively stable and effective whatever the environment in which people find themselves. By multiplying exposures to pertinent statements, slogans, and key symbols, the probability is increased that opportune conjunctures of predisposing and environ-

mental factors will elicit and fix world loyalty responses. The child who is admonished to pray by an unloved aunt today may be requested to include all humanity in his prayers by a much-loved mother tomorrow. And the patterns propagated by an unloved schoolteacher, neighbor, classmate, or clergyman today may be repeated by a much-admired teacher, neighbor, classmate, clergyman, editor, commentator, author, and party leader tomorrow. As the "plus pockets" of the ever moving environment become suffused with symbols consistent with world loyalty, the total impact of negative elements and "minus pockets" is reduced.

Although the discussion has dwelt chiefly on communications brought to the attention of individuals and groups, the same principles apply to the features of the milieu that are not specialized to the function of statement-making. Exposure to persons, to the assembly line, to army drill, to battle, and to any set of unique or recurring situations cannot fail to have some significance for spreading or restricting the spread of world loyalty. If the general level of insecurity rises, from whatever cause, a crisis stage can develop in which all components of the self which are not firmly integrated in an identification with all mankind may get the upper hand, resulting in demands on the self and on others that precipitate nationalistic, imperialistic, or other orgies of human destructiveness.

The network of institutions prevailing in a given community or set of communities may, taken as a whole, either contribute to the growth of world loyalty or impede the process. (It has frequently been affirmed, for example, that the "expansive" tendencies of capitalism lead inevitably to imperialism.) When we plan to further world loyalty, we have the task of so modifying the network of institutions throughout the world community that our goals can be achieved. And this requires the spread of mores patterns which are sufficiently in harmony with conscience, reason, and impulse to survive.

Since many existing mores patterns include sentiments which are incompatible with world loyalty, it is essential to modify the present structures of right and conscience. The appropriate technique is, in part at least, the splitting of conscience. The technique of super-ego splitting is to oppose symbols and persons to one another who are equally acceptable to the super-ego, thus compelling the use of reason or the giving-in to more primitive impulses. A crude instance is the use of a world loyal Protestant theologian versus one who is disloyal.

The foregoing examination of factors affecting world loyalty has made use of concepts whose operational indices are at least as complex as world loyalty itself and emphasizes the necessity of maintaining a continuing survey of the ever shifting trends of the world community.

III. CONSEQUENCES

The foundation has by this time been laid for the most important point to be made about the impact of world loyalty as a factor upon all other factors in the world community. The relationship is contextual. There are no absolute effects of world loyalty on other variables, since the outcome at any given time and place is a function of the whole pattern of variables with which world loyalties interact.

Under some circumstances (in some contexts) the world community is brought nearer our postulated goal of a free society by the invocation of world loyalties. A sentiment of being positively identified with mankind increases the likelihood that many acts of policy, and many other acts, will be shaped deliberately with a view to furthering the goal. Personalities can be matured who are capable of relying upon self-approval rather than immediate success in the environment when they give expression to world loyalties.

But in many circumstances world loyalty can have opposite results. The cue symbols which evoke loyalty responses may be invoked in aid of policies that impede or disrupt the march of humanity toward a world society of free men. In the name of humanity, democracy, and freedom the Russian-centered and the American-centered worlds may annihilate each other. In the name of human dignity a world state, if brought into existence, might be corroded and eventually destroyed.

Therefore, we have reached the conclusion that whether world loyalty helps or hinders the world community depends upon the timing and proper articulation of the acts fostered by the sentiment.

IV. POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE

From our analysis of the dimensions of world loyalty, and of the interactions of this factor with other factors in the world community, we draw the following inferences:

1. Since the indices of world loyalty and of all factors significantly affected by it, and affecting it, are continually changing, a means must be found, if policy is to be effective in moving toward a desirable form of world society, by which the pertinent indices can be kept

calibrated, and all propositions about trend and interdependence can be kept under continual check and recheck.

2. The need can be met by establishing new institutions which provide the flow of intelligence upon the basis of which rational policy choices can be made. A rational policy in relation to world society is one which increases the probability that the goal sought will, in fact, be attained with least sacrifice of well-being, power, wealth, respect, enlightenment, and other values.

In incomplete form the necessary institutions are already functioning in some parts of the world. University, governmental, and market research organizations operate in many countries. Methods of every degree of intensiveness are employed, ranging from the brief (poll) interview to depth interviews (such as psychoanalysis), and from topical projects to prolonged community case studies.

The problem is to complete coverage throughout accessible parts of the globe, so that the entire flow of world loyalty responses can be kept in correct relation to the changing constellation of cause and effect. We need a continuing World Attention Survey, which describes the way in which the attention of representative elements in every community is exposed to pertinent doctrines, formulas, and *mirandas* and to significant key symbols, slogans, and full statements (described in terms of occurrence, elaboration, and intensity of utterance). This calls for surveillance of the mass media, notably the radio, press, and film; but it penetrates much farther, describing the communication process in situations representative of the entire institutional matrix of the world. The World Attention Survey joins, and to some extent overlaps with, the World Attitude Survey, which draws together the data (based like the preceding, on scientific sampling) about effects produced by exposure to communication and noncommunication factors. Effects are opinions, preferences, and deeds; with the exception of the last point, the deeds, the chief indices are statements. These world surveys must, it goes without much saying, be viewed in the perspective of a *total survey program* that follows significant trends in all the values throughout the globe.

The surveying program, it should be emphasized, includes the pretesting of contemplated lines of policy action. The effectiveness of proposed changes in communication and noncommunication related to world loyalty can be tried out in small, representative situations before final judgment is made as to the adequacy of the proposed policy for a larger context.

The surveying program, furthermore, will *aid the politics of prevention* by disclosing the changing level of insecurity and by spotting the situations in which crisis is rising to the point of explosiveness. By bringing these trends into view ahead of time, policy-making elements can be confronted with a variety of proposed policies designed for preventive action. Creative minds can invent and pretest means to the contemplated end.

The general proposal, therefore, is to perfect the institutions enabling us to maintain a continuing audit of the effectiveness of our culture in creating loyalty to humanity as a whole. World loyalty already exists in the personalities and within the culture patterns of many persons and communities. The problem is to increase the influence of these elements upon the progressive reconstruction of the world community and to bring about the elimination or nullification of counteracting elements.

And what is the prospect that the machinery proposed will be used for the purposes specified or that it will be captured and turned against the ends for which it is designed? This is a question of the total effectiveness of those who think and feel our way; and this can be settled only by the as yet undisclosed face of humanity's future. The enemies of the world society do not need these instruments; the friends do. The instruments of attention and attitude surveying provide us with the means, for the first time in history, by which we can put into effect the principle of treating the thoughts and feelings of others with due deference. By scientific sampling we can actually become aware of what these perspectives are in a vast, large-scale, global society. And we can use this knowledge to make available the stream of intelligence upon which ever more rational opinions consonant with ever more comprehensive sentiments of world loyalty can be based and put to effective action.[12]

12. I take the liberty of citing some further articles of mine in which points touched upon here are more fully treated: "The Interrelations of World Organization and Society," *Yale Law Journal*, LV (1946), 889–909; (with Joseph M. Goldsen), "Public Attention, Opinion and Action," *International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research*, I (1947), 3–11; (with Myres S. McDougal), "Legal Education and Public Policy; Professional Training in the Public Interest," *Yale Law Journal*, LII (1943), 203–95. The most comprehensive analysis of loyalty problems is the "Studies in the Making of Citizen Series" edited by Charles E. Merriam and published by the University of Chicago Press.

DISCUSSION OF WORLD LOYALTY

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

MR. WRIGHT: "World Loyalties" should be a unifying subject. "Culture" seemed to get us into the realm of diversity. Professor Lasswell's discussion may help us to decide whether there is anything on which the world can be unified.

MR. HAROLD D. LASSWELL: I have heard comments from some of my friends who seem to be surprised that I have been able to maintain absolute silence these last few sessions. I will say in partial explanation, if not extenuation, that the ground for this singular abstinence apparently was the superfluousness of the remarks which I felt called upon to make. I was struck by the fact that, whenever anybody said anything that was particularly absurd, somebody else came along and checkmated it presently, so I did not feel that I had any contribution to make to the general flow of the discussion.

The second excuse is curiosity. I am fascinated by what happens when specialists in different fields get together and engage in that arduous and difficult task of attempting to convey meanings to one another. This was an extraordinarily interesting exhibit, and I did not want to spoil the flow by personal interruption. I was performing the role, in this sense, of a spectator.

The point which, I think, struck me about our deliberations thus far is the great state of frustration in which several of us are, a state of concealed pessimism. I am astonished that no one has broken out with a forthright declaration of pessimism. I think especially that Mr. Morgenthau is to be congratulated on his self-restraint.

Another feature of the situation is the feeling that all of us apparently are frustrated policy advisers eager to get on to the business of inventing ways and means which are pertinent to the immediate future. This I found especially frustrating because I, too, share a great deal of interest in undertaking to think as creatively as may be about the alternatives of action which confront us in the visible future.

I thought that Mr. Wirth gave us an admirable example of self-restraint in the initial discussion of the concepts. I think, too, that we have had one very fortunate development which is pertinent to what we are going to say this evening and that is the extraordinary

graciousness and candor of Mr. Boulding in exhibiting himself as a man suffering from moral and intellectual perplexities. I speak of that with genuine appreciation because most of us lack this disarming candor in reflecting so explicitly our moral as well as our intellectual problems.

I confess that among the intellectual frustrations which I felt are the difficulties that arise from approaching this problem in a framework that is not very congenial to my ways of thinking. It would have been more congenial to my special mode of looking at the problem of the world community if we had started by asking ourselves: What is the shape of the world community that we, ourselves, want? If we had begun with some clarification along this line, I think that at least my own processes would have gained in sharpness and discipline. Actually we have been constantly introducing our preferences with respect to the shape of the society that we would like to realize in fact. But we have, so to speak, been smuggling them in. I would like to have begun by having direct testimony about the nature of these goal values which we want, if we can, to put into practice over the long-time period. There is where such considerations as those advanced by Margaret Mead when she talked about cultural diversity were peculiarly appropriate. Mr. McKeon's formulation this afternoon, when he spoke of shared values as a shorthand way of characterizing the sort of objective that we have, was along the line I would certainly have enjoyed spelling out in more detail.

Such an approach would have enabled me to estimate the relevance of a great many comments and interpretations. I find it convenient to work that way because I think in terms of shared values—of shared power and of the values of shared wealth, shared respect, and shared enlightenment, for example.

I am not altogether sure that the goal approach would have achieved much, because, as Mr. McKeon pointed out, there is such a thing as creative ambiguity. In a group of this kind, in the initial stages at least, it may be a very fortunate thing for people to leave unspecified the practices which they think may achieve their values. But it would have been more congenial for me to have started thinking along these lines, partly because it would have made me more aware of possible differences of objectives in the long-run task of constructing a world society.

Second, we might have asked: What do I expect in terms of varying degress of probability (disregarding what I want and prefer) for

the long run; what do I expect in the fairly immediate future and in the longer-range future? That would have been very helpful to me in evaluating a great many of the remarks that were passed in the course of the discussion. I found myself constantly inhibiting my own participation at various points because of the uncertainty as to whether the person who was making the remark expected a disaster in the very immediate future or whether he was making his comments in a somewhat more optimistic perspective. Since I am acquainted personally with only a few of the participants, I would have welcomed this sort of clarification of tentative expectations about what confronts us in the next years.

As far as I am concerned, let me very quickly and inadequately specify some of the developments which I regard as probable. I have gone into this at some length elsewhere, and so I am going to dismiss this with a few phrases.

Before weapon parity between the Soviet Union and the United States is believed by the United States to be achieved, I expect that we will pass through two phases. We are in the first phase, in which there is continuous negotiation for the discovery of institutions that will be deemed adequate to control the weapons of destruction. My expectation is that no satisfactory agreement will be reached.

The second phase I would expect to begin when it is widely believed by responsible leaders in the United States that weapon parity is soon to be achieved by the Soviet Union. In this phase I think there will be a great concentration of fear and anxiety, a very strong demand on the part of many elements to wage a war of prevention. There may be a preventive war, but I will not discuss the successive stages which I foresee in case this is attempted, how it can be brought about, and what would happen if the United States were victorious.

I will skip that alternative and refer to the high probability that, if there is no preventive war, there will be a very considerable period during which the bipolar system will develop with a minimum of contact between the two systems. As far as the United States is concerned, this will involve the transformation of our institutions progressively in the direction of a garrison state (a militarized society).

It is possible that this situation will not culminate in war. One of the most optimistic forecasts that we could consider is the one to which Mr. Boulding made reference in his remarks this morning—that the bipolarized world will continue without overt war. I would go farther and indicate that under certain conditions I would antici-

pate a relaxation in international tension. I am not going into this, because it is not altogether appropriate to my topic. I merely want to indicate some of the framework in which I am operating.

Thus I would have welcomed a sharing of expectations. Possibly we would have developed from that two or three major contingencies that we might have discussed from the standpoint of what can be done at successive phases of each. This would have been more congenial to me as a starting-point than the procedure which emphasized the concepts appropriate to the analysis of the general problems of the world community.

If we had begun this way, we might have been able to answer that penetrating question which Mr. MacNair asked: When one of us says "we," who is meant? We might take that "we" to mean this group, and, under various conditions of expectation with regard to the future, we might analyze our alternatives as a group.

Certainly one alternative is that after this interstimulation we continue our present lines of separate activity. A second possibility is that, in whole or in part, we undertake to continue this group or to develop a special group which would initiate by that very act a new institution to be made use of in the pursuit of our objectives.

We might undertake to organize a world community association for the purpose of building the world community now. Such an association could be developed along many lines. We might start off by assuming that the effect of any given set of words or any given details of operation is a function of the context in which those words and operations are found and that the task in any concrete situation is to explore the possibilities of adjusting that context in such a way that it fosters values we favor.

It might be that we could start organizing the world community by agreements establishing an association for which we would solicit members. We could explore the eligibility of members in terms of the ideology that we chose to propagate. We could perhaps acquire funds that would enable us to organize many different cultural, economic, and social institutions for furthering our aims.

There is another possibility which might be linked with the world community association, or pursued as an independent project by this group, or promoted through the various channels available to each one of us separately. That is to organize our own intelligence function so that we in this room could improve the flow of information on the basis of which we give our advice to others. This would

carry us very quickly into some of the technical considerations which we have frequently talked about in our conferences and which I have outlined a little more formally in the document that is before you. I attempt to indicate what is involved in organizing a continuing intelligence function in order to improve the caliber of our own thinking and to stimulate our own inventive processes.

To summarize some of the major points: The problem under discussion is to develop a continuing survey of the degree to which world loyalty is found in the parts of the world accessible to us. This is a matter of specifying to our colleagues and other associates in the enterprise some definitions which we find satisfactory for describing these fluctuations in loyalty. Certainly we want to have a continuing survey of ideologies in the parts of the world accessible to us.

There is the problem of specifying operational indices with sufficient clarity to enable us to relate our very high-level abstractions, like "world loyalty," to the vast range of concrete situations about which we want information. Our conceptual terms are unimportant. I note in passing that the terminology that I use is by no means alien to the tradition of formal political analysis. I talk about "doctrines" and "formula" and "*miranda.*" Two of these terms I have borrowed from Mr. Merriam, the other I have borrowed from Mosca—and defined them to avoid overlap.

The first three subdivisions of my paper talk about the theory of the ideology; then comes the ideology in application through time and in concrete circumstances.

In addition to a survey of trends (both in theory and in application), we need a continuing appraisal of the factors affecting these trends, and here again is one of the causes of the frustration which I think some of us so often felt in our discussion. It was entirely appropriate—but not new—for someone to say, for example, that if we have exchange of students some of the students will become supernationalists and some will not. What is new—and unknown—is the changing significance of the factors that affect the occurrence of the student responses. What I am suggesting here is simply a continuing attempt to keep current our knowledge of the relative significance of student exchanges of various types for world loyalty.

The point of keeping current is that, instead of enumerating a long list of factors and exchanging anecdotes and reminiscences, we

could evaluate the current and impending significance of factors, hence furnishing a rational basis for policy.

I kept a list for a long time in this conference of the number of statements which were made and then qualified or denied. The absence of a common frame of reference meant that inadequate criteria were present to decide when a qualification was pertinent. Our discussion would have been more productive if trend-analytic knowledge had been at hand. Then we could have considered the alternative open for creative intervention.

In the second part of my paper I talk about the effect of two kinds of conditions. One I call "culminating conditions," by which I mean the changes in the environment which follow if an individual engages in what we call a world loyalty response. Does it improve his value position in terms of power and wealth, respect, and so on, or does it weaken it? We are concerned with such change because of our expectation that if loyalty responses enhance the value position of a person, he is likely to continue them in the future under comparable circumstances. By handling the culminating conditions during infancy, childhood, and adolescence, we can develop personalities which are relatively emancipated from dependence upon the indulgences and deprivations of the immediate environment encountered in later life. The person can achieve a conscience which will provide him with all the indulgence and deprivation that he needs, carrying him through "blood, sweat, and tears" even to martyrdom.

I also talk about "initial conditions," by which I mean exposures in the form of communication and noncommunication activities that initiate world loyalty responses. The point there is to specify the kinds of exposures that have this effect.

In the third part I deal with the "Consequences of World Loyalty" in relation to the other factors that constitute the world community or condition it. We have the task of keeping our words of ambiguous reference (our concept terms like "loyalty") related to changing circumstances so that we will be better able to contemplate the ways open to us for achieving our objectives. The discussion closes by emphasizing the role of "Policy and Intelligence" somewhat after the manner of what I have just said.

CONDITIONS OF A RESEARCH FOR PRETESTING ATTITUDES

MR. WRIGHT: Mr. Lasswell thinks we could understand the situation better if we made it clear to ourselves what we want and where

we think we are now. Someone remarked earlier in this conference that we had to start from where we are now, and I suppose where we think we are now is determined by our expectation of what will happen in the immediate future.

MR. HART: I think this is in line with Dr. Likert's request for suggestions as to research. Mr. Lasswell suggests very interesting and provocative types of research into sentiments and attitudes in the context of the total situation and of the total personality of the individual.

I wonder if Mr. Lasswell would be willing to amplify the kind of expectation that he might have with respect to these kinds of research, ideally; under what auspices would he like to see such research undertaken? Would it be the department of state of a given nation or country, or would it be some international body, or would it be undertaken by private citizens? Then, looking at the situation as it really is, what would he expect to be the best auspices that could be provided?

MR. LASSWELL: I would like to develop such a survey procedure under private auspices. I would like to see it developed by people who share our value objectives with respect to the world community. I would therefore recommend undertaking to correlate as many of our existing activities as possible with this in view.

I am only too aware of the point which Mr. Morgenthau has so properly and effectively emphasized—that we have the problem of calculating who we are in terms of power in a world in which power is a matter of such profound significance. For this reason I would like to begin, as long as the channels of private action are open to us, along these lines and then develop reserve niches in official agencies in the hope that in the circumstances where we would find ourselves there would still be a choice of a "better" and a "worse" from our point of view.

MR. YOUNG: Would you extend that possibly to other nations where we also might get private agencies to participate? That might bring us ultimately up against the problem: Where are the limitations or boundaries beyond which research cannot be extended?

MR. LASSWELL: So far as the visible future is concerned, if we undertook to do this along private lines, only certain countries of the world would be accessible to us. That is quite clear. The same thing would apply if the research were under the wing of an official organi-

zation, with the possible exception of one or two of the organizations which were mentioned earlier. I would hope to develop through each of these channels as much supplementation as possible.

EXPECTATIONS AND PREFERENCES

MR. POTTER: I would like to ask Mr. Lasswell if he would elaborate on his anticipation regarding this first period. What was stated somewhat oversimplifies the relations between the United States and Russia. I believe he said that he did not expect that an accommodation would be achieved in the first period. I don't want to argue that an accommodation is possible, but I think we should have a little elaboration of the point.

MR. LASSWELL: Can't we postpone that until tomorrow when you talk about "Institutions"? This would involve us in calculations of of the very short run. My remarks are to be construed in precisely the sense in which I uttered them, namely, as my expectation and not my preference. I have refrained from many public statements of pessimism about the world picture, in the hope that we can move successfully toward our objective.

MR. POTTER: Doesn't that mean: We don't know; therefore, we must go ahead and see whether we can accomplish anything. That rather removes the problem.

MR. LASSWELL: I want to make explicit my distinction between expectation and preference. Each one of us when we examine ourselves carefully find ourselves making various kinds of concessions in the allocation of our energy with respect to the probabilities of what is going to happen and where we can most effectively accomplish our objectives. That is what I meant by that moral quandary problem that was so beautifully and eloquently expressed by Mr. Boulding.

My own disposition is so to act as to increase the likelihood that my preferences will transpire even when I think that the chances are nine out of ten against them. I happen to be a somewhat optimistic and sanguine person, and, consequently, I am willing to operate as effectively as I can in a number of situations even when I have slight expectation that what I prefer will take place.

MR. WRIGHT: Is it possible to maintain this distinction between "expectations" and "preferences" in practice? The distinction can be made formally, but if one's expectations are entirely negative, or

in large degree negative, on a certain proposition, doesn't that nullify the possibility of effective action to achieve one's preferences? No one will work for something that he regards as hopeless. Mr. Lasswell said he had refrained from public expression of pessimistic expectations.

MR. LASSWELL: It is an extremely important point you have raised. I want to suggest that that is the type of question that needs continuous investigation through time so that we may be able to appraise the effect of pessimistic "statements" on people in the going situation. So I would want to put into this framework of continuous scrutiny the relative significances of the alternatives we have been talking about.

MR. BLOCH: Personally, I am a short-run pessimist and a long-run optimist. The disturbing factor in your statement for me was that you assume not only certain technological developments and political developments in the Soviet Union and the United States but also a certain stability in the constellation of power—I don't want to say in the "balance of power." It seems to me quite possible that in western Europe or Asia or Africa other centers of power and of ideology might arise that might give an entirely different aspect to the present situation. So far we have had this polar concept, on one side Moscow, on the other side Washington and London. Somewhere in our discussion we should make up our mind that at least in the long run another center or nucleus of force might arise.

MR. LASSWELL: That is one of the optimistic possibilities; it is, however, a possibility that I personally regard as having low probability.

MR. LEISERSON: Wouldn't it be of value to point out the connection of Mr. Hart's point about how one would conduct this continuing survey of loyalty responses with Mr. Lasswell's point about preferences? One of the tendencies that confirms the pessimistic outlook that we express is that the group inside our government, which might be expected to share our diversity in evaluating the categories in which we would set up our research project, entertain in large measure anti-Communistic or chauvinistic opinions. The result would be a bureaucratic rift between a research of the kind standard in government and one of the kind which Mrs. Benedict or Mr. Warner might set up. There would be an eternal battle to maintain suitable conditions for research on this question.

MR. LASSWELL: I concur in your remarks, and I certainly have no

intention of forecasting that persons with my preferences, for example, will long survive in any of the setups that I am now talking about. However, I think there are possibilities as things stand now, and even if some of my more pessimistic expectations are confirmed, for research operations to go on under several government auspices. This even happens in the Navy; it even happens in the Army; it even happens to some extent in the State Department. It happens to some extent in Agriculture; and, of course, we are all aware of the plans of some of the international organizations to improve their continuing intelligence functions. I refer especially to the inquiry procedures contemplated in UNESCO. My only recommendation is the obvious one, that we want these preferences to survive as long as possible and to have as much power as possible; and one of the ways of operating is to use every nook and cranny in our social situation for this purpose.

Mr. Leiserson: My only reaction would be that, as individuals who share the general feeling that diversity is important, we need to have what it takes to stay in government, survive in these battles even if some other groups do happen to win out for the moment. In other words, we have to know what we stand for and try to influence government, not run to get outside the government into these private organizations.

Mr. Lasswell: Because I laid on the table certain preference statements of my own and certain expectation statements, it is possible that the rest of our discussion might be devoted to the profound and ever recurrent issues which arise in the question of how we evaluate "survival" and "power" in different situations as against, or in relation to, the other values and one's sense of how to maximize his own values. I am, however, for the moment assuming that each one of us can fight that out in the privacy of his conscience.

Mr. Morgenthau: I am somewhat disturbed at the juxtaposition between optimism and pessimism. The term "pessimism" has been used in our discussion as a kind of modern intellectual argument, as if we were under an obligation to be optimistic. I know, of course, that there is a very strong tendency in American folklore toward optimism regardless of the evidence of the facts; however, it seems to me that a scholar has first of all an obligation to be truthful regardless of whether his expectations or preferences are borne out by his investigations of facts. If I say that the house is on fire and we had

better get out, the relevant question to ask is not whether or not I am pessimistic but whether I am right or wrong.

Furthermore, optimism and pessimism are relative concepts. If somebody tells me that he can cure cancer by prescribing orange juice, I am deeply pessimistic about that statement. If somebody tells me that one can do away with war by appealing to the good nature of Mr. Stalin, I am deeply pessimistic. I am much less pessimistic with regard to other prospects and forecasts, and I would not make the fine distinction Mr. Lasswell has made between preferences and investigation.

If, for instance, we arrive at the conclusion, which I here posit in a mere hypothetical form, that negotiations between Russia and the United States are hopeless, then we are forced by that pessimistic conclusion to pay no more attention to the possibilities of a compromise between the United States and Russia at the present moment but to think about the problem of preventing war or to make up our mind as to whether we want to work in favor of preventive war. That decision again will depend very much upon our forecast as to the possibility of the United States and Russia living in a kind of balance. If we arrive at the conclusion that such a balance is much less likely to last today than it did in the past history of the modern state system, then our attitude toward the problem of preventive war will be different from what it would be if we had arrived at more optimistic conclusions with regard to that alternative.

So I think we ought to dispense with optimism and pessimism as argumentative concepts. We should also dispense with the fine and somewhat unrealistic distinction between our preference and our analysis of the situation.

THE NEED OF WORLD LOYALTY

Mr. Bruner: There is a psychological dilemma in the problem of developing world loyalty. Loyalty is a process of identification. We know from a large amount of clinical data that, when a person is in a state of anxiety, as the world is now, it grows increasingly difficult for him to develop loyalties or identifications with entities or symbols far beyond his ordinary ken, far beyond the usual security-giving things of everyday life. The anxious person is unlikely to identify himself with mankind or world symbols. Yet this world that we picture ourselves as going into right now is in essence an anxious world. So we have, on the one hand, the problem of creating world loyalty,

but we must do it at a time when we have a high level of anxiety which works against world loyalty. That is the dilemma.

Is it necessary to have a world loyalty in order for there to be a peaceful world? Is it necessary, for example, for the French Canadian to identify with the English Canadian, and vice versa, in order for there to be peace in the Province of Quebec?

Mr. Lasswell: To take your first point, I would not phrase that as a dilemma; I would phrase that as an analysis of the factors in the program. In order to move in the direction of the responses that we have specified and have under consideration, one of the problems is that we must operate with people of varying levels of uncertainty and of anxiety, since it is notorious that uncertainty with respect to the future is highly correlated with anxieties. Those persons who are uncertain about the future also are very likely to have active concentrations of anxiety. This makes our problem in operating under the present conditions enormously difficult, and it is precisely why I put so much emphasis upon the necessity of maintaining this continuous check, this continuous audit, of the relative efficacy of the alternatives that we think up in different situations in an effort to accomplish our purposes.

While I recognize the importance of these factors, I feel that there are many ways to reduce the anxiety level in a great number of situations—ways which range all the way from very simple devices of catharsis to more profound changes in the availability of employment, and so through a long list of things which there is no need to enumerate. I should hope under the crisis conditions you specify to increase skill in so acting as to reduce the effective anxiety levels in a number of the situations that we have in view.

Your second point, as to whether or not we need widespread identification with world symbols in order to achieve the world community, is one which I can answer, in a formal sense, in the negative. I think it is entirely possible that we can dream up a speculative model of society in which we could have much of what we are talking about with a very minimum of world loyalty; however, let me quickly interpose that I think such a speculative model is not likely to be related to the situation in which we will have to operate. I would tend to dismiss it as a speculative model of a rather unproductive sort. It does, however, have this merit, that it calls attention again to the alternatives that face us if we attempt to choose some operational indices for world loyalty as a concept.

My own definition of world loyalty does include a world symbol, partly because I think that some identification with it follows from the statement that one is interested in achieving a society that maximizes the dignity of all human beings. I would regard identification with a world symbol as included within that definition. So I would specify world loyalty either as a conceptual definition or as an operative index, whichever you will.

Mr. Likert: In a study we did a while back we found—and it is consistent with other data—that people tend to be much more world oriented on general questions and much less so on specific questions. They tend to favor the United Nations or the world community as ideal concepts, but they tend to revert when it comes to specific issues, as, for example, when they are asked about an immediate problem that involves immediate action, such as a loan to Russia or a loan to Great Britain. I wonder how we can solve this problem. It is serious, for example, in establishing a plan for the international control of atomic energy. At the present time our results suggest that if Russia would accept the Baruch plan enthusiastically, the American people would probably reject it. I am certain that, even though the American people favor a world organization, it will be difficult to convince them of the need for the international control of atomic energy. What are the steps that we ought to take?

As our negotiations with Russia have become more difficult, our willingness to accept an ideal form of world government has become less and less. We have, then, the problem of refusal to accept the specific even when the general is accepted and the tendency to run away from world loyalty under the impact of specific face-to-face problems with Soviet Russia.

PRETESTING OF EXPERIENCES

Mr. Lasswell: One aspect of the question which you pose is the general question of the relationship between responses to symbols of ambiguous reference and symbols of a more specific sort. I have nothing new to add to the general theory of that subject. I would rather, therefore, make a comment about some of the operational possibilities which are involved in recognizing that one needs to operate in the framework of the relationship between general and specific attitudes.

I think we can open up a great many new possibilities by the skilful handling of our techniques of exploring and pretesting experi-

ence. One of the consequences of proceeding in the way I have outlined is that it may disclose in advance a great many new possibilities of action in a given situation.

Mr. Likert's example is an extremely good one. There are circumstances in which one can imagine that a foreign power would acquiesce in an enforcement machine, and one of the problems is to explore the way people are likely to respond by spelling out in advance the sequence of experiences that they are likely to go through if this alternative arises. One has an opportunity to discover all sorts of new dimensions of the problem, and perhaps to devise preventive measures when one has discovered in advance the resistances which may be encountered.

There is also the possibility of pretesting alternative ways of dealing with difficulties of this sort. (I recognize that our present procedures of surveying attention and attitudes are in a partial state of development. My emphasis upon their relevancy here is not to be taken to imply that these procedures are very far advanced.)

All of us at times would like to discover the present predispositions of persons by successfully imagining the contingent environments in which they may find themselves and specifying in detail the way in which such environmental changes will present themselves in experience. Then comes the purely technical problem of devising a procedure by which one can confront a representative individual or group with such a vigorous and full presentation of the way his predispositions are to be stimulated in a given situation that his present response can be regarded as a valid indication of future response.

I am talking here in terms of the future improvement of the various testing, pretesting, and exploratory procedures which are available to us. The important intelligence problem is that of making available to decision-makers new alternatives of operation by stimulating the creative imagination of the policy adviser through the use of the data provided by these procedures. If the procedures prove useful to us in our effort to accomplish some of our long-range purposes, they may suggest ways by which we can facilitate the creative processes that Mr. McKeon talked about.

Mr. Young: If I follow what you were trying to say, you were thinking of the possibility of presenting verbally or pictorially, or by some dramatic episode, what might happen—let us be concrete—in an atomic war. Is not this a problem of communication, to elicit possible predictive pictures or predictive responses which would pro-

vide a valid basis for judging how people might behave in an actual situation and which might assist in laying down a policy to apply in such a situation?

The question in my mind is the limits of human imagination. I remember talking to an English friend about his experiences in the big blitz in London some few weeks before I went over for the first time. He pointed out the great difficulty of making civilians, who had never experienced this kind of warfare, realize the situation. The city of Leeds, I understand, never had an air raid through the whole war, and even though its people could go to London occasionally and see what happened and continually communicated with relatives, still they could not envisage the actualities of air raids clearly in their own minds.

The question would be: In an actual series of Hiroshimas and Nagasakis, how valid would these pretests prove to be, since such events are so far outside the realm of any ordinary human experience?

Mr. Lasswell: That is a technical question of what procedure you invent as a device to implement that program.

Mr. Young: There are limitations in human personality and human experience which in turn limit human imagination.

Mr. Parsons: It does not follow that it is desirable to get that degree of imaginativeness or vividness for moral purposes.

Mr. Likert: We might predict through knowing what people did under similar circumstances. We don't have to ask the people in Leeds what they would do if they were bombed like Hamburg. We know what they would do; they would flee the city. I would predict now that if any city in the United States were to be hit by an atomic bomb, there would be a demoralization in our urban areas the like of which we have never seen. We know what happened in England, Germany, and Japan; we can predict reasonably well what the people here would do.

Mr. Young: Well, if Likert or others can now predict behavior in an atomic war, there is no point in presenting a series of alternative courses of action in case of war in advance. We should spend our research on something else.

Mr. Likert: It is true that many of our research techniques need further development. But, nevertheless, without asking each person what he is going to do, we can make predictions as to what people will do under certain circumstances, knowing how other people have behaved under such circumstances.

REMEDIES FOR GENERAL ANXIETY

MR. HART: Following up Mr. Bruner's question about the difficulty of developing loyalty to world symbols while people are in a state of anxiety, would it help to relieve anxiety if people were given a better understanding of the dimensions of the real world in which they are living? Would not such an understanding provide more specific references to the world symbols about which loyalties must be organized? It seems to me that anxiety arises in part from general ignorance of the kind of world in which we are living.

MR. LASSWELL: The implications of your formulation, with which I agree, are far-reaching. You are pointing out that one of the sources of anxiety in our society is that so many persons have no framework, no inclusive picture, of what the world around them is and what the future holds.

Certainly we need to explore the effectiveness of various ways of presenting people an inclusive picture of what the world holds for them and of various pictures. It is a commonplace of scholarly analysis that one of the fundamental difficulties of our world is precisely this lack of a comprehensive framework to include the identifications, the expectations, and the demands of people everywhere. One of our basic problems is that of working out ways and means for overcoming that difficulty.

Here in this room there are many persons who with colossal self-restraint have refrained from presenting their own recommendations. There are present persons who have extremely comprehensive pictures which they would like to share with large numbers of people about the development of the world historical process and about the place which each person and group can occupy in it. I am very much in favor of the careful exploration of such alternatives. At the moment I am putting the emphasis, not upon the consistency of these various recommendations with any set of preferences which I might have, but rather upon our need to explore the ways in which a variety of situations can be communicated effectively in comprehensive frames of reference.

MISS MEAD: I would like to go back to the question that Mr. Bruner raised about the development of loyalty in a situation of apprehension. I prefer to use the word "apprehension" and beg the technical question of what "anxiety" is. I merely use English. Isn't it going to matter a good deal whether this world to which loyalty is being developed is seen as something in need of protection or as

something which can protect one if one belongs to it? Because under conditions of apprehension we can work hard for something that is in need of what we can give, but the combination of apprehension and a desire to identify with something larger and sheltering is incompatible.

Mr. Lasswell: That is a very penetrating point and precisely the kind of point that one would want to put in the works for careful pretesting and exploration along the lines which we have indicated. Each one of us from our several backgrounds can formulate several suggestions as to how to proceed. Your example is a very ingenious and relevant one, it seems to me, in outlining a way to proceed with anxious people.

One way to deal with anxious people is to make certain that we present, among the alternatives open to them, something which they can protect, which is smaller than they are, which needs this type of universal support. The difficulty may arise, however, that under these circumstances some persons may subordinate themselves to power rather than themselves playing the protective role. These are issues certain to arise when we get down to the business of putting these words into life.

Mr. Bloch: There is a group of persons who have dabbled constantly with definitions of world loyalty. Those are the servants of the United Nations. They are also the only persons who have given an oath to the United Nations which in a sense constitutes a world loyalty oath.

It occurs to me that world loyalty means a great many different things to different people. Some look at the United Nations as an organization which provides them a job, as a clerk in New York who changes from the National City Bank to the United Nations. Others come to work for the United Nations as a kind of supernational organization.

The loyalty oath is very general because it is a symbol of service to an ideal which is a new *idée* force and lacks the rigidity of frozen traditions. It is an oath not to take instructions from any government or outside authority, and it implies allegiance to the Charter of the United Nations, although the Charter is not mentioned in the oath.

Mr. Bruner: I would like to underline the point that Margaret Mead made concerning the sources of security. The creation of a political institution can do a great deal toward aiding an identification

with world symbols. If we can set up, for example, a world police force or some accord which would insure the outlawing of certain weapons, the possibility of identifying ourselves and our own security with an institution like the United Nations would be much improved. People don't know whether the United Nations is going to pay off in protecting them against a push-button war. If an arms accord could be reached outlawing atomic weapons, I think we would have taken the great step of identifying our security with the security of the world through the United Nations.

MR. PARSONS: Wouldn't that argue more for U.N. control than for a simple agreement to abolish?

MR. BRUNER: Agreement to abolish and control.

MR. PARSONS: The positive side of it is that this is where the power centers rather than that we have agreed to renounce the power.

MR. WRIGHT: You must create conviction that the United Nations is a real power capable of doing something.

CONFLICTS OF LOYALTIES

MR. MORGENTHAU: I found Mr. Bloch's example of the United Nations loyalty oath particularly instructive. Obviously, we all have different kinds of loyalties which are arranged in hierarchical form; we have loyalties to ourselves, loyalties to our families, to our city, to the institution to which we belong, to our country, to humanity, and to God.

Certain persons have a particular loyalty to the United Nations. It seems to me that the place of that loyalty to the United Nations within the hierarchy of loyalties would be tested if a conflict should arise between loyalty to the United Nations and to the individual's own country; that is to say, when loyalty to the United Nations would ask us to perform a certain action which loyalty to our country would forbid us to do, and vice versa. Or, to put it on a general ethical level, we recognize the general, universalistic, humanitarian, religious command, "Thou shalt not kill"; on the other hand, under certain circumstances our own country addresses to us the command, "Thou shalt kill," and the test of which loyalty is the stronger arises only in such a concrete situation.

One cannot speak of world loyalties in the abstract; one can only speak of which loyalty is stronger in a particular situation, the traditional loyalty to one's own country or the loyalty to a higher entity.

MR. LASSWELL: I suggested a distinction useful for dealing with

this sort of problem. One can distinguish attitudes as indexed by certain kinds of communications which people make from attitudes indexed by their deeds. It is quite possible to investigate in concrete situations the structure of an attitude. We can do it by psychoanalytical interviewing; we can do it by brief poll interviewing; or we can use other procedures.

The question is: To what extent are statements that we make about the organization of the self in a given situation valid? Validity means whether or not the method of evaluating and describing what the person communicates permits us to forecast his behavior in a certain range of environmental circumstances. Whenever we ask a question such as, "Do communications addressed to people have any effect on their loyalties and do those loyalties have any effect on their conduct?" we have a set of questions which can be separately and relevantly posed.

Mr. Morgenthau used the word "test" for loyalty in the same sense in which I talked about the effect of an attitude. We are concerned with world loyalties that have effects in stated situations.

OPINIONS AND ATTITUDES

MR. WRIGHT: I think it may be useful to distinguish between attitudes and opinions. By opinions I mean expressions of attitude. The only thing that is communicated is opinions. Attitudes are things that exist in the person's mind.

A little while ago Mr. Likert pointed out that people sometimes express preferences for world loyalty but that in a concrete situation they will not act in accordance with that expressed preference. One way of interpreting that is that the individual intended to express an opinion different from his actual attitude. There is, however, another possible explanation: It may be that the individual's attitude is for world loyalty, and yet, because the expressions of opinion which he hears about him are so generally nationalistic, he is convinced that very few people have world loyalties, and therefore his expectations are that it is hopeless to accomplish anything through world loyalty. Consequently, he speaks and acts nationalistically, perhaps urging preparation for preventive war.

May that not illustrate a situation likely to prevent the world from acting as a society? Many people might express the opinion that effective action through the medium of the United Nations is impossible even though their attitudes favored such action. They

did not express their real attitudes because people generally were expressing bearish opinions about the United Nations. This created bearish expectations, and people often like to express their expectations rather than their preferences to avoid appearing romantic. Thus a project which everyone favored might fail because no one said he favored it. Opinion prevailed over attitudes.

How are we going to assure a communication of opinions which really express the attitudes of world loyalty which may exist? Isn't that the problem we were faced with when we were discussing the distinction between expectations and preferences? Unless people communicate to one another their real preferences, even though they do not expect the preference to be soon realized, then the world public opinion necessary to establish a world society may be lacking even though everyone favors such a society. Effective world loyalty, in other words, is a function of what people say as much as of what they feel or think. Expressions of pessimism or optimism may influence the course of events.

Mr. Lasswell: From a technical point of view this is an everyday sort of problem. If we have access to people, we are in a position to explore what we call their attitudes by the various techniques with which we are familiar. Certainly deception in the ordinary sense of the word, in the sense that a man tries to lie or tries to disguise in various ways his conviction, is quite a common problem and can in a great number of situations be dealt with without distorting the results. If we have in mind the situation in which we cannot get access to a person and have to try to interpret a lot of indirect material as evidences of the attitude, then the problem is exceedingly difficult.

Mr. Wright: That approaches the question I had in mind. It is not what the expert can know about public sentiment but what the public itself knows about it that is important. The average man judges by what people are saying—that is, by public opinion. He assumes that public opinion reflects the prevailing attitudes, but it may not. In so far as polls measure only public opinion, they may suffer this same distortion.

Mr. Lasswell: There are ways to handle the polling material which need lead to no misunderstanding of what is being said. Perhaps the problem that you intend to raise is: What are the ways that people have of interpreting what is given them as polling results or as results of interviews? There, I think, you put your finger upon an extremely important question.

There is sometimes a tendency on the part of people who receive polling materials to regard them as a final expression of opinion which absolves them from exercising their official obligations, responsibilities, and opportunities. Hence, opinion polls are in many cases made use of as devices by which the individual rationalizes his position and brushes off the intellectual problems which are involved in making up his mind on a major policy issue.

One of the problems of response to a flow of polling information is to develop a critical understanding of the limitations of such reports. People must be informed how this material is to be construed. For instance, in some situations involving the Russians it was pointed out to some officials that, almost regardless of what happened over a short period of time, about 15 per cent of the people continued to express themselves as very hostile to the Russians; on the other hand, there was a smaller percentage of persons who were pro-Russian through thick and thin. There were two very contrasting ways in which officials responded to that information. Some said, "Look at the immense preponderance of anti-Russian sentiment." Others said, "This indicates the enormous flexibility of the situation. Only a small proportion of the people are crystallized either anti-Russian or pro-Russian."

I would be glad if the experienced intelligence officers here would comment on this problem of the interpretation of polling results.

Mr. Hart: I subscribe completely to what you have just said so far as the official use of materials is concerned. It goes further back also to the interpretation which is imposed in the handling of the material by the report writer.

I cannot quite agree with Mr. Wright in his distinction between attitude and opinion in this particular context, that a person is necessarily lying when he expresses loyalty to the United Nations but opposition to some indispensable means of achieving a United Nations.

Mr. Wright: Perhaps it would be better to say he is not correctly interpreting his own attitude.

Mr. Hart: His response to a question about the first matter, given all the factors that are present in his situation at the time, may be a perfectly honest response, and the response which he gives in the second situation may also be perfectly honest. Where the error arises is that oftentimes the one who is conducting the study does not have a sufficiently comprehensive view of all the relevant factors

present in the two situations; consequently, he mispresents the results of his study. I think that is a very common thing. Also, the exploration does not always proceed far enough, using some of the other devices that Mr. Lasswell suggested besides sheer dependence upon an answer to a single question in an interview situation. What might appear to me, looking upon just these two answers of a single respondent to two different questions, as a conflict or an inconsistency might not turn out to be an inconsistency or conflict at all if we got at the complete frames of reference in which the two responses were given.

A respondent may not see all the implications of the values that are posed for him in a particular question as I see them, and, consequently, his answer may appear to me to be shortsighted or inconsistent with some other answer that he gives. The most difficult problem of analysis is to discover these subtle, but highly significant, differences in respondents' interpretations of questions.

I think those of us who are dabbling around in this field are painfully aware of the difficulties that we are up against in handling problems of that sort. And I believe the most hopeful effort in the field of polling is now being directed toward the solution of just these problems. Only as the effort succeeds will our reports on the state of opinion cease to be subject to gross misinterpretation by public officials and the general public.

Miss Mead: I think Mr. Lasswell has raised a question of our responsibility to set up as many forms of intelligence as possible that will keep us continually informed on these developments. As the results of this intelligence become part of the policy-making of the country, whether it is communicated privately or communicated through such agencies of public opinion as the great opinion-sampling centers, we ought to recognize that we have a responsibility for what we evoke. We must be concerned not only with the correct interpretation of the particular cluster of answers or opinions that are evoked, but there is even a deeper responsibility.

We found this out during the war once when we were using children's essays as an indicator. We collected a large number of children's essays from a small New York town from the seventh grade to the twelfth grade, and every grade but the eleventh grade gave the answers that were to be expected. The eleventh grade gave a straight *Chicago Tribune* line that was completely incongruous with the tone

of all the other answers in the entire school. The only possible hypothesis we could construct was that the teacher was responsible. The eleventh grade were not all at a special stage of puberty nor could we think that they came from one group of families in the town. We went back and investigated the teacher. The teacher was not on anybody's staff, on the staff of "America First," or a member of any subversive organization or anything of that sort. The teacher was a very aesthetic young man who had given the assignment with a sneer: "More of this nonsense from Washington." That was all; but it was sufficient to evoke quite different answers from the brothers and sisters of children who had been expressing attitudes of an opposite sort and which, if cumulated over the country, might have had an effect on policy-makers in an exactly opposite direction.

So we have at every turn the possibility that, by the techniques which we use in our intelligence search, we may set up situations which will evoke from individuals who are themselves confused and ambivalent one set of opinions themselves directly hostile to the direction in which we are morally committed.

Mr. Wright: That is the point I had in mind. The expression of opinion can be determined by a very slight phenomenon such as you speak of, not by any fundamental attitude; yet such expressions influence public policy more than do fundamental attitudes.

Mr. Hart: But, as Mr. Lasswell pointed out, we all know the ways of avoiding that sort of thing. In a program such as he suggested here I don't see that the distinction is particularly relevant.

Mr. Wright: Opinion polls are designed to show public opinion. In a time of crisis everybody is supposed to express a certain opinion. In time of war, for instance, everybody is supposed to be patriotic, and so our opinion polls would show predominantly patriotic opinions; but isn't it likely that there continue to be a great variety of attitudes. Public opinion is one thing, and the polls, if properly conducted, show what it is. But private attitudes are another thing and have to be detected by a different method. It is, of course, important to know both.

Mr. Hart: I think there is no doubt about that; however, in a rounded program of this sort where we are not just checking verbal responses to a single question or a single battery of questions administered in a single interview but are using these in conjunction with other means of getting at attitudes, we are pretty well protected against misleading research reports.

MEASUREMENT OF ATTITUDES

MR. LIKERT: There are two comments that I would like to make. One is in connection with what Mr. Lasswell was saying about the responsibility of the administrator in a society where the administrator has some sense of responsibility to the public, whether it is a democracy or some other form of government. I think it is extremely important not only that the administrator have a clear understanding of his alternatives in a given situation but that the person who does the research is equally aware of all dimensions of the problem. Many times the administrator does not see the problem in dimensions on which research can be done, and the scientist has to restate and reorient the problem somewhat. That is a very important part of the process of doing research and obtaining intelligence. After the research is completed, the results should be presented to the administrator so as to make clear to him the real desires of the people in relation to the alternative courses of action that he faces.

One point of great confusion concerns the use of public opinion polls in connection with legislative action. In the discussions of the use of polls as guides to democratic action, the point of view is often expressed that the Congress or an administrator should follow the course of action preferred by a majority in the poll. This point of view may be varied when the public has enough information to make a choice. Often, on complex problems, the great majority of people do not have important technical information concerning each of the possible courses of action. Under such circumstances the real purpose of a poll should be to find the general policy that people prefer and the general objectives they have with regard to the problem. Such information can and should be an important guide to the legislative body or administrator in helping select the course of action which genuinely expresses the real wishes of the people. It is most unfortunate that at times some of our current polls fail to differentiate between questions on policy and questions on specific courses of action.

It is essential that our legislators and administrators clearly recognize that they should be guided by the desires of people as revealed by polls on policy questions. They should be equally clear in realizing that polling results on specific courses of action, especially where technical matters are involved, are usually erroneous and misleading. Our legislators and administrators should recognize that they are responsible for making decisions not only because they often

have far more information than the public but also, as Mr. Lasswell mentioned, because they have the necessary latitude.

Nothing that I have said means that information should be kept from the public. Quite the contrary! I mean merely that the public generally cannot be kept fully informed on all details of all the problems of our society.

The second point concerns Mr. Wright's comment. Obviously, polling results at times are in error. There are sixty-four different polling agencies today in Japan. They are springing up like mushrooms. The same thing is true in the United States. There are a number of these agencies, consequently, that are being run by inexperienced and untrained personnel. They are likely, under the circumstances, to issue results that are not accurate.

It is possible, however, to measure people's true attitudes even in areas where there is pressure on them to conceal the truth. For example, we were able to measure membership in the Nazi party in Germany.[1] We have measured also the fear of nonredemption of war bonds in the United States.[2] We could not ask a person, "Do you believe the United States Treasury is not going to redeem bonds?" Such a question would yield only inaccurate results, but we can measure the fear of nonredemption by asking people a series of questions. We asked them such questions as where they bought bonds, why they bought them, what they thought of the bonds, what they planned to do with the money they had invested in bonds, and when they planned to do this. Our interviewers recorded practically verbatim the answers to these and the other questions in the interview. When the data from these questions were analyzed, we found that some people would mention that they did not believe that the bonds would be redeemed, or that the bonds would be redeemed only after a moratorium, or that the bonds would be redeemed with inflated dollars or some similar answer, indicating some fear of partial or nonredemption. We found that the percentage of persons who indicated such fear of nonredemption, directly or indirectly, increased from about 11 per cent to something over 35 per cent and then fell rapidly after V-J Day.

1. Helen Peak, "Observations on the Characteristics and Distribution of German Nazis," *Psychological Monographs*, Vol. LIX, No. 6 (1945); *Morale Division Report on Germany*, Vol. I: *United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1946–47* (Washington, D.C., 1947).

2. See forthcoming book by Dorwin Cartwright on research for the Treasury Department by the Division of Program Surveys, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture.

It is important to recognize that attitudes are of an emotional rather than of an intellectual character. Our different attitudes develop from the various experiences that each of us has and from the attitudinal and cultural atmosphere in which we live. Because attitudes are not intellectual, the attitudes held by a particular individual are often illogical and inconsistent. This should not be disturbing. Our only concern should be to measure attitudes accurately, which is possible with existing methods, and to obtain as much data as possible on the sources of these attitudes.

MR. BRUNER: I would like to amplify Dr. Likert's last point on consistency in opinion. Here, frankly, is one place where opinion research has not yet grown up. There is consistency or congruence when we get down to a person's deepest attitudes or values. There is a common emotional core of past experience brought to bear on each new experience. Much that seems to be frivolous about opinion results comes from the fact that we have not sufficiently developed psychological techniques in getting at these deeper layers of attitude.

It must be remembered, moreover, that opinion is always related to the various situations in which a person finds himself. Mr. Lasswell mentioned, for example, that the situation will always be an extremely important determinant of what a person says about some issue. We still don't know too much about that. For example, we can say right now that people by and large are in favor of the United Nations; yet where we are confronted by a conflict, where chips are on the table in a showdown fight as to whether we can carry out the Greco-Turkish program, we still are not able to state what attitudes that situation would evoke. On those two levels the deeper, more penetrating analysis is necessary, and those in research will have to admit that that is where we are still in our infancy. That is the direction in which intelligence will have to go in the future.

PRETESTING ATTITUDES AND GOVERNMENT PROCEDURES

MR. HARDIN: I get the impression from Mr. Lasswell's paper that it is thought possible to shape human experience so that a certain set of expectations will emerge or a certain set of values will be predominant and that there can be institutional changes made so that the persons with the proper responses will be in positions of authority. He writes: "The generals and the admirals; chief executives, civilian administrators, and judges; key figures in business in every line of profit-seeking; key figures in labor, agriculture, and the professions;

owners, regulators, editors, and contributors to the mass media of communication; the decisive figures in academic, ecclesiastical, and artistic life—all these, and every influential individual besides, need to be chosen from among the personalities who respect themselves enough to respect others, who are relatively free of personality disorder, and who are loyal to the cause of humanity." Then the next paragraph begins: "To a certain extent this requires the *modifying of policy-forming and policy-executing routines.*"

The question I have is: What do we have in the way of concrete proposals to change the policy-forming and executing routines in order to police the selection of leading personnel in influential positions in the country?

The second question more or less grows out of that. I may be reading too much into the argument, but I am wondering if it is thought possible scientifically to inculcate personality structures of the sort which will give mass responses of a predictable nature so that we can get away from the kind of check that many political scientists have thought necessary, namely, party government. That is to say, that no one government can be allowed to perpetuate itself without the chastening criticism of an alternative party.

MR. LASSWELL: Yes, I see the pertinence of those two points, and they interest me immensely from the standpoint of inventing new routines which will increase our efficiency in getting what we are aiming at.

As to what are the alternatives of improving our institutional policy of personnel selecting, it seems to me that there are a number of potentialities in our present civilization which have not been wholly exploited from this point of view. With respect to choice of personnel, it is still difficult as a matter of administrative convenience to have prospective personnel examined by the extremely promising projective tests which are now at hand. We do not have in New York City, we do not have in other significant places at the present time, easy access to highly competent persons who are able to make the type of report that these procedures are capable of rendering possible.

I might mention the interesting experiments which have been going forward in selecting personnel in the Dutch Army and in the British Foreign Service.

I am suggesting that we have the great task of inventing, selecting, adapting, extending, and continually auditing the impact of these procedures. On the perfecting not only of selection but of other in-

stitutional practices, we have many possibilities. Several of the rules of evidence in the United States courts seem to have very adverse effects upon what is brought to the attention of the jury. It is possible to explore such impacts. It is possible to explore institutional practices throughout our entire governmental structure, our business structure, our ecclesiastical structure, and so on through the list. There are numerous new procedures which can be invented and tested for the conduct of discussion.

Margaret Mead and I have been experimenting with a number of devices in discussion—introducing so-called "clarifiers"—and Miss Mead has explored a great variety of situations to find out under what conditions we get ascertainable kinds of audience participation. We are just on the very brink of systematically investigating these possibilities.

With respect to the present state of scientific knowledge on how we can inculcate, as you put it, or develop personality structures, I would say that we have a great many hypotheses which are better than plausible guesses. And the kind of procedures that we are talking about can carry us beyond where we are now. I am not among those who feel that our present knowledge is very far advanced, but I am among those who are concerned that it is farther advanced now than it was fifty years ago and especially that we do know how to find out a lot of things that we need to know by the use of recently devised procedures.

With respect to the problem of integrating various procedures of personnel selection and the rest with a variety of institutional systems, all sorts of creative exploration is called for. I could specify in some detail just how I think it would be possible to increase the readiness of people in our culture to receive a good deal of information about the destructive tendencies of various personalities whom they were considering for appointment or election. I am reasonably confident in forecasting the following: If we have freedom of maneuver in our future institutions, we will integrate with our officially recognized governmental routines the use of polling procedures.

There is no time to spell out in great detail a number of recommendations which I have, and I am not sure that this would be the place to evaluate them. I will only point out that new potentialities for the rational assessment and revaluation of our routines of decision making are upon us.

Miss Mead: I think a great many people feel very strongly that

choice and selection of persons is manipulative to a degree that is incongruent with democracy and is much more congruent with governments that rely on more coercive authority. There are, however, other ways of selecting persons in a policy-making division than the testing of individuals. One of Mr. Lasswell's former students has recently devised a constitution for an occupation in which there are four or five suboccupational groups. He has very carefully arranged to put in a strategical position the suboccupational group with the character structure and background best calculated to advance the whole occupation in a good direction as he sees it. That is not a choice of individuals but is a choice of classes of individuals. It is a creation of a situation which is itself self-selective and evokes a sort of personality instead of sticking individuals down like butterflies with pins. I think that some people might be inclined to reject a good part of this program if they felt it included too definitely either the rejection or the selection of individuals in psychiatric or personality terms.

MR. HARDIN: I assumed that Mr. Lasswell's remarks covered that. If I had not thought so, I would have raised a further question.

MR. LASSWELL: I am glad we have had that explicit formulation.

WORLD LOYALTY AND PEACE

MR. POTTER: I take it that it is well realized that people who make the declaration of loyalty to the United Nations, to which Mr. Bloch referred, are not necessarily expressing world loyalty. I suppose it is fairly well known that people who took this declaration of loyalty to the League of Nations did so with the most diverse reservations. Some of them took it very seriously and were worried about it, and some of them were very cynical about it.

MR. WRIGHT: You might say the declaration is an opinion favorable to world loyalty but not in all cases an adequate expression of attitude.

MR. ANGELL: I think that world loyalty is a means to an end and not the end itself. The end itself, presumably, is peace. I wonder whether Mr. Lasswell feels that his discussion of world loyalty and the very elaborate means he has for testing and examining it covers adequately Mr. Boulding's point. Suppose we don't get a direct world loyalty but do get an increased sense of world responsibility in national terms, as Mr. Boulding suggested. Would your procedure discover that if it should occur?

MR. LASSWELL: If the problem were to investigate the degree to

which national loyalties are becoming harmonized with world loyalty, this would certainly be revealed by the type of procedure we have been discussing.

With respect to the question as to whether one looks upon world loyalty as a means or an end, my personal view of the matter is that I would include world loyalty among my ends, but I would regard it also as having instrumental significance.

MR. WRIGHT: I wonder whether Mr. Boulding's phrasing of national loyalty recognizing a world responsibility is not really only another way of expressing what Mr. Lasswell has called *world* loyalty. Is there any difference in substance between the two?

MR. BOULDING: I think they are both criteria for judging what is good or bad in political policy. I confess that I am still not quite sure what loyalty is.

PRETESTING ATTITUDES AND PROPAGANDA

MR. HART: Mr. Lasswell, in this very provocative plan for an ambitious research program, you evidently have in mind some combination of contemplative and manipulative approaches. The manipulative part of it is clear in as far as it involves the use by government officials or people in responsible positions of systematic information about public opinion as it is accumulated. However, I infer that you have in mind also some sort of propagandist approach as the research goes along, by means of which you can present to people certain values that you wish to examine.

MR. LASSWELL: My forecast would be that, if we were to engage in such an enterprise, we would be attempting to move toward the realization of our defined objective and that many of the manipulations that we would clarify to different policy people would be propagandistic—that is, they would be advice on propaganda strategy. Certainly it would be assumed that people would constantly draw from the data, and I am sure that we, in performing our total function in society, would engage in various manipulative operations. I have taken that for granted.

MR. HART: Would you present these value judgments as part of the research itself to test out people's reaction to them and to gauge their relative effectiveness? If we are operating privately, how are we going to accomplish that?

MR. YOUNG: It seems to be implied in Mr. Lasswell's paper that we would be doing something of that sort.

MR. LASSWELL: It seems to me clear that certain types of problems are amenable to pretesting which goes along concurrently with the program that I have underlined. There are certain other problems of total control that I feel are only indirectly amenable to pretesting, but that is a technical problem.

MR. HART: I suppose it is the latter that I am thinking about and am worried about mainly.

THE IDEOLOGY OF WORLD LOYALTY

MR. MCKEON: The analysis of communication contacts and loyalties which we have followed thus far has turned largely on institutional processes. As a result we have alternately emphasized "political formula" and collapsed the discussion of "political doctrine" and "political formula" into a single problem. It would be too bad to fail to distinguish doctrinal content and form of presentation, particularly since one of the great powers of Mr. Lasswell's analysis lies in the possibility of separating political doctrine from such formulas as we have considered. The peculiar character of the anxiety in which we find ourselves at present, the anxiety that permeates this room, arises from problems of political doctrine. But anxiety has become a fundamental concept in modern philosophies, and we have become anxious about the formulation of our anxieties.

When I returned to Paris last year, among the philosophers whose acquaintance I renewed or whom I met for the first time were those who have developed the widely popular doctrine of existentialism. The existentialists were particularly eager to learn about the philosophic situation in the United States, with an eye to the possible reception of existentialism there. They were convinced, however, that existentialism had little chance of being acceptable to Americans because the basic concept of the existentialist philosophy is anxiety, and Americans had not gone through experiences that would lead them to a full and proper sense of anxiety. I realize now that my answer to their inquiries was frivolous. I said that, in view of the intricacies of existentialism and in view of the ambivalence of most philosophical processes, it seemed to me probable that existentialism would get a start in the United States, and the process would end with anxiety instead of beginning with it. After this evening I feel that I should offer them the reassurance that Americans are quite as anxious as Europeans.

The quality of the anxiety which has come up in our discussion is,

however, quite different from the anxiety of phenomenologists. Mr. Lasswell's statement of the problem consisted in his anticipation of the clash to which he saw two opposing ideologies moving down the line of the future. Either ideology would involve a kind of world loyalty, and each is based upon a kind of philosophy. Whether the victory goes to "mass democracy" or to "parliamentary democracy" in such a struggle, a kind of world loyalty will accompany the victory. But our meeting is devoted to the analysis of means by which a world community might be established without violence and without the suppression of any legitimate cultural or political ideal. This is not a problem that can be treated adequately in terms of political ideology and formula, nor is it solved intelligently by waiting for the triumph of one of the opposed unanalyzed philosophies. I had the impression that it was some such conviction that led Mr. Boulding last night to object to "democracy" and call for something like "responsibility." We are talking about a world organization in which a diversity of cultures is to be preserved. A diversity of cultures need not mean a diversity of ideologies, but what we lack today is the kind of political inventiveness that might lead to the kind of political structure suited to resolve and remove what is essentially a false struggle.

That kind of inventiveness has been displayed only intermittently in political thought in recent years. There were signs of it in the declaration of human rights in the Atlantic Charter. The Commission on Human Rights of the Economic and Social Council is concerned with the same fundamental inquiry into human dignity and freedom, but it is faced by political difficulties in the way of coming to agreement. UNESCO is likewise embarked on the enterprise of using educational, scientific, and cultural means in the solution of political problems. The charter of UNESCO is a beautifully expressed statement of purpose, as vague as other charters, but full of insights into what, following Mr. Wirth's distinction, constitutes a world society rather than a mere community.

Behind the distinctions which I am trying to state is a recollection of Hamilton's statement, in the ninth Federalist paper, that it was only by virtue of the vast advances recently made in the science of politics that the federation which he advocated was possible. In the hundred and fifty years since Hamilton wrote, the science of politics has not provided means for a like solution of the problem of world organization. Therefore, I want to emphasize, once more, the

political character of the problem of world community. We shall not solve that problem by more studies concerning how people do live or concerning how they react or concerning the relation of what they say to world loyalty. What are needed are analytical devices and political institutions to develop behind conflicting political ideologies some conception of what that world loyalty would consist in and how it would preserve and integrate a diversity of attitudes.

Mr. Lasswell: I find myself in entire agreement with Mr. McKeon's emphasis upon the importance of exercising the creative function in the development of doctrine. It happens that our discussion has not turned on evaluations of doctrine. One of the things which I had in mind in making a certain reference this evening was that there are present here persons who have committed themselves to formulations of doctrine that I feel could profitably be evaluated. Were this group meeting and continuing its functions, I would hope that it would be possible to give careful, consecutive consideration to the doctrinal inventions which have been proposed. I should hope, too, that the procedures which we have been discussing would stimulate and constantly call for this continuing process of creation, which involves the discovery and exploration and spreading of doctrinal integrations.

I deliberately defined world loyalty in such a way that several world loyalties may be included; hence, one of the problems of clarification which is involved is that of making explicit which world loyalty, or which world loyalty integrated with which demands and expectations, and supporting which institutional practices, we would indorse. That was done deliberately in order to avoid settling "by definition" the question of which ideologies, among those which purport to foster world loyalty, do in fact do so.

The method of treatment which I adopted excluded or postponed or de-emphasized certain issues. It was done partly with long-range objectives in mind and partly as a self-denying ordinance for our discussion this evening.

WORLD INSTITUTIONS

By PITMAN B. POTTER*

IN WHAT follows various things said in the tentative outline distributed by the committee which prepared our program will be repeated, other things will be echoed, and still others will be disputed. Specific mention of these various items will not be made in every case, although it is hoped that it will be readily possible to identify the various points.

The term "institution" might be employed, in any discussion of world institutions such as that in which we are engaged, in a very abstract manner, to refer to such concepts as national sovereignty, the balance of power, or the like, just as we speak of the institution of private property in another context. But, although such a manner of speaking would not be without interest and significance, we shall employ the term in a more concrete sense, namely, to refer to entities such as unions of states or international legislative or administrative agencies. Our problem—the existence and significance of world institutions—will not be made easier of treatment thereby, but that is a secondary consideration.

Similarly the term "world" might be employed to mean merely in the world or of the world rather than definitely covering the whole world; in the former sense the Olympic Games might be regarded as a spectacular world institution, without inquiring whether all the countries of the world participate or not. This will raise the familiar issue of regionalism against universalism[1] and minor issues such as that of world-wide but spotty distribution. In general, we shall consider that, in order to be truly a world institution, an institution should cover the whole world and not leave any important vacant spots. This may seem a rather mechanical or literal interpretation, but the term "world" is one of the few words upon whose precision we can count in this discussion! Again such an interpretation may make our problem more rather than less difficult.

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1. On the problem in general see article by present writer, "Universalism versus Regionalism in International Organization," *American Political Science Review*, XXXVII, No. 5 (October, 1943), 850, and bibliography in n. 1.

If, on the other hand, we speak merely of institutions of the world community, we relax our standards somewhat. If there exists a world community, that community might, obviously, possess agencies not world-wide either in membership or in field of operation, except for the ultimate authorization of the agency and the indirect effects of its activity. Any regional international organization, such as the Pan American Union or the Arab League, would satisfy this concept. Such organizations would hardly seem to justify the label of "world institutions." On the other hand, if an institution which is world-wide in membership carries on its activity only in one location—such as the international union for Arctic exploration—we should probably still regard this as a "world institution."

On the other hand, reversing the analysis, we should contrast the concept of an international organization with that of a world institution. There is no logical reason why the world or the world community should not be organized according to the federal (international) form, although those who advocate world organization and world government today seem clearly to lean, either knowingly or unknowingly, toward unitary rather than federal organization, often miscalling that which they demand "federal union."[2] We must bear in mind all the possible relations between international organization and the world community.

We shall not pause here to discuss the nature of this latter basic concept or the existence of a world society, but we shall assume that it does involve a certain—rather, an uncertain—degree or amount of objective unification, on the one hand, and a similar amount of subjective unity, on the other, and that, so defined, a world social community does exist to some degree. The sociologists and the psychologists have helped us to understand some of the problems involved here, but for the purposes of our discussion we merely assume a positive state of affairs. Our viewpoint is the political—that of the building and operation of the state, including policies and procedures as well as structural organization. On the other hand, we shall not bestow any attention upon government in local states or substate groups, in spite of the significance for the world problem of the proper functioning of those systems and their proper adjustment to international institutions and practices outside.[3]

2. Emery Reves, *Anatomy of Peace* (New York, 1945); Clarence K. Streit, *Union Now* (New York, 1939).

3. Walter H. C. Laves, "The United Nations: Reorganizing the World's Governmental Institutions," *Public Administration Review*, V (1945), 183.

There exists in some quarters a strong disposition to criticize any emphasis upon political institutions as such. The functionalists demand attention instead for functions and procedure and stigmatize political structure as lifeless and mechanical. One widely read commentator has said that it is on the objectives of the United Nations that we must keep our attention fixed, not on the machinery and technique of that institution. This reaction away from any study of international organization can go very far.

The reply appropriate seems quite obvious. International institutions constitute the most substantial and stable element in the field. They embody concretely the purposes and behavior of the nations, which regard the establishment of an institution to conduct their common business as the most significant step which they can take because it involves them unequivocally with one another as no other step could. They—such institutions—also, far from being lifeless, are composed of living human beings who are animated by all sorts of ideas and feelings and who translate cold fact and abstract principle into concrete current action. They also involve, along with their structure, characteristic procedures and techniques. Properly treated, these institutions provide the most fruitful aspect of the international problem upon which to hang the study thereof.

In spite of this criticism leveled at the institutional approach, and the warning that we cannot solve the international problem by machinery alone, it is, as the tentative outline suggests, precisely by the creation of new institutions that the most serious attempts are being made today to attack that problem. In particular the problem of peace and security is being attacked by a program of voluntary cooperative police action. This is not world government in the proper sense, or the simplest sense, because there are gaps in the scope of the system, both as to states participating and as to areas of operation (in the sense mentioned). In addition, because the system is not organized on the basis of the people of the world as such, in a single mass, but on the basis of those people organized in states ("we the Peoples of the United Nations"), it is still international organization rather than world organization, or at least it is world organization in an indirect (federal) form. It is, on the other hand, "government" in that it tries to apply coercion in appropriate ways and degrees.[4]

It should be recalled, however, that the international problem, or the world problem, consists not only of the question of peace and se-

4. United Nations Charter, Art. 42.

curity. There are almost unlimited problems of health, nutrition and housing, morals, communications, and all sorts of both material and spiritual (in the most general sense) welfare to be solved. These problems may be subordinate to that of peace and security in an immediate sense, but they are the most important of all in the long run, and their treatment absolutely cannot be postponed until the war problem is solved. And it is precisely in connection with these matters that the institutional development in the international field has been greatest both in point of total volume and also as to internal development—namely, in complexity and degree of perfection.[5]

At this point there arises the contention that effective political institutions cannot be established until the social community has evolved rather completely. Things are said which resemble some of the curious utterances on political problems recently emanating from some atomic scientists, or the dangerous—even absurd—ellipsis that wars begin in the minds of men. It is, of course, perfectly clear that some degree of social unity is necessary before political institutions can function at all, for those institutions express that unity and afford facilities for its functioning—whether the function be education or maintenance of order. On the other hand, it is very shallow or myopic social science not to observe that such institutions in turn contribute to developing social solidarity further. The interaction observable here is so elaborate and rich that disregard of the second aspect of the situation is at least as erroneous as would be disregard by the lawyer or political scientist of the importance of social support at the base of the structure. The United States, in its history from 1789 to 1865 or even down to our own day, is probably the most striking example in the history of the world (except, perhaps, for Switzerland) of the tremendous contribution which political organization can make to building a social unity which did not exist before or existed only in one or two sharp and strong common purposes, namely, demands for order and prosperity, the basic demands in any such situation. And it will be noted that these cases are precisely cases of federal union, the form most germane to world organization. Political scientists and lawyers should avoid inflated notions of what state organization and procedure can accomplish without social support and should remember certain glaring illustrations of the seriousness of this deficiency, such as the noble experiments of the League

5. Chapter VIII A of forthcoming fifth edition of author's *Introduction to the Study of International Organization* (New York, 1948).

of Nations at Geneva and of prohibition in the United States. Sociologists on their part should not become too reactionary on this point and trap themselves into the solecism of saying in effect that political institutions are bound to be ineffective until the point is reached at which they will no longer be needed. To do so is to adopt precisely the most barren and unsociological interpretation of political institutions possible and to forget entirely their dynamic and creative role.[6]

International institutions of the creative type have appeared in the international sphere in large numbers since 1875.[7] Many examples of international institutions for the settlement of disputes (arbitral courts, boundary commissions) can be traced back through thousands of years into antiquity. Numerous examples of the creative type of institution (consular and diplomatic agents, treaty-making, conferences) are to be found in fragmentary or at least rather tenuous form all through ancient and medieval times also. Some expansion and intensification of these institutions occurred from the time of the Renaissance onward (in the field of consular service from before A.D. 1100), but these scattered institutions were never effectively tied together in anything like a world organization or world constitution. It was in the second half of the nineteenth century that the major developments in this direction took place, namely, the holding of conferences in series in time of peace and the establishment and operation of permanent multipartite international administrative agencies (isolated cases occurred in 1792, 1804, 1856, etc.), the former development being closely linked with the latter. Finally, the concept or program of collective security, introduced on the practical plane by the Concert of Europe, was pushed forward to a considerable degree under the League of Nations. It was also around the beginning of the twentieth century that the conception of a general international organization underneath or above the special institutions made its appearance. Until this time it can hardly be said that any general pattern of world organization was developed except in the minds of certain poets and philosophers. All this went on con-

6. It might even be suggested that if any governments or statesmen or politicians are willing to undertake the risk of trying to create an international institution, there must exist some considerable demand for it. It may be recalled that many schemes of international organization have been put forward in history which have been allowed to wither away in absence of such basis (see Edith Wynner and Georgia Lloyd, *Searchlight on Peace Plans* [New York, 1944], pp. 31–81).

7. See *Introduction to the Study of International Organization*, chap. xi, for brief history of international institutions, with bibliography.

tinuously and increasingly in spite of many temporary and partial interruptions by limited or general wars throughout modern history.[8]

Along with these institutional developments on the official plane went a somewhat similar development of private institutions overlapping national boundaries, such as the Institute of International Law and the International Chamber of Commerce.[9] In one sense these private institutions probably correspond even more closely than do intergovernmental institutions to the sociologists' conception of vital and significant international or world institutions, but they do not possess such authority or power of coercion, or, it must be said, even such effectiveness on the purely voluntary level as would command our respect in comparison with the intergovernmental agencies. At the same time they often precipitate the establishment of the latter, they morally support and practically co-operate with the official agencies, and they accomplish important results in spite of their deficiencies in such manner as to deserve more attention than legalistic purists or strongly state-minded political scientists admit.

The newly developing institutions of international legislation and administration had a pronounced effect, of course, on international relations, international ideas, and international behavior. Material relations among the nations were modified by the promotion of trade and travel and health work, cultural appreciation in international terms was extended, and the responses and loyalties of individuals were stimulated and extended as never before. Although the development of a world community is obviously far from complete, and in certain areas and social groups hardly begun as yet, it also seems true that such a process is immeasurably further advanced today than it was a short century ago, and this not only as a result of basic human appetites and mechanical inventions but also as a result of the services of the international political institutions cited.

Today this development centers mainly in and around the United Nations, succeeding the League of Nations, although many independent international administrative agencies still exist, not to mention the whole general Pan-American system and its many subordinate agencies.[10] The situation is not greatly changed from what it

8. For a picture of the accumulated results of these developments see *Handbook of International Organizations*, published by the League of Nations, 1938 edition.

9. Lyman C. White, *The Structure of Private International Organizations* (Philadelphia, 1933).

10. For the Pan-American system and affiliated agencies see Ruth D. Masters, *Handbook of International Organizations in the Americas* (Washington, 1945). A similar volume for the world is now in preparation by Dr. Masters.

was in 1939, except for limited but perceptible increases of authority and possible power for the United Nations (increased majority voting, increased potential power of enforcement) and great promise of co-ordination of special international institutions with the general system. Increased status for the private individual or group, alongside the sovereign state, as a participant in world organization, might also be added.[11] The nations have in fact subordinated themselves to the international institutions further than ever before by accepting more advanced provisions for international regulation and decision, and this in spite of the flaunting of the idea of national sovereignty in the United Nations Charter[12]—while flouting it in fact at various points—and the somewhat exaggerated talk about the Great Power veto. Viewed with as much detachment as one can muster—especially one who deeply believes in the social value of these developments—the wave of international institutional organization which has rolled in upon the world in the past few years exceeds anything of the kind in any like period of history. It can hardly be true that this tidal wave is the artificial creation of dreamers or intellectuals and does not correspond to a vital social unity in the international world underneath.

There might exist some differences of opinion concerning the advisability of developing further, or even attempting to develop, international co-operation and control in certain fields, such as migration, trade, education, or defense. Actually beginnings have already been made in the direction of international action even in these fields.[13] In the United Nations the Economic and Social Council, the Security Council, and the General Assembly are all reaching out into phases of national life relatively untouched by international regulation hitherto. That is to say, the states members of the United Nations, or rather the governments of these states, or rather the peoples supporting those governments, are, for the moment at least, demanding developments in international institutional organization and activity which imply either the existence of the strong beginnings of an international or world community or a surprising expansion in the absence of such community. It is not believed that the developments cited are entirely artificial or unreal.

11. Clyde Eagleton, "The Individual and International Law," *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law* (1946), p. 22.

12. Art. 2 (1).

13. Arts. 1 (1), 11, 15, and others, of the United Nations Charter; constitution of UNESCO; and proposed constitutions of IRO and ITO (see *Basic Facts about the United Nations* [Lake Success: United Nations, 1947]).

It might be objected, perhaps, that the relations among the nations today, and in particular among the Great Powers, especially between the United States and Soviet Russia, are such that any experimentation, not to say trifling, with organized international cooperation and control is bound to be futile and even dangerous. Such experimentation, it may be said, is calculated to play into the hands of states seeking to exploit the technique of power politics for selfish ends or at the very least, in view of the hopelessness of the world situation, to create illusions of peace and security, as is alleged was done in the preceding period by the League of Nations. Any illusions must be guarded against, of course, and, if the situation is as bad as it is described, there should be no difficulty about that. On the other hand, it is impossible to assume in advance, in the face of the record, that all matters are going to be handled always and entirely by the methods of power politics. The best hope in this connection seems clearly to lie in the direction of involving the powers in as much organized international procedure as possible, with a view to subduing their impulses and controlling their actions. This may be the most important aspect of international institutional development today. We cannot be sure of the result, but we can at least undertake the experiment with some prospect of success.

DISCUSSION OF WORLD INSTITUTIONS

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

MR. POTTER: Our job this morning, I take it, is to descend from the "sublime" to the "meticulous" and to try to work out some of the details of matters that we have been talking about in the last day or so.

It may seem something like an anticlimax to turn to the organization and operation of international institutions after discussing philosophical principles of loyalty, social unity, and so on. But there are two obvious answers to any such feeling: unless our consideration of the other problems enable us to get along to concrete results, they may not be of great value in saving the world from catastrophe, ourselves included; and, more important from my point of view, it may very well be that the solution of some of those more fundamental problems can be sought with greater success along the line of institutional development than along the line of pure speculation.

I shall not spend much time on the definition of an "institution." I am talking about concrete institutions, such as international unions or their organs; not about such things as "national sovereignty" or the "balance of power," which are institutions in a more abstract sense. By a "world institution" or an "international institution," I refer to the Pan American Union, the International Labour Organization, the International Bureau of Weights and Measures, or something else of that order.

Second, there is a really serious problem involved in the interplay between the terms "world" and "international." Some people, by the use of the term "world," mean to indicate a preference for something more unitary or more unified than international federal institutions. That is a practical problem today.

There exists some reluctance in certain quarters to spend much time on these international institutions at all. The "functionalists" feel that international activity, co-operation, and agreement on objectives are the dominant considerations and are somewhat impatient with discussion of machinery and procedure of international co-operation. This is a reflection in the international sphere of a similar divergence of view in dealing with government in the national sphere,

where the functionalists are inclined to argue that machinery of government is lifeless, mere bones, and mechanics, deserving little attention. One commentator has argued that we ought to keep our eyes resolutely fixed on the objectives of the United Nations and stop talking about its organization and procedure.

The answer is obvious. These institutions are not by any means lifeless; they are made up of people who are animated by motives, personal and national; they are the agencies which translate the purposes and functions of the United Nations into actual life. And, besides, in dealing with these institutions, we should not disregard the way in which they operate, the functions which they try to perform, and the degree in which they succeed.

We ought to remember also that international institutions are not to be thought of solely in terms of the problem which is preoccupying most of us these days, namely, peace and security. Obviously, we are all of us worried about the state of the universe and about the possibility of recurrent world war. On the other hand, it is not accurate to think of international institutions solely in terms of the problem of peace and security. There are many other jobs to be done in the world, some of which contribute to the attainment of peace and security, but many jobs which are related to that only very indirectly. I should argue that it would be a very unfortunate conception of the international problem to restrict our thought to the peace problem. Problems of communications such as we were discussing yesterday have some value in themselves apart from their contribution to the maintenance of peace. The same is true of international health, of international trade, of administering international prosperity.

From the way in which the problem was formulated in the outline there arises the main problem, "the contention that effective political institutions cannot be established until the social community has evolved rather completely."

Perhaps I oversimplify the problem, but it seems to me that the answer is fairly obvious. It is certain that no international institution can be established, or, more important, can operate effectively unless a certain minimum degree of social unity already exists. I would be inclined to put that necessary minimum quite low.

We do have in the international sphere, and in the national sphere, too, for that matter, examples of interstate institutions established on the basis of little more than a mutual desire to get a certain job of common interest to the participants done, the participants disagree-

ing on almost everything else. That is a minimal type of international institution. The more social unity exists beforehand, the more elaborate and effective an institution can be created.

But there is another consideration, namely, that these institutions in turn contribute to the development of social unity. To overlook that fact, to say that political organization is always the end and never the beginning of social unification, and to imply that institutional organization and activity of the type we are talking about do not contribute to the further development of social unity is, it seems to me, to fly in the face of facts. I should think it would be just as bad an error to underrate the services which political institutions can render to social unity as it would be to fancy that setting up a state or government, or enacting a law, is enough to accomplish whatever one has in mind.

I should not for one moment confine my study of international institutions to the purely and completely official institutions. International institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce, W.F.T.U., and so on, differ from the official institutions. To some extent they are on a lower level with reference to their capacity to get things done, but they often lead to the creation of official institutions, and they co-operate with the official institutions. I regard the point of view of the lawyer or jurist who would throw these private institutions out of consideration because they are not official or intergovernmental as bad sociology though it may be good law. It stems perhaps more from irritation with the private organizations on the part of some of the people who take that position than it does from straight logic.

The international institutions, public and private, created in the latter part of the nineteenth century contributed much, in my opinion, to the development of international or world solidarity and to the establishment of more general institutions in the twentieth century.

Mr. Morgenthau uttered a caution with respect to the development of international communications because of the fact that power politics was the dominating element in the current international situation and that, by developing international communications, we might further that conflict or give one party to that conflict a means of making good its pretensions or its ambitions. The same argument might be made in connection with international institutions. I have heard it made. Ultra-left critics—I don't mean Communists but

ultraliberal critics—of the old League of Nations used to argue that it simply strengthened the Great Powers in their domination of the international scene. It might be argued that the United Nations and some other international institutions play into the hands of the states engaged in power politics.

I suggest that we think carefully about this aspect of the matter. We are surely not saying that all states at all times in their dealings with all matters in relation to all other states play power politics. There is a great deal of international activity carried on which escapes from the game of power politics. I would argue that it would be folly to concentrate our attention so narrowly on the problem of politics, power, and peace that we disregard all the other jobs to be done in the international field. Much international co-operation, I am perfectly certain from simply looking at the record, is carried on without much play of power politics. Furthermore, it is barely possible that these international institutions provide a device for cutting into, restraining, toning down, or taming the play of power politics.

I wonder, for example, whether the involvement of certain powers in the United Nations' procedure in the last year or two has not to some extent inhibited their free exercise of power in relation to one another. Getting the Great Powers tangled up in these institutions may be one of the methods of attacking the power-politics problem.

Harold Lasswell suggested that after an initial period, another three or five years, it may become evident that we cannot go ahead co-operating successfully with Soviet Russia; that the United Nations will come to an impasse, and that we will have to envisage an eventual conflict.

If that is true, aren't we wasting time trying to develop international institutions, specifically the United Nations, and wouldn't it be better to break off now and start on the other road?

I think it is very uncertain whether that is going to be the outcome. I seem to see signs of slight modification in the Russian attitude. I have hopes that continued practice with the institutions of the United Nations will carry that further. But at least on the purely experimental plane it is certainly not clear that we cannot succeed along this road, and therefore it ought to be tried while in the meantime bearing the other in mind.

It perhaps would have been a good thing if there had been a good Army or Navy man in the room while we were discussing these matters. We should have a very strong skeptical or cynical view pre-

sented, and, if ultimate break is a possibility, obviously it has to be borne in mind and prepared for.

It may be argued that we cannot operate international institutions with any fruitfulness while saying, "We know this might break down, and, in fact, we are getting ready for the break." As a matter of fact, we do exactly that in government and in other spheres of life. There is no reason why adequate precautions cannot be taken while trying the experiment of developing international unity through international institutions.

MR. WRIGHT: We may wish to consider not only the specific questions concerning institutions which Mr. Potter has laid before us but the general question of where we want to go and what we should do to go there. Perhaps this is not remote from the subject, because an institution may be defined as a union of values with procedures for realizing them.

If we assume a world society as a desirable goal, there seem to be at least six types of procedure for achieving it. We might rely on private communications. Individuals, by writing or lecturing, as Mr. Angell explained, could seek to expound their views and influence the minds of other people. That could be furthered by such a procedure as Mr. Lasswell referred to under a national private organization, seeking to inform and influence the minds of both leaders and led. A further step would be the development of national organizations. Mr. Potter referred to the fact that there are many such institutions. Then, in the fourth place, national governments might adopt policies broadening the sense of responsibility of all governments along the line that Mr. Boulding referred to. Public international organizations, the kind of thing that Mr. Potter dealt with particularly, may contribute to building the world society. We have many such institutions including the United Nations and UNESCO, as well as the older organizations like the Universal Postal Union. I suppose a final method would be to set up a world government which rests, not on national governments, but directly on people. There is a group in this country that wants to call a world constitutional convention over the heads of national governments and form a world government by a spontaneous action of the peoples of the world.

RELATION OF INSTITUTIONS TO SOCIAL SOLIDARITY

MR. MORGENTHAU: Mr. Potter has raised a number of fundamental problems, the most fundamental of which, it seems to me, is the

problem of the relation between political institutions and the social substratum. That is the problem which in modern times was first raised in the polemics of Edmund Burke against the spirit of the French Revolution and which was formulated by John Stuart Mill in the question of whether political institutions are made or whether they grow.

In our civilization there is a strong tendency toward believing that political institutions can be made at will—that it is the mere intention and legislative skill of the reformer which decides as to whether or not a political institution will be successful. I am glad to find that Mr. Potter does not share that illusion. On the other hand, I would like to elaborate a few points which are implicit rather than explicit in Mr. Potter's paper.

Mr. Potter, I think, is aware of the actual relationship which exists between social forces and political institutions. A certain modicum of social forces favorable to political institutions must be present in order to allow such institutions to be created and to be successful, but the very existence of political institutions will strengthen the already existing social forces. I would, however, introduce a qualitative element into this situation. It is not enough to say that there exist many social forces making for international co-operation in the cultural, economic, and communications field. What is more important is to ask: What kind of social forces are necessary for the development of political institutions? First, there must exist sufficient power to contain the antagonistic tendencies which threaten the cohesion of society within socially tolerable bounds. Second, there must exist a social equilibrium which minimizes the psychological causes of social conflict and which, as the Federalist papers, especially No. 51, have taught us, is as essential an element in the domestic as it is in the international field. Finally, there must be a consensus with regard to a minimum of justice; that is to say, we have to have a consensus as to a minimum of social values to be pursued through political institutions.

Without social forces of these three kinds, I do not think that any other kind of social forces will allow political institutions to develop. If I ask myself: What is the international situation in this respect? In what respects do there exist social forces of these three kinds in the present international situation? I am compelled to conclude that such social forces, where they exist at all, are extremely weak and in any case much weaker than the corresponding social forces which operate on the national level.

The conclusion, then, is that, as an inevitable result of that social situation, any international institutions of a political nature become instruments of the national forces which are so much stronger than the international ones. It is exactly for that reason that the League of Nations, while eminently successful in the humanitarian and cultural fields, was eminently unsuccessful in the political field.

I would have agreed with Mr. Potter as to the importance of cultural and humanitarian co-operation, that is to say, of nonpolitical co-operation in general, if I were speaking not in 1947 but in 1847. Today, however, whatever satisfaction one can derive from international co-operation in the cultural, humanitarian, economic, and other nonpolitical fields is, I think, negated by the threat to Western civilization which the lack of consensus in the political field creates. In other words, the urgency of political unity and the threat of the lack of political unity is so overwhelming that I must say it is a lack of perspective to pay so much attention to the cultural and nonpolitical field in general and to say: Well, we don't have very much political consensus, but that isn't so bad since we have so much consensus in the nonpolitical field.

Mr. Gottschalk: Mr. Morgenthau raises a question of intellectual history in quoting Burke to the effect that out of the cultural pattern arise institutions that cannot succeed if devised out of purely intellectual persuasion alone. It is a fact that part of the revolutionary activity that Burke had in mind departed far from the cultural pattern and therefore led to reaction; but it must also be borne in mind that, if those identical revolutionary activities had not occurred, the pattern of the nineteenth century would have been very different. The fact that they did occur led to certain revolutionary successes in the nineteenth century. The question of the influence of intellectual patterns on subsequent events is one that can be argued many ways, but the pure theory of one generation may lead to social and political vogues in a subsequent generation that otherwise might have been quite different.

One may talk about the creating of a world constitution as a silly thing, but, even if such a constitution were contrary to our present possibilities and cultural trends, it may in the future be as significant a fact as that the League of Nations once existed. The fact that the League of Nations existed is now an important fact, not a theory. It is part of the cultural pattern from which the United Nations has arisen.

The point I am making is that aspirations or preferences ("preferences" is a word that Mr. Morgenthau does not like—use "prejudices" or "fears" if you prefer)—that aspirations or preferences are facts and that they do have an effect upon the subsequent cultural pattern.

MR. MORGENTHAU: I have no quarrel with Mr. Gottschalk's remarks and would only add that illusions are also a kind of facts. If I remember my own Geneva days, from 1932 to 1935, I found then—especially in retrospect I found, because one always finds more in retrospect than when one is present on the scene—I found that the illusions created by the success of the League in the nonpolitical field and the expectation of a similar success in the political field was one of the major causes for the failure of the League and the failure to prevent the second World War. If responsible statesmen had been clear in their minds as to the distinction between the political and the nonpolitical and the overwhelming importance of the political, they would not have been misled by these illusions which prevented them from taking timely measures against the approaching holocaust of the second World War.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Doesn't that make our problem a three-dimensional one? We have the problem, first, of power politics, then the problem of the international organizations which already exist, both of which are quite concrete subjects, and then a third problem of the potentialities, of the possibilities?

Mr. Wirth indicated to us that we ought to avoid both the inevitable and the possible and think of the feasible, but the meaning of those adjectives are questions of time; they are functions of time. If we have a long time to deal with a problem, then what is feasible or possible is something quite different from what it is if we have only a short time. If the time is very short, then the possible and the inevitable come very close together, and the feasible is close to both the inevitable and the possible.

NATIONAL DIFFERENCES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

MR. MARSCHAK: Could Mr. Potter give us the benefit of his judgment and experience as to the feasibility of an international political organization that would embrace groups of very different political ideologies?

It is clear that if the United States should accept communism now, then, after a certain shifting of personnel, the possibility of interna-

tional co-operation with the Soviet Union would become possible. If there were a democratic revolution in Russia, perhaps something similar would occur. If we don't consider either of these possibilities, but assume that things will continue to go on as they do in both countries and the dissimilarities will persist, what are then the legal forms of co-operation that would be feasible and advisable? No doubt there may be such possibilities, and probably experience of the past would be enlightening.

Organizations like the Holy Alliance were inspired by ideological similarities. Perhaps there are also cases in which it is humanly possible to reconcile those ideological differences under the pressure of necessity and to devise proper political co-operation. It seems the pessimistic point of view would be to say that the difficulties we are facing now are not ideological but geopolitical in nature and, therefore with a world government, would end in a civil war. I don't see that there is any reason for this degree of pessimism. The problem is difficult, but yet Mr. Potter has sufficient judgment and knowledge of legal constructions to tell us what can be done.

Mr. Potter: I don't think that I can add much to the little I have already said. It has been found possible to create interstate institutions in the past where a considerable divergence existed between the constitutional systems and the social and economic setups in member-states. The extent of divergence which is tolerable depends largely upon the level upon which the interstate institution is created. If the institution is created to do a relatively special and isolated job, great divergencies are possible.

To establish an organization of general jurisdiction intended to deal with all kinds of matters, and particularly an interstate institution designed to go deeply into social life, greater similarity of the members is necessary. The situation may be getting worse on that score, because there is a disposition to extend the functions of international institutions to matters such as individual rights and cultural life which inevitably raise problems of the differences among the participant states.

That is one of those problems which cannot be solved by sitting at a distance and speculating as to whether the degree of unity exists which makes it possible to go ahead, but only by experimenting and trying.

Mr. Wright: I might add to that a point which Hans Kelsen has often made—that it has been possible to establish international arbi-

tral tribunals which operate by majority vote between countries of extremely different cultural characteristics. For that reason Kelsen thinks that an international judicial organization would probably be the easiest to establish. Such an institution might deal with matters which have a greater political importance than those dealt with by such institutions as the Universal Postal Union. In the latter, countries of very different political complexion have co-operated for long periods of time. I believe Mr. Potter would agree that institutions, the main object of which is the maintenance of security, have not been achieved among powers of very different cultural background unless hampered by the free veto of each of those countries. That means that they have not advanced much beyond diplomacy.

Mr. McKeon: It has been pointed out that we are in a historical situation which is unique in many respects. We may learn from history, but in seeking historical lessons the novelty of our problems should also be borne in mind. Changed circumstances affect the pertinence of the excellent distinction that Mr. Morgenthau has made between the "cultural" and the "political."

The intellectual communities of the past were seldom affected directly by the oppositions among political communities. During wars, as late as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and indeed even during the nineteenth century, scientists and scholars crossed lines of battle, and academies, institutes, and universities were in uninterrupted communication unaffected by diplomatic relations. Only recently have we come to the point at which even the most abstract intellectual activities are recognized to have political importance and even military implications. One promising consequence of the resulting inhibition of scholarly and scientific communications is the possibility that the intellectual community may act more effectively on the political community in the future than it has in the past. This influence of intellectual associations should be borne in mind in discussing the creation of a world society by the establishment of new political institutions. I should like in particular to indicate how such intellectual resources might be applied specifically to the problem which Mr. Marschak raised, for it seems to me that two of the ways by which we might move toward an effective international political organization depend on intellectual work and analysis.

One way, the more direct way, would involve an effort of intellectual imagination in political science directed to the problem of how a world organization can be established in which the parts are more

disparate than they have been in any earlier federation. Is a world federation possible in which the economic systems of the constituent parts are diametrically opposed, the political organizations wholly distinct, and the cultural background and ideologies basically different? What characteristics would such a political structure have and by what political organs would it operate?

The problem may also be approached by indirection. It is entirely possible that intellectual relations, cultural relations, relations through the arts, philosophy, and science, or even the effort of peoples speaking to peoples by means of the media of mass communication may remove some of the apparent differences that divide the peoples of the world. Ideologies are important as expressions, direct and indirect, of actual attitudes, but oppositions are usually not so sharp as ideologies make them seem. Similarities and harmonies among cultural, economic, and political realities may be greater than is disclosed in statements about them, and, if communication is established, the sharp edges of ideological conflict may be broken, and the existing international organizations may be sufficient to resolve real conflicts or the opposition to necessary changes of organization may be lessened.

We are faced by the need of a double process: one is the establishment of a political organization which will anticipate differences and provide the means of coming to agreement, and the other is the reduction of apparent and verbal differences due to the statement of oppositions which exceed, because of fear and insecurities, the real dangers inherent in a situation. These two processes should progress concomitantly.

THE CULTURAL, THE ECONOMIC, AND THE POLITICAL

Mr. Bloch: Dean McKeon has made some of the points I would have made more inadequately, but I would go further than he did. Coming back to the university, I feel like a defrocked priest coming back to religious service. I have become a bit of an iconoclast. I begin to feel like Boulding—that a lot of bunk which we have been fed is falling off, and I no longer see the distinctions between the political, the cultural, and the economic.

Take, for instance, the cultural problem of the translation of the classics which was discussed in the United Nations. That immediately became a political issue. What is a classic for a man with a cer-

tain political point of view is not a classic for a man with another political point of view.

It is possible to speak of nonpolitical co-operation among engineers or physicians, but can one speak of such co-operation among historians, or to use a *reductio ad absurdum*, among political scientists? That is what some of the cultural separations might lead to. We certainly cannot separate the economic from the political. We cannot speak of nonpolitical, economic co-operation. What it really comes to is that we want to develop co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union because these are two conflicting poles, and in this co-operation everything is political.

Whatever the League of Nations did achieve in the cultural field was possible partly because of the different time—I apply a long-range argument to a short-range period—and partly because the Institute of Intellectual Cooperation operated in a realm where there was no serious diversity among the powers. Furthermore, that co-operation was on a very small scale even in cultural activities. I believe today we will have to give up all the separations between political, cultural, and economic.

MR. WRIGHT: I suppose Mr. Bloch would recognize that the translation of the classics would have a maximum of political content for the Soviet Union because of the Soviet emphasis upon ideologies.

MR. BLOCH: That is possible. I was giving this as a very small example, but during the first conference of the postal experts of U.N. two-and-a-half days were spent mostly in straight political discussion. During the war, because of failure of political understanding, the Soviet Union had actually been refused membership in the Universal Postal Union, and the "independent states" of Slovakia and Bohemia were members. Some people define the political concept of membership as different from the technical. Even organizations like the Universal Postal Union and the World Health Organization need a political base for co-operation.

MR. POTTER: I am very glad that Mr. Bloch has introduced this qualification. The difference between the political and the nonpolitical activities of the League of Nations became very familiar in discussions, and on one occasion I tried to define that difference. As a step in that direction I consulted some fifty people who had participated in national government administration and the international administration of the League of Nations. My conclusion was, as Mr. Bloch has suggested, that there was no purely nonpolitical subject.

Sit in on a discussion of activities for the suppression of traffic in opium and see how much politics there is in that, for example.

I want to add one word in reply to what Mr. Morgenthau said concerning the activities of the League in the so-called "political field." It is easy now, having in mind the failure to check Japan and to act effectively against Italy, and all the consequences which followed these failures, to forget that for a good many years the League succeeded in dealing with purely political matters with relative effectiveness.

As to whether there is today sufficient consensus on the "political" level, again I would say that we cannot be sure. We are horrified when we read the headlines, but I would also say that we should pay some attention to what is actually being done by these states, in spite of their professions and pretenses, in the development of institutions like the International Bank which are surely not dealing merely with innocuous topics.

Miss Mead: I want to go back to what was said originally about the intellectuals and the cultural patterns, as if the intellectuals lived in one place and the culture in another. That goes back to the point I tried to make with regard to regularities rather than uniformities.

If we take the entirety of social phenomena and regard any classification and the whole pattern as ideas in the heads of people who are talking about them and get rid of the idea that there are political facts and cultural facts, we avoid these artificial classifications and this misplaced concreteness that go on so much of the time. On the other hand, with that point of view, we would never say that the aspiration of a single individual inside a society, no matter how much he wanted to alter things, was not part of the cultural pattern of that society, was not regularly related to it. The actual functioning of the intellectual in the society that Mr. McKeon brought up will vary from period to period. I agree completely with his analysis, but it always has to be included within the cultural pattern. We sitting somewhere near Chicago are as much a part of the cultural pattern as the policeman on the corner or the children in the public-school grounds. If we think of all the different types of thought, all the different functions of thought in a society as regularly interrelated, we get out of that order of dichotomy.

I have just finished analyzing a convention of the American Association of University Women, which is a voluntary organization or-

ganized along local, state, regional, and national lines. It is an association of branches which derive their membership from the national organization rather than an aggregation or federation of autonomous groups. One gets an opportunity to see what happens in the American scene with this attempt to relate each local group to a national pattern. The members were incapable of national enthusiasm on any issue of any complexity. If it was a question of how much money had been raised for fellowships, for instance, where each individual unit could be aggregated up to a national whole, they could clap; but the minute any procedure was proposed which in a sense involved the whole human being and not how much money had been put into a fellowship, there was difficulty.

I think that is a characteristic of almost every organization in this country. If we watch Americans, we find they can accept limited national goals, which include in this country, of course, Army and Navy and war. People in the state of Indiana can accept a sign during the war, "Speed limit 35 miles an hour, by order of the U.S. government." This makes the U.S. government as invasionist as His Majesty the King for temporary purposes of war, but, whenever the whole human being and a whole program is involved, Americans tend to revert to their ideas of local autonomy.

The A.A.U.W., and I have seen this happen before in this country, can build enthusiasm to the regional level. If we get a continuous group of states, we can get a certain amount of identification with whole procedures, but that is where it ends. I don't believe that the world problems, although the contrasts are infinitely greater, are of a different order than the contrast between Maine and Texas and California and Mississippi. There is similarity in the world situation with the sorts of problems that we experience in this country and the sorts of places where it is possible to build a general organization and where it is necessary to build regionally or only state-wide or locally. The same precedents concerning the interactions and complexities of these processes will hold if we are willing to extrapolate from national situations to the situations that we find in the world as a whole.

Mr. Parsons: I would like to comment on what Mr. Bloch said—that interdependence is not the same thing as identification. I think Mr. McKeon made an excellent statement of the interdependence of political and cultural elements in the situation, but simply to drop the distinction and say they are just the same thing is not in my

opinion helpful. I think Mr. Morgenthau's distinction is entirely valid on that level.

I would hope that before the morning is over we would have some discussion of the specific facts of the Russian system in its specific relations to our system. I think we all will agree that that is the nub of the empirical problem we are up against. We have been discussing political institutions in general without reference to the specific interaction that we really face. I think there are a number of people present who could contribute important insight into that problem.

INFLUENCE OF THE ATOMIC BOMB

MR. LIKERT: Our discussion has been proceeding on certain assumptions, part of which are false. These false assumptions are producing a serious error in our appraisal of the present situation and our consideration of the development of a world community. When we say, for example, that the situation is not much changed from 1939 and assume that there are not important social forces at work, I think we are underestimating tremendously the terrifically powerful forces present. There is evidence that the atomic bomb and biological warfare, particularly the atomic bomb, are motivational forces as powerful as any that have emerged for a long time. The existence of the atomic bomb has had a profound effect upon the people of the United States.

Any time an event or phenomenon is of such dimensions that 99 per cent of the people in this country know about it in a relatively short period of time, that event is of extreme importance and influence. And 99 per cent of Americans know of the atomic bomb. It is rapidly developing motivational forces of tremendous power in this and other countries.

Powerful motivational forces produce rapid changes in institutions. For example, during 1931 and 1932 attitudes toward the participation of the federal government in the support of unemployment relief shifted rapidly and substantially. The shift was from feeling that local and state agencies could handle the problem adequately to a recognition that the problem was so large that it must be dealt with by the federal government. This major shift in attitudes resulted in a corresponding change in social institutions. The W.P.A., P.W.A., and such agencies as the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the Rural Rehabilitation Administration rapidly came into being to meet the problems of unemployment and agricultural distress.

The Social Security Administration was established also at that time.

Institutions are created by people to meet the problems about which they are genuinely concerned. The people in this country and other countries appear to be increasingly concerned about the atomic bomb. With development of this concern, there will be pressure to establish institutions to control atomic energy. It would seem desirable in our discussions, therefore, that we recognize that people are concerned about the atomic bomb and that pressure is mounting for the establishment of an institution to control it. This pressure can be very important in the development of a world community.

MR. WRIGHT: As I recall, Mr. Likert, from your study, while 1 per cent had never heard of the atomic bomb, about 20 per cent had never heard of the United Nations.

MR. LIKERT: It would be more correct to say that they did not know what the United Nations was.

MR. MCKEON: What "people" are we talking about in these generalizations? Have inquiries been carried on in countries other than the United States? Is the atomic bomb an American psychosis? What kind of information about its use and effects has penetrated to Central Europe, and what kind of "concern" is felt about it behind the "Iron Curtain"?

MR. LIKERT: At present, we do not have data showing how the people of Central Europe or Russia feel about the atomic bomb and the need to control it. However, there is no reason why we cannot obtain these measures if we desire to do so. The fact that there is an "Iron Curtain" increases the difficulty of obtaining these measurements and may decrease their accuracy somewhat, but it does not prevent the possibility of measurement. Obtaining these measurements is no more difficult than measuring the effect of bombing on German civilian morale during the war, and this was done by the Morale Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey prior to V-E Day. Bruner, you studied the attitudes of the French after D-Day (and in many ways the problem is similar). Do you have any results on this?

MR. BRUNER: I say it is quite parallel: Here is a weapon, and they feel it is out of their control; they feel that Russia and the United States have taken the initiative on this particular problem and there they are. The giants are about to have a battle, the bombs will be dropped, and they are in their path.

MR. LIKERT: Dean Sawyer of the University of Michigan was civilian technical director of the Bikini tests. Recently he showed some colored films taken at the time of the tests to a group of people, and in the course of his discussion he stated, "I don't want to live in a world where this instrument is not controlled." That is a frightening statement and is similar to the statements that many of our physicists are making today. Last spring a group of physicists held a series of meetings for a week in various cities and towns in Kansas and certain other states. The procedure was to have a group of physical scientists describe the tremendous power and danger of the bomb. These meetings thoroughly frightened people. It is very dangerous to scare people thoroughly and not suggest some constructive steps that they can take. When people have great fear and anxiety that is uncontrolled and undirected, it can easily be diverted into socially destructive directions. These physical scientists need and want the help of social scientists. The thinking of this group could be very helpful to them if we can suggest the kind of social institutions that should be created to control atomic energy and the steps that should be taken to establish these institutions.

THE POLITICAL AND THE NONPOLITICAL

MR. POLANYI: The limited wars of the nineteenth century were as a rule accompanied by definite conceptions of what might be expected to happen *after* the war. (In England, up to a point, this idea still survives. I remember having been surprised to find in 1938–39 that people were discussing anxiously the issue of war and peace not in terms of winning the war, which was taken for granted, but in terms of the peace, i.e., of the situation *after* the war.) The period which follows upon a war must be regarded as peace, even if it should turn out to be a period of economic chaos and intermittent wars and civil wars, since this only means that our notions of "peace" have to be adjusted.

Now, the last two wars were general wars—the first in a century—and that is one of the reasons why we failed to consider before deciding for war what the position *after* the war would be. We should not for a third time make this same mistake. Anyhow, even if the short run is to be war, the long run will be "peace." What kind of world institutions should we consider today in view of the kind of "peace" which would emerge? This is the question.

The first consideration is to avoid new wars as far as possible. But to avoid wars it is not enough to have *political* institutions which

regulate the relationships of governments (or subgovernments, in case of a unitary world system). It is an illusion to imagine that wars can be avoided merely by the good will of the sovereign (or subsovereign) governments composing a political system. Only if life is controlled *at the source* is it possible to prevent conflicts from being instituted and eventually *forcing* governments into war.

The nineteenth century made us forget this, because in laissez faire we seemed to possess a rule of law that controlled life at the source. Actually, this was true only domestically, the problems which divided large groups were not resolved by the rule of law as applied to individuals on different sides of the boundaries, and the strain between nations continued to increase.

A creative answer is needed to the question: What institutions—maybe within the framework of the United Nations—might deal at the source with everyday reasons for conflict such as raw materials and monetary and similar problems arising in the economic field? Laissez faire up to a point solved them, and, now that it has gone for good, they are up again and demand a solution. To avoid wars, world institutions must transcend politics and deal primarily with peace.

Mr. Leiserson: Concerning the breakdown of distinctions between political, cultural, and economic it may be worth while to give some creative meaning to the ambiguous term "political thinking."

It certainly is true that in the policy sense, as Mr. Bloch says, we cannot admit that there is a separation between the technical and economic and the political. Yet we must have some sense of what we mean by political thinking, or we will have to say that all is political, in which case we are likely to be taken over by the power-holders and the power-grabbers.

We have to make certain assumptions and expectations as to the conditions under which political decisions will be made, and assumptions have somehow to be related to the official structure of program planning and strategic planning in relation, for example, to such things as the atomic bomb and the dispersion of our resources in the event of atomic warfare.

Mr. Gottschalk: The questions of the identification of the various aspects of society and what to do about Russia strike me as interdependent. We are dealing with a country which thinks that everything is an expression of economic life. When Shostakovich is able to say that good music is an expression of the class struggle, then we've got to deal with a problem of whether we allow Shostako-

vich's symphonies to be played in our country, or whether Beethoven's symphonies are not connected with the class struggle. What we are confronted with is the fact of Russia making everything totalitarian, and therefore of what should be our response, even in the intellectual sphere.

Mr. Rippy: I want to express appreciation to the anthropologists for what they have done for the historians in their definition of culture. Not only is Russia totalitarian, but in practically all countries the economic and the political are coming closer together, so it is going to be increasingly difficult to distinguish between the political and the economic.

Mr. Bloch: On Mr. Parson's point I fear I did not make myself quite clear. I did not mean to equalize the cultural, the political, and the economic but to treat them as interdependent variables. We deal with social relations, with relations among peoples or institutions or governments. We cannot think of good cultural relations as a variable developing independently of good political relations. I am very emphatic about that.

When people focus on so-called "political relations," they often ignore the cultural, as Professor Polanyi pointed out. But if we think that we should make an effort to salvage such cultural remnants of society as would survive a possible breakdown of our international political relations, then our goal is extremely narrow, just as narrow as the people who say, "Let's keep the formalistic political relations between nations and not pay any attention at all to the cultural relations." The point I make is that everything we talk about in international relations—political, cultural, or economic—is a set of interdependent variables.

Miss Mead: I want to distinguish between viewing the whole of a culture in terms of phenomena and then looking at the same data from different points of view and the totalitarian approach. From the cultural point of view, a country may have focused power in one place so that it controls every aspect of life, or it may have focused power in many different places. One would not be more a total approach from the anthropological point of view than the other.

Mr. Parsons: Certain differentiations may not be inherent in the phenomena in one sense but inherent in particular social structures. We have heard a good deal about the breakdown of the nineteenth-century structure, which to a very important degree segregated political and economic considerations from each other. Part of the situ-

ation Mr. Bloch is pointing out is a result of the breakdown of that structure.

The present situation is seriously unstructured, and that is one of the sources of our difficulties. One direction of movement is to attempt to introduce new patterns of structure, one aspect of which would be to make possible certain of these segregations.

It seems to me one aspect of the ideological values we are faced with is that they constitute barriers to that sort of structuring. I feel that the difficulty in dealing with a Communist is that we cannot segregate any particular problem; he puts you in the position of "all or none," no matter what we discuss with him. That is one of the fundamental barriers to the kinds of partial adjustment which are indispensable in a pragmatic going world.

MR. MORGENTHAU: I do not accept the distinction which Mr. Bloch has made. From a stratospheric point of view, of course, all lakes and villages and cities look alike; the closer we come down to earth, the clearer are the distinctions.

I want to deal with the common-sense distinction between the political and the nonpolitical. Obviously, there is a difference not only in degree but in kind between the question,"Who shall control the Dardanelles?" and the question,"Which classics shall be translated from Russian into English and from English into Russian?" "Political" refers simply to the power of a nation. I grant you that in a conflict situation, a situation where we have tension in a technical sense, everything becomes of necessity political, because everything of necessity affects the power of the two nations in conflict. Still, even then, there is a distinction in magnitude between the different questions of a political nature. The cultural and economic questions have less effect on the power of the respective nations than the military and geographical problems which provide the immediate issues for conflict.

There may or there may not be interdependence. We may have a parallel development between the nonpolitical and the political, or we may have exactly the reverse. We may have great similarity and symbiosis in the nonpolitical field and deep antagonisms in the political field. It does not help to create a new institution in the nonpolitical field if the political situation is deteriorating more and more.

Take, for instance, the situation which led to the breakdown of Greek civilization. The Greeks enjoyed the highest possible degree of cultural unity, but when the Peloponnesian War broke out, which

brought Greek civilization to its downfall, political antagonism was much stronger in its destructive effect than was the unifying effect of the nonpolitical relations.

MR. WRIGHT: I should like to make one comment about Mr. Morgenthau's illustration. I should think the question of whether a world institution should regard Karl Marx as a classic or Thomas Aquinas as a classic to be translated might be considerably more political than the question of who controls the Danube.

MR. RIPPY: There are various elements in the nonpolitical, some of which are much more closely related to the political than others. I think that, of all the nonpolitical, the most closely related to the political is the economic. Political relations are so closely connected with the economic that in modern times they are inseparable.

MR. RIESMAN: Could we not stop exchanging our respective professional imperialisms and try to answer some of the types of questions which Mr. Likert was trying to raise, namely, exchange data. I would like to ask Mr. Bruner, Mr. Lasswell, Mr. Likert, what they might do if they were assigned the task of finding out the world loyalties, the world apathies, or the world resistances of the Russians today; and, secondly, what they would do to change those loyalties, apathies, or resistances on the basis of data we have and methods we might use.

MR. POTTER: I would certainly go along with the idea that the differentiation between problems to be dealt with by international institutions on the line of distinction between nonpolitical and political is extremely treacherous and unrewarding.

Mr. Leiserson said he thought we ought to have a more precise definition. In any particular matter we have a nonpolitical level and a political level, and we get on to the nonpolitical level only when we have dealt with the questions of policy and principle involved. It is a question not of certain subject matters being political and others nonpolitical but of different levels in dealing with the same subject matter.

Take, for example, the matter which Mr. Wright has mentioned—arbitration. As long as we don't have an agreement to arbitrate, it is a highly political problem whether we can get an agreement or not. Once we get an agreement to submit, then it is a highly technical problem; how shall the tribunal be composed and what procedure shall it follow. In the case of narcotic drugs, if we don't have a con-

vention, it is a highly political matter; if we get the convention, it is nonpolitical.

Mr. Morgenthau came down out of the stratosphere, but only to the arena of this room not to actual international affairs from which our intellectual speculations are far removed. You cannot sit in the Health Commission or any other such commission without seeing political firecrackers pop all the time. We want institutions to deal with all types and all phases of international problems.

Mr. Wright: I would like to follow Mr. Riesman's suggestion and get to the issues of public opinion which Mr. Likert mentioned. I am not sure there will be much change in the discussion, because, it seems to me, the distinction between the political and nonpolitical depends upon the intensity of public opinion in a group on an issue. If opinion is very intense on such a question as how we translate a particular word in the Bible, as it was in the early Middle Ages, that becomes a political question.

Mr. McKeon: The intensity of public opinion, in turn, depends on the institutional forms in which it can find expression. It was the institutional ramifications and applications of the church that gave political importance to distinctions which have lost their political significance since the Middle Ages; and, conversely, there is evidence that many widely held aspirations have been without influence through lack of a public medium for their formulation and pursuit. For these reasons I do not believe that the contrast which has been made between the "democratic" and the "responsible" is a fundamental distinction; it embodies an unanalyzed conception of "democracy" and assumes a resolution of the differences alleged between "parliamentary" democracy and "mass" or "proletarian" democracy. The resolution of that distinction affects both the character and the operation of world institutions, and, in so doing, the distinction between political and nonpolitical. These are problems that are treated least ambiguously in specific questions about world institutions. The Soviet theorists criticize Western democracies because they make no place for mass participation in administration; we criticize Communist conceptions of democracy because elections in such democracies provide no means to express differences of opinion, with the result that legislative assemblies are reduced to approving measures which they have had no part in formulating, the administration is predetermined to a single party, and the courts are inaccessible to appeals for the protection of individual rights. Yet despite these dif-

ferences, and indeed with little attention to them, we engage in constructing world institutions to which both the Eastern and the Western world should be responsible.

MR. LIKERT: The important fact, it seems to me, is that men create institutions whenever they are sufficiently wrought up over an issue. Consequently, when people feel strongly about a matter, they usually create the institutions that are required to implement their feeling.

At present, however, we do not really know how the people in most of the rest of the world feel about the atomic bomb and its control. As Mr. McKeon has suggested, there is need to obtain these data, especially on how the people in Russia and its satellite countries feel. Obviously, there are real difficulties in the way of securing such data, and any effort to obtain them will be only partially successful. Nevertheless, appreciably more information can be obtained than we now possess, and this information would be very valuable in guiding policy decisions.

There are several approaches which could be employed to find what the Russian people know about atomic energy and its control and how they feel about the entire question. There are a number of Americans who go to Russia for different purposes. They contact a wide variety of Russians. These Americans could all be interviewed, using a carefully developed interview form, and the results could be analyzed in terms of the kinds of Russians each of the different Americans had contacted.

Similarly, many Russians come to this country. They too could be interviewed over a period of time, using an informal, conversational approach. No doubt some of them would refuse to answer questions. Others would refuse to answer certain questions. But, nevertheless, important data could be obtained from this approach. Refusing to answer a question is an important datum in itself.

There is not time to consider all the different approaches that might be used to find out how the Russian people feel on this question and how their attitudes change under different influences. One more approach, however, might be mentioned. The Iron Curtain has different degrees of permeability. The attitudes of the Communists in various countries, including some of the satellite countries, could be obtained from sample interview surveys. Moreover, the changes in these attitudes that occur from time to time and the causal influences associated with them could be studied. These data would help to

show what kinds of influences are most likely to produce the attitudes that will permit the world to move to the establishment of a world community.

There are, of course, many other data that are needed and should be collected systematically. Thus, for example, there is need to analyze the content of the material that the Soviet leaders are presenting to their people in the newspapers, over the radio, and through all channels of communication. These results would have two important uses. They would, first, help to indicate the goal of the Soviet leaders by showing the direction in which they are trying to influence the thinking and behavior of the Russian people. The second use would be to relate the shifts in attitudes of the people to the material being presented to them to see which material is exercising the greatest influence on attitudes.

In this country there is no question but that there is a substantial amount of concern about Russia, a fundamental distrust of Russia, and an amazing amount of misinformation and lack of information about Russia. There is very active concern on the part of about a quarter of the people in the United States with regard to atomic energy; inactive latent anxiety among half the people; and the other quarter more or less fall between.

The attitudes of Americans toward Russia seem to shift with events. For example, from June, 1946, to August, 1946, there was a substantial shift in a hostile direction. You remember that the Council of Foreign Ministers that met in April came to an impasse. From August to December our attitude toward Russia shifted appreciably in a direction favorable to Russia; from December to April, 1947, the shift was in the unfavorable direction. The attitude was more unfavorable in April than at any point that we have measured.

The attitude toward participation in a world government tends to shift with American attitudes toward Russia. The more we feel that we are getting along well with Russia, the more willing we are to enter into a world government that would have the same relation to the different nations that our federal government has to our forty-eight states. The less we feel that we are getting along well, the more reluctant we are to enter such a world government.

I am citing these data to illustrate the kinds of research that can be undertaken to provide guides to administrators and social scientists in solving the problem of how to develop the institutions that are required for a world community.

MR. WRIGHT: Mr. Likert has, I am sure, clarified the problem we have been discussing by showing that the political importance of a problem in the sense of the degree in which it threatens the peace is a question of the intensity of attitudes about it, which can be measured, which shift from time to time, and which can be dealt with by alternative procedures. Group conflicts can be developed by following the wrong procedure and avoided by following different procedures.

I suggest that we continue discussion on the question raised by Mr. McKeon as to the forms of organization that would be most likely to apply the right procedures.

EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON RUSSIA

MR. MCKEON: Soviet institutions and American institutions have been contrasted repeatedly in the course of our discussion, and it is easy enough to recognize the points of contrast which have been enumerated. It is more difficult to know what the differences mean or what to do about them. We have heard the accusation that we in the West think of democracy exclusively in terms of a parliamentary type of democracy and that, although parliamentary democracy is not the only type of democracy, we lack the imagination necessary to perceive the characteristics of other forms. I am willing to concede that I lack some of that imagination. My unimaginativeness might be remedied if political scientists and other experts here will set forth the answers to two sets of questions. Mr. Parsons wanted, in the first place, to have the two types of institutions contrasted, and I should like, in the second place, to be informed concerning institutions of an international character which might bring the two forms of democracy into co-operation.

MR. WRIGHT: The question, then, is: What kind of international institutions would best facilitate co-operation between two countries with such different institutions as Western democracy and Soviet totalitarianism?

MR. ANGELL: Perhaps we could approach that question inductively by looking at Western Europe. I cannot conceive that in Italy and in France there are not already some attempts being made to bridge the gap. What they are I don't know, but it seems to me that there must be some people in Italy and France, where the pressure of these two systems is very great, trying to work out an accommodation. Perhaps there is even some embryonic form of institutional accommo-

dation already. It might be worth while to use Mr. Likert's methods or some other method to study that particular phenomenon as it emerges.

MR. LASSWELL: A way to evaluate the impact of international organizations on the Soviet Union is to explore the question of the degree to which experience in various kinds of international organizations tends to obsolesce the Russian doctrine. By the expression "obsolescing the Russian doctrine," I mean that the doctrine becomes *phraseology* and loses the intensity which seems to be characteristic of its present formulation by doctrinal specialists in the Soviet Union.

Our problem is to accomplish something which has been accomplished in a variety of situations in the past by retaining the doctrinal language but permitting redefinitions of it, so that, for example, where we have the doctrine of world civil war, it is possible for these phrases to be repeated but for the associated expectations and demands to become redefined in such a way that the probability of conflict is reduced.

If we investigate the press in the Soviet Union through various periods, we find fluctuations in the number of "small-group" demands for privileges. I refer to the trade-union press, for instance, in which we get an indication that this or that trade-union organization is putting forward special requests to receive access to rest, recreational, and medical facilities and extra housing. We can follow such fluctuations in the pluralization of demands. This is an indication of the type of data which one can collect which bear on the state of effective demands, expectations, and identifications.

To return to the connection of international institutions with doctrinal obsolescence, I wonder whether the consequence of participating in international organizations will be to increase or to diminish Russia's estimate of the outside world as a threat. Let me make a few casual and superficial remarks about diplomatic contacts.

Some diplomats approach a negotiation with Russia expecting that their opposite numbers will combine business with pleasure. By building up a friendly out-of-hours contact, the hopeful diplomat desires to make a great contribution to the reduction of the stress in the world. I think that it is correct to say that persons who had high expectations of this kind were especially frustrated and overreacted against the frustration of their hopes.

This was one of the difficulties that led a colleague of mine who had observed this process to remark, "Never send a social worker to

Moscow, or never send a social worker to negotiate with the Russians." The expectations are of a sort that leads to this kind of response to frustration.

MR. WRIGHT: But Mr. Harry Hopkins, who was a social worker, was, I think, one of the most successful negotiators with the Russians.

MR. LASSWELL: I am not vouching for the authenticity of the generalization. I am only commenting on these frustrations of some of our diplomats.

MR. EMMERICH: Would you add the salesman, too; never send a salesman?

MR. LASSWELL: Yes, with the qualifications one always attaches to a generalization.

To continue my comments on the problem of dealing with Soviet negotiators. There often is a second phase in which diplomats develop the conception that, after all, in dealing with the Russians, we must be very firm.

What are the consequences in terms of our mutual estimates of insecurity of these methods of participating in international organization and of carrying on bilateral negotiations? What have been the changes, if any, which have been taking place in confrontation technique? To what extent shall we encourage bitter confrontations by Russians and Americans with the idea that, if we have an exaggerated expectation of breakoff, and these expectations are constantly frustrated, we develop a "Wolf! Wolf!" response to the situation? Is security furthered if people expect these ceremonial battles to go on indefinitely, with nobody actually pressing a button?

I present these comments only to add a little specificity to the questions involved in evaluating the impact of international institutions on the Soviet Union and on us.

MR. MARSCHAK: I should like to call attention to weekly extracts from the Russian press published in English by the University of Washington. They do not seem to be widely known. It is not too difficult, when we continue to read this material, to get a feeling of what these people are talking about and how they operate their social structure. The fact that the Russians don't have a free press makes contact with them difficult, but a monopolistic press is also an important index for information and should not be neglected. These people with whom we have to negotiate might feel it would be profitable for people to subscribe to the Washington sheets and perhaps to do something about spreading them. I understand the translations

consist of selections from *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, five or six articles, and then, in addition, there are short abstracts from the news part of those periodicals. I think it is very useful.

TECHNIQUES FOR DEALING WITH RUSSIA

MR. EMMERICH: A great many of us have had random experiences and tend to generalize on one or two cases. I think the type of approach represented here—the anthropological, sociological, psychological approach—may well be studied as to some of the things that are keeping us apart.

The assumption has been made that there are no parliamentary institutions in Russia. They certainly have a tremendous amount of committee work; they certainly have a tremendous number of meetings and bodies called "conferences," in which they have apparently developed a procedure which is quite different from the House of Commons, the House of Representatives, or Robert's *Rules of Order*.

I have felt for some time that an examination of the Soviet method of conducting deliberative bodies would be a very instructive study, using perhaps the techniques that have been mentioned here. Such a study might not be so profound as some of the other things that have been discussed here, but it might be helpful in alleviating minor questions that arise out of the procedural conduct of an international deliberative assembly in which East and West participate.

Another type of thing that interests me is the problem of political and administrative delegations to Soviet missions in comparison with ours and that of the British and other nations. I rather suspect that there we have much more of a common ground than we know, but I am not sure. We have a lot of assumptions, which I share, that they have a very much greater degree of positive, specific instruction and much less authority to negotiate. On the other hand, I have heard that questioned from very authoritative sources. We just don't know, and we do know that a great many of our delegates and representatives on commissions are very closely bound by instructions. We have something like the Atomic Energy Plan, for example, from which we cannot deviate.

I think an examination of Russian deliberative procedures, committee procedures, as well as their administration procedure of delegation and clearance in comparison with ours, and preferably an examination conducted in collaboration with people of their area, might be one of the most constructive things we could embark upon.

MR. HUGHES: I am very much interested in what Mr. Lasswell said of the people who can't stay in Russia and negotiate with people whose mask is different and who stand for a different kind of system. That is a very common thing. People that can't take it and have a revulsion come back and blow off at home. That is the great problem in the management-labor situation; the position of the management man as a representative is quite different from that of the labor man. We have all seen those blowoffs of a man who tries it and who can't do anything with these "scoundrels" and comes back and blows off.

What have any of our social psychology people discovered about the sources for discovering people in this country who can stay in, in whatever situations of negotiations are created in these institutions? We can't have institutions unless, whatever the state of feeling in the two countries may be, we have people who can carry on and who are not completely downed by frustrations. Do we know anything about that?

MR. BRUNER: That is a very good point. During the war, when we faced the job of choosing agents operating in certain countries, we were much concerned about picking them and we set up assessment schools. The psychologists picked these people on certain traits of emotional stability—people who would not crack under stress.

In the course of that work a great deal was learned about personality traits required in an individual for stress of work in situations which are dangerous. A great deal of auxiliary information was acquired about other personality types that were fitted to do certain other jobs.

It seems to me to be obvious that one of the things we have to do is to pay much more attention to the personality makeup of people who are going to be involved in these very stressful negotiation situations. I dare say those who actually operate in the international field will bear me out that there are people who, because of the personality constellation, just cannot take it. We know, for example, people who have frustration tolerance, people who can be frustrated day after day, just blame circumstances; others who blame themselves and reduce their efficiency; and others who blame others and break up the conference. We can spot those people.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE PROCEDURES

MR. WRIGHT: It is very interesting that we always get down to the personality and psychological aspects of our problem. We seem not

to be able to get into the question, which may not be important, of whether one type of institutional setup would be better than another.

Miss Mead: I think we can get to the institutional setup once we have a better description of Russian procedures than we have at present; for instance, the Russian procedures of unanimity, which go way back beyond the Soviet and which we interpret as immediate political moves and which undoubtedly are used in the power contest, but, nevertheless, are built upon their procedures of nomination and election and collective decision in the old Russian village community. We should know accurately and in detail what those procedures are, which means that we need descriptions of committee meetings of Russians when nobody else was there. There is a little of this in the literature, but not much. We also need a description of nomination procedures, where they nominate and veto and nominate and veto until they are left with somebody whom they can elect unanimously. That procedure ends up in something very much like our own, but every step is different, and it is on the steps that the situation jags. We need a description of their minute procedures, and I think they have to be exceedingly minute—things like, "Where does a chairman sit?" There appear to be parts of Russia where, if one enters a committee meeting, one cannot identify the chairman. That looks like a very small point, but it is a point of major magnitude when compared to the way in which we set up a committee room.

There is a bit of folklore going around of a semipolitical party given by Russians to Americans with an oblong table. There were no place cards, so the Americans, being guests, were allowed to sit down first, and they all sat down at the two middle positions, in line with the Canaan wedding feast; the Russians had to sit down at the ends, and the Americans said, "Look, the Russians always take the best position."

It seems to me a remarkably good piece of folklore in the way in which small procedures may jag the works, so that in the end we do not get to larger matters. The whole argument in the San Francisco Conference about the Presidium—and that burst of misunderstanding about the Presidium needs more detail than Drew Pearson gave it—appears to have arisen from a genuine misunderstanding on the matter of procedure. It then was blown up in the American press into a major issue.

So that we have to have adequate descriptions of these procedural

differences; we already know our own procedure. With such knowledge it becomes a sheerly technical job to devise a situation within which people with one set of procedures and expectations and a group of people with another set of procedures and expectations can function. But we cannot devise it in ignorance of one side of the equation, and, in devising it, we should have that knowledge which is not at present beyond our powers to obtain.

MR. WRIGHT: Perhaps we should go back to the Conference at Westphalia, which took five years discussing procedural matters before they could get around a table. They began with a square table, and, since the head of the table would be in a position of priority, nobody could be at the head of the table. They finally adopted a round table, where there would be no priority, which was fine until someone suggested that priority at such a table would be the position nearest the door. Such questions as that—how to sit around a table—took five years before really substantive negotiations on the Peace of Westphalia could begin.

I once made a computation of the length of time of peace conferences. The Peace of Westphalia took eight years to make. There was a steady diminution in the length of the great European conferences. Vienna took thirteen months, and Versailles only seven, the most rapid general peace negotiation there had ever been.

It is striking that the making of the peace after World War II may be comparable in length to Westphalia. We haven't really got started yet. At the Congress of Westphalia there were few accepted rules of diplomatic procedure, because sovereign states were only beginning to function. It took a long time to get started, but gradually procedures were worked out. Now we have the Soviet Union, with wholly new ideas, attempting to abandon the traditions of diplomacy. We are back at Westphalia with the enormous difficulty of devising procedures which will work.

MR. HUGHES: To what extent were people through those eight years the same people?

MR. WRIGHT: There were changes during the time. Of course, the war was going on through much of it, so that the military situation was shifting as the diplomats tried to meet.

MISS MEAD: We have got to be reasonably clear, in this twilight position of Soviet relations, whether we are making studies of the Soviet Union with their full knowledge. The thing I said just now you could say to any Soviet official, "We would like to understand

better how you run a committee so we can run the committee more to your liking." It would not be a potentially warlike statement. But a no-man's land of ethical and political ambiguity is raised by one of the methods that Mr. Likert described; that is, interviewing members of the Communist party in Czechoslovakia to find out what the Soviets do not want us to know about what they think. The minute that is announced as a procedure, it alters the situation, and the procedure becomes less useful. It makes the Soviets a lot of work. They will then become alerted, and the degree of communication will be lowered, which is one of the things that we least want to do because we want to increase communication. This confusion arises between techniques that are appropriate to operations which were called during the war "black" and operations which can be called "white." The degree of publicity that we give our procedures and the extent to which we relegate warlike intelligence procedures to definite security areas, if we are going to have them at all, and the avoidance of these intermediate zones of procedure which increase mutual suspicion because of semipublicity—these, I think, are problems that ought to be faced very definitely.

STUDIES TO PROMOTE UNDERSTANDING

MR. POLANYI: I am struck by the fruitfulness of this part of the discussion. I feel that what Mr. Angell said about investigating what the Communist parties and non-Communist parties have been developing in European countries would be fruitful; all manner of ways of compromise must have been worked out there. The point is to try to find out what is the approved idea of an honorable compromise in terms of the *other* country and, also, to make sure—that is a question of communications, really—that *one's own* people understand thoroughly what is going on. Otherwise compromise may become impossible from one's own side.

As to avoiding conflict, I suppose that is a question of conceptual generalization. That is what Grotius did on a large scale in a somewhat similar situation, enabling Christian and "heathen" states to live together.

MR. PARSONS: There is, it seems to me, a further, exceedingly important point in which an analysis of the reaction patterns that are typical in a group can throw considerable light, and that is the fine line that is defined by Mr. Lasswell's formula of "firm and friendly." We certainly have important differences of typical character in the

kinds of reactions that there will be toward Greece and the kinds of firmness and the way in which those are interpreted by the other party. I think that is one of the most important fields of analysis in the relations of any two groups.

There would seem to be pretty general agreement, at least among the people with some experience with whom I have talked, that there is a very fine line in dealing with the Russians—that we don't get along by offering to give our shirt away, as it were, and being an easy mark. On the other hand, we can consolidate opposition and antagonism by certain kinds of belligerency. It is a very important line to draw.

Mrs. Wright: There is one point that Mr. Potter suggested which has not been discussed at all and which is germane to this topic: How do we develop social consciousness, without which, we say, institutions cannot develop or be effective? It seems to me there is needed a kind of adult education which will produce the kind of public opinion which Mr. Potter has been talking about. My particular concern with it is a quantitative one. If we are to have a public opinion, a social consciousness which can support these institutions, how much information must people have in order to be enlightened and understanding supporters of the institutions. I think the mass of information and the complexity of it is more than any average—and I might say some not so average—individual can master. I would like to hear somebody suggest a social invention whereby we could get simplified information which is at the same time true and useful.

Mr. Potter: The question raised by Mr. McKeon might relate either to domestic political institutions in Russia or to a Russian conception of what international institutions should be like. Of course, the two things are not completely separated. Techniques of conducting discussion, reaching agreement, and administrative arrangements arrived at in the domestic sphere are likely to carry over into the international sphere.

I think that we have more data on the organization of representation, legislation, and administration in Soviet Russia than some of the remarks would suggest. I have been out of touch with the field of comparative government for some time, but it is my impression that some materials are available. We certainly need more work there, as Miss Mead suggested, and we may be able to get something in the near future from the Russian Institute at Columbia.

I would agree with the implications of what Harold Lasswell said.

It is my very definite impression that the Russians have not been insistent upon, and have not even proposed, any novelties in the field of international institutions—at Geneva, at San Francisco, and in connection with the operation of the United Nations. I am afraid that our difficulties lie deeper than mere institutional forms. The Russian diplomat is more bound by instructions. He is instinctively more tenacious and resistant. Of course, tenacious and resistant diplomats of other countries have been known in the past; on the other hand, one Russian diplomat at least—his fate might prove the point—behaved as a normal diplomatic representative.

I fear the trouble lies deeper. It lies in the assumptions made and not made on one side or the other. The Russians specifically seem not to assume the necessity for securing national advantage in combination with other countries, in common with other countries, rather than an exclusive competitive advantage. It lies on the level of the attitude taken toward the distribution of information; it comes up in connection with willingness or unwillingness to state one's position at any particular moment; and it lies on the level of excessive abuse of the distinction between agreement in principle and fighting on detail. On that level, below the institutional forms, there is a great deal of differentiation, and that is where we need study.

I have been struck by the repeated expression that much study of types of world institutions is needed now, or after the next war, which heaven forbid! I wonder if we are all aware of the extent to which this problem of forms, procedures, functions, personnel, and techniques of international institutions are being studied today and, moreover, are being experimented with in the various international institutions which have been created recently. I have seen a project for compilation of constitutions and rules of procedure of some twenty international institutions of recent origin. Some of them are familiar, but others are not so well known.

I am not worried so much about that problem as I am about the one to which Mrs. Wright has referred. Perhaps we should have given more attention to this problem of education, or promotion, in connection with the development of a world community.

The real trouble there is familiar once it is mentioned. We are doing a great deal in this country, but not much is being done in other parts of the world, where, I would say, not that it is more needed but that it is also needed. Especially nothing is being done on the specific point of making education on these issues available, assimilable, and comprehensible to the lower or the lower middle strata of society.

MR. ADAMS: Would it not be profitable to study the more fundamental aspects of the historical background of the different cultures, not only of Russian culture but also of oriental cultures?

A comparative study of the ethical and juristic concept of natural law, for example, would perhaps serve to produce better mutual understanding between East and West. So far as I know, extensive comparative studies of this concept are not available. A group of Protestant theologians in Chicago, under the auspices of the World Council of Churches (whose international office is in Geneva, Switzerland), has during the last five years been engaged in studying the history and significance of the idea of natural law in Western civilization. Indeed, the group has published a number of expository and critical articles on the subject in the *Journal of Religion*. In the discussions undertaken by this group, the question has repeatedly been posed as to the nature and influence of concepts of natural law prevalent in the Orient, concepts that are comparable to those familiar in the Occident and that might provide a basis of common understanding between the Orient and the Occident.

Comparative studies of ethical (and juristic) concepts that are fundamental for the West and for Russia would reveal significant similarities and contrasts between the outlooks of the West and those of Russia. Certain of the fundamental differences between Western and Middle Europe with respect to natural-law doctrine are fairly familiar. We recall, for example, Ernst Troeltsch's notable study of these contrasts in his essay, "The Ideas of Natural Law and Humanity."[1] Further comparative studies of this sort would serve as a basis for deeper mutual understanding between the different cultures, and especially between Russia and the West.

Pursuing the idea that Mrs. Wright has just mentioned, however, the Harris Foundation might profitably discuss the question as to what can be done in the area of higher education to bring about better understanding, especially with respect to the subsurface problems to which I have just referred. Certainly, courses should be presented at least in the universities to foster the kind of understanding that will enable people in the future to form judgments and develop attitudes relevant and constructive with respect to relations between West and East and between the United States and Russia. Superficial presentations of these matters today in the universities can only produce superficial attitudes among our people in the ensuing years.

1. Translated by Ernest Barker and published as an appendix to his translation of Gierke's *Natural Law and the Theory of Society* (Cambridge, 1934).

MR. WRIGHT: In reference to Mr. Adams' first point, comparative studies of concepts of natural law may possibly develop in connection with the United Nations project on fundamental human rights. So far as the West is concerned, there have been volumes, such as Lauterpacht's, which have related the present discussions of fundamental human rights to the Western concepts of natural law. UNESCO is actively pursuing the kind of studies of education to which Mr. Adams referred.

MR. MORGENTHAU: I find myself in complete agreement with what Mr. Potter has said, and especially with his remark that actually the problem lies deeper than the understanding of behavior or the examination of institutions. Let me suppose we knew everything there is to be known about the psychology of the Russians, and the Russians knew everything there is to be known about our own psychology, and both of us knew everything about the best method of coordinating conferences, about getting along with each other, and about international institutions. We would still be faced with the fundamental questions which separate us, such as who is to control China, who is to control the Dardanelles, who is to have the dominant power in Central Europe. It seems to me that in these mutual power relations lies the crux of our relations with Russia and the question of whether we are going to have war or peace.

MR. LIKERT: If we know what the Russians' objectives are, if we know what their values are, if we know what they really want, what they are willing to fight for, and what they are willing to compromise on, then we know a lot about the Politburo. That is what I mean by psychology.

MR. MORGENTHAU: Even if the Russians knew what we don't want to give up and what we are willing to, there is still a conflict if the Russians want what we don't want to give up.

MR. WRIGHT: I think there is clear evidence that both the Western countries and Russia have tried to model the United Nations upon their own institutions. From San Francisco down, the Soviet's concept of the major institutions of the United Nations has resembled their Politburo (secret conferences of representatives of the great powers), whereas there has been a continuous tendency of the Western powers to emphasize the role of the General Assembly and the creation of a world public opinion. That, I suppose, is something to be expected.

APPRAISALS OF THE CONFERENCE

MR. WRIGHT: I have asked Mrs. Benedict from Anthropology, Mr. Morris from Philosophy, Mr. Guerard from History, and Mr. Emmerich from Public Administration to give us the benefit of their observations on what have been the main achievements of these last two days of conference.

MRS. BENEDICT: The conference has been most interesting as an example of free discussion; ideas have been put forward at every point. But this has not been a conference either for planning of research or of action, and it has not been a conference in which we have been reporting on work in progress.

To me one of the great interests of the conference has been the different perspectives, different attitudes, among the people who were participating. Each is influenced by the background from which he comes and by personal experience in his own active life. There have been some who felt that a discussion of what values were supported by world institutions was a waste of time; some who said that to discuss whether or not government was responsible was almost an act of romantic piety. Some have felt that there were no mechanisms of any kind that were independent of the purposes for which they were used and that, therefore, it was necessary always to discuss the values supported by them, their character, and their quality.

This came out with extreme clarity over and over, whether the essential differences discussed were between purposes or between forms and procedures. We could never stop the discussion of any topic before it got into the qualitative field and had raised the question of the characteristics, the values, that were being furthered. Even when we were discussing responsibility and the necessity of responsible government, Dr. Marschak pointed out that one of the greatest dangers in the world had been a kind of responsibility assumed aggressively by one country over the rest of the world; it had been one of the great ways of keeping the world divided. When we were discussing communications, there was the problem of whether people are brought together or kept apart by the quality of the communications. When we were discussing world trade, we had to discuss the classic belief that world trade would bring about unification in spirit and in-

stitutions and the fact that, in the modern age, world trade has been one of the decisive factors in national antagonisms.

Especially I was interested as an anthropologist in all those discussions which I group under Mr. MacNair's question of "Who are 'we'?" The whole problem of the range of *we* and *they*, from conflict to interdependence, is one of the things that is set up with so much regularity in many of the civilized cultures that we are discussing and in primitive civilizations. In Eastern Europe it is a folk statement to say that "if *they* want it, it cannot be to our advantage"; it is a folk village statement, a folk peasant statement at all levels, and this assumption of *we-theyness* has been traditional between nations: *We* are a nation, and *they* oppose us.

The topic that was proposed to us here was in how far this conflict could be subsumed under common purposes. We know very well from all comparative studies that any we-ness that is extended—and, as Mr. Boulding pointed out, the we-ness may be very small and still be effective—has to be set up with certain expectations of avoiding pain and of being rewarded with certain satisfactions.

The problem of the development of we-ness is something that we have to feel our way toward at the present time in international relations, and it is in that special connection that it seems to me so important to consider the studies Dr. Lasswell and Dr. Likert have proposed which will take account of different qualitative actions and words that are injected into the situation. It is not only the quality of them but the timing of them that is important. The need for continuous observation, continuous quantitative and qualitative study as we go along, is of the utmost importance.

I would also add to the suggestions that Dr. Lasswell and Dr. Likert proposed my own feeling that there is a great deal to be done in the study of the fundamental premises upon which people base their intercourse and their interpersonal relations. These are inevitably used in political situations, and it is of great importance internationally that we should know those countries where fights must always precede a decision, or where a fight must be stopped before we can make a decision.

Then there is the problem of what compromise means in different countries. Compromise means strength to some and weakness to others. Nations differ in these regards, as well as different regions of the world.

It seems to me, therefore, that continued pooling of effort along

all these lines, continued emphasis upon applying research to be undertaken and upon reporting on work in progress, might be the most important outcome of our conference.

MR. GUERARD: I feel that my head is reeling. I am going home with a cultural Katzenjammer; when I emerge from that, I may do some effective analysis.

This meeting is exactly the idea that I have been working for for a good many years—the idea of a School of *Humanity*, or, if you like a Greek word, a School of *Anthropology*; the interconnection, the inseparable union of the study of all the activities of men beginning with the habitat and geography, which ought to be presented if it were only to fight against the illusions of geopolitics, and right up to religion.

In my own field, which is that of cultural history, I feel very strongly that the enlightenment may be summed up in the ideas of John Locke; there are ever so many conceptions, political and economic, that are derived from that. We have noted a number of times the word "romanticism," meaning no doubt, on the one hand, nationalism and, on the other hand, utopianism. The Manchester School, romanticism, and Marxism all belonged to the realistic period. At the present time we are romantic by culture, including neoromanticism, a great deal of Thoreau, and quite a bit of existentialism in philosophy, which may be summed up in the one formula, "Snafu." At present we have to recognize that there are many approaches.

It is good that we should come together because in all our disciplines we are speaking jargons. It is very good to get together so as to harmonize our jargons. If we speak jargon, let's speak one that we can understand among ourselves in order, for one thing, that we may make the world understand; and possibly also in order to check our own thoughts. We are very likely to become the prisoners of our own jargons. When we have invented a certain terminology, we think that we have created a new science and elaborated a solution.

A point that struck me very strongly in this discussion, besides the co-operation of many disciplines, is that our general attitude is not static; we do not accept the world as it is and say it ought to stay as it is. The best definition of status quo is the mess we are in, and we want to get away from that mess.

We had presented to us the idea of the converging of cultures. That can be attained in two different ways. We have the problem

that was raised of nature versus culture, but what if human nature were like an onion? If one layer of culture after the other is peeled, there might be nothing left. If we believe in human nature rather than in culture, the convergence would be in the past, the return to the essentials, the return to the earthly paradise. That is primitivism.

I think that idea has been abandoned at present. Our attitude is progressive. I have the idea that, if we are going back into the past to seek unity, we may stop short of that Edenic perfection and land in the country of Ur, which is sheer barbarism, and we may overshoot the mark and, instead of landing in Eden, we may land in Armageddon. The danger of going back to the past was illustrated in the romantic, and particularly the German, ideal. It has landed us in barbarism. I think there was no great difference among us in thinking that the way out is forward; that is, that we have with our ideas to arrive at a "harmonization of cultures," to start from where we are and to meet at the top, each culture being a part of the final integration.

I was very much interested, because I had, I confess, a wrong impression of anthropology, to hear Miss Mead insist so much on complexity and a rich diversity; the idea that cultures cannot be reduced to a single formula; that there can be no absolute conformity. A culture is all the richer when it is composed of elements that may even be antagonistic, that certainly are varied. We will have to give up the orthodox, dogmatic, absolutistic ideal. This is a varied world of many creeds, of many laws, and we need a traffic policeman; but we do not want to commit ourselves to a single dogma.

The consequence I evolved from that, and in which I differ from some of the members here, is that we have to give up the territorial bases of community and society, whether you call it the totalitarian or the territorial fallacy, according to which everybody who lives in a given area is supposed not merely to obey the regulations— that is inevitable—but also to have the same thoughts and to have the same feelings. It simply cannot be done. It is a form of the old thinking we got away from, the curious doctrine of *cujus regio ejus religio*, the idea that the king had the right to determine the fate of the country. We know that religious faith cannot be determined territorially. We know that a certain belief about static values cannot be determined territorially. I think that is true of all phenomena of culture; we have independent cultures that are not territorial. We have to remember that.

In order to get away from territorialism, from the idea of an absolute and enforced conformity, there are several ways. One was mentioned by Mr. McKeon; that is to say, not to abandon the idea of systematic thought, we have to have a certain degree of logic and cogency in our thought, but to abandon the idea of systems as absolute, to consider them exclusively as practical tools, as working hypotheses, and be ready to experiment, be ready to shift.

The danger with the Russians is that they have found the absolute truth, and there is no reasoning with them; but if we should adopt the same idea and say, like Mr. Hoover, that our American way of life is solidly capitalistic, we would be in as dangerous a position as they. We are, in fact, applying quite a number of Communistic practices and principles in this country just because our country is not totalitarian. We might possibly get the Russians to understand that. If, however, we emphasize the idea that "we have a system, you have a system, and never the twain shall meet," the conflict is bound to end in a fight. We must remember that all myths have aesthetic symbols, which ought not to be underrated. I think they are the essential things; but, unless they are imposed as objective truths, they cannot be imposed at all. Therefore, my idea would be to separate completely religion, including the religion that manifests itself in aesthetic forms and the religion of nationalism, from the practical business of the state.

That is why I should like to have you keep the national state and the supernational or the world state on a strictly practical level; not that they are not based on idealism, but I do not believe that idealism can be reduced to an institution. It may be a guiding impulse; it is not a rule of thought. It is perfectly possible to have a nationalism that is nonterritorial, nonlegal, nonconstitutional. I think this is what happened in the case of the Jews from the time of the Diaspora. We had there a community and we had a tradition, a consciousness, but without any formal rule. One could be a Jew and feel one's self a Jew even if one did not actually practice the religion, for Jewishness was not absolutely bound to any kind of ritual. So, if we would get away from the idea of territorial and organized and institutionalized nationalism, I think we would solve a great many of our problems.

At present the danger is in material forces placed at the service of ideas. Ideas and ideals have the right to fight; they ought not to fight on a material plane. Peace would be possible if the state were considered purely practical. Practical men don't want to fight; all prac-

tical men have come to the idea of Sir Norman Angell that war does not pay.

I don't like the mixture of sentiment and organization. You never would make me love a tax collector because he is a representative of Uncle Sam. I love Uncle Sam, but that is something different. The question of administration is quite different from the question of idealism. I believe that for a world state it is necessary that we have some kind of authority; but I believe it is not necessary that it be of the familiar pattern.

I thought many of my colleagues were thinking too much in terms of the Federalist papers, although they are very interesting at this time. We may have to have the same functions, but not in the same hierarchy; and I think at present the one central question, which is the greatest threat but also the greatest promise, is atomic power. I should like to see the idea of the world state based on that, expanding it from atomic power to scientific research in general. That is the central point. From that we would have to evolve other institutions to resemble very much institutions of the national states. Instead, however, of having authority descend from the idea of the sovereignty of one man or one group, to put at the center of the stage the idea of co-operation in scientific research. This idea is central, not because of fear but because of the value of working together for common ends.

I regret that we did not discuss more the problem of regionalism. Mr. Potter, I think, spoke of regionalism versus universalism. I don't see that there is any opposition whatever. Regionalism is a form of federalism; it is something which exists within universalism and which I do not separate in any way from universalism, but I think it is the next step that we ought to think of most definitely. I would characterize a region as the largest possible area of free communication, meaning free circulation of men, goods, and ideas, as it prevails among our states.

I believe that the immediate problem for us is the problem of Europe, which is also the problem of Russia. We cannot possibly settle the German question except within the framework of Europe. If Europe is organized, people will see what kind of Germany can exist in that Europe; and also the problem between the United States and Russia would be completely transformed if we had a Europe that would be at the same time democratic and socialistic. It would be an enormous buffer state; not a kind of buffer state that can be

kicked about all the time, but a third giant who would be able to take care of itself.

I feel there has been too much talk of *making peace*, i.e., signing treaties. Why *make* peace? We are supposed to have peace at present. Peace, after all, is part of war. Let us not have the idea of making peace as the first thing. Let's leave that behind. I wish that the United Nations would recognize that peace conferences of the kind we have had are now impossible. That is the old-fashioned idea of the separate states that remain separate. What we have to do at present is to organize for the future. Already, we have a kind of *modus vivendi*, hardly *vivendi* at all but a way of barely existing. The problem at present is not the problem of making peace but of organizing the world. I mention the possibility of a world constituent assembly. I wish that the so-called "peace conferences" would frankly turn to that; that is, looking forward, instead of liquidating the war, we should think of organizing the world.

Mr. Morris: I have been concerned these past years primarily with the problem of value, and I have looked at this conference from that perspective. I firmly believe that mankind periodically needs some comprehensive goal or way of life as a temporary stage in giving itself direction. I think that is a problem which in the long run we cannot evade and which, in fact, appears in the background of our whole discussion.

It has come up in a number of ways: in the notion that values are the center of cultures and that our psychological tests have failed to get to the value structures of persons. It has come up in the occasional reminder that we have to act in ways that do not destroy the values for which we professedly stand. If we ask ourselves, "What is the value pattern that has been the dominant, underlying background against which our discussions have taken place?" the only one which has been explicitly mentioned is that which Margaret Mead defended —valuing the dynamic integration of the different. I think we are indebted to our anthropologists in recent decades for having made the importance of that pattern clear.

It is worth while pointing out, however, that that is the dominant theme of our American tradition. I have looked through Thoreau and Whitman and Melville in recent months rather carefully from that point of view, and they all express it. It is also the dominant conviction of the philosophic tradition represented in American pragmatism. From Peirce through Dewey and Mead and Kallen we have

had a prolonged defense of philosophic pluralism. The whole idea of *E pluribus unum* is, on a national scale, the larger background of this respect for multiplicity. I think we have been, at this conference, thinking within this basic value pattern of our culture. Underneath the surface there may be considerable dissent in some members, but it has not been made vocal.

It is interesting that there has been no countervalue pattern explicitly proposed. That means that, at least as far as this group is concerned, there is no mandate to our representatives to turn America into a new Rome and to attempt to impose the uniformity of its pattern upon the world. I think it is very significant that no alternative to cultural pluralism has been offered.

I have been studying, in the last three years, the value patterns of actual individuals, trying to do on the level of the individual what the anthropologists have been doing on a cultural scale. Out of some twenty-five hundred persons who have been presented with alternative value patterns as possible directives for their lives, it is interesting that the pattern of the dynamic integration of the different is among American college students strongly preferred to any other of thirteen alternatives. The alternative of a close-knit, uniform, totalitarian society is one of the very lowest in acceptability. The psychological attitudes operating in our young strongly favor the value pattern which we have been implicitly accepting here.

It is interesting that, among various value patterns, the one that expresses sympathetic concern for other persons, a kind of analogue to Christian ethics, ranked fairly low. Yet one of the items, where the students were asked to evaluate the position that one should be concerned with the development of other persons but not at the expense of the development of one's own self, was ranked exceedingly high. In other words, the mere fact that an exclusive sympathetic concern for others is largely rejected does not mean lack of concern for others, provided it is done within a pluralistic pattern in which one retains one's own uniqueness. It shows that respect for diversity is still the strong unifying principle of our culture.

The importance of making explicit our value framework is that it helps to provide a criterion for the direction in which to move; namely, everything becomes good which advances whatever basic value pattern we accept, and everything becomes bad which opposes it. If we made our value pattern more explicit, we could answer much more sharply the question of whether a given social institution or a

given educational procedure is good in the sense that it moves in the direction of achievement of that value or bad in the sense that it frustrates it.

The one thing I have missed in these meetings is the psychiatric point of view. We talked a lot about anxiety; I think the relation between Russia and this country is in part to be conceived in terms of the problem of the causes of anxiety and the possible ways of reducing it. The fruitful suggestion has been made, but not developed fully, that perhaps we ought to stress not the head-on ideological differences but more indirect techniques concerned with the reduction of anxiety. When one is working with the psychotic or psychoneurotic in a situation of anxiety, the task is to reduce the anxiety so that the defenses the individual has erected to protect himself in that situation do not become necessary.

If we look at our international relations from a psychiatric point of view, we see that we often take steps likely to increase anxiety here and in Russia, and this in turn buttresses the protective, defensive measures in each country which increase hostility.

The problem of the reduction of anxiety seems to me to have been put somewhat in the background of our discussion, and I think it is very important in a realistic discussion of our relations to Russia to bring it to the forefront.

There was an occasional note of anxiety at our meetings. I do not think it was a dominant theme, even though there is perhaps more anxiety than was verbalized. There was a sense of urgency; but I would not say that our participants were dominated essentially by anxiety in their character structures. I think that the note of resourcefulness is still in the saddle, at least as far as we are concerned. In other words, I think we are still essentially working within the value pattern of integrated diversity, and with the confidence in our resourcefulness which has in the past characterized this culture. Whether that value pattern will continue to maintain itself under the stress of coming events is another matter. The point is that it is operating here in this conference, it is operating in our literature, it is operating in major movements of our philosophy, and it is still very strong in the attitudes of young people all over the country. It is our main ground for hope.

Mr. Emmerich: I am supposed to talk about the lines of action which suggest themselves to me, from a practical background rather than from a sociological or literary one. These suggestions may occur

to you as having nothing to do with what has been said, and, if that is so, it is not accidental.

With regard to Mr. Morris' last comment, I think there has been a good deal of frustration and anxiety exhibited here. This does not seem to me to be particularly a pathological symptom. I would suggest that there is a good deal of mental health here, because I think we have good reason to be anxious, frustrated in the fact of the predictions of the imminent extinction that abound. If we had not felt that way, I think we might have been psychotics.

My first suggestion arises out of my own special frustration, my work begins largely in the field of action, one that would be called social engineering rather than research in pure science. I have, nevertheless, become persuaded that this interdisciplinary type of conversation is of the highest value. I think it is one of the most urgently needed devices in our time. My own frustration arises out of the fact that, as the conference progressed, I knew less and less of what people were talking about. I had a slight suspicion that I was not alone in this and that others were having this difficulty. Communication, I would suggest, begins at home and needs to be improved among social scientists themselves if these interdisciplinary conferences are to have their maximum value.

As a specific way of acting on this, it occurred to me that the Social Science Research Council might be asked to investigate this matter to see if specific devices could be invented for translation. I don't know enough about it to know whether to suggest that we should have an official interpreter, the way they do at an International Congress. We should put these things in our various languages, or have the chairman submit glossaries before we come here so that we could have a point of reference. Nevertheless, in spite of those trivial suggestions, I think the problem itself is important and is somewhat alleviated by the fact that we do meet and begin to have some appreciation of the other person's vocabulary.

I think research is action, and I think thinking is action. I think we need not only interdisciplinary meetings among social scientists but increasing collaboration with physical scientists and administrators. I did not miss the military men here at all, but I did miss the physical scientists, the natural scientists. I think we have to face the fact that when we bring in the administrator, or the natural scientist, the problem of communication is not any simpler—indeed, more complex—but I think that the intense interest manifested by the physical scientists in social problems today, to whatever reason that

can be attributed, makes it very important that they be brought into the conferences of social scientists and administrators when no action is to be taken, and in the preliminary stages when these things can be discussed in a general way.

This three-way conversation or communication—social scientist, physical scientist, and administrator—is one of the most important things to encourage. As a practical corollary of that, I would say that it would be shocking to contemplate at this time any aid by government for programs in science which did not embrace all science. A proposal for a national science foundation which eliminates social or any science is to me pretty much an obsolete idea, and I hope it won't happen.

On the problem of personnel I won't go into detail but will make one general, flat statement. It seems to me more and more we have to develop both the general administrator, the man who is not just a sublimated specialist and who can handle a variety of disciplines which bear on his work and can co-ordinate a variety of specialists, and also the general social scientist, of which I know less. We also have to arrange ways in which they can meet.

In that connection a tremendous amount of work is needed on the theory of advice. How can the various disciplines be brought to bear in time on the administrator's thinking, the politician's thinking, the statesman's thinking, before he is right up against the decision? What disciplines should the public servant tap in regard to the policies he is formulating? How can he best use the advice he gets from scientific sources without abdicating to the specialist or expert where he is politically accountable? What is the best way for the administrator to organize such materials to bring them to practical use. There is a great opportunity for useful work in this area of the theory of advice.

My next recommendation goes more to the field of philosophy. I should have had Mr. McKeon's assistance on this. I find myself more pessimistic than Mr. Boulding on the prospects of economic decline in this country, more optimistic than Mr. Lasswell on the probability of averting world decimation; but it seems to me that, in order to form a world community or a world society, some kind of "as if" philosophy, if there is such a thing, is the answer. I think we have to act in these perilous days *as if* we believed that disastrous wars and paralyzing depressions can be avoided by human intelligence and by human good will and application.

I am really arguing here against intellectual defeatism or predesti-

nation on these matters. I think we must act as if the human intelligence which created instruments for productivity rather than for destructivity could redirect them into constructive avenues. I think our anxiety must not be allowed to paralyze our minds, and to prevent the organization of our intellectual and institutional resources, to which I give great weight, to control events. We must go deliberately forward as though we could win a battle.

My next suggestion is related somewhat to my remarks yesterday on the question of cultural autarchy. We should by all means strengthen and develop the institutions that we have to work with. We have to cling to them, and they include *all* international organizations, as Dr. Potter pointed out—not only those of the United Nations and its organs, and not only the specialized agencies which are directly connected with it, but all the international organizations of a governmental, intergovernmental, or private type, or combination of those.

As pointed out yesterday, there were two thousand of the private international types of organizations listed by the League of Nations before the war. I recall a statement that there were four hundred international scientific unions alone. I think we have to restore some of these organizations. I am going abroad this summer to five or six of them where we are really in the process of reconstructing organizations we had before 1939 and which the war eliminated.

The reconstruction of a lot of these private organizations is an extremely important thing today. I appreciate now better than before the types of diversity that can divide and the common properties of human nature that can connect us, but I have seen in operation the tremendous force, especially since the war, of some of these international organizations. There is a tremendous appetite for people to meet together. The desire to get together is stronger than ever where people have some interconnecting field. That may be cultural, but I don't think we should overlook the political and emotional uniting power of these organizations.

I have a specific suggestion about the United Nations. I think we should unite the United Nations. This is a very special institutional suggestion which I hope to treat in greater detail some day. I think all these specialized agencies should be located in one center. I think they would feed each other's strength; they would feed on each other's resources. We are now baffled by having them in separate centers. UNESCO is in Paris, Food is in Washington—I don't know

where Health is. We have a source of weakness also. Aside from the obvious matter of expense, there is the much more dangerous matter of jurisdictional fighting among the institutions desiring to be united. That is the greatest danger of having them separated.

I want to say one word, finally, in a special plea for UNESCO. It is very easy to feel that UNESCO is the whole show. It isn't just a side show, but I think UNESCO and the United Nations have to form a better relationship, understand each other better, or we are going to have both of their values impaired.

UNESCO has demonstrated a very particular strength. I have seen it operating in this country, where practically hundreds, if not thousands, of American voluntary groups come together because they want to hear about UNESCO. There is a concept of culture in UNESCO much wider than in the old Institute of Intellectual Cooperation before the war; it is a mass concept of culture—democratic, "grass-roots" culture—it goes to every schoolteacher and every school child in the country. It has a vast political potential if we know how to harness it correctly. The fact that the Elks, the Knights of Columbus, and the Rotary clubs show up, as well as women's clubs, at UNESCO meetings is something we cannot afford to sneer at. It evidences an enormous appetite for a new kind of citizenship in a new world community and world society. It still may be very crude, we still don't know how to handle it, and we are puzzled as to what to do with it, but it should not be brushed aside. This link between the citizen and his organizations and world bodies can be improved, and it applies not only to UNESCO. This emotional bond ought to be tied to the whole group of institutions which make up UN.

Mr. Wright: Perhaps you will all agree with me that our four reporters have all of them emphasized the feeling that toleration or relativism, recognition that differences are of degree rather than absolute, has dominated our discussions. Most of them have detected a spirit of intelligent optimism, a determination that expectations of the worst shall not frustrate our acting as if something constructive can be done. These two ideas seem to have predominated in our discussions.

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[PRINTED IN U·S·A]